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' I 
CHAMBERS Of' 
;$ttp"Ttutt Qfttttrl cf tqt ~nittb ,jhtttg 
._-aglpttgtcn. ~· Qf. 2llc?~~ 
-JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
January 18, 1972 
Dear Chief: 
This is in response to your memorandum of 
January 17 concerning rearguments. 
I norninate for reargument the two abortion 
cases, No. 70-18, Roe v. Wad~ and No. 70-40, Doe 
v. Bolton. It seems to me that the importance of the 
issues is such. that the cases merit full bench treatment. 
I think another candidate is No. 70-58, Fein v. 
Selective Service System. 
So far as your nominations are concerned, my 
reaction is that No. 70-45, United States v. Brewster, 
because of its fundamental importance and precedent, 
deserves reargument, and that No. 70-5061, Kirby v. 
Illinois, should also be reconsidered. Justice White 1 s 
separate concurrence certainly so indicates. 
In surnrnary, I vote to set down for reargument 
Nos. 70-18 and 70-40, No. 70-45 and No. 70-5061. I 
shall abide by the Conference 1 s reaction as to No. 70-58. 
Sincerely, 
I v. ;;r. ---
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.:§u.pum t <!fourt of t~t ~trittb- ~bU~t:f 
~nslpughm. W. <!f. 2ll.;tJl·;J 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CO 
Herewith is a £" 
case. 
existence of issues o 
I think that this would be all that is necessary for 
d isposition of the case, and that we need not get into the 
more co1nplex Ninth Amendment issue. This may or may 
not appeal to you. 
In any event, I am still flexible as to results, and 
I shall do my best to arrive at something which would com-
mand a court. Would it be advisable, rather than having 
numerous concurring and dissenting opinions immediately 
1 written, to have each of you express his general views in J o rder to see if we can come together on something? fj 
The Georgia case, yet to come, is more complex. 
I am still tentatively of the view, as I have been all along, 
that the Geor ia case merits rear ument b ~£ a 
bench. I shall try to pro uce something, however, so that 
we may look at it before any decision as to that is made. 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
1st DRAFT 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Powell!./"' 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA~Blackmun, ~~ I 
Circulated: $(/~ 2,:) 
No. 70--18 
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On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for 
the Northern District of 
Texas. 
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Memorandum of MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN. 
Under constitutional attack here are abortion laws 
of the State of Texas.1 2A Texas Penal Code, Arts. 
1 "Article 1191. Abortion 
"If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman 
or knowingly procure to be administered with her consent any drug-
or medicine, or shall usc towards her any violence or means what-
ever externally or internally applied, and thereby procure an abor-
tion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor 
more than five years; if it be done without her consent, the punish-
ment shall be doubled. By 'abortion' is meant that the life of the 
fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman's womb or that a 
premature birth thereof be caused. 
"Art. 1192. Furnishing the means 
".Whoever furnishes the means for procuring an abortion knowing 
the purpose intended is guilty as an accomplice. 
"Art. 1193. Attempt at abortion 
"If the means used shall fail to produce an abortion, the offender 
is nevertheless guilty· of an attempt to produce abortion, provided 
it be shown that such means were calculated to produce that result, 
and shall be fined not less than one hundred nor more than one· 
1 housand dollar~. 
"Art. 1194. Murder in producing abortion 
"If the death of the mother is occasioned by an abortion so pro-
duced or by an attempt to effect the same it is murder. 
"Art. 1196. By medical advice 
"Nothing in this chapter applies to an abortion procured or at-
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1191-1194 and 1196 (1961). These statutes make it 
a crime to "procure an abortion," as therein defined, or 
to attempt one, except w1th respect to "a.n abortion 
procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose 
of saving the life of the mother." 
I 
Jane Roe/ a single woman residing in Dallas County, 
Texa.s, in March 1970 instituted this federal suit against 
the District Attorney of the county. The plaintiff 
sought (1) a declaratory judgment that the Texas abor-
tion laws are unconstitutional on their face and (2) an 
injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the 
challenged statutes. 
Roe alleged that she was 11nmarried and pregnant; 
that she wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abor-
tion "performed by a competent, licensed physician, 
under safe, clinical conditions"; that her life did not 
:;.r>pear to be threatened by the qgntjpnation of her 
pregnancy; and that she could not afford to travel to 
another jurisdiction in order to secure there a legal 
abortion under safe conditions. By an a.mendmen t to 
her complaint, Ror purported to sue "on behalf of herself 
and all other women" similarly situated. She claimed 
a deprival of rights protected by the First, Fourth. Fifth, 
Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
tempte-d by mrdirnl nch·icr for the purpo:<C' of ~n1 · iu~ tlw lifp of thr 
mother." 
"'"'Tlie fore-going Article~. togrthN with Art. 1 Hl5 , eompri"r C'haptrr· 
9 of Title 15 of the- Penal Code. Artirlc 1195, not :1ttarkrd here, 
reads : 
"Art. 195. Destroying unborn child 
"Whoever shnll during parturition of the mother destroy the· 
vitality or life in a child in 11 state of being born and before actual 
birth, which child would otherwise have been born alive, shall be 
confined in the penitentiary for life or for not less than five years."' 
2 The name is a pseudonym . 
.. . ... 
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James Hubert Hallford, a physician licensed under 
Texas law, sought, and was granted, leave to intervene 
in the Roe suit. In his complaint in intervention the 
doctor specified types of conditions he saw in preg-
nant women "·ho came to him as patients. 
John and Mary Doc," a married couple, filed a com-
panion complaint to that of Roe. This also names the 
District Attorney as defendant, claimed like constitutional 
deprivations, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. 
The Does alleged tha.t they were a childless couple; 
that Mrs. Doc was suffering from a "neural-chenucal" 
disorder; that her physician had "advised her to avoid 
pregnancy until such time as her condition was mate-
rially improved, although a pregnancy at the :present 
time would not present a serious risk" to her life; that 
pursuant to medical advice she had discontinued use 
of birth control pills; and that if she should become 
prcgnau t, she would want to terminate the pregnancy 
by an abortion performed by a competent, licensed ) 
physician under safe, clinical conditions. By an amend-
ment to their complaint, the Docs purported to sue 
"on behalf of themselves and all couples similarly 
situated." 
The two actions were consolidated and heard together 
by a duly convened three-judge district court. The suits 
thus presented the situations of the pregnant single 
woman, the childless a.nd nonpregnant married couple, 
and the licensed practicing physician, all joining in the 
attack upon the Texas abortion Jaws. Upon the filing 
of affidavits, motions were made to dismiss and for sum-
mary judgment. The court found that Roe and Dr. 
Hallford, and members of their respective classes, had 
standing, but that the Does had failed to allege facts 
sufficient to state a present controversy and therefore 
3 These names also are pseudonyms. 
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did not have standing. It concluded that, on the de-
claratory judgment request, abstention 'vas not war-
ranted; that the "fundamental rjght of singlg \Vomen 
and married persons to choose whether to · 
t 1e I mth Amendment through 
rteen Am n m "; that the Texas abortion 
laws were void on their face because they were both over--broad and va.gue; and that abstention was warranted 
with respect to the request for an injunction. The court 
then dismissed the Doe complaint, declared the abortion 
laws void, and dismissed the application for an in junc-
tion. 314 F. Supp. 1217 (ND Tex. 1970). 
The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor, pur-
suant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253, appealed to this Court from 
that art of the District Cou · ' · ment · · 1-
JUnctive relie . The defendant District Attorney filed 
a notice of appeal, pursuant to the same statute, from 
t he V1stnct Court's grant of declaratory relief to Toe 
and Dr. Hallford. Both s1des also have taken protec-
tive appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit; that court ordered those appeals held 
in abeyance pending decision here. 
We postponed the decision on jurisdiction to the hear-
ing on the merits. 402 U.S. 941 (1971). -II -
It might have been preferable if the defendant, pur-
suant to our Rule 20, had presented to us a petition 
for certiorari before judgment in the Court of Appeals 
with respect to the granting, adverse to him, of de-
claratory relief. Furthermore, we are aware that, under 
Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427 (1970), and Gunn v. 
University Committee, 399 U. S. 383 (1970), § 1253 
does not authorize an a) )eal to this Court from the 
grant or t 1e enia.l of declaratory relief a one. e con-
clude, nevertheless, that those decisions do not prevent 
70-18-MEl\10 
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our review of both the injunctive and the declaratory 
aspects of a case of this kind when it is properly here, 
as this one is, on appeal under § 1253 from specific denial 
of injunctive relief, and the arguments as to both aspects 
are necessarily identical. See Carter v. Jury Commis-
sion, 396 U. S. 320 (1970), and Florida Lime and Avo-
cado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73, 80-8~1 
(1960). It would be destructive of time and energy for· 
all concerned were we to rule otherwise. 
III 
We are next confronted with issues of justiciability1 
standing and abstention. Do Roe and tfie Does have 
that "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy," 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 ( 1962), that insures 
that "the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be pre-
sented in an adversary context and in a form historically 
viewed as capable of judicial resolution," Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968), and Sierra Club v. Morton,-
U. S. - ( 1972)? And what effect does the pendency 
of criminal charges against Dr. Hallford in state court~ 
for violating the same Texas abortion laws, have upon 
the propriety of the federal court's granting relief tO> 
him as a plaintiff-intervenor? 
A. Jane Roe. Despite the use of the pseudonym, it 
is not suggested that Roe is a fictitious person. For-
purposes of her case, we accept as true her existence, 
her pregnant state as of the time of the inception of 
her suit in March 1970 and as late as May 21 of that 
year when she filed an alias affidavit with the District 
Court, and her inability to secure a legal abortion in 
Texas. 
Viewing Roe's case as of the time of its filing and 
as late as May 21, there can be little dispute that it 
then presented a case or controversy and that, wholly 
apart 1rom the class aspects, she, as a pregnant single· 
70-18-l\IEl\'IO 
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woman thwarted by the State's abortion laws, had stand-
ing to challenp;e them. Indeed, we do not read the 
appeUee's brief as reallY asserting anything to the con-
trary. The "logical nexus between the status a&'lerted 
and the claim sought to be adjudicated," Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U. S., at 102, and the necessary degree of conten-
tiousness, Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103 (1969), are 
both present. 
The appellee notes, however, that the record docs not 
disclose that Roe was pregnant at the time of the Dis-
trict Court hearing on May 22, 1970,'' or on June 17 
when the court's opinion and judgment were filed. He 
therefore suggests that Roe's case is now mooJ.bccause 
she and all others like her are no longer subject to any 
1970 pregnancy. 
The usual rule in federal cases is that the existence 
at all stages of 
t 1e action is initiated. mle tales v. Munsingwear, 
l nc., 34o 0. §. 36, 39-41 (1050); Golden v. Zwickler, 
394 U. S., at 108; SEC v. Medical Committee for Human 
Rights, 404 U. S. 403, 405 (1972). But if, as here. 
pregnancy is a significant fact in litigation , the 266-day 
huma.n gestation period is so short that the pregnancy 
will have terminated before the usual a) ellate )rocess 
1s com 1at ternunat10n makes a case moot, 
pregnancy litigation seldom, if ever, will survive beyond \ 
the trial stage. if then, and appellate review will be· 
effectively denied. Our law is not that ng1cl . P reg::" 
nancy often comes more than once to the same woman 
'The apprllrr'~ brirf, p. 18, twirr ~ tatr~ that thr hraring; brforc-
the District CourL was held on .July 22. 1970. Thr docket entries, 
Appendix 2, and the transcript. Apprndix 76, di sclo~c this to be an 
rrror. The July datr apparrntly is the time of the reporter's tran-
Rrription . Appendix 77. 
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and in the general population, if man is to survive, it 
is always with us. 
Pregnancy provides almost a classic justification for 
a ~onclusion of nonmootness. Otherwise, it is "capable 
of repetition, yet evading review." See Southern Pacific 
Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comrm'ssion, 219 
U. S. 498, 515 (1911); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814, 
816 (1969); Carroll v. President and Commissioners, 
393 U. S. 175, 178-179 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 
392 U. S. 40. 50-53 (1968); United Stales v. W. 1'. 
Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 632-633 (1953). 
We therefore agree with the District Court that Jane 6) ~ 
ll2_e had standing to undertake this litigation and that 
the terminatiOn of her 1970 pregnancy did not render @ ~ 
the case moot. 
B. Dr. Hallford. The doctor's position is differ<'nt 
from that of Roc and from that of the Docs. He came 
into Roe's litigation as a plaintiff-intervenor a.lleging 
m his complaint that he: 
"in the past has been arrested for violating the 
Texas Abortion Laws and at the present time stands 
charged by indictment with violating said laws in 
the Criminal District Court of Dallas County, 
Texas to-wit: (1) The State of Texas vs. James H. 
Hallford. No. C-69-5307-IH, and (2) The State 
of Texas vs. James H. Hallford, No. C-69-2524-H. 
In both cases the defendant is charged with 
abortion .... " 
In his immediately preceding application for leave to 
intervene the doctor made like representations as to 
the abortion charges pending in the state court. These 
representations were also repeated in the affidavit he 
executed and filed in support of his motion for sum-
mary judgment. 
70-18-MEMO 
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Dr. Hallford is therefore in the situation of seeking, 
in a federal court, declaratory and injunctive relief with 
respect to the same state statutes under which he is 
charged in crimt 1al prosecutions simultaneously pend-
ITig m state court. Although he stated that he has 
been arrested m tile past for violating the State's abor-
tion laws, he makes no allegation of any extraordinarx,. 
circumstance, where the danger of irreparable loss is 
great and immediate in posin a thre': an federi lly 
pro ecte ng , a cannot be eliminated by his e-
fense against the state prosecutions! Ne1ther IS t here 
any allegation of harassment or bad faith prosecution. 
He seeks now, for purposes of standing, to draw a dis-
tinction between ~din~_prosecutio3 and ~bl~ 0.::, 
ture ones. We see no merit in that distinction. Under ........._ 
the circumstances, therefore, our decision last Term in 
Samuels v. Macken, 401 U. S. 66 (1971), compels the 
conclusion that the District Court erred when it granted 
declaratory relief to Dr. Hallford and failed to refrain 
from doing so. The court, of course, was correct in 
refusing to grant injunctive relief to the doctor; the 
reasons supportive of that action, however, are those 
expressed in Samuels v. M acl~ell, supra, and in Younger 
v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 
U. S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82 (1971); 
and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U. S. 216 ( 1971). See also 
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 (1965). We note, 
in passing, that Younger and its companion cases were de-
cided after the three-judge District Court's decision here. 
Dr. Hallford's complaint in intervention, therefore, is 
to be dismissed." He is remitted to his defenses in 
G We need not consider what different result, if any, would follow 
if Dr. Hallford';; intervention were on behalf of a class. His com-
plaint in intervention does not purport to assert a class suit and 
makes no reference to any class apart from an allegation that he 
"and others similarly situated" must necessarily guess at the mean-
70-18-MEMO 
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the state cr·iminal proceedings against him. We there-
fore reverse the judgment of the District Court to the 
extent that it granted Dr. Hallford relief and failed to 
dismiss his complaint in intervention. 
C. The Does. In view of our ruling as to Roe's 
standing in her case, the issue of the Does' standing in 
their case has little significance. The claims they assert 
ltfe essentially the same as those of Roe, and the statutes 
they attack are the same. Nevertheless, we briefly refer 
to the Docs' posture. 
Their pleadings present them as a childless married 
couple, the female not being pregnant, who have no 
desire to have children at this time because of their 
having received medical advice that Mrs. Doe should 
avoid pregnancy, and for "other highly personal reasons."· 
But they "fear ... they may face the prospect of be-
coming parents." And if pregnancy ensues, they "would 
want to terminate" it by an abortion. They then assert 
the inability to obtain an abortion legally in Texas 
and, consequently, their facing the alternatives of an 
illegal abortion there or of going outside Texas to some-
place where the procedure could be obtained legally 
and competently. 
We thus have a married couple as plaintiffs who have, 
as their asserted immediate and present injur , only an 
alleged "detrimental effect upon t 1eir marital hap-
piness' because they are forced to 11 the choice of re-
fraining from normat sexual relab ons or of endangermg -
ing of Art . 1196. His application for leave to intervene goes a little 
further for it asserts that plnintifT Roc does not adequat ely protect 
the interest of tho doctor "and the class of people who arc physi-
cians . . . and tho class of people who are . . . patients . . . ." 
The leave application, however, is not the complaint. Despite the 
District Court' statement to the cont rary, 314 F. Supp., at 1225, 
we fail to perceive tho bare cs;;entials of a class suit in the Hallford 
complaint. 
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Mary Doe's health throu h a )Ossible pregnancy." But 
1ey are a couple who, m t 1e uture, mig t evelop a 
condition on Mrs. Doc's part brought about by future 
intercourse and the future failure of those cont'Nic'eP-
tive measures they feel they might safely employ, and 
\\·ho thereupon, at that time in the future, might want 
an abortion that might then be unavailable to them 
legally under the Texas statute. 
This very phrasing of the Doe's position reveals the 
speculative basj§ of their a1leged injury. It is well 
settled in Texas that Mrs. Doe JJJay ugt he a prjpcjpll.l 
or· an accom 1lice under Art. 1191 with respect to any 
a ortion upon her allC thus is not hereelf subject to 
prosecution under t xas abor ion laws. Watson v. 
tate, fl Tex. App. 237, 244-245 (1880); Moore v. State, 
37 Tex. Cr. Rep. 552, 561, 40 S. W. 287, 290 (1897); 
Shaw v. Slate, 73 Tex. Cr. Rep. 337, 339, 165 S. W. 930, 
931 (1914); Fondren v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. Rep. 552, 557, 
169 S. W. 411, 414 (1914); Gray v. State, 77 Tex. Cr. 
Rep. 221, 229, 178 S. W. 337, 341 (1915)." And their 
alleged injury rests on possible future contraceptive 
failure, possible future pregnancy, possible future un-
preparedness for parenthood, and possible future im-· 
pairment of h . Any one or more of these several 
possi 1 Ities may not take place and all may not com-
bine. Theee possibilitie . in the Docs' rstimation mi ht 
have some rea or 1magmec Impact upon t 1eir marita ..... 
G There is no immunit~· in Trxas for thr fathrr who is not mar-
rird to thr mother. Ilarnmett v. State, 84 Trx. Cr. Rrp. G~5, 209 
S. E. 661 (19H)). But wr h:wr found no ca~r 1 hat drtrrminrs the 
iHsue as to the husband of the ahortrd mot hrr. Since the :1ppell:mts 
do not claim or drmonstratc that the statutr h:~s brcn u~rd .1gainst 
husbands, and sinrr prosrcution i~ drprnclrnt upon thr further-
contingency that 1\lr:;. Doc's hu~bancl aid in obtaining an abortion, 
if one becomrs ncer~~:try or drsirable, we conrludr that Doc's status 
in this case is not materially different from his wife'~. 
70-18-i\lEMO 
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ha) )ines . But we are ngt menprqd tg ssy that the 
are aile ation of so indirect an injur is sufficient for 
t 1eir case to present an actua case or controversy. We 
conclude, as a consequence, that they have no standing 
to pursue the lawsuit they have initiated. Golden v. 
Zwtckler, supra, 394 U. S., at 109-110 (1969); Younger 
v. Harris, 401 U. S., at 41- 42. Their purported case 
falls far short factually of those resolved otherwise in 
the cases, Investment Company InsWute v. Camp, 401 
U. S. 617 (1971), Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 
U. S. 150 (1970), and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 
97 ( 1968), that the Does urge upon us. 
The Does, therefore, are not appropriate plaintiffs in 
this litigation. Their complaint was properly dismissed 
by the District Court and we affirm that dismissal. 
IV 
vVe turn to the merits. The Texas abortion laws are 
not new. They a~ed in essentially their present 
form as Arts. 1071-1076 of Texas Revised Criminal 
Statutes, 1911. And they read substantially the same 
as Arts. 536-M1 of Revised Statut0s of Texas. 1879, ~ L 
and as Arts. 2192-2197 of Paschal's Laws of Texas,i86'6. I~ Y 
The final article in each of these compilations made / 
reference, as does the present Art. 1196, to "medical 
advice for the pumofe of saviug the life of the mother.11 
A. Long ago a suggestion apparently was made that 
the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague because 
of definitional deficiencies. The Texas Court of Crim-
inal Appeals had little difficulty with that suggestion 
for it disposed of it peremptorily: 
"It is also insisted in the motion in arrest of 
.i udgmen t that the statute is unconstitutional and 
void in that it does not sufficiently define or describe 
the offense of abortion. We do not concur [with 
12 
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counsel] in respect to this question." Jackson v. 
State, 55 Tex. Cr. Rep. 79, 89; 115 S. W. 262, 268 
( 1908). 
\Ve are advised, however, that the same court, on 
November 2, 1971, in Thompson v. §taf:E, No. 44.071, 
an opinion apparently not yet published, held, against_ 
constitutional challeng,e, that the Texas abortion laws 
are not vague or oyerbroad. The copy of the opinion 
with which we have been furnished indicates that the 
court held "that the State of Texas has a compelling. 
interest to protect fetal ljfe"; that Art. 1191 "is designed 
to protect fetal life," citing Mayberry v. State, 271 S. W. 
2d 635 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954); that the Texas homicide 
statutes, particularly 2A Texas Penal Code Art. 1205, 
are intended to protect a persou "in existence by actual 
birth" and thereby implicitly recognize other human 
life that is not "in existence by actual birth"; that the 
definition of huma.p ljfe js for the legislature and not 
the courts; that Art. 1196 "is more definjte tha.n the 
District of Columbja statpt.e ppheld jn Vuitch"; and 
that the Texas statute "is not vague and indefinite or 
overbroad." A physician's abortion conviction was 
therefore affirmed.7 The Thompson case thus appears 
to be a flat and recent holding by the Texas court that 
the State's abortion laws are not unconstitutional for) 
vagueness. 
Elsewhere, decisions on constitutional challenges, on 
various grounds, to other state abortion statutes do not 
appear to be fully consistent. See Babbitz v. McCann, 
310 F. Supp. 293, 297-298 (ED Wis. 1970), appeal -dismissed, 400 U. S. 1 (1970); Rosen v. Louis'iana State 
7 In a footnote the Texas court observed that any issne as to the 
burden of proof under the exemption of Art. 1196 "is not before us." 
See Veever.s v. State, 354 S. W. 2d 161, 166 (Tex. Cr. App. 1962) . 
Cf. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 69-71 (1971). 
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Board of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (ED 
La. 1970), appeal pending; Steinberg v. Brown, 321 
F. Supp. 741 (ND Ohio 1970); Doe v. Scott, 321 
F. Supp. 1385 (ND Ill. 1971), appeal pending; Corkey 
Y. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (WDNC 1971), appeal 
pending; DO'e v. Rampton , - F. Supp. - (Utah 
1971), appeal pending; People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 
458 P. 2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970) .. 
B. Last Term, irt.. .. Pnited States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 
62 ( 1971), decided iller the District Court's ruling in 
the present cases was handed down, we had under con-
sideration a District of Columbia statute that made 
the procuring of an abortion a crime unless it "were 
done as necessary for the preservation of the mother's 
life or health and under the direction of a competent 
licensed practitioner of medicine." The District Court 
had dismissed a physician's indictment under that statute 
on the ground that it was unconstitutionally vague. 
This Court reversed that dismissal and remanded the-
case. MR. JusTICE DouGLAS was of the view that the 
statute failed to meet the requirements of procedural 
due process', 402 U. S., at 74, and dissented in part. Mrr. 
JusTICE 8'l'EWAR'l', also dissenting in part, 402 U. S., at 96, 
was of the opinion that a "competent licensed prac-
titioner of medicine" was wholly immune from being· 
charged with the commission of a criminal offense under 
the District of Columbia statute. 
The vagueness claim in V uitch focused only on the 
word "health" in the District statute and on its appli-
cation to mental as well as to physical well-being. The· 
Texas statute, Art. 1196, with which we are here con-
cerned, exempts from criminal abortion, described in 
Art. 1191, only an abortion procured "by medical advice 
for the purpose of saving the life of the mother." No -reference whatsoever is made to heal.th. Saving the 
mother's life is the sole standard. Vuilch's analysis 'ms 
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that the word "health" in the statute was employed 
in accord with eneral usa e and modern understandin 
an me u eel psychological as well as physical well-
being, and thus presented no problem of vagueness, be-
cause fhis "is a 'ud ment that )h sicians are obvious] 
called upon to make routinel~" 402 U. S. , at 72, an 
1s of little assistance here. erta.inly it provides no 
answer to the constitutional challenge to the Texas 
statute. 
C. \V e are not here concerned "·ith broad areas of 
medical judgment as to health generally. We are con-
cerned, in contrast, with a proccclme that is exempt from 
criminalit onl if it is "for the )Ur )Ose of sa.vin the 
1 eo the mother," So viewe(, we encounter 1 cultws 
of great consequence under the vagueness challenge. 
The exempting Art. 1196, of course, has application 
only to one rendering "medical advice." Although even 
this is by no means certain or clear, we assume, for pur-
poses of simplifying the issue, that this protective pro-
vision is available only to the licensed physician, and is 
not available to the unlicensed physician or particularly 
to the nonphysicia.n who would procure the abortion 
under the guise of rendering "medical advice." whatever 
that may mean as applied to him. But what does the 
statute say even for the licensed )h sician? 
t 1ere IS a. mere possibilit~ t 1a.t s 1e w1 not survive? So 
far as we can determine, C1e Texas courts have not limited r!\ 
the statute and have only repeated its phrasing. See ~ 
Ex parte Viele, 292 S. W. 889, 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1927). Further, who is to exercise that judgment-the 
physician alone in the light of his training and experi-
ence, or a. group or committee of his peers, or a medical 
association, or a. hospital review committee? And when 
is the saving of a life to be measured in the time scale? 
70-18---MEMO 
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Must death be jmmjpenq Or is it enough if life is 
prolonged for a year, a month. a few clays, overnight? 
Is a mother's life "saved" if a post-rape or post-incest or 
"fourteenth-child" abortion preserves, or tends to pre-
serve, her mental health? If the procedure is generally 
favorable to the mother's health, is her life thereby 
'~" within the meaning of the statute? One's well-
being and the very continuance of life depends some-
times on slender differences in medical treatment, in body 
chemistry, in exposure to infection, and in medical 
knowledge. 
The applicable standard is whether the statute is "so 
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at Its meanin and differ a to its a lie · 1 " 
onnally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 
(1926); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 , 616 (1968), 
or, phrased another way: 
"It is established that a law fails to meet the re-
quirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so 
vague and ~dardless that it leaves the public 
uncertain as to the c~duct it prohibits or leaves 
judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally 
fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not 
in each particular case." Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 
382 U. S. 399, 402-403 (1966). 
We conclude that Art. 1196, with its sole criterion for 
exemption as "saving the life of the mother," is insuf-
ficiently informative to the physician to ";,hom it pur-
ports to afford a measure of professional protection but 
who must measure its indefinite meanin at the risk of 
his liberty, and that the sta ute cannot withstan con-
~ 1 
stltui wnal challenge on vagueness grounds. 
v 
This conclusion that Art. 1196 is unconstitutionally 
vague means, of course, that the Texas abortion laws, 
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as a unit, must fall. The medical exception of Art. 1196 
does not go out alone for then the State would be left 
with a statute proscribing all abortion procedures no 
matter how medically urgent the cause. Then, too, the 
physician's professional obligation and duty would be 
improperly thwarted. 
Our holding toda4 does not imply that a State has no 
legitimate interest m the subject of abortions or that 
abortion procedures may not be sub
1
ected to control b 
1e 1e nu o e matter is the appropriate-
ness of the control when criminal sanctions are imposed. 
We do not accept the argument of the appellants and 
of som h 
VI 
Although the District Court granted plaintiff Roe and 
intervenor Hallford declaratory relief, it stopped short 
of issuing an injunction against enforcement of the Texas 
abortion laws. The Court has recognized that different 
considerations enter into a federal court's determination 
of declaratory relief, on the one hand, and injunctive 
relief, on the other. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 
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252-255 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479· 
(1965). We are not dealing here with a statute that, 
on its face, appears to abridge free expression, an area 
of particular concern under Dombrowski and refined in 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S., at 50. 
We find it unnecessar to decide wheth 
Cour erred m withholding injunctive relief for we as-· 
sume that the Texas prosecutorial authorities will 1ve 
u ere ence to t e eClslOn o this Court relative to the 
constitutional inya.l jdjty gf the Texas abortion laws. 
The judgment of the District Court as to intervenor· 
Hallford is reversed and Dr. Hallford's complaint in in-
tervention is dismissed. In all other respects, the judg-
ment of the District Court is affirmed. Costs are allowed 
to the appellee. 
MR. JusTICE PowELL and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST 
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case~ 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Dougla::3 
Mr. Justice Br ennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr . Justice Marshall 
Mr . Justice Blackmun 
~ Justice Powell 
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Er . Justice Rehnquist 
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MR. JuSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
I dissent from the Court's decision that the Texas 
abortion statute, which allows abortions only when they 
arc "procured or attempted by medical advice for the 
purpose of saving the life of the mother," 2A Texas Penal 
Code Art. 1196, is unconstitutionally vague. 
This decision nccessaril overrules United States v. 
Vuitch, 402 . 62 ( 1971), decidec only last Term, 
which upheld against vagueness attack D. C. Code Ann. 
§ 22-201 which allowed abortion only when "necessary 
for the preservation of the mother's life or health and 
under the direction of a competent licensed practitioner 
of medicine." In that case, a district court had dis-
missed an indictment on the ground that the statutory 
standard was unconstitutionally vague, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 
and the Government appealed directly to this Court, 
v,·hich reversed the District Court's decision. The vague-
ness disgussion in Vuitch did not, as the majority assert§. 
"focus ... only on the word 'health,' " although the 
greater part of the discussion in this Court's opinion and 
in that of the District Court was devoted to parsing that 
phrase. The lower court had treated the statutory stand-
ard as the "preservation-of-life-or-health standard," 305 
F. Supp., at 1035, as did this Court, 402 U. S., at 70, 71. 
Furthermore, the decision that the "preservation-of-life" 
standard is not impermissibly vague was a necessary part 
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of the Court's holding, since it would otherwise have been 
forced to affirm the District Court's decision voiding the 
statute, des )ite the fact that it had overruled that court's 
decision re arc Ill the va ucne o the ")rescrvatwn-
o -1calth" standard. Instead, the Court upheld the 
D. C. statute in its entirety. 
If called upon to reconsider this Court's decision in 
Vuitch, I would reaffirm it and would not, therefore, 
void the Texas statute on vagueness grounds. If a 
standard which refers to the "health" of the mother, a 
referent which necessarily entails the resolution of per-
plexing questions about the interrelationship of physical, 
emotional, and mental "·ell-being. is not impermissibly 
vague, a statutory standard \\'hich focuses only on "saving 
the life" of the mother ,,·oulcl appear to be a fortiori 
acceptable. The Court's observation that "whether a 
particular operation is necessary for a patient's physical 
or mental health is a judgment that physicians arc ob-
viously called upon to make routinely \Yhcncver surgery 
is considered," 402 U. S., at 72 (footnote omitted), is 
particuarly applicable to medical decisions as to when 
the life of a mother is endangered, since the relevant 
factors in the latter situation arc less numerous and are 
primarily physiological. 
Finally, the vagueness claim is not properly presented 
in appellant Roc's attack on the Texas statute. There 
is no question that Art. 1196 docs not authorize abor-
tions-by-request and that it instead articulates a stand-
ard which a woman seeking an aoortion would recognize 
as relevant to her case. Any Texas doctor would simi-
larly realize that an abortion could not be performed 
unless the requirements of Art. 1H)6, whatever they might 
be, were met. On its face, therefore, the statute divides 
women seeking abortions into two classes: those who 
make some claim that an abortion is necessary to save 
their life and those '"ho do not. Assuming that the stat-
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utory standard is impermissibly vague, confusion and 
uncertainty will be created among women in the former 
group. Appellant Roc, however, falls into the latter 
group, since her complaint asserts that she desires an 
abortion "[b 1 ecause of the economic hardships and social 
stigmas involved in bearing an illegitimate child." and 
admits that her "life does not appear to be threatened by 
the continuation of her pregnancy." (R., at 11.) Indeed, 
appellant Roe argues at length that the right to terminate 
an unwanted pregnancy, for whatever reason, is an inte-
gral part of constitutionally protected rights of privacy. 
(Brief of Appellants, at 99-109.) For such women, who 
make no claim that an abortion is necessary for the pur-
pose of saving their life, the possible vagueness of the 
statutory standard is irrelevant since, however, the class 
of " ·omen is defined who qualify for an abortion becatise 
their life is somehow endangered, they are ipso facto 
outside of this class. "Th.c underlying principle [of the 
void for vagueness doctrine] is that no man shall be held 
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not 
reasonably understand to be proscribed." United States 
v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617 (1954). Sec also: United 
States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U. S. 29, 32-33 
(1963); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951); 
United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, 7 ( 1947). What- t 
ever merit appellant's Ninth Amendment and related 
claims may have, it cannot be rationally contended that 
it is not perfectly apparent that the abortion she desires 
is clearly prohibited by the Texas statute. This is not 
a case involving "the transcendent value to all society 
of constitutionally protected expression," Gooding v. Wil-
son, 405 U.S.-, - (1972), in which appellant might 
have standing to attack the possible infirmity of the stat-
ute as applied to members of another class. Cf. Baggett 
v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 366 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 
371 u.s. 415, 433 (1963). 
"" -
f 
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Mr. Justice Dougla::~ 
Mr. Just i ce Brennan 
Mr. .Jus t i ce Stewart 
Mr . Justice Marshall 
M:r . Justice Blackmun 
vM'f'. .Justice Powell 
I · •. , Justice Rehnquist J.. -~ • 
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R'8c i rculated: 
Jane Roe et al., Appellants, On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for 
the Northern District of 
v. 
Henry 1V ad c. Texas. 
[May - , 1972] 
MR. JusTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
I dissent from the Court's decision that the Texas 
abortion statute, ·which allows abortions only 'vhcn they 
arc "procured or attempted by medical advice for the 
purpose of saving the life of the mother," 2A Texas Penal 
Code Art. 1196, is unconstitutionally vague. 
This decision necessarily overrules United States v. 
Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971), decided only last Term, 
which upheld against vagueness attack D. C. Code Ann. 
§ 22- 201 which allmYecl abortion only when "necessary 
for the preservation o£ the mother's life or health and 
under the direction of a competent licensed practitioner 
of medicine." In that case, a district court had dis-
missed an indictment on the ground that the statutory 
standard was unconstitutionally vague, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 
and the Government appealed directly to this Court, 
which reversed the District Court's decision. The vague-
ness discussion in Vuitch did not, as the majority asserts, 
"focus . . . only on the word 'health,' " although the 
greater part of the discussion in this Court's opinion and 
in that of the District Court was devoted to parsing that 
phrase. The lower court had treated the statutory stand-
ard as the "preservation-of-life-or-health standard," 305 
F. Supp., at 1035, as did this Court, 402 U. S., at 70, 71. 
Furthermore, the decision that the "preservation-of-life" 
standard is not impermissibly vague was a necessary part 
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of the Court's holding, since it would otherwise have been 
forced to affirm the District Court's decision voiding the 
statute, d0spite the fact that it had overruled that court's 
decision regarding the vagueness of the "preservation-
of-health" standarcl. Instead, the Court upheld the 
D. C. statute in its entirety. 
If called upon to reconsider this Court's decision in 
1'uitch, I would reaffirm it and would not, therefore, 
void the Texas statute on vagueness grounds. If a 
standard \Yhirh refers to the "health" of the mother, a 
referent which necessarily entails the resolution of per-
plexing questions about the interrelationship of physical, 
emotional, and mental \Yell-being. is not impermissibly 
vague, a statutory standard ,,·hich focuses only on "saving 
the life" of the mother "·oulcl appear to be a forl'iori 
acceptable. The Court's observation that ''\d1cthcr a 
particular operation is necessary for a patient's phyf"ical 
or mental lwalth is a judgment that physicians arc ob-
viously called upon to make routinely whenever surgery 
is considered," 402 U. S., at 72 (footnote omitted) , is 
particuarly applicable to medical decisions as to when 
the life of a mother is endangered, since the relevant 
factors in the latter situatioll arc less numerous and aro 
primarily physiological. 
Ji'inally, the vagueness claim is not properly presented 
in appellant Roc's attack on the Texas statute. There 
is no question that Art. 1196 does 110t authorize abor-
tions-by-request and that it inskacl articulates a stand-
ard \rhich a woman seeking an abortion would recognize 
as relevant to her case. Any Texas doctor would simi-
larly realize that an abortion could not be performed 
unless the requirements of Art. 1196, "·hatcver they might 
be, " ·ere met. On its face, therefore, the statute divides 
\\·omen seeking abortions into two classes: those \Yho 
make some claim that an abortion is necessary to save 
their life aud those who do not. Assuming that the stat-
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utory standard is impermissibly vague, confusion and 
uncertainty will be created among women in the former 
group. Appellant Roc, however, falls into the latter 
group, since her complaint asserts that she desires an 
abortion "[b] ecause of the economic hardships and social 
stigmas involved in bearing an illegitimate child." and 
admits that her "life docs not appear to be threatened by 
the continuation of her pregnancy." (R., at 11.) Indeed, 
appellant Roe argues at length that the right to terminate 
an unwanted pregnancy, for whatever reason, is an inte-
gral part of constitutionally protected rights of privacy. 
(Brief of Appellants, at 99--109.) For such women, who 
make no claim that an abortion is necessary for the pur-
pose of saving their life, the possible vagueness of the 
statutory standard is irrelevant since, however, the class 
of women is defined who qualify for an abortion because 
their life is somehow endangered, they arc ipso facto 
outside of this class. "The underlying principle [of the 
void for vagueness doctrine] is that no man shall be held 
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not 
reasonably understand to be proscribed." United States 
v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617 (1954). See also: United 
States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U. S. 20, 32- 33 
(Hl63); Jordan v. De George, 341 U. S. 223, 231 (1951); 
United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, 7 (1947). What-
ever merit appellant's Ninth Amendment and related 
claims may have, it cannot be rationally contended that 
it is not perfectly apparent that the abortion she desires 
is clearly prohibited by the Texas statute. This is not 
a case involving "the transcendent value to all society 
of constitutionally protected expression," Gooding v. Wil-
son, 405 U.S.-,-- (1072), in which appellant might 
have standing to attack the possible infirmity of the stat-
ute as applied to members of another class. Cf. Baggett 
v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 366 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 
371 u.s. 415,433 (1963). 
CHAMBERS OF 
~ttp-mtu <.qou:rt ctf t4c ~lnitth ~tn.tcs 
~al'!!filtgtott, p. (!}. 2.0giJ1·~ 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
May 30, 1972 
70-40 - Doe v. Bolton 
Dear Harry, 
Confirming our telephone conversation 
of yesterday, I am i.n basic agreement with your 
memorandum in this case, subject to modifica-
tions which I understand you intend to make. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
5/31/72--LAH 
Rer Abortion cases 
Judger 
Attached is a flurry of notes that have been circulated 
today in these abortion cases. Justice Blackmun, the author 
of the opinions for the Court in these two cases striking 
down the Texas and Georgia statutes, has gingerly suggested 
the possibility of reargument. The vote is S-2. Justices 
Marshall, Douglas, and Brennan have circulated notes urging 
the contrary course. I assume that, consistent with the 
principle you have adhered to heretofore, you will wish to 
state no view on these cases. If you desire, however, I will 
supply you with copies of the opinions and abstrac~ them for 
you. 
UH 
... ,. ., 'r• 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.§u.prtm.t <.qcurl cf t~e 111ttittlt ~bdtil 
'nla.slriugton, gl. <.q. 211~,1-~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL May 31, 1972 
Re: No. 18 - Roe v. Wade 
No. 40 - Doe v. Bolton 
Dear Harry: 
Like Bill Brennan, I, too, am opposed 





Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: Conference 
CHAMBERS OF' 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
~u:p-rttttt QI4tud of t4t 'J!tttittb j>mttg 
'cWMltmgfuu:. ~. QI. 2.LT~>l-~ 
May 31, 1972 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Abortion Cases 
I have had a great many problems with these cases from 
the outset. They are not as simple for me as they appear to be 
for others. The states have, I should think, as much concern in 
this area as in any within their province; federal power has only 
that which can be traced to a specific provision of the Constitution. 
Perhaps my problem arises from the mediocre to poor 
help from counsel. On reargument, I would propose we appoint 
amici for both sides, but that can wait. This is as sensitive and 
difficult an is sue as any in this Court in my time and I want to 
hear more and think more when I am not trying to sort out several 
dozen other difficult cases. 




.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS 
Dear Harry: 
~u:.prrntt <.!Jcurt nf tqt 'Jnittb: ~bttts 
2ID'M!rhtgtnn. ~. <.!f. 2!l'bt'*.;l 
May 31, 1972 
Re ·: Abortion Cases 
I have your memorandum submitted to the Conference with the suggestion 
that these cases be reargued. 
I feel quite strongly that they should not be reargued. 
are as follows. 
My reasons 
In the first place, these cases which were argued last October have 
been as thoroughly worked over and considered as any cases ever before the 
Court in my time. 
I know you have done yeoman service and have written two difficult 
cases, and you have opinions now for a majority, which is 5. 
There are always minor differences in style, one writing differently 
than another. But those two opinions of yours in Texas and G~orgia are 
creditable jobs of craftsmanship and will, I think, stand the test of time. 
While we could sit around and make pages of suggestions, I really 
don't think that is important. The important thing is to get them down. 
In the second place, I have a feeling that where the Court is split 
4-4 or 4-2-1 or even in an important constitutional case 4-3, reargument 
may be desirable. But you have a firm 5 and the firm 5 will be behind you 
in these two opinions until they come down. It is a difficult field and a 
difficult subject. But where t .here is that solid agreement of the majority 
I think it is important to announce the cases, and let the result be known so 
that the legislatures can go to work and draft their new laws. 
Again, congratulations on a fine job. I hope the 5 can agree to get 
the cases down this Term, so that we can spend our energies next Term on other 
matters. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.hprttttt <qou:rt of tqt ~ttittb ~tatte 
Jl'MJri:n:gtctt. ~. <q. 2ll.?J!.~ 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
May 31, 1972 
MBMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 70-18 - Roe v. Wade 
No. 70-40 - Doe v. Bolton 
Nearly all of you, other than Lewis Powell and 
Bill Rehnquist, have been in touch with me about these 
cases. A number of helpful and valid suggestions have 
been made. 
You will recall that when we were canvassing 
the list for possible candidates for reargument when the 
bench would be full, I suggested that, although the Texas 
case perhaps might come down, the Georgia case should 
go over. This suggestion was not enthusiastically 
received. It was the consensus, as I recall, that I pro-
duce some drafts and we would see what reactions ensued. 
I have done this and, frankly, I prepared the Texas memo-
randum the way I did in the hope that we might come near 
to agreement there irrespective of the disposition of the 
Georgia case • 
. Although it would prove costly to me personally, 
in the light of energy and hours expended, I have now con-
cluded, somewhat reluctantly, that reargument in both 
cases at an early date in the next term, would perhaps be 
advisable. I feel this way because: 
1. I believe, on an issue so sensitive and so 
emotional as this one, the country deserves the conclusion 
of a nine-man, not a seven-man court, whatever the ulti-







2. Although I have worked on these cases with 
some concentration, I am not yet certain about all the 
details. Should we make the Georgia case the primary 
opfii"ion and recast Texas in its light? Should we refrain 
from emasculation of the Georgia statute and, instead, 
hold it unconstitutional in its entirety and let the state 
legislature reconstruct from the beginning? Should we 
spell out -- although it would then necessarily be largely 
dictum -- just what aspects are controllable by the State 
and to what extent? For example, it has been suggested 
that upholding Georgia's provision as to a licensed hos-
pital should be held unconstitutional, and the Court should 
approve performance of an abortion in a "licensed medical 
facility." These are some of the suggestions that have 
been made and that prompt me to think about a summer's 
delay. 
I therefore conclude, and move, that both cases 
go over the Term. 
Sincerely, 
1 a. !.1. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.®utttttttt <!fond of tire 'Jl.lttit.cb ~tatcs 
~:tsqi:ttgtctt, to. <!f. 2Ll.?'~~ 
.JuSTICE WM . ..J . BRENNAN . ..JR May 31, 1972 
RE: No. 70-18 -Roe v. Wade 
No. 70-40 - Doe v. Bolton 
Dear Harry: 
As I suggested,! see no reason to put these cases 
over for reargument. I say that since, as I understand 
it, there are five of us (Bill Douglas, Potter, Thurgood, 
you and I) in substantial agreement with both opinions 
and in that circumstance I question that reargument 
would change things. 
Sincerely, 
~~~0 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
,:%u.prmtt <!Jcu:rt cf t4t Pttit.dt ~tates 
'Jitrasfrhtghm. ~. <!J. 20gt>1,;t 
CHAMBERS OF" 




I have your memo to the Conf'erence 
dated May 31, 1972 re Abortion Cases. 
If' the vote of' the Conf'erence is 
to reargue, then I will f'ile a statement 
telling what is happening to us and the 
tragedy it entails. 
The Chief' Justice 




, !ll\,..1f)I.:RS OF 
i'tq.tumc <!Jourt oJ tire 'Jlttritt~ .§fcili$ 
'Jlllrn$flittghm, ~. <!J. 20gtJ~~ 
· ·:n~, I. POWELL,..JR. June 1, 1972 
J\IEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Abortion Cases 
The question is whether the abortion cases should be reargued. 
In the early weeks of my service on the Court a number of 
possible candidates for reargument were considered by the Conference. 
I took the position then, as did Bill Rehnquist, that the other seven 
Justices were better qualified to make these decisions. I therefore 
t aok no part in any of them. 
The present question arises in a different context. I have 
been on the Court for more than half a term. It may be that I now 
have a duty to participate in this decision, although from a purely 
personal viewpoint I would be more than happy to leave this one to 
others. I have not read the briefs; nor have I read either of Harry's 
opm10ns. I am too concerned about circulating my own remaining 
opinions to be studying cases in which I did not par!.· ' ipate. I certainly 
do not know how I would vote if the cases are reargued. 
In any event, I have concluded that it is appropriate for me 
to participate in the pending question. I have read the memoranda 
circulated, and am persuaded to favor reargument primarily by the 
fact that Harry Blackmun, the author of the opinions, thinks the cases 
should be carried over and reargued next fall. His position, based on 
months of study, suggests enough doubt on an issue of large national 
importance to justify the few months delay. 
Sincerely, 
' ' t .. 
.ihtpumt ~ottrl of tqt ~nittb ~tateG 
~Nllfri:ttghm. ~. ~· 20~'1.;1 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUI S T 
/ 
June 1, 1972 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Abortion Cases 
I concur in the views expressed by Lewis Powell in his 
memorandum to the Conference of June 1st, and therefore vote 





Jiu:vrttttt <!fouri cf tlt't ~tb ,jtattg 
jilasJringtcn.1;}. <!f. 2llgtJ!.~ 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. June 1, 1972 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Abortion Cases 
The question is whether the abortion cases should be reargued. 
In the early weeks of my service on the Court a number of 
possible candidates for reargument were considered by the Conference. 
I took the position then, as did Bill Rehnquist, that the other seven 
Justices were better qualified to make these decisions. I therefore 
took no part in any of them. 
The present question arises in a different context. I have 
been on the Court for more than half a term. It may be that I now 
have a duty to participate in this decision, although from a purely 
personal viewpoint I would be more than happy to leave this one to 
others. I have not read the briefs; nor have I read either of Harry's 
opinions. I am too concerned about circulating my own remaining 
opinions to be studying cases in which I did not participate. I certainly 
do not know how I would vote if the cases are reargued. 
In any event, I have concluded that it is appropriate for me 
to participate in the pending question. I have read the memoranda 
circulated, and am persuaded to favor reargument primarily by the 
fact that Harry Blackmun, the author of the opinions, thinks the cases 
should be carried over and reargued next fall. His position, based on 
months of study, suggests enough doubt on an issue of large national 
importance to justify the few months delay. 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
~np-rtntt <!fottrt cf tqt 'Jtlttittb' $5tttftg 
11Jagqington. !0. <!f. 2ll.?'l-~ 
June 5, 1972 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Abortion Cases 
My view has been that these cases should 
be reargued, and I still think so. 
Sincerely, 
.· 
i'o ~ r 1 , C'hic:t' Justica;'-
tir, ,-r·•r:;tice Brennan ', 
t , !1aticc Stewart\ 
6th DRAFT !' · .~ ·ot1 co W~1i te · 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES~ ~;-·ce BlackmUill · 
• , r:t · cc Uarshalll~ 
• , . .,·t co Powell 
l'- . ' ... :,icc Rehnquisti 
Nos. 70-18 AND 70-40 
Jane Roe et al., Appellants, 
70-18 v. 
Henry Wade. 
r .. ,,, . , ~ . ; J. 
On Appeal fr~rp. the.United ~ 1 $}) v-
States District Court fol" ~ • 1 
the Northern Dist~ict of 
Texas. 
Mary Doe et al., Appellants, 
70-40 On Appeal from the United 
v. States District Court for 
Arthur K. Bolton, as Attor- the Northern District of 
ney General of the State Georgia. 
of Georgia, et al. 
[June -, 1972] 
Mn. JusTICE DouGLAS. 
I dissent from the order putting these cases down for 
reargument. 
The problem involving state abortion legislation is not 
a brand new one to the Court. United States v. Vuitch,. 
402 U. S. 62, involved the District of Columbia statute .. 
It was argued January 12, 1971, and decided April 21, 
1971. The case presented a troublesome question of the 
jurisdiction of this Court as well as a substantial con-
stitutional question. Yet it was disposed of in shortly 
over three months after oral argument, Mr. Justice Black 
writing for the majority. 
The present abortion cases involve the statute of Texas 
and the statute of Georgia. They were put down for 
argument last Term and were heard December 13, 1971. 
The Conference on the two cases was held on Decem-
ber 16, 1971. 
THE CHIEF JusTICE represented the minority view 
in the Conference and forcefully urged his viewpoint on 
70-18-ME:\IO 
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the issues. It was a seven-man Court that heard these 
cases and voted on them. Out of that seven there were 
four who initially took a majority view. Hence tradi-
tionally the senior Justice in the majority- who in this 7 
-..A.. .... ,. ~ 
case was not myself- should have made the ass1gnment 
oft he opinion. For the tradition is a longstanding one 
that the senior Justice in the majority makes the assign-
ment.1 The cases were, however, assigned by THE CHIEF 
J USTICE. 
The matter of assignment is not merely a matter of 
protocol. The main function of the Conference is to find 
the consensus.~ When that is known, it is only logical 
that the majority decide who their spokesman should be; 
and traditionally the selection has been made after a 
very informal discussion among the majority. 
1 Chief Justice Hughrs dc~rribed the opinion a~s ignmcnt process 
as follows : "After a dcriKion has been rcarhed , the Chief Justice 
assigns the case for opinion to one of the members of the Court, 
that i.s, of course, to one of the majority if there is a diviRion and 
the Chief Justire is a member of the majority. If he i .~ in a mi-
norit~·. the senior As~oci :1 t e Justire in the majority assigns the case· 
for opinion ." C. Hughes, The Supreme CourL of the United States 
58-59 (1966) . See also W. Brennan , Inside View of the High Court , 
The New York Time l\1:tgazine, October G, 1963, at 35 , 102; F. 
Fr:mkfurter , Chief Justires I Ibn• Known , in A. We:; tin , An Auto-
biography of The Supreme Comt 211 , 2:n (1963); J . Harlan, Some-
Aspects of the Judicial ProeC'ss in the Supreme Court of the United 
States, 33 Aust. L. J. 108, lHl (1959); T . Clark, Internal Operation 
of the United States Suprl'me Court, 43 .T . Am . .Tud. Soc. 45 , 50-51 
(1959) . 
~ Chief Justice Hughes said of the Conferenre: "In the Supreme 
Court every judge comes to the ronferenre to cxpre~s hi~ vil'ws and 
to vote, not knowing but that hl' may ha\·e the responsibility of writ-
ing the opinion which will arrord with the vote. Hl' is tlmH keenly 
nware of his rc,;ponsibility in voting. It is not the practice in the· 
Supreme Court to postpone vot ing until all opi11ion ha ~ lwrn hron:rh t 
in by one of the judgrs which may be plausible enough to win the· 
ndherence of another judge who has not studied t he case rarcfully."' 
Op. cit., 59. 
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When that procedure is followed, the majority view is \ 
promptly written out and circulated, after which dissents 
or concurrences may be prepared. 
When, however, the minority seeks to control the as-
signment, there is a de&iructive force at work in the 
Court. 
""Perhaps the purpose of the minority in the Abortion 
""'- - -
Cases is _to to;: to keep control of the merits. If that is 
the aim, the plan has been unsuccessful. Opinions in 
these two cases have been circulated and each commands 
the votes of five members of the Court. The decisions 
should therefore be announced." 
The plea that the cases be reargued_is~ely another 
strategy by a mmority somehow to suppress the ma·ority 
vie,~th the hope that exigencies of time will change the 
result. That might be achieved of course by death or 
conceivably retirement. But that kind of strategy di-
lutes the integrity of the Court. 
Historically this institution has been composed of 
fiercely independent men with fiercely opposed views. 
There have been-and will always be--clashes of views. 
The Conference, though deeply disagreeing on legal and 
constitutional issues, has traditionally been a group 
marked by good-will. A majority view, no matter how 
unacceptable to the minority, has been honored as such. 
The incumbents have honored and revered the institution 
more than their own view of the public good. 
The Abortion Cases are symptomatic. This is an elec-
tion year. Both political parties have made abortion an 
issue. What the political parties say or do is none of our 
3 Last Fall we ::dl agrerd to deny a mot ion for additional oral argu-
ment in spite of counsel',; admonition tlmL the issues warranted more 
extended airin~ . 404 U.S. 81:3. And, though we again were advised 
that the rasrs wrre of paramount signifir:mre, we nonetheless denied 
a request, b~· Texail to postpone :ugument until it could be beard by 
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business. We sit here not to make the path of any candi-
date easier or more difficult. We decide questions only 
on their constitutional merits. To prolong these Abor-
tion Cases into the next election would in the eyes of 
many be a political gesture unworthy of tho Court. 
Five members of the Court have agreed on a disposi-
tion of the Texas and Georgia Abortion Cases. One 
dissent has already been written. Those opinions should 
come down forthwith. 
A number of abortion cases arc being held 4 for the 
present two cases. The log jam should be broken. 
I dissent with the deepest regret that we are allowing 
the consensus of the Court to be frustrated. 
4 The cases now being held for the Texas and Georgia Abortion 
Cases are: 
Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 70-42 (La.) 
Rodgers v. Danforth, 70-89 (Missouri) 
Hanrahan v. Doe, 70-105 (Illinois) 
Heffernan v. Doe, 70-106 (Illinois) 
Corkey v. Edwards, 71-92 (North Carolina) 
Thompson v. Texas, 71-1200 (Texas) 
Doe v. Rampton, 71-5666 (Utah) 




Mr. Larry A. Hammond 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Abortion Cases 
DATE: October 6, 1972 
I have just read your cert note in 72-56 Abelee v. Markle, 
in which Judges Lumbard and Newman, Clarie dissenting, struck 
down €onnecticut's 1860 abortioo. law. 
When we come to decision time in the pending abortioo. cases, 
keep in mind that we may wish to take a look at the Lumbard/Newman 
opinions. 




No. 70-18 OT 19/2 
Roe v. Wade 
Appeal from USDC ND Texas 
No. 70-40 OT 1972 
Doe v. Bolton 
Appeal from USDC ND Georgia 
In view of the unusual posture of the abortion cases 
at present--with first draft opinions already circulated 
and a promise of recirculation from Justice Blackmun--it 
may be best not to treat this as an ordinary bench memo. 
Instead, I would like to outline the existing opinions by 
Justices Blackmun and White and to suggest the manner in 
which these cases might be disposed of best. I will also 
attempt to flag a number of the questions that we might wish 
to explore in more detail. 
I. FACTS 
(1) Roe v.Wade, No. 70-18 
This case is actually two suits consolidated into a 
.. -2--
single case by the three-judge ct in the USDC ND Texas. The 
plaintiff in one was was a fictitiously named pregnant 
woman who desired an abortion but was not sufficiently 
threatened in terms of her life to satisfy the statutory 
requirement. The plaintiffs in the second case were a 
fictitiously named married couple who were childless. The 
wife suffers from some disorder that has caused her physician 
to recommend that she avoid pregnancy. She was also advised 
to discontinue use of the more effective birth control 
methods. They would like to continue freely enjoying their 
marital relationship but feel deterred by the knowledge 
that if the wife becomes pregnant they may not have the 
means available to obtain an abortion. Finally, a third 
party has intervened in the case--a Dr. J.H. Hallford. 
He was the named defendant in a pending criminal state prose-
cut ion. 
On a number of grounds, these plaintiffs sought injunct-
ive and declaratory relief against enforecement of the Texas 
aborti on statute which permits a physician to perform an 
abortion only to "save the life of the mother." The DC, -~ ~ld that the individual pregnant woman (and her 
class) had standing and that the Dr. also had standing. 
~it found that the ~rried cou~le's claim did not 
present 
raise sufficient facts to state a/controversy. cJhird~it 
struck down the Texas abortion law on two grounds: (1) 
interference with a woman~s fundamental right to control 
her reproductive process unsupported by a compelling state 
interest, and (2) vaguenesg of the word "life." On these -bases ir declared the. Texas - law unconstitutional and void ' -
.... 3--
but for reasons of comity and respect for state-federal 
relationships refused to enjoin the Texas statute. The 
three classes of plaintiffs below appealed the denial of 
injunctive relief. 
(2) Doe v. Boltonp No. 70-40 
This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief 
heard by a three-judge ct which was instituted by pregnant 
women, single and married, physicians, nurses, clergymen, 
--. and 
social workers,/nonprofit Georgia corporations. Plaintiff" 
Doe was an indigent, married woman who was pregnant and 
who had been advised that less danger to her health would 
be caused by an abortion than by having the child. She 
applied to the Abortion committee of one of the hospitals 
and her application was denied because her case did not fall 
within one of the categories of cases in which an abortion 
would be proper. The DC found that only the pregnant woman's 
claim was sufficiently controverted and immediate to satisfy 
the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III. On 
the merits, the DC recognized, as did the Texas DC, a funda-
'---mental right of a woman to deicde for hersJLlf whether she ---------------
wished to continue her pregnancy. The DC held that insofar 
as the statute endeavored to restrict the circumstances or 
categories of cases in which an abortion would be permissi le, 
r- --......__.----
it was unconstitutional. Insofar as it merely prescribed 
the manner in which the operation was to be performed, the 
restrictions were not found to be sufficiently intrusive 
of that fundamental right to warrant striking them down. 
Like the Texas DC, however, the Georgia DC refused to 
--4- ... 
issue an injunction. 
II JUSTIDEE BLACKMUN'S OPINIONS 
(1) Roe v. Wade 
Before reaching the constitutional issues, the opnion 
tackles the several jurisdictional claims. First, it finds 
that the fictitiously named pregnant woman and her class 
have standing to challenge the Texas law. The fact that the 
initial plaintiff is no longer pregnant is not preclusive 
since the very nature of the right asserted is one that 
for obvious reasons, 
arises frequently and, ~#!lj*lll##~iidll may easily 
evade review. This is standard mootness reasoning applied 
in cases in which the questions only arise in hurried 
circumstances. Second, the Doctor who was a defendant in a 
pending state criminal prosecution was found not to be 
properly allowed to intervene. This judgment was based on 
Samuels v, Mackell and Younger v. Harris. Those cases, decided 
after the DC opinions in these two cases, establish that federal 
courts should only intervene in extraordinary circumstances 
in the cases in which a state criminal prosecution is 
pending. Third, the opinion agrees with the DC that the 
married couple have not presented a basis for standing of 
sufficient immediacy to warrant considering their claim. 
Justice Blackmun concedes, howeverg that the absence of these 
parties does not make any difference in the case since 
the pregnant woman can present the requisite constitutional 
challenge. 
On the merits the opinion rests on the vagueness groun~s. 
-----Justice Black.mun finds that the word "life" is inadequate to 
--5--
convey to the doctor in advance the circumstances in which 
he may perform an abortion. His reason follows closely the 
Texas DC reasoning. Must the doctor conclude that the 
patient will surely die before be may act? Or, may he act 
when there is more or less than a 50% chance of death if 
an abortion is not performed7 Is the mere possibility of 
death of the mother enough? He also focuses indirectly on 
the word "save" in conjunction with the word "life" and 
wonders whether a life that is improved in terms of the 
mental or physical health of the patient is "saved." 
His analysis differs from the DC only in that he must 
grapple with a precedent decided by this Ct after the Texas 
DC judgment--United States v. Vuitch, 402 u.s. 62 (1971). 
Vuitch held that t~e DC abortion law was not vague. That __ ... ,._-
law allowed the doctor to perform an abortion if "necessary 
for the preservation of the mother• s life or health." Justice 
Black held that "health" meant mental health as well as 
physical health and that the word was not vague because 
doctors were well familiar with determinign within their 
expertise whether the patient's condition called for any 
particular medical procedure. Justice Blackmun distinguishes 
Vuitch on this latter ground. He seems to conclude that the 
Vuitch statute was OK because it opened up the decision to 
the broad (and essentially unreviewable) discretion of the 
physician, while under a "life" statute the doctor's judgment 
is not given a free rein. The statute is insufficiently in-
formative to be enforceable. What Justice Blackmun is really 
saying, I believe, is that "life and health" is a good 
standard because it gives the physician a carte blanche 
--6 .. -
within an area of his professional expertise. Whatever a 
D.C. doctor concludes about the propriety of an abortion now 
will be approved because, presumptively, he will be making 
a judgment that the operation is called for to preserve the 
health and life of the mother. A narrower standard, 
however, is subject to attack because it makes the physician 
rest his medical judgment on a small and ambiguous deter-
mination of the saving of the mother's life. 
Having struck down the law on vagueness grounds, Jus-
tice Blackmun does not reach the substantive challenge 
based on the fundamental "privacy" right. Finally, the op-
inion does not enjoin the statute since the Ct is confident 
that Texas will comply. 
Justice White dissented and made three points in his 
short opinion. (1) Vuitch, in his view, impliedly held 
that the word "life" was not vague, and, therefore, the 
instant decision overrules Vuitch. (2) "Life" is a more 
exact standard than "health" and is a standard with which 
the medical profession is quite familiar. The major consid-
erations in a "life" decision will be psyiological and not 
so sweeping as health determinations. (3) If the pregnant 
woman is the only plaintiff with standing she cannot attack 
the law on this ground because, whatever its parameters, it 
is not vague as to her since she virtually concedes that 
abortion is not 
the lit#ij#jdi#li~ necessary to preserve or save her life. 
(2) Doe v. Bolton 
In this opinionp at the outset, the ~regnant woman 





as well as the physician. The question was closer as to the 
nurses, clergymen, and counsellors whose claim was less 
immediate and direct. But, because the other plaintiffs were 
conferred sufficient standing to raise all the issues, it 
was unnecessary to reach a final conclusion as to them. 
On the merits, Justice Blackmun was forced to look at 
two sorts of restrictions in the Georgia law. The law had 
both substantive and procedural restrictions. The DC had 
struck down the three categories of circumstances under 
which an abortion would be permissible ((1) continuation of 
the pregnancy would endanger the life of the pregnant 
woman or would seriously and permanently impair her health; 
(2) the fetus is very likel to be born with an irremediable 
mental or physical defect; (3) the pregnancy resulted from 
rape). The propriety of that judgment was not before the Ct 
-----since the State would be the only aggrieved party and its 
appeal had already been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
However, the striking of those restrictions left the statute 
requiring only that the abortion be based on the physician's 
best clinical judgment that it is necessary. Justice Black" 
mun finds this not too vague. He relies on Vuitch because 
it stresses that a statute is not vague when it commits 
medical decisions to the expertise of a physician. And, 
on the ground that each factor has a bearing on health, 
Justice Blackmunstates that it would be proper for the Dr. 
ro consider "emotional, economic, psychological, familial, 
and physical" Jltfi:il.i.Jit factors. 
He then turned to consider the procedural restrictions. 
At the outset he recognizes the existence of a fundamental 
--8-,.. 
personal right to marital and personal privacy. While he .._. 
agrees that a "woman's interest in making the fundamental 
personal decision whether or not to bear an unwanted c~ild 
is within the scope of personal rights protected by the 
9th and 14th Amendments," he finds that the right is not 
absolute. Applying the compelling state interest analysis, 
he sees an interest in protecting the life of the unborn 
and views that interest as increasing as the pregnant woman 
approaches term. Because of the existence of a compelling 
state interest in the life of the baby, and because of 
an interest in the health of the mother, the state may 
regulate abortions to some extent. The task is to examine 
each state imposition or restriction with particularity 
to gauge its impact on the fundamental right. 
With this analytical framework set out, Justice Black-
mun proceeds to strike down a number of provisions of th~ 
state statute. (1) The state statute required that abortions ----be performed only in accredited hospitals. He finds that 
the accreditation procedures of the Joint Comm'n on Accreditation 
of Hospitals (JCAH) are unrelated to safety in performing 
abortions but that they relate to other matters such as 
length the hospital has been in existence and the presence of 
certain advanced equipment and progrmas. While a state surely 
has an interest in safety in the operat ion, it may not 
justify the present restriction on that ground. (2) The 
requirement of final approval by the hospital committee is 
rejected because it serves no useful purpose not already 
served by other provisions of the statute and was undul~ 
restrictive of the patient's raights. (3) The requirement 
--9- .. 
that a physician gaintthe concurrence of two other physi-
ciams was also struck down on the grounds that the 
medical judgment of the originating physician should be suffi-
cient, that no other medical procedure requires such consultataion 
as a matter of law, and it is unrelated to the patient's 
needs and infringes the physician's right to practice. (4) 
He also strikes down the residency requirement • 
I 
He does not accept the argument that the Georgia abortion 
law discriminates against the poor--especially in light of 
the several restrictive portions that have been struck down. 
In thi~ case, too, he does not issue an injunction but 
assumes that the state will comply. 
There is no circulated dissent. 
In summary--looking at both what the DC and Justice 
. 
Blackmun 8 s opinions would do to the Georgia statute--it now 
would have only the following provisions. The abortion 
must be performed by ~icensed physician based on his 
best clinical judgment than an abortion is necessary. His 
~dgment must be reduced to writng. The operation must be 
d)performed in a hospital licensed by the State ~.::. <2.f Health. 
~inally, no hospital is compelled to allow abortions to 
~be performed and no physician or nurse is required to perform 
or assist in the performance of an abortion if it offends 
them on moral or religious grounds. 
III. DISCUSSION 
While I am torn because of my strong agreement with 
the result in these opinions and because of my prior assertions 
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that the cases should have come down last Term, I must now 
confess that upon a close reading I find these two opinions 
very difficult to accept. They were hurried efforts and I 
am confident that the recirculations will be vastly improved. 
At present, however, I would not ask you to join him. 
In the Texas case I find the vagueness rationale unper-
suasive in light of Vuitch. Justice White's dissent makes 
that a hard position to stand behind. In the Gerogia case 
I think I am in basic agreement with Justice Blackmun's 
conclusions but would prefer to see a more tightly written 
and carefully analysed opinion. 
You have suggested that we should scrap the vagueness 
rationale since we reach the fundamental rights determination 
in the Georgia case anyway. There is only one problem that 
may make that a difficult course to pursue. At present, 
because the Georgia case requires only an examination of the 
procedural restrictlions, there is no need to weigh the 
state's countervailing interest in protecting the life of the 
unborn. Justice Blackmun specifically states that he does not 
reach that question. While he need not in the Georgia case 
he would have to reach it in the Texas case. 
With the thought in mind of suggesting a convincing 
rationale for the balancing problem presented, I have read 
carefully Judge Newman's recent Connecticut opinion and have 
attached a copy for your use. (This was drafted in part by 
Andy Hurwitz so you may gain some feeling as well for his 
writing ability.) The thesis of the Newman opinion is 




For various reasons, most Justices recognize the existence 
of a "fundamental rights" doctrine, L e. , somewhere in the 
Constitution most Justices find a number of individual 
personal rights that are generally to be shielded from 
state or federal interference. The seminal precedent is 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) in which the 
Ct struck down the Connecticut law prohibiting the distribution 
of contraceptives. The opinion for the Ct (Douglas & Clark) 
found the right of privacy of the marital relationship to 
be protected by the Constitution. This is the famous 
"penumbras" opinion in which the rights of privacy in the 
marital relationship was found in the emanations from several 
provisions of the Bill of Rights (including the 1st, 3d, 4th, 
5th, 9th and 14th Amendments). Three concurring Justices 
(Goldberg, Warren, Brennan) found that the concept of liberty 
protects personal rights that are fundamental and that this 
protection can be found in the 9th Amendment; "The enumeration 
in the Const, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny 
or disparage others retained by the people." Justice White 
also finds the statute unconstitmtionalon the ground 
that it deprives "liberty" under the due process clause. 
I 
Finally, Harlan finds the fundamental privacy interest in 
the concept of ordered liberty protected by the due process 
clause. 
It would not be difficult for this Ct to find a fundamental 
right of a woman to control the decision whether to go through 
the experience of pregnancy and assume the responsibilities 
that occur thereafter. 
--12--
But, that rt would not be absolute but, since it is 
of high and fundamental importance, it could be abridged 
only in the face of a compelling state interest. Here the 
most compelling state interest is in preserving the life of 
the unborn. From that point you might reason as Judge New-
man does that the state interest becomes more dominant 
when the fetus is capable of independent existence (or 
becomes "vaible"). The closer to term the unborn fetus is 
the geeater is the state's concern. And, since the state 
would not be imposing an absolute bar to abortional freeom 
but only a time restriction a balance might be permissible 
that would allow a state to sustain a statute saying that 
abortion may be prohibited after the 6th month. Indeed, 
it might be able to support an earlier time as long as the 
prohibition was not absolute. The crux of Judge Newman's 
analysis is that the state may not bar abortional 
frePdpm altogether on the basis of a proposition that is _, 
subject to such great public debate and affects individuals 
so personally. A law that affects fundamental personal 
privacy interests is of a different order than other state 
laws. If there is great dispute between people of good faith 
about the significance of the state's 
interest in the life of the unborn, we will not allow it to 
take the right to decide away from the individual. 
Of course this is still a tentative judgment but I do 
believe that a well reasoned opinion can be written reaching 
this result without placing the Ct in the position of deciding 
··- ----
as a super~leg~~ure ~~~~ it will permit abortions at 
any specific point in time. -
--13--
I think, too, we might consider the possibility of 
writing a short opinion ourselves if we cannot be satisified 
with Justice Blackmun's eventual efforts. In an area of 
constitutional adjudication which is as personal as this 
is there is no reason for each Justice not to state his own 
constitutional philosophy and since yours may be closest to 
Harlan's among the Griswold options, we might wish to set it 
out separately. 
Please tell me what issues you find hardest to tackle and 
I will devote more time to them. 
UH 
No. 70-18 ROE v. WADE Argued 10/11/72 
~ /JJA-S:~1 ~'(-it?~~ . 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
December 1, 1972 
Re: Abortion Cases 
Dear Harry: 
I have been struggling with these cases. 
I shall probably end up concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
Sincerely, 
~~~ 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~~mu~~~~t~mu~~mug 
._ult'htghm. ~. ~· 2ll,;t~~ 
December 4, 1972 
Re: Abortion Cases 
Dear Lewis: 
I appreciate your letter of November 29 with its 
suggestions. 
I cannot know, of course, where we shall end up. I 
have not had any intimation of violent disagreement, but I am 
informed that Byron and Bill Rehnquist will dissent at least in 
part. Bill Douglas 1 dis sent seems to be confined to his footnote 
1 and the Younger v. Harris issue. Bill Brennan has indicated 
that he also is concerned about Younger because of his posture 
in that case when it was decided. 
I have no particular commitment to the point marking the 
end of the first trimester as contrasted with some other point, such 
as quickening or viability. I selected the earliest of the three be-
cause medical statistics and the statistical writings seemed to focus 
on it and to draw their contrasts between the first three months and 
the remainder of the pregnancy. In addition, I thought it might be 
easier for some of the Justices than a designated later point. 
I could go along with viability if it could command a court. 
By that time the state's interest has grown large indeed. I suspect 
that my preference, however, is to stay with the end of the first 
trimester for the following reasons: (1) It is more likely to command 
a court. (2 ) A state is still free to make its decision on the liberal 
side and fix a later point in the abortion statutes it enacts. (3) I may 
be wrong, but I have the impression that many physicians are con-
cerned about facilities and, for example, the need of hospitalization, 
Mr. Justice Powell -2- December 4, 1972 
after the first trimester. I would like to leave the states free to 
draw their own medical conclusions with respect to the period after 
three months and until viability. The statesr judgment of the health 
needs of the mother, I feel, ought, on balance, to be honored. 
I would be willing to state, either in the opinion or in a 
footnote, what is essentially the obvious--namely, that a state is 
free to leave the decision to the attending physician and to regulate 
at a later date than the end of the first trimester. 
These are just passing thoughts. 
Bearing somewhat on this is correspondence that has passed 
between Bill Rehnquist and me. I enclose copies of it for your infor-
mation. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.iu.prtmt <!fourt of tlrt 'J!tttittb .;§tafrg 
~tttllfinghm, lfl. <!f. 20c?J1~ 
December 4, 1972 
Re: Abortion Cases 
Dear Harry: 
/ 
I am about where Byron said he was with respect to 
these cases; I will probably concur in part and dissent 
in part. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
December 5, 1972 
Abortion Cases 
Dear Harry: 
As I have said to you, 1 am generally in accord with your 
fine opinloos in these eases. 
I may have a few suggestions, but expect to concur in due 
time. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blaekmun 
lfp/ss 
ee: The Conference 
j;u.vrtmt <.qourt of tift 'Pnit.tb ~tafttt 
Jra.afti:ngtott. :p. <!J. 2.0~J~.;t 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS December ll, 1972 
Dear Harry: 
RE: Abortion Cases 
I favor the first trimester, rather 
than viability. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.Snvrtutt <!fttttrl ttf tltt ~nittb' .ihdta 
... rulltittghm. ~. <q. 2!l.;tJ!.;l 
December 11, 1972 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Abortion Cases 
One of the members of the Conference has asked 
whether my choice of the end of the first trimester, as the 
point beyond which a state may appropriately regulate 
abortion practices, is critical. He asks whether the point 
of viability might not be a better choice. 
The inquiry is a valid one and deserves serious 
consideration. I selected the earlier point because I felt 
that it would be more easily accepted (by us as well as 
others) and because most medical statistics and statistical 
studies appear to me to be centered there. Viability, 
however, has its own strong points. It has logical and 
biological justifications. There is a practical aspect, too, 
for I am sure that there are many pregnant women, par-
ticularly younger girls, who may refuse to face the fact 
of pregnancy and who, for one reason or another, do not 
get around to medical consultation until the end of the first 
trimester is upon them or, indeed, has passed. 
I suspect that few could argue, or would argue, 
that a state's interest by the time of viability, when inde-
pendent life is presumably possible, is not sufficiently 
developed to justify appropriate regulation. What we are 
talking about, therefore, is the interval from approxi-





One argument for the earlier date is that the state 
may well be concerned about facilities and such things as 
the need of hospitalization from and after the first trimester. 
If the point of viability is selected, a decision of this kind is 
necessarily left to the attending physician. 
I would be willing to recast the opinions at the later 
date, but I do not wish to do so if it would alienate any Justice 
who has expressed to me, either by writing or orally, that he 
is in general agreement, on the merits, with the circulated 
memorandum. 
I might add that some of the district courts that have 
been confronted with the abortion issue have spoken in general, 
but not specific, terms of viability. See, for example, Judge 
Newman 1 s observation in the last Abele v. Markle decision. 
May I have your reactions to this suggestion? 
Sincerely, 
LAR 12/11/72 / 
REa AbOrtion Cases 
Froma LAH 
Judge• 
I have received a copy of Justice Blackmun's letter 
to the conference concerning the line-drawing problem 
in the abortion cases, i,e. whether 3 months, 6 months 
or never is to be the rule. 
First, his note is couched in terms that convince 
me that his first interest is to have a solid block for 
whatever position is taken. He appears willing to sac-
rifice his personal view for the benefit of getting 
a full Court. 
Second, although he still prefers, apparently, 
the 3-month rule, he sees certain benefits of the "via-
bility" rule. Indeed he expresses what I feel is the 
most important practical clonsideration. For many poorp 
or frightened, or uneducated, or unsophisticated girls 
the decision to seek help may not occur during the first 
12 weeks. The girl might be simply hoping against hope 
that she is not pregnant but is just missing periods. Or 
she might know perfectly well that she is pregnant but 
be unwilling to make the decision--unwilling to tell 
her parents or her boyfriend. 
Third, he expresses a single argument in oppostion 
to the viability rulea 
"One argument for the earlier date is that the 
state may well be concerned about facilities and 
such things as the need of h&spitalization from 
and after the first trimester. If the point of -viability is selected, a decision of this kind is 
--2- .. 
necessarily left to the attending physician." 
~,., ._. 
(p. 
2 of HAB' s memo) 
He appears to be suggesting that whatever point is 
selected must be the point with respect to every proffered 
state interest. This does not comport with the tenor 
of his two opinions. They suggest that each asserted 
interest of the state must be examined on its own merit. 
Therefore, the Ct might well approve a rule of a state 
I saying that all abortions after the first trimester must be performed in a hospital. The state might support 
its judgment on the basis of empirical evidence 
indicating that the dangers of complications, and the 
need for postoperative care is greater during the second 
trimester. In the same opinion the Ct could well say 
that where the interest asserted by the State is protection 
of fetal life or "potential life" no point earlier than 
viability is permissible (for the reasons stated in 
Judge Newman's opinion in Abele). 
RECOMMENDATION 
I suggest that you respond to Justice Blackmun's 
note by indicating that you prefer the point of viability 
for purposes of the State's right to protect potential 
lilfe argument. And, that you see no reason why a 
state might not require that abortions performed earlier 
a:t'e 
be performed in a hospital if there I# sound health 
reasons to support it. You might also indicate that it 
is your preference (as I understand it) to go ahead and 
say in this opinion, by way of dictum as was done in Dunn 
v. Blumstein, that viability is the proper point. But thatl 
• • "t ., . ·~. 
--3--
you might add, if stating a particular point in the gesta-
tion process is going to divide the Court youg like 
Justice Blackmun, would be willing to leave the matter 
open. MOreover, you might go so far as to explain why 
you think it desirable to state a specific point in order 
that women and state legislatures will have a standard 
to rely on. 
LAH 
~u.pumc ~on.rt llf tire 1Jnitc~ .§tatcs 
'Jlln.slringtlln, ;p. QJ. 20~)~~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL December 12, 1972 
Re: Abortion Cases 
Dear Harry: 
I am inclined to agree that drawing the line 
at viability accommodates the interests at stake 
better than drawing it at the end of the first tri-
mester. Given the difficulties which many women may 
have in believing that they are pregnant and in de-
ciding to seek an abortion, I fear that the earlier 
date may not in practice serve the interests of those 
women, which your opinion does seek to serve. 
At the same time, however, I share your concern 
for recognizing the State's interest in insuring that 
abortions be done under safe conditions. If the 
opinion stated explicitly that, between the end of the 
first trimester and viability, state regulations di-
rected at health and safety alone were permissible, I 
believe that those concerns would be adequately met. 
It is implicit in your opinion that at some 
point the State's interest in preserving the potential 
life of the unborn child overrides any individual 
interests of the women. I would be disturbed if that 
point were set before viability, and I am afraid that 
the opinion's present focus on the end of the first 
trimester would lead states to prohibit abortions com-
pletely at any later date. 
In short, I believe that, as the opinion now 
stands, viability is a better accommodation of the 
interests involved, but that the end of the first tri-
mester would be acceptable if additions along the · 
lines I have suggested were made. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: Conference 
Sincerely, 
. . ' 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
Re: Abortion Cases 
Dear Harry: 
I am inclined to agree that drawing the line 
at viability accommodates the interests at stake 
better than drawing it at the end of the first tri-
mester. Given the difficulties which many women may 
have in believing that they are pregnant and in de-
ciding to seek an abortion, I fear that the earlier 
date may not in practice serve the interests of those 
women, which your opinion does seek to serve. 
At the same time, however, I share your concern 
for recognizing the State's interest in insuring that 
abortions be done under safe conditions. If the 
opinion stated explicitly that, between the end of the 
first trimester and viability, state regulations di-
rected at health and safety alone were permissible, I 
believe that those concerns would be adequately met. 
It is implicit in your opinion that at some 
point the State's interest in preserving the potential 
life of the unborn child overrides any individual 
interests of the women. I would be disturbed if that 
point were set before viability, and I am afraid that 
the opinion's present focus on the end of the first 
trimester would lead states to prohibit abortions com-
pletely at any later date. 
In short, I believe that, as the opinion now 
stands, viability is a better accommodation of the 
interests involved, but that the end of the first tri-
mester would be acceptable if additions along the 
lines I have suggested were made. 




Rea ABORTIONs WOO's note 
Froms LAH 
Judge, 
I am shocked at Justice Douglas' note. The Justice, 
who more than anyone else on this Court stakes his judi-
cial reputation on protecting the poor and the black 
(see his separate lldissent in Kras~cannot fail to recog-
nize that a first trimester rule falls most heavily on 
those classes. After Rodriguez and Chambers (maybe over the 
Xmas holidays) I will find time to devote a day to 
seeing what empriical research is available on the question 
of how long it takes women--especially the yound, the 
poor, and the minorities--to recognize their predicament. 
LAH 
This refers to your memorandum inviting expressions as to a 
choice between the "first trimester" and ''viability." 
Once we take the major step of affirming a woman's constitu-
tional right, it seems to me that viability is a more logical and defen-
sible time for identifying the point at which the state's overriding right 
to protect potential life becomes evident. 
' There are other reasons, mentioned in your memorandum, 
which also lead me to the same conclusion. My guess is that older 
women, married women and others who are experienced or sophisti-
cated willlmow when they are pregnant and be willing to acknowledge 
it. They also will know where abortions can be obtained(.!.:£. in New 
York), and how to go about arranging for them. But the women who 
most need the benefit of liberalized abortion laws are likely to be young, 
inexperienced, unsure, frightened and perhaps unmarried. n may well 
be that many in this category either would not know enough to be sure 
of pregnancy in the early weeks, or be too embarrassed to seek medical 
advice prior to the expiration of the first trimester. If there is a con-
stitutional right to an abortion, there is much to be said for making it 
effective where and when it may well be needed most. 
~. ·" I' 
As I believe I mentioned at Conference, I was favorably impressed 
by theCA 2 opinion (Judges Newman and Lumbard) in Abele which identi-
fied viability as the critical time from the viewpoint of the state. I. • 
Sincerely, 
The Conference 
;§u:prtmt <!J.llud .llf tfrt 'Jttnittb .:§tatts 
~aslrhtghm. ~. <If. 2.0gt'!-~ 
CHAMBERS Of" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
Re: Abortion Cases 
Dear Harry: 
December 13, 1972 
I have more "ploughing" to do on your memo but one 
thing that occurs to me is the possible need to deal 
with whether husbands as such or parents of minors 
have "rights" in this area. Then, too, since the 
Court gave "illegitimate fathers'' the same rights 
as a lawful parent, we must face up to that. 
I will have some other comments but they may be 
washed out by suggestions from others. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
J 
CHAMBERS OF 
.inpumt <!fonrt of tqt ~lnlttb ,jtatttl 
Jfag!rittgton. ~- ~- 20~)~~ 
..JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
December 14, 1972 
Re: Abortion Cases 
Dear Harry, 
This is in response to your memorandum 
of December 11. One of my concerns with your opinion 
as presently written is the specificity of its dictum--
particularly in its fixing of the end of the first trimester 
as the critical point for valid state action. I appreciate 
the inevitability and indeed wisdom of dicta in the Court's 
opinion, but I wonder about the desirability of the dicta 
· · being quite so inflexibly "legislative." 
My present inclination would be to allow 
the States more latitude to make policy judgments be-
tween the alternatives mentioned in your memorandum, 
and perhaps others. I had hoped to prepare a tentative 
concurring opinion by now. I shall certainly get some-
thing written and circulated during the Christmas recess. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
~ttttt Qfourl ttf tqt 'J!lttittlt ~htttg 
'~hudfittghm. ~. Qf. 2ll~'1~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
,._..., .. 
December 15, 1972 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: Abortion Cases 
I appreciate the helpful suggestions that have come to me 
in response to my memorandum of December 11. I now feel some-
what optimistic that the issues are in focus and that an agreement 
in some general areas may be in prospect. 
With your permission, I would like the opportunity to re-
vise the proposed opinions in the light of these suggestions. I have 
in mind associating the end of the first trimester with an emphasis 
on health, and associating viability with an emphasis on the State's 
interest in potential life. The period between the two points would 
be treated with flexibility. I shall try to do this revision next week 
and circulate another draft before the end of the year. It is my 
earnest hope, as you know, that on this sensitive issue we may avoid 
excessive fractionation of the Court, and that the cases may come 
down no later than the week of January 15 to tie in with the convening 
of most state legislatures. 
Sincerely, 
. J/. u.lf 
...,.. 
~Ultr~mc <;ond cf t~~ ';tlnitdt ,:%itntcs 
~nsfringt(ttt, ~. ~· 20.?.J12 
CHAMBERS OF 
j 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS December 22, 1972 
Dear Harry: 
I have your circulations of December 21 
in No. 70-18 - Roe v. Wade and No. 70-40 - Doe 
v. Bolton. Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: Conference 
.. : .. ' 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.§u:prttttt <!fcurl cf t4t 'Jnttittb .®taf.tg 
1lhttlltingtcn. gl. <!f. 2!l,?}t;l 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL December 26, 1972 
Re: No. 70-18 - Roe v. Wade 
No. 70-40 - Doe v. Bolton 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me in your memoranda 
of December 21 in the subject cases. 
Sincerely'{!<.__ 
T.M. 




JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~u:prttttt ~ou.rt ttf t~r 'Jllnitrlt ~b:t.t.l'il 
~aglrhtgtcn. ~. ~· 2ll,?Jl·~ 
December 21, 1972 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Abortion Cases 
Herewith are revised drafts of the Texas and 
Georgia memoranda. 
I have endeavored to accommodate the various 
views expressed to me orally or by letter. The principal 
change in the Texas memorandum is at page 47 ~~ 
Here I have tried to recognize the dual state interests of 
protecting the mother's health and of protecting potential 
life. This, I believe, is a better approach than that con-
tained in the initial memorandum. I have tried to follow 
the lines suggested by Bill Brennan and Thurgood. 
The Chief has expressed concern about the rights 
of the father. I have mentioned these in footnote 67. This 
will not be VE' ry ~a tis fying, but I a m somewhat reluctant 
t o try to cover il1e:.. p oi nt in case s where the father's right s , 
if any, are not at issue. I suspect there will be other 








Mr. Larry A. Hammond 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Abortion Cases 
DATE: December 27, 1972 
I am inclined to join Harry Blackmun in his latest circulations. 
He has made some improvements, which resulted - in significant 
degree - from the suggestions you made to me. 
There is no great hurry about my joining, so loog as I let Harry 
lmow my position prior to the Conference oo January 5. Accordingly, 
your first priorities should remain Rodriguez, Chambers and Bayse. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
" . 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
Dear Harry, 
~tqrrtmt <!fou.d of tqt ~ttitdt ~tatts 
~ttsqington. J:D. <!f. zo,s>~,;t 
December 27, 1972 
Re: Abortion Cases 
J 
Over the week-end I re-read your memoranda 
in these cases. I think your most recent circulations are 
even better than the original ones, and I was again greatly 
impressed with the thoroughness and care with which you 
have accomplished a very difficult job. 
I have now decided to discard the rather 
lengthy concurring opinion on which I have been working, 
and to file instead a brief monograph on substantive due 
process, jo~ your opinions. My short concurring state-
ment will, I hope, be circulated before the end of this week. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
() c~ I 
· !~ 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
.Su.p-rtmt <!J01trt cf tlre 'Ji1ttittb ~tntes 
'Jllhtill1ittgtcn. ~. <.q. 20,?>1~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JusTicE wM. "" · BRENNAN, .JR. December 27, 1972 
RE: No. 70-18 & No. 70-40 - Roe v. Wade 
and Doe v. Bolton. 
Dear Harry: 
I agree with your circulation of Decem-
ber 21. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 




~ \._,.. . 
j 
t' 
~tutt <!fltttrl ttf tqt ~ttitt~ ~tatcs 
~~tsfrittghm.19. <!f. 2llc?J.I.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
November 21, 1972 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 70-18 - Roe v. Wade 
Herewith is a memorandum (1972 fall edition) on the Texas 
abortion case. 
This has proved for me to be both difficult and elusive. In 
its present form it contains dictum, but I suspect that in this area some 
dictum is indicated and not to be avoided. 
You will observe that I have concluded that the end of the first 
trimester is critical. This is arbitrary, but perhaps any other selected 
point , such as quickening or viability, is equally arbitrary. 
I have attempted to preserve Vuitch in its entirety. You will 
recall that the attack on the Vuitch statute was restricted to the is sue of 
vagueness. 402 U.S. at 73. I would dislike to have to undergo another 
assault on the District of Columbia statute based, this time, on privacy 
I 
grounds. I, for one, am willing to continue the approval of the Vuitch-
type statute on privacy as well as on vagueness. The summary here attempts 
to do just that. You may not agree. 
I apologize for the rambling character of the memorandum and 
for its undue length. It has been an interesting assignment. As I stated 
in conference, the decision, however made, will probably result in the 
Court's being severely criticized. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
~u.puuu <q 4llttt c-f t~t 'J!lnittlt ;§taus-
~lt£fltinghm, lfl. QJ. 20blJl·~ 
November 24, 1972 
Re: Abortion Cases: No. 70-18 - Roe v. Wade and 
No. 70-40 - Doe v. Bolton 
Dear Harry: 
I have read your "fall" editions in the above-entitled 
cases, and although I am still in significant disagreement 
with parts of them, I have to take my hat off to you for 
marshalling as well as I think could be done the arguments 
on your side. I think I will probably still file a dissent, 
although more limited than I had contemplated after the 
Conference discussion; therefore, this inquiry should be 
viewed as one coming from a potentially adverse party, 
rather than from an ally. 
I have the feeling that the position that you, I, 
the Chief, and Lewis at least in part have been adhering 
to in the Gooding type cases would limit the concept of 
"overbreadth" even in the First Amendment area. If I am 
right in this, ought not your Texas opinion to invalidate 
the Texas abortion statute only as applied to a litigant 
who seeks abortion within the first "trimester", rather than, 
as I understand you to do, invalidating it in toto? 
Second, would you permit any more latitude to Georgia 
in her procedural requirements after the first trimester, 
when apparently she is to be accorded greater latitude in 
the substantive determination of the circumstances under 
which an abortion may be had? 
Sincerely, , 
pttt 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
.. 
'. 
LAH ... ·ll/27/72 
Res Abortion Cases (No. 70"18 & 70-40) 
Judges 
We have received Justijce Blackmun's majority opinions 
in the two abortion cases. We have also received Justice 
Douglas' concurrence in each along with his separate 
comments. 
In compliance with your suggestion at conference, he 
has scratched the vagueness approach and has embraced the 
straightforward constitutional view taken by Judge Newman 
in the Connecticut case. Undisputably, these are better 
drafts than were circulatedlast Term. They are more 
scholarly, they show Justice Blackmun's efforts over the 
summer, and they, in the main, do not have the disquieting 
appearance of judicial fiat which lurked in the opinions 
last year. Of course, I urge you to join him. However, 
there are a number of aspects of the opinion that I deem 
important enough to bring #j to your attention. In the order 
in wihich each problem arisles in the opinions, I raise the 
following questions• 
ROE v. WADE 
(1) Pp. 12"14. HAB holds that the married couple, the 
Does, do not present an "actual case or controversy" because 
their claims
1 
are too remote and speculative. He finds that 
the injury alleged by the couple "rests on possible future 
contraceptive failurep possible future pregnancy, etc." It 
t h h · d · 1 w;.,J, h · seems o me t at t e~r concern rests more ~rect y ~ t e~r 
present marital relationship. Irrespective how speculat~ve 
~~ "b"l" f . .  poss~ ~ ~ty o preganncy ~Sp m4rr~ed couples often do 
--2--
take these family planning problems very seriously. For 
some, the knowledge that contraceptive failure may laad 
to pregnancy (Which is heightened in this case because 
of the woman's ph~iological problems requiring a restrict-
ion upon her choice of contraceptives) is enough to deter 
present sexual activitye•or, at least, to place emotional 
limitations on the enjoyment of that relationship. In 
an opinion that elevates the fundarnanetal right of privacy 
the legitimacy of a couple 9 s 
it seems unwise to denegrate i~il#~lil~il#lliiid~l~i~ 
family planning considerations. 
HAB intimates (p. 12) that the claims raised by the 
couple "are essentially the same as those i~ of Roe," and 
therefore the "issue of the Does' standing ••• has little 
significance. " Note that in an anal ago us situation in Doe 
v. Bolton, he decides not to pass on the "case orcontroversy" 
question regarding nursesp social workers and clergymen 
; QS'!S? t bsfn 7 · w• "for tre issues are adequately and 
sufficiently presented by Doe and the physician." (p. 9). 
I see no reason for him not to apply the same approach in --
Roe. The case-or-controversy issue is a close one; in some --measure his disposition undercuts the sanctity of the 
marital relationship; it is unnecessary to the disposition 
of the case. 
(2) P. 37 & p. 48. In his discussion of the concept 
of constitutional privacy, HAB properly l ites the applicable 
cases and accurately indicates that the right to privacy 
has been found in se~al different places. Then he states: 
....... )--
"This daight of privacy, whether it be found in the 
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty 
and restrfuctions upon state action, as we feel it is, 
or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth . 
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people,~ l+ 
brmad enough to encompass a woman 8 s decision whether 
or not to terminate her pregnancy. " ( ~~) 
He thus declares that it is the Ct's view that the right of 
privacy inheres in the concept of "liberty" under the 14th 
Amendment. (He underlines thi holding in the summation on 
page 48 when he says that the rt is in the due process 
clause of the 14th Amendment.) 
I do not think he needed to say where in the Constitution 
he finds the right. As Griswold indicates there is great 
differences of opinion on this question. Moreover, he does 
not state that it is not elsewhere so the possibility is 
still open that it is in some other provision. Nowhere 
does he explain why he finds it in the due proess clause 
JJ.'IlJ. 9 " .. ~mrather than in the th Amendment or in the penumbra. The 
" 
point he makes in the quoeed sentence is that the Ct has 
found the right heretofore and
1
no matter where it resides
1 
it covers this case. I , thereforep view the underlined 
clause as a gratuity unnecesaary to flithe result. He could 
. 
probably be persuaded to delete the clause and make the 
necessary word change on page 48 as well. 
~ \ (3) P. 47 & 48. 
-~~I have about the opinion. After establishing the necessity 
This is the most important reservation 
-~ o~alan~ing, and after recognizing that the state may have 
~ 






"We repeat that the state does have an important 
a~d legitimate interest in the potential~ity of human 
l l fe and that this interest grows in strength as the 
woman approaches term. At some point ~~ this interest 
becomes "compelling." We fix that point at, or at any 
time after, the end of the first trimester." 
Again, on page 48, in his recapitulation, he states that 
the state's right is out balanced during the first trimester. 
Nowhere does he state the basis for that "fixing." It __ __...__ .. ,..-...._.,_·~-----__.,......,--, 
......---· .. -·-
is clear that this is where he thinks the line may properly 
be drawn, i.e., where th~alance should be struck, but he 
does not explain how that decision is arrived at. 
~~ In this case, since the statutory prohibiton was 
~..,. ' , 
~~ t;,{ total, it is unnecessary to the result that we draw the 
.£ ~ line. If a line ultimately must be drawn, it~-~t 
"-----' · "viability" provides a better point. This is where 
Judge Newman would have drawn the line. It is consistent 
with common law history. Moreover, it comports with the 
rationale that the dliijid~#id#~jll#dl#j~li#i#ij controversy 
over the finding of the time of beginning of "life" is 
so great, and affects such intensely personal interests, 
that the Ct will not allow the state to make that judgment. 
At some point the controversy does not appear to be so great. 
Most people would probably agree that the state has a much 
greater interest in protecting a viable entity than it does 
at some earlier time. 
If an earlier time is to be accepted I think it incumbant 
upon HAB to explain how he finds and draws that line. 
As a political matter, it is my guess that if the 
opinion does not draw any line most states will adopt a 




24 weeks. We may eventually get a case involving a "first-
trimester" statute but I would have the Ct await that event 
and not anticipate it in advance. 
(4) P. 49. HAB has placed considerable emphasis on 
te ro~ of the physician and the free exercise of his pro-
fessional judgment. Indeed , on page 49, he states, " the 
u.c, 
abortion decision inherently is a medical one, and .e resp-
onsobility for that decision must rest with the physician." 
Doesn't it seem that this language overstates the doctor's 
role and undercuts the woman ' s personal interest in the 
decision7 All medical decision~ are the product of an 
agreement between patient and doctor. I see no reason, 
therefore, not to add a clause to this sentence indicating 
that the aborti6ion decision must rest "with the physician 
and his patient." 
DOE v. BOLJhTON 
Generally, I am not as enthusiastic about this opinion 
as I am about Roe v. Wade. While I do agree with his 
analysis on each of the major points, I have difficulty 
finding the rationale for his judgments. If he were following 
through clearly with the analysis launched in Roe he would 
address each of the state restrictions in terms of whether 
they satisfy some compelling state interest sufficient to 
overcome the fundamental right. In effect I think that this 
is what he does but his language has too much of a ring of 
substantive due process. He seems to hold that (1) the 
accreditation provisionp (2) the hospital committee require-
ment, and (3) the confirmatory consultation with 2 other 
•' 
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physicians do not serve any legitimate state interest of 
sufficient weight to overcome the woman°s and her personal 
physician°s interests. He does not talk enough in the 
careful language of "compelling state interest" although 
he embraces that basic approach. 
There is not much that can be done about this point 
since it does not lend itself either to easy alteration of 
the opinion or to easy explanation. Moreover, it is not 
critical since the language is sufficiently ambiguous to 
elude any charge of overt substantive due process. 
RECOMMENDATION 
I would urge you to talk to HAB about each of the 4 
things I have outlined in tb Roe case. Each could be easily 
handled and each would , in my view, improve the opinion and 
protect the Ct at tre same time. I view point 3 ("first 
trimester") as of overriding importance and would counsel 
that you not join until that matter has been aired. The 
other points I view as "ni~e to have" but not critical. I 
guess that you should not make any comments about Doe v. 
Bolton but #d~ use complimenary remarks regarding that 






CHAMBER S OF 
$5u:;rrtutt <4ou.rt of t4t 'Jllttittb ~tatta 
~att4inghttt, gl. <4. 21l~Jt~ 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
November 27, 1972 
Re: No. 70-18, Jane Roe v. Henry Wade 
No. 70-40, Mary Doe v. Arthur K. Bolton 
Dear Harry, 
You have done an admirably thorough 
job in these two cases, and I am in basic agreement 
with the results you reach. I shall perhaps write 
separately in concurrence. 
SJncerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
e ~ .,. 
November 27, 1972 
Re: Abortion. Cases 
Dear Bill: 
I think that my answers to the two questions you raise in 
your note of November 24 are as follows: 
1. I would have conceptual difficulty in invalidating the 
Texas statute only as applied to a litigant within the first trimester. 
I am not now prepared to say that immediately after the first tri-
mester a very restrictive statute of this kind would pass consti-
tutional muster. Part of my difficulty, of course, may be due to 
the approach I or~ginally preferred to the Texas statute. You may 
recall that in the 11 Spring Edition" I would have struck the statute on 
vagueness grounds. I still think it is vague and could not withstand 
ca1•eful analysis. I do not know, and I doubt if any physician can 
know, what is meant when the statute speaks o£ 11 the purpose of 
saving the life of the mother." We sustained the D. C. statute in 
Vuitch only because it also related to "health." My vagueness 
approach, however, did not find favor. Byron disagreed with it, 
and most of the others preferred to get to what they called the "core 
issue. 11 Thus, this time around, I used the Texas case as the primary 
one and did not reach the issue of vagueness. 
2. The answer to your second question is definitely in the 
affirmative. I agree that after the first trimester a state is entitled 
to more lati tude procedurally as well as substantively. 
Sincerely, 




November 29, 1972 
Aborticm Cases 
Dear Harry: 
As I have said, I am enthusiastic about your abortion opinions. 
They refieet impressive scholarship and analysis, and I have no doubt 
that they will command a court. 
In view of the complexity and delteaey of the subjeet and the 
issue involved, I suppose there will be - however - some suggestlODS 
and reservations before the votes are finally in. 
I write at this time to inquire whether you view your choice of 
''the first trimester" as essential to your deeistcm. In your covering 
memorandum of November 21 you suggest that this in an "arbitrary" 
time, but that any other selected point might be equally arbitrary. 
I have wcmdered whether drawtng the line at ''vlabUity'' - if we 
emelude to designate a particular point of time - would not be more 
defensible in logic and biologically than perhaps any other single time. 
I have reread Judge Newman's optnlm in Abele v. Markel (concurred 
in by Ed Lumbard). In addressing thta issue, he says: 
" • • • the state interest in protecting the life of a fetus 
capable of living outside the uterus could be shown to be 
more generally accepted and, therefore, of more weight 
tn the emstttutional sense than the interest in preventing 
the abortion of a fetus that is not viable. The issue might 
well turn on whether the time period selected could be 





accepted sense, rather than for the brief span of hours 
and under the abnormal conditions illustrated by some 
of the state's evidence. As to the latter situation, 
the nature of the state's interest might well n<X be 
generally accepted. Finally, and most important, such 
a statute would not be a direct abridgement of the woman's 
constitutional right, but at most a limitation on the time 
when her right coold be exercised. " 
I rather agree with the view that the interest of the state is 
clearly identifiable, in a manner which would be generally understood, 
when the fetus becomes viable. At any point in time prior thereto, 
it is more difficult to justify a cutoff date. 
Of course, it is not essential that we express an opinion as to 
such a date. Judge Newman did n<X do this explicitly. II. holding the 
Connecticut statute unconstitutional, he pointed the way generally 
toward "viability" without making this an explicit ruling. 
I am not sending a copy of this letter to other members of the 
Court. No doubt we will discuss your opinbm. in Conference, and I 
thought 1t might be helpful - to you and certainly to me - if you had the 
opportunity in advance to consider my reservation as above expressed. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blaekmun 
lfp/ss 
be: Larry 
' 0 \ 
Memo to: Larry Hammond 
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. January 3, 1973 
Abortion Cases 
I have now read more carefully the third draft, and I 
am prepared to join- unless you have some last minute advice. 
It seems to me that Justice Blackmun has reached a 
constitutionally sound result and stated it clearly. Although he 
gives credit in his memo of December l to others, I suggest 
that you are entitled -particularly in view of your education of 
me on the viability issue - to credit that is nonetheless substantial 
because it will never be recognized. I think I was perhaps the first 
to press for viability change. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
LFP, Jr. :pls 
•,· 
January 4, 1973 
Abortion Cases 
Dear Harry: 
I had the opportunity over the ''holidays" to review 
more carefully your circulations of December 21, and I am 
happy with the revisions. 
I commend you on the exceptional scholarship of 
. the opinions. 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
. ~ .... 
... : ·~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~ttprtmt Q}cu.rt of t4t 'J!Uiittlt ~htfeg 
~agftingtcn:. lf). <q. 2tl~J1~ 
January 11, 1973 
Re: Abortion Cases 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion in these 
cases. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
January 16, 19 73 
Abortion Cases 
Dear Harry: 
I think your proposed announcement is excellent, and will 
contribute to the understanding of the Court's decision. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. .Justice Blackmun 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~lt}trtmt ~qu:d ltf tqt 'J)lnittb .i>fattg 
Jf~lrhtghm. ~. ~ :W'bT~.;l 
January 16, 1973 
Re: No. 70-18 Roe v. Wade 
No. 70-40 - Doe v. Bolton 
Dear Harry: 
I am working over some concurrences in the 
above cases and will try to have them in your hands and 
circulated sometime tomorrow. I do not believe they 
will involve any significant change in what you have written. 
I s ·ee no reason why we cannot schedule these 
cases for Monday. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 




~uprttttt <qttttrt ttf t4t ~ttittb ;i$hrltil 
._N:lllpnghm. ;!El. <q. z.agm,, 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
' ' 
January 16, 1973 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: Abortion Cases 
I anticipate the headlines that will be produced over 
the country when the abortion decisions are announced. 
Accordingly, I have typed out what I propose as the 
announcement from the bench in these two cases. I enclose 
a copy of it for your review and advice. Please note the 
penultimate paragraph. 
I suggest that copies of this be given to Mr. Whittington 
for distribution to the press if any reporters desire it. It will 
in effect be a transcript of what I shall say, and there should be 




No. 70-18 - Roe v. Wade 
No. 70-40 - Doe v. Bolton 
These are the abortion cases that were argued first in 
December 1971 and again last October. They are appeals from three-
judge federal courts in the Northern Districts of Texas and Georgia, 
respectively. 
The law suits attack the constitutionality of the Texas and 
Georgia abortion statutes. The actions were instituted by pregnant 
women, both married and unmarried, by a married couple in the 
Texas case, and by physicians and others alleging an interest in the 
subject matter. 
The Texas statute is representative of those that are presently 
in effect in a majority of our states and that, for the most part, were 
enacted during the last half of the nineteenth century. The Texas 
statute prohibits any abortion, or any attempt at an abortion, except 
where it is procured by medical advice for the purpose of saving the 
life of the woman. It makes no reference to health, as does the District 
of Columbia statute considered in United States v. Vuitch decided here 
in the 1970 Term. 
The Georgia statute, on the other hand, was enacted only in 




Model Penal Code. It is representative of recent legislation enacted 
in approximately one-quarter of our states. It makes an abortion a 
criminal act with certain exceptions. The exceptions are those where 
the abortion is performed by a licensed physician and, "based upon 
his best clinical judgment, 11 the abortion is necessary because the 
pregnancy if continued would endanger the life or health of the woman, 
or the fetus would very likely be born with a grave and permanent 
mental or 'physical defect, or the pregnancy resulted from forcible or 
statutory rape. The Georgia statute also imposes procedural condi-
tions for the obtaining of the abortion. These are several in number, 
but among them are (1) Georgia residence, (2) concurrence in the abortion 
decision by two additional licensed physicians, (3) performance of the 
procedure in a hospital both licensed by the state and accredited by 
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, and (4) approval 
by a hospital abortion committee. 
The Texas federal court held that a woman had a right, pro-
tected by the Ninth and Fourteen Amendments, to choose whether to 
have children and that the Texas statute was void on its face. It, 
therefore, held the state statute unconstitutional. 






Georgia statute including the portion specifying particular circum-
stances in which an abortion may be sought, but upheld the balance 
of that state's statute. 
The plaintiffs in both cases took appeals here, and we set 
the cases down for argument successively. 
The abortion issue, of course, is a most sensitive, emotional 
and controversial one, perhaps one of the most emotional that has 
reached the Court for some time. The issue is a matter of great public 
interest and is not confined to lawyers and their law suits. Attitudes 
are firmly rooted and firmly held. At the same time, attitudes by no 
means are uniform. We are aware of this, and we are fully aware that, 
however the Court decides these cases, the controversy will continue. 
Our task, however, is to decide them on constitutional principles as we 
perceive those principles to be. 
In the Texas case we have filed a lengthy opinion that attempts 
to review the history of attitudes toward abortion, popular, legal, 
civic, and moral, from ancient times down to the present. We have 
endeavored, too, to note the change in attitu~es over the last century of 
professional bodies such as the American Medical Association, the 
American Public Health Association, and the American Bar Association, 
and, indeed, the changing attitudes among the courts of the country, 
' > 
• < •' ~ ' 
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No. 70-40 
both federal and state. This examination revealed a number of interesting 
things. One is the fact that most of the strict abortion statutes were 
enacted by the States about a hundred years ago. Another is the conclusion 
that it is very doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a 
common law crime, even with respect to the destruction of a quick fetus. 
A third is that there is little consensus, even among religious or medical 
groups, as to when life begins. Some would fix it at the moment of con-
ception. Others focus on quickening. Still others accept live birth as 
the significant point. 
We have concluded again, as the Court has done before, 
that there is a right of personal privacy under the Constitution. It is 
not spelled out in so many words, but the Court has recognized this right 
before in many cases and in varying contexts. We feel that it is founded 
in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restric-
tions upon state action. We further conclude that this right of personal 
privacy includes the abortion decision, but we emphasize that the right 
is not unqualified and that it must be considered against important state 
interests in regulating abortion. 
There are, we feel, two important interests that a state 
possesses and that if it so desires, it may seek to protect by legislation. 
The first is the state's interest in preserving and protecting the health 
No. 70-18 Page 5 
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of the pregnant woman. The second is the state's interest in protecting 
the potentiality of human life, irrespective of the moment when life 
actually begins. These interests are separate and distinct. Each grows 
in substantiality as the woman approaches term, and at some point 
during pregnancy each becomes "compelling." 
We thus have, in tension, the pregnant woman's right of 
privacy, on the one hand, and these two distinct state interests, on 
the other. 
We conclude: 
1. For that portion of the pregnancy stage prior to approx-
imately the end of the first trimester, the woman's privacy right dominates 
the interests of the state. It follows that, during this period, the abortion 
decision must be left to the medical judgment of the woman's attending 
physician. 
2. From that point on, however, the state's interest in 
protecting the health of the mother looms ever greater. As a consequence, 
the state, in promoting its interest in health, may, . if it chooses, regulate 
I -
the abortion procedures in ways that are reasonably related to maternal 
health. Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are 
requirements as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform 





where the procedure is to be performed; and as to the licensing of 
the facility. 
3. From and after viability, which is usually at the end 
of approximately the 26th or 27th week, and which is the point at which 
the fetus has a reasonable chance of independent life if it were then born 
or removed from the mother, the state's interest in protecting the 
potentiality of human life dominates the woman's right to privacy. It 
follows that the state may, if it chooses, regulate and even proscribe, 
that is, prohibit, abortion, except where it is necessary in appropriate 
medical judgment for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. 
4. The state may define the term physician to mean only 
a licensed physician, and it may proscribe any abortion by a person who 
is not a physician. 
We feel that this holding is consistent with the relative weights 
of the respective interests involved, with the lessons and examples of 
medical and legal history, with the attitude of the common law toward 
abortion, and with the demands of the profound problems of the present 
day. The states are thus left free to place increasing restrictions on 
abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens so long as those restrictions 
are tailored to the recognized state interests. The decision, we also 




that abortion is essentially a medical decision until, of course, those 
points in pregnancy are reached when the state interests become 
dominant. 
Viewed under this analysis, the Texas statute must fall, and 
·we, therefore, affirm, with one procedural exception, the judgment of 
the federal court of the Northern District of Texas. 
In the Georgia case we hold that the procedural requirements 
for J. C. A. H. accreditation for the hospital, for the hospital abortion 
committee, and for the two-doctor concurrence are unduly restrictive 
of the patient's rights and of the attending physician's rights. Similarly, 
we do not uphold the provision that the patient be a resident of Georgia. 
The remainder of the Georgia statute is allowed to stand. 
We thus strike a balance between the interests of a pregnant woman 
and the interests of the state in health and in potential life. Fortunately, 
the decisions come down at a time when a majority of the legislatures 
of the states are in session. Presumably where these decisions cast 
doubt as to the constitutional validity of a state's abortion statute, the 
legislature of that state may immediately review its statute and amend 
}t to bring it into line with the constitutional requirements we have 
endeavored to spell out today~ If this is done, there is no need wh~tsoever 




In closing, I emphasize what the Court does not do by these 
decisions. I fear what the headlines may be, but it should be stressed 
that the Court does not today hold that the Constitution compels abortion 
on demand. It does not today pronounce that a pregnant woman has an 
absolute right to an abortion. It does) for the first trimester of pregnancy, 
cast the abortion decision and the responsibility for it upon the attending 
physician. Thereafter, the decisions permit the state, if it chooses, to 
impose reasonable regulations for the protection of maternal and fetal 
health. And, after viability, they give the state full right to proscribe 
all abortions except those that may be necessary, in appropriate medical 
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. 
The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Stewart 
have each filed separate concurring opinions. Mr. Justice White has 
filed a dissenting opinion, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist has joined him in 
that dissent. Mr. Justice Rehnquist has also filed separate dissenting 
opinions for the two cases. 
H.A.B. 
LAH 1/16/73 
Rec Stewart's opinion in the abortion cases 
Judgec 
Yiou have asked me whether there are any reasons why 
you should resist joining in StewartQs concurrence. While 
I cannot answer the question unequivocally, there are four 
things that come to my mind that should probably bear on 
your dec is ion 1 
(1) The opinion is, primarily, a personal one. It is 
Stewart's explanation of how it is possible that he can 
join the majority now even though he dissented in Griswold. 
He wrote a lengthy dissent in Griswold (and joined another 
lengthy dissent by Justice Black) decrying substantive due 
process and felt some duty to justify his switch. Written 
with that ~motive in mind, I doubt (a) whether he antici-
pates that others whill join him, and (b) whether it is 
the sort of opinion that one ought to join. 
(2) Substantively, as I read it, it adds nothing new 
to HAB's opinions. It makes no points that are not made 
or are under-stressed in his opinion. 
(3) In one respect, however, it tends to obscure the 
holding of the majority opinion. Note on pp 4-5. PS 
says that "legitimate objectives are ..• perhaps sufficient" 
to justify more stringent regulations. There are few 
"perhapses" in Hab's opinion. Also he notes that 
health considerations are adequate to permit the State to 
"regulate aborions as it does other surgical procedures." 
I do not know whether HAB personally agrees with this state-
ment. His opinion seems to indicate that during the first 
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trimester the State's power will be significantly limited, 
possibly even more limited than its general power to 
regulate surgical procedures. My only point here is 
that Stewart's concurrence in this area contributes to 
the ambiguity of HAB 0 s opinions and you may think it un-
desirable to add a second vote to the confusion. 
(4) Finally, apart from the PS opinion itself, what 
do you think will be HAB's personal reaction to your 
joinder? Do you think it will in any way hurt his feelings? 
When you write an opinion for the Ct is disappoints me to 
have others writing separately repeating what I had hoped 
we had said aa fully and as completely as necessary. Is 
it possible that HAB will view your decision to join PS 
as an indication that PS says something that he did not 
say adequately himself? 
On balance, I lean toward recommending that you not 
join PS, although if you think PS will be pleased none 
of the thoughts I have expressed seem preclusive. 
LAH 




.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~tntt ~tmrl oJ tltt ~nittb ,iht.ttg 
._-u£riu.gton. ~. ~· 2D.;t'!~ 
January 23, 1973 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: Abortion Holds 
The Clerk has supplied me with a list of cases being held 
for the abortion decisions. Presumably, these will appear on a 
supplemental list for the ·Conference of February 19. I have chosen 
to review these holds now, while abortion is fresh in the minds of 
all of us, rather than immediately before the February Conference. 
The following cases do not concern the basic abortion issue. 
One or more of them are being held, not only for Abortion but for 
Obscenity. In any event, I am inclined to hold all of them further for 
obscenity: 
No. 70-1 - Grove Press Inc. v. Flask 
No. 70-10 - Florida Ex. Rel. Faircloth v. 
M & W Theatres, Inc. 
No. 70-23 - Thompson v. United Artists 
Theatre Circuit, Inc. 
No. 70-24 - ·Grove Press, Inc. v. Bailey 
I· 
I 
Abortion Holds Page 2 
No. 70-25 - Spivak v. Shriver 
No. 70-30 - United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. 
Thompson 
No. 70-35 - Austin v. Meyer 
No. 70-41 - Meyer v. Austin 
Noo 70-304 - Byrne v. P. B. I. Co, Inc. (This is the 
Massachusetts "Hair" case.) 
The following cases, it seems to me, really involve Younger v. 
Harris problems. None of them concern the basic abortion issue. I 
make no recommendation as to these cases, for I feel that each of us 
should approach them independently. 
No. 70-102 - Cahn v. Long Island Vietnam 
Moratorium Committee 
No. 70-120 - Mailliard v. Gonzalez 
No. 71-439 - Barlow v. Gallant 
The following are abortion cases: 




This case concerns the Louisiana statute which is 
similar to but not identical with the Texas statute. The 
three-judge court by a two-to-one decision upheld the statute. 
Thus, strict:ly on the abortion issue, I would be inclined to 
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vacate and remand for reconsideration in the li ht of 
No. 70-18, Roe v. Wade. There is, however, an 
interesting Younger v. Harris abstention angle in the 
case. The appellant, who is a licensed physician, was 
charged under the abortion statute. He claims that he 
was released on bail and never brought to trial. Soon 
after his arrest, the appellee Board notified the doctor 
to appear and show cause why his medical license should 
not be revoked. Before the hearing took place, Doctor 
Rosen instituted ·this federal action for declaratory and 
injunctive relief. 
The State, appellee, claims that in light of pending 
administrative proceedings before the Board, the federal 
court should have abstained. [This is an interesting asser-
tion, as the State won below.] Appellant claims that the 
administrative board could have given no effective relief. 
There is no provision, according to appellants, for judicial 
review of the Board 1 s determination. Thus, Younger and 
other cases would not apply. 
I am inclined to agree with appellants, but as a 
similar issue is raised in Gibson v. Berryhill, No. 71-653, 
this case might be held for that decision, and thereafter 
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remanded in light of both Gibson and the abortil n decisions. 
No. 70-89 - Rodgers v. Danforth 
This is an action by physicians, clergymen and women 
challenging the Missouri abortion statute. That statute is of 
the Texas type. The three-judge court abstained on the ground 
that no case or controversy existed (since there was no 
allegation that any of the plaintiffs had performed, or had per-
formed upon them, an abortion, or that any prosecution was 
pending or threatened, and stressing that there was as yet 
no authoritative 'state construction of the . challenged statute). 
The motion to dismiss is based soley on untimely docketing. 
I would vacate and remand for reconsideration in the light of 
, I 
No. 70-18, Roe v. Wade, and No. 70-40, Doe v. Bolton. 
' 
j No. 70-105 - Hanrahan v. Doe 
' l 
I 
This is a challenge to the Illinois abortion statute. 
l The Illinois Act is of the Texas form. The suit is a class 
action by four physicians and two women. · The three-judge 
court declared the Illinois statute unconstitutional insofar 
as it restricts the performance of abortions during the first 
trimester of pregnancy by licensed physicians in a licensed 
hospital or medical facility. Injunctive relief was granted. 
Judge Campbell dissented. You will recall that we have 
.. 
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heretofore granted a stay in this case. I would vacate 
and remand for reconsideration in the light of No. 70-18, 
Roe v. Wade. 
No. 70-106 - Heffernan v. Doe 
This is a companion to the preceding case. It is 
an appeal by a defendent-intervenor and guardian ad litem 
for the class of unborn children. I would have the disposition 
of this case follow that of No. 70-105. 
No. 71-92 - Corkey v. Edwards 
This is a· challenge to the North Carolina abortion 
statute. The statute is of the modern type adapted after 
the ALI model and is close to that of Georgia. I made 
reference to it in footnote 67 of the Texas opinion. The 
statute in some respects is more detailed than Georgia's, 
for it requires, when the pregnant woman is a minor, the 
l. written consent of the spouse or parents. The plaintiffs 
here were physicians and a layman. The three-judge court 
upheld the statute exc~pt for a four-month residency require-
ment. It denied the request for injunctive relief. Our Georgia 
decision bears directly on this case, and I would, therefore, 
vacate and remand for reconsideration in light of both No. 70-
18, Roe v. Wade and · No. 70-40, Doe v. Bolton. 
' ' 
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No. 71-1200 - Thompson v. Texas 
This is another case concerning the Texas statute. 
The appellant, however, is a licensed physician who was 
convicted of performing an abortion in violation of the statute. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the conviction. I 
would either (a) reverse outright or (b) vacate and remand for 
reconsideration in the light of No. 70-18, Roe v. Wade. 
On balance, I would prefer to vacate and remand. 
No. 71-5666 - Doe v. Rampton 
This involves the Utah statute which is of the Texas 
type. The three-judge court, by a divided vote, upheld the 
statute and denied declaratory and injunctive relief. I would 
vacate and remand for reconsideration in the light of No. 70-
18, Roe v. Wade. 
No. 72-56 - Markle v. Abele 
This is the first Connecticut case. Under attack was 
the former Connecticut statute. It was similar to that of 
Texas except that an abortion was legal "unless the same 
is necessary to preserve [the mother's] life or that of her 
unborn child. II The three-judge court by a divided vote 
declared the statute unconstitutional, and the state appeals. 
Thereafter, the Connecticut General Assembly was called into 
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emergency session, and a new bill was passed. This new 
bill is the subject of a second appeal hereinafter listed. It 
does not in so many words repeal the old statute. I would 
be inclined to vacate and remand for reconsideration of the 
issue of mootness. An alternative would be to affirm. I 
prefer the former. 
No. 72-69 - Kruze v. Ohio 
Here the Ohio statute is under attack. It is of the 
Texas type but refrains from declaring illegal an abortion 
"necessary to p~eserve [the mother's] life, or ••• advised 
by two physicians to be necessary for that purpose. 11 The 
petitioner is a physician who, apparently in a negligent manner, 
performed an abortion on a young girl who threatened suicide. 
Later she did commit suicide. The doctor was convicted by 
a jury. He challenges the statute and in addition asserts 
prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective representation of 
counselo The latter contentions, it seems to me, are not 
certworthy. I would grant, vacate and remand for reconsideration 
in the light of No. 70-18 , in Roe v. Wade. 
I 
No. 72-434 - Bryn v. New York City Health 
and Hospital Corporation 
This is the Ne.w York abortion case. The New York 
Court of Appeals refused to invalidate the liberal New York 
'; 
!' 
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abortion law. Among other things, it held that fetus 
is not a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The court went on to hold that the issue is not 
justiciable and that its resolution is to be left to the legislature. 
I would dismiss for want of a substantial federal question. 
No. 72-730 - Markle v. Abele 
This is the second Connecticut appeal. It concerns 
the 1972 Connecticut statute enacted after the first had been 
held unconstitutional. The new statute prohibits an abortion 
except one perfoTmed by a licensed physician when the 
abortion "is necessary to preserve the physical life of the 
mother and when such abortion is performed in a hospital 
licensed by the State of Connecticut." The same three-judge 
court was convened and by the same divided vote it held the 
statute unconstitutional. I could (a) affirm or (b) vacate and 
remand for reconsideration in the light of No. 70-18, Roe 
v. Wade, and No. 70-40, Doe v. Bolton. On balance, I lean 
toward affirmance. 
I should point out that in No. 71-106 no motion to dismiss or 
affirm has been filed. It is my understanding that with respect to an 
appeal the absence of such a motion does not prevent our discussion of 
H. A.B. 

























































































































































































































Messrs. Hammond, Kelly 
and Wilkinson 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: February 2, 1973 
Mr. Justice Blackmun's memorandum of 
January 23 re abortion holds 
I plan to follow Mr. Justice Blackmun in all of his recommendattooa, 
subject to discussion at the Conference. 
He makes no recommendatiou, however, as to three cases em 
p. 2 of his memorandum in which Younger issues are raised, namely: 
70-102, 70-120 and 71-439. 
I woold appreciate it if you (the respmsible clerk) would give me 
your reeommendatton with respect to each of these prior to the February 
16 Conference. 





Messrs. Hammond, Kelly 
and Wilkinson 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: February 2, 1973 
Mr. Justice Bla.ekmun's memorandum of 
January 23 re abortion holds 
I plan to follow Mr. Justice BlaekmWlin all of his recommendations, 
subjeet to discussion at the Conference. 
He makes no recommendations, however, as to three cases m 
p. 2 of his memorandum in which Younger issues are raised, namely: 
70-102, 70-120 and 71-439. 
I would appreciate it if you (the responsible clerk) would give me 
your recommendation with respect to each of these prior to the February 
16 Conference. 
L. F. P., Jr . 
..... , ... · 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
~qrtutt <lfoud of flrt 'Jifuittb ,ihdtg 
~altltin!lhm. ~. <!f. 2ll,?'t.;f 
February 2, 1973 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
In the light of Justice Blackmun' s memorandum of 
January 23 I suggest we request the Clerk to strike 
the first nine cases (under the "Hold for" category) 
from the Conference List, page 15, for February 16. 
Unless I hear to the contrary I will so instruct the 
Clerk, requesting that the cases be relisted after 
the obscenity opinions have been announced. 
Regards, 
LAH 2/21/73 / 
No. 70-18 & 70-40 
Roe v. Wade, Doe v. Bolton 
The rehearing petitions in the abortion cases add 
nothing. I thought that you'd be interested to know that 
the State of Georgia relies on your opinion in Shadwick v. 
Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) in which you warned against 
"conve:tting desirable practices into constitutional 
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This action CamQ on for hearing before the three-judge 
district court, Honorable J. Edward Lumbard, United Stutes 
Senior Circuit Judge, Honorabla .T. Emmat Clarie, United 
States Distr:f.ct Judge, and Hono:rn.bla Jon o. Ne~1Illall, United 
States District Judgo, D41d thG issues having baen cluly heard 
and a ~randum of decision, dated September 20, 1972, 
hnving been duly rendered, it is 
ORDERED tlult plaintiffs 1 prayer for a judgment declilr· 
1ng Public Act No. 1, May 1972, special session, Connecticut 
General Assembly, unconstitutioMl be, and hereby is, 
granted; and it is further 
ORDERED that defendants, their agents, servants, em• 
ployees, and attorneys, and those persons in active concert 
' or par
1
ticipation ~~ith them a.:-a permanently enjoined £rom 
taking any action to enforcG any of the provinions of 
Public Act No. l, Y~ 1972, special session, Connecticut 
I . 
General Aoscmbly, 
' ·• ··. 
... 
. , 
" . . 
• 
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Dated thia 20th da.y of SeptcDbcr, 1972. 
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·. ·, . 
J. Edtmrd Lumbard 
United Statoa Senior Circuit JudgG 
~ .. · . ..; . ·. 
. ;
Jon o. :Ne"'-"11'-.m 
United Staten District Judge 
I dissent from the Judgment, for the 
reasons expressed in my accompanying 
Opl.Ul.Oil. 
T • E1TJ41Gt: Claric 
·United States Diotrtct Judge, 
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mt~!AN, District Judges 
.;z:-• :;o ..... 1-W!OIL~!-WUM OF DECIS10!~ 













The issue in this casa is the constitutiotullity of 
Connecticut's recently cnncted lmt prohibiting all abortions 
except t11oso ncccasa~y to oa.ve tha phyoieal life of the 
y 
; mothor. Public Act Uo. 1, 11ay 1972, special session. The 
case is an outgrowth of previous litigntion beforo tha same 
jud.Bas tJho colJ!ilriso Cl~ia Court. Our prlor decision, rendered 
on April 18, 1972, declared unconstitutional G» 53-29, 53-30, 
tmd 53·31 of tha Connecticut General Statutes, statutes en-
nctcd in 1860 that had prohibited obo4tions subject to 
. virtually tho c~a c.xccption ns the prCDcnt st!ltuto D.nd had 
: Also prohibited ndvice and devices concerrU,nz abortionn • 
. Abele v. M~rklc, 342 F.Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972). Plnintiffs 
: 1n thio and tho c.crlicr litigation m:a Devaral hundred 
womun includi113 doctozoo, nw:scG, socilll worl~s and other a 
~ho vioh to aclvisc concerning abortions, n~d. pregnant uoman 
'lo;Uo \1ish to b~vo Llll abo~tion. Dofcudantu in both caooo .nre 
tho o to. to attorney ~cnorul m1d tho s tnto' a attorneys, tl1a 
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latt~ having juriocliction to pro~ccuto for violations of 
tho clulllcnged stnt"'~to. 
After our e:1rlicr c!ecicion.- tho Connecticut General 
Aosem!>ly tiiDt in a Gpccial se~zion and on Hay 23, 1972, en-
. nctcd Public Act No. 1. T'ncrcaft:cr pL:Untiffg filod in tho 
prior et1sa a n:otion to enjoin tha enforcement of the new 
y \ 
swtute. On May 31, 1972, tho Chief Judge of this Circuit 
des~gnated tha threa judges who had heard tba prior caae to 
be me:IWcro of a new three-judge diatrict court, purnuan~ to 
-28 u.s .. ;:; .. S 2234, to bct1r the constitutional challenga to 
the naw utatuta. · Dolicving tl~t: thi:l challenge should be 
hoard -in a scparttto c~ce, wa ordered tlult tha UlOtion papero 
?./ 
bo con3idored a complaint end filed with a new caao numhcr. 
A hearing was subocqucmtly hold at which both sidea prcDente 
witnesses. In addition various documents and pbotogropha 
hnva also been presented and considered. and we have had tho 
benefit of helpful briefs by mnici curiae supporting both 
sidea. 
Tho suhst~ntive provisions of ~s 1972 legislation pro-
hibiting ~bortionG ere quite similo.r to the 1860 statutes. 
However, tho lfl60 exception which had pe1."mi.tted nn abortion 
\Jhon necossllry to prescrva the lifa of tha -woman or that of 
tba unborn child ban baen limited in the n~i' statuto to an 
a~ortion "nccco•'Hlry to PJLQCiOl.'"VO tho phyoic&tl life of the .... .. ...... 
100thcr." The maximum ponaltica \4hich had been . ·two yc:.rs 
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'• 
year for enC-ouraging m1 ribo.:-tion. Imva ~:tll bean oat at fiv~ 
yearo. Hora signi~ic~tly, while t:hcl fortiWr GtatutEUl 1n;4do 
no explicit rcfere:J.Co to tho stnto interest they ware pur-
porti'C3 to adv.:mco, tho firzt caction of t:ha 1972 lc&,1Dlat1o-
. ..... 
Thus tha Connecticut G~cral At>acrcl>ly twa CA--prassed ito 
jucl~nt • in th3 tc:~t: of tho cha.llc.ngcd s tatuta, that tho 
21 
lifa of a fotu& should b3 protected. !iLat specification 
of legislativa .purposc rGicca the constitutional queotion of 
. \1hethor tho stata ha.a power to advance such 4 purpose by 
abridging almost totally tho constitutionally protected righ 
of A w-oman to privacy and pernonal choica in matters of sex 
and family life. 
such privn.cy bas been net forth by tha Suprema Court. 
Eicenr;t~dt v. Bnird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Gric-;mld v. Conn• 
.~cticut, 381 u.s. 479 (1965). Indeed, Baird ~1 have antici 
patcd tl1Q outcor:.a oi cacC3 6Uch us thin ~hen tha Court 
observed: · 
· I 
"If tho richt of priv.:lcy r.~:'!~m!J an1thin;t 1 
it in the rl:;ht of t:ho indi vic~u~!_, Dl:.li.A:icd 
or nlnr,lc, to be free £ro::1 \41\ ,laL.-r.J.ntcd 
govcl"TT:"·l~nt.:ll intru::;ion into a'lttcro co 
funu~m~tally ~fioctin~ a pcroon aa tho 
'0 
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dccicion ~noth<n:' to benr or beget a child." 
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~antio;1 tlult tha sbltuto hero challenged is a direct abridg -
mcnt of har righ'=• ·· It i~ not a regulation of the manner in 
1-1hich abortio:w ~y ba parformcd, such as in approprin.ta 
medic(ll facilitica or by approprlnto medical personnel. It . 
is an cl>r;oluto prohibition. And the prohibition npplias to 
every caca of n p::czrumt tror-"".nn uith the colo exception of 
an aho~tion noccsDary to prcncrva the ~~·s lifa. 
Gri!;,_·,old illuGt-:atcG t\·N cpproacllea to the constitution l 
iosua posed by thia CClGo. ~· Tho opinion of Justica Douglas 
appc.o.rs to posit tho right of marital privacy alii an absolute 
right, totally il:zru::o f~c;u cts~a abridgement. Tha opinions 
of Junticea lliu:'U:w,. ~mite and Goloocrg, ho~Taver, all concede 
that tho rlght r:.:lY be abridged if thQ stat~ can demonstr<lte 
tbnt ita regulation is founded upon a nufficiently compell 
otato interest. - · 
It mt1y well ba that tho right of a w-oman to decide 
"'hot:hcr or not to cnn-y to tcr.11 tha fetuo within her is s 
right itr~a fro~ total govcr1~tal abridg~cnt. Cer~ly 
tho int:crcsto of n \-:OI!laA'l in giving of hor phyoical and 
emotional colf du~ing prc~~ncy and tho interests that ~ill 
. 
ba Affcctod throur.hout her lifo by tho bitth nnd rnioin~ of 
a child ~o of a f~ 3rcotcr dc~rcc of Girruificunco and 
pcroorutl intim..1cy than tho ri:;ht to oond a child to private 
• 
,. 
.. '-· -. 
. ' . ' 
-s-
...... . , .. 
. .. -·· ' ' . 
.., . 
.. , ' . . 
... .. "' . . 
school protected in PicT.cn v. Sociot7 of Sintcro, 268 o.s. 
510 (1925) • or tho righ: to teach a foraizn l.nnguago pro--
tected in Hayer ~.:r. Ncbr~ckn, 262 u.s. 390 (1923). The 
eicions "fulva renp3ctcd the privnta realm of family Uf'e 
w!1ich tha state cnnnot enter." Prince v. ll.'1.!Hmchuoettn :>. 321 
u.s. 158, 166 (l944)(emphssi.D added). 'l'ha right to an 
aborti:on is of even greater concern to .tho "'""ODnn than tho 
rizht to uaa a contraceptive p::otect~d in Grls~:-old v. Conn• 
ecticut, ctt.:>rn, for contraccptio:l iD not tha only means of 
preventing pragnun~)', l7horcos abortion iG tho only mesnn of 
tcrr.rl.nating m1 tm""..:~ted pxcgn.:mcy. Tho ~ignificanco of tha 
'W01ll3tl'o . right might ba discou7tted Gor:lewhat if chca simply 
ch:mged her mincl nftc:r a doliborato decision to become 
pregnane. nut the oignificunca of tllCJ right ia extremely · 
high if prcgru1ncy result:: becauBe the ~'"Oman · io ignorant, 
. or bec~:nwc through no ·fc.ult of he~ o~~ 4 contraceptive de• 
vica has failed, nnd tha Gi~ficcnco is at · tha ut:ll:Ont -when 
prcgrumcy recult3 . bee<1usa tha '\vcnwn hrul been. r.n.ped. 'l'ha 
statute before. us abridges the 't.lOmml' s right in all of these 
situtltions. 
Ho\wever, cine a ttOst rn.c:ubars of tho oajority in Grir;"'·olcl 
I 
sought · to apply them:.:pcll:tng ntato interest teat. -wa ara 
' . §} 
obli~cd to do tho Du~o. No~~lly that ~~uld rcquiro Ukiking 
tho difficult jucltjtlcr,t: uo to \·lhcthc.r the strlt<l intcrost 
aoocrtcd in cufficicntly compcllin3 to juotify ubrid~cmont 
\ 
' 
of tho wom.:ul 1 s coru»tit:utional right. But tharo aro br"' 
dictinguiobing anpecto of this cnoa that require co~idcr&• 
tion beforo tha c~to int:cros~ CQ b0 weighed ~ainst tha --
~1o:.l:ln 1 G ri~t. The first concorna the nature of tha rights 
poose~sed by tilo fat"~~ fo-: \vhoGa benefit tha sblt:e int:erest 
is aaoe:rtcd. I Tha second concorns tha nature of tho otata 
interest bej_ng asncrtcd. 
A.. Tho init~l in~; is whether the fetus is a per• 
son, -vrl.thin tha mc.~~niMZ of tho fourteenth amendment, having --a constitution~lly protected right to lifo. If it is, tlten 
a legiol!ltura n::y ~all l1avo oomo diacretion to protect that 
right even at tha expanse of someone o~e1 o constitutional 
right. Eu·t if tho fetus lacks conotitutional rights, the 
question then becomes -whether a laginlatura may accord a 
purely statutory right .ut thG expcnso of nnothor per!:on 1 s 
eonatit-ution:ll right: • . . 
_Our concluoion, based on tha text and history of the 
Conatitution nnd on cuscn intcrp1.·cting it, is th:tt a fetus .. "-"' . 
is not a creon "dthin tha meru1ing of tho fourteenth amend• 
~:&&!·· Thel:e is nothing in tha hictory of tru:lt lilllCndmcnt 
nor in ita intcl'"Pl.·ctzt::!.on by the Suprema Court to give c..ny 
cupport t~b:ltcvm: to the contention thAt a fetus has con-
stitutioru:1l ri[;ht:G.. In pnited St~tc9 v. Vuitch,, 402 u.s. 

















ctruing tho ·fltatuta to por.:llt abortiona to protect nQt only 
tho r.cothor'o life ancl phyoicul health but her mental health 
sa well. If a fetus t~as a pcrcon· with a fourteenth amend-
ment right not to be d~privcd of life except by due process 
of lAw, it io inconcciv,!lbla that tha Court ~"'Uld have re• 
tlolvod a do-ubtful quo~tion of statutOry conGtruction by en-
larging tha . :.it:uation.-J in which such a life could ba ex-
tingui~hc.d. · l'.oraover. l;'ailo Vu:ttch did not rulo on either 
tha constitutional right of tha fetus or t:ha cotUJtitutional 
. :right of tho ~, tho decision ca.ata not tha slightest 
doubt on tho validity of :1 atat:uto permitting nn nborticn to 
pro tact a woiJ:Ul' s m....---ntal hoolth. Surely tho ·Court ~ould 
have withheld even ~cit: .approv.:1l of abortions in such cir• 
cumst:Dnces if the conoequanco -was the tendnation of a Ufe 
entitled to fourteenth amcn~·ant protection. 
No decision h41::: c~e to our attention holding tbat; a 
fetus has fourteenth Qllcnclmcnt rightn. Tho isGue wao 
cqunroly faced by at least t:wo of tha courts that have sus-
tained tho constitutionality of Dt:sto laws permitting 
abortiordl • .. BYE!! v. !r~H Yo~1~ Citv R~nlth_r~ Hor:pitnlo Corp!.• 
_n. Y .2d_ (1972); HcGm:vcy v. H~:tcc-Ho!':v~ n • o 11o~pitnl, 340 
F.Supp. 751 (U.D. Pa. 1971). C£. Pea v. Henrahini, 339 F. 
Supp. 986 (D. I<an. 1972). B)"i..'"Il nnd l-!cGnt\7cy reject tha 
. i: ~ 
. cl.nm th~~ a fetus hao fourt:oc•1th am.cnt.bent righto. Indeed, 
I 
it io difficult to ~inc ho-;1 ll ctAtutc permitting aboxtion 
could ba conntitut:io~l if tho fctuo l1t1d fourteenth mr.cnc!-
• 
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ment rlght3. Even ono of tho fc-~ decioion9 ouattdning tha 
constitutionality of a restrictivo nbortion otututo casi:s 
no daub~ on the propriety of :.t lcgiollltiva judgment per- · 
mitting ~bortion ~hero tber0 ia subatm1tial rlslt that: the 
mothor1 a health ~ould be gravely impaired or ~here pregnancy 
resulted from rApe or inccat. Corkey v. Edmrrds, 322 F.Supp. 
1248 (H.D. N.C. 1971). UG do not beiieva such circumstanceo 
could justify tcl."tlin.tlting tho lifo of a person with four-. . y . 
tec:1th m:.endmcnt righto. 
If tho fetus mn:vivcG tha period of geat.ation, it '~ill 
bo born and then becom3 c parson entitled to tha legal pro• 
tac:ti.ons of th<a Constitution. But it9 capacity to become 
such a. person doos not mc:m that during gestation it io such 
0. per non. . 'Xbe unfertilized ovum also baa tha capaci~ to 
beco-me a living hu::llml being, but t:l1o Const:il"utioli doea not -----
o.ndou it with rights vhich the stato mny protect by inter-
fering t4ith tha individual• s choice of ~,h~ther tho ovwn · 
· .~7ill be fcxtilizcd. . Grim·1old v. · Connecticut, ,supra. 
Of course, the fact tha.~ o. fetus is not a pcroon en-
titlad to fourtacnth amonc!mont rii;hto dooa not mean tlult 
goven1mcnt may not confer righto upon it. A wido range of 
rizhto ha.s bocm accordc.d by ctntutes nnd court dccisiono. 
TllcGa i include the ri~ht to co::pcnsation for tortioUD injury • 
tbQ right to pa.rcntlll Liuppot't, and thQ r~~;ht to i.nhcr:I.t 
I 
proport"'J•-·· Dut: tho cr~ntin3 of t.hcco righto was not dono at 










fM.zor b:xo -co con.Dt:itutio;:ul 4:1~t: to inflict injury" on a 
upon n fetun tho absolute right to be born .contrary to tha 
profcrcnco of a prc~t o;;o:t:m, it :;bridges her conotitutio~~l 
right to morlt;ll ~d cexual privacy. Whothor it ~y do GO 
crmnot be cGt{&bll::;had by tha feet: tlul~ other prot:ectioru; c:.m 
It 1a ono thinz to pc.-mit n legi.Glatura coma discretio.:l 
- in ndju~tinz ccl:lflicting ~ir;bto batworu1 groupa of peopla, 
o~ch of ,.;ho;a btl~ a. c~im to constitutional protection. Soe,. 
o.s. ~ I\ntzcnb~ch '(],. U~Cltn·u.~, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); ~Tones v·. 
Alfro·:J n. lbvc-r Co., 392 u.s. 409 (1960). It in altogether 
diffcr~~t to cuzcoGt ~t o legioLatura can accord a ntatu• 
tory right to a fct:ua ~1uch lc.clw constitutional righta "~hen 
~oinz ~o requir~a tho abrldgC!llmlt of a womr.n' s own consti tu• 
tiorull :i:ight.. l~Q doubt a rlght to be born is of groater 
significcnca thml tho right to receivo compensation for 
tortiouo inj~-y or othor pccuni~ or property rights. But 
it ia doubtf-ul '\.;hathCj!' tho constitutioMl riebt of the 
mother con be totally abrid:;cd by a lcgiolativa effort to 
confer evcm u aignifi~t statutory right upon a fetw:i vhich 
doco not l1aVG ony four~ccnt:h umcnd.r.cnt rizhts. 
I' 
Be· ~10 otato intcroot ~dvanccd by thio ·GtatUtQ ia 
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lulvo boon claimed, in other cncoo, to be oufficiently 
ecmpolling to ju.st:ii'-y :lmpair-....c.nt: of conot:itutional rights. 
A compolling stz:.to intor~nt baa generally bocn one whera 
\ . .. 
I .. . . 
- ' 
tha natura of tho inte~ost ~~an broadly acceptad, uith dispute 
rcrJ.aining only ns to w'hcthor tho sta.to could constitutionnlly 
advanca that intercot by the specific menno baing challenged. 
\ 
mwn Ju:lcric.:ma of Japancco clasecnt w~re placed in relocation 
camps ·· ao a protection in tho event of invasion, it lmD 
wiuely ncccpecd that th~ra wao sn important gov~tal 
intcroot in r.rl.libcy oecurity, evan though it wno a t'ilattor 
of &hm."P dispute w11.othor that interest could justify an 
abridgement of conntitutiordll rightG baaed on a racial 
clnooific~tion. . Rorc~~tnu v. United State~, 323 u.s. 214 
(1944). Evon t·ihcro a govCl:'l1LlCntal intcreot has been found 
not: cufficicntly comp~lling, thora io uzually no diaputa 
olo ut. tbtl natura of the state intcrant. For example, in 
N.h .. A.C~P .. v._ Alnbmrt1 1 357 u.s. 449 (1958), the at:ate of 
Alabama had a eencrally accepted interest in tha enforcement 
of ita corpora to lavm; the conot:itutiolll.ll issue wasHhethar 
that: aclcnowlcc.lgcd intcrcot ~ma sufficient to juGt:ify di:r-
clorrura of N.A.A.C.P. m~bcrchip liGtG, an impnirmcnt of 
first amendment ri~to. 
In thi~ c&lao tha conotitutio~l iacuc l1ould be dif.fi-
1 
cult pnough if it involved dctcn:roinin(; wh~tbc.t" thll '-x>man' a 
x4;ht to privacy ia out~tcichcd by tho atata interest in 
.. .. ---
protecting tha lifo of tl1e foL'UGe nut hero thora is GGrious - ........_......_ __ _- .. -.. 
'-~;·· 






. ' .. 
dicputo concerninz tho nature of tha stata interest to bo 
; weighed. SomQ belicva tila fctuo ia in every re~cct a h~ 
. . 
baing f~o:n the r:omcnt of conception. Others beliova therGI 
is a point dur:lng tha prcgrum~J t;hcn :lt bacori"~a in m.my 
rcopccw a hu111cn bcd.,"1J. Still othera boliovo ~t until it 
is hom, a fc~ ia. r:crely G ~r;~ of protopl.'lsm, ti'hich, 
though it uny h~va ccr.na attrib<ltcD of a human beinz Guch as 
hunger ~d a ne.....-vous syctcra, ~ not a hlllilan baing in o.rq 
21. 
ocnso. no cleci::;icr.1 of tho Sup~G Court: hila cvor permitted 
tm.yono'ts c:on1;ti~tiOl.1.3l rig!lt to ba directly abridged to 
protect a statQ inte.rast ~vhich is subject: to nuch a vtlrl.cty 
of parvoMl judg;=onts. Whnt:ovor di.ccration a legislature 
tl4.."")' have 1n dec:Ldinr;, -vithin conut:tt:utional litrl.t:o. to acoort 
a t;encrn.lly aclo:~o-wlcdgod state intc:rest at the el:pensa of 
a conctituticn..:.l rl:;ht, it cnn=.ot do co hera where tho 
significanca of the conotitutional right ia cxtr4tordinarily 
~1, and tho na~o of the stnto intcrcct assertod is it• --celf a matter of ouch diverse personal judgment. Such an 
intercot ca4U40t acquiro tha forco of a governmental decroo 
to nbriclge nn indivic!ucl's connt:itutional r:I.cht. To uphold 
ouch a G~tuto ~~ould pc.""mit tho Gtato to imposa its view 
: of tho nature of ~ fctwl upon thosa who huva tho coootitu• 
tional right t:o bnca llil ix:port®t dccioion in their pcr-
1 
conal11ivcG upon a d!ffc~cnt vic~. 
No doubt in tho Oz>inion of l:l...'lil7 pcoplo tho nature of a 




• . I 




! ta.inty. In ·the!:: vic-:.J, porh....--pa in tho vicu of ~om0 of tha 
' 
' . 
! log1olntoro ~7ho en.::.ctcd thio otat:uta. abortion io conoidcrod 
: tho aelibe.xLlte !:.ill~ of a lr~ bain.go 'W3 do not doubt 
tho sincorit'-..1 of thooo who hold thio viet.:. nor min1mizo thci 
depth of their ccnv.l.ction. in this zcgard. llut under tha 
ona tl41.t thay m:J.y follo\1 in tJ."'lair pcr~l livoo and ceek to 
: patriotizm to pc..'l*Oi~ L"'ldividw.l school children to decline 
i to pledge ullcgi.cnco t:o tho flag bcenuno of thci: pornonal 
tivo of A:"eligion ~o bar public t;chcol nutho~it:ioG fr<Q con .. 
ducting roli;;io~ c:'crcioc:;; in !3choolo. There ~a thooe 
· · tvbo belicV(!l it in destructive oi family life to permit the 
use of cont:rc:~.ccptivco. In c~ch inotanca, the viewpoint · 
behind tho challenged govexu..;.cntal .action l1nn a scrioun, 
thoughtf-ul jud~aut, deeply held by large nu.mbero of people. 
; But in cnc.h inctcnco t.."la Su?rcna Court ruled that Guch a 
. viewpoint could not constitutionally bo it:~oscd by tha power 
of tha. r;tnt:c upon indivlduulc tvho did not ohara this vim1 • 
. ... .. . 
J-rcnt V5:ri';in:t.':'l. f.tntc no~rd of Educ. v. nnrn~ttc, 317 U.S~ 624 
(1943); Enn;nl v. V:1.ta!.£, 370 U.fi. 421 (1962); Grir:~~old v. 
. I • . . . 
Co.m1cet:tcut, r,urn:-.1. T11c prcmioc of tho no dccioiorw, ond of 
tho Bill of llit;htG itt;olf, iD clu1t in tho lon3 run, 11at:riotinj 1, 
...... ,. 
\ 
~ · . 
.. .. 
' .. •. 
. , 
' roligicn, and fmn.ily lifo Yill flourloh bottoo: in an er!vU'on-
I 
: mc.nt of indivioun.l frcod.c:l if o~to rczimcntntion of thought 
1a prohibited. Tho CMt-10 prcmico. lcach:J to tho coucluaion 
that a wom.:m' a right to dec ida ~hctbm: to h::.va an abortion 
i'huo, tho cc~olll.nz Gt.:lto intorcot t.ot~t cmmot ba 
o.ppliod in thio ~o in tho s~ wa.y it lw:J boan applied in 
tho otata int:crcct boin3 z;u;zcrtcd iD trUbjcc~ to t<lidcly vary-
ins porrion.al vieu~.., Of courzc. lcgir;Llt:ion io not rendered 
unconutitutior1.:1l olz:?ly bcccuoo it otivanceo a social policy 
nbout "iihich pcoplo differ. Ho1.'"nUllly it: is tho legiclat:ivo 
function to renolvo such difforcncos. Dut whore a stato 
interest cubjcct: to ctich vm:iety ~f vic~-JPOint is asserted 
on bclmlf of ~ fotu!j ~hich lacks conotitutionnl rlghto, and 
·uhora tho aooortion of cuch an intc:?:~3t ~;ould accompli~h 
; tho vh-t:ually totul c.b:.-id3cz:~nt of a · coo.ct:U:ut:ional r-lght: 
I 
. of spocisl oigni:Zi~nco, in t.hosa cttC'lQ.9tanccu such a s~ta 
intcrcnc cannot prcvcil. 
Tho Gtato oalT.o~tly urgos upon us· conoidar~tion of tha 
oitu~tioll ~vllOl:O ~l1 ~bort.ion por.fo~<l ~to in o. p;:c~1ncy 
rocultn in a "live birth. 11 Evidcnco w~:; offered tO chow 
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1 several bourn nft:or :m cbortion opcr~tion. It in not en-
I 
' . 
,. ' . ' 
L tircly clem: which of t:t.~ alternative content:ionll tha ntnta 
· ~ llmld.nz: (a) tfu:t the Gtato has a compelling intareat in 
. . 
protecting the lifo of ~ fetus -which actually survives nn 
D.bo:rtion opc:ativn; or (b) tr..nt the sts.ta luls a compelling 
intcrc:;t in protecting t:ha life of a fetu!l in utero t1hich 
han progressed to tha point during pregnancy when it could 
surviva out:sida ~"lc utcru~~ Of couroe, noithar contention 
ju~tifio~ P'ublic Act No. 1, 'bcc:!uoe the abridgcmont oi tha 
. ~'a constitutiontll right a.ccom;>lichcd by thia statuto 
is ftrr more cxtcnsiva th4m vhat ~.,ould ba required to protect 
j tho lifo of n fcz:u.::, in oitb.cr of tha oitu.ntiono just des• 
' 
; crlbc.do A stst"Uto D.:J.Y r..ot advanca a governmental iutcrent 
intorcat tn.LlY be. nciv~nced by a lees dr~stic nbrldgcm~nt:. 
Sea, e.g., Unit~d Stnt~s v. Robel. 389 u.s. 258 (1967). And 
uhilo -wa need not m'ld. should not e.t~rcos r,ny conclusion 
about Gtatutcs .ndvtmcing such l:lara limited interests • llnaly-
. Bis of them does serva to highlight tha invalidity of tha 
; st::.t:utc before us. 
If a statute protected the lives of nll fetusca bora 
nlivc, i~ "~uld ba protecting persons entitled to f~-tccnth 
' mnancl:i:lcnt rlghtn. And while thcro m.:1y bo · soma variation in 
vio\Jpoint, it "'"-ould bo generally nccoptcd that tho right: to 
Wo of a live btiby, born throu:;h cu1."'Vivrtl of an abort: ion 








.... . -. .,.\-. 
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protect. 2-~covcr, a statuto pratoctinz tho lifa of such a 
surviving fctuo ~ould not i~:Iz tho w"'nlan1 s right to lln 
abortio;t. Tnc wom:m ~had tha ~rtion; it simply bun not 
-If a statuto &ought to p~otcct tho l~voo of nll fetuocn 
tdrl.ch could OUivive ontnido tha uto1:tta, such a sbltute would 
bo c legisULtiva acccpUlncc of tho concept of viAbility. 
Uh.ilo ~utho4"itics m.o.y diffor on tho precise time. there io 
no doubt that c.t :zoza point dar-Jr.g· pre~cy a fetun is 
· ~~blQ, "'lith p~cr ~~diccJ. attention, of &m-viving outr.:ida · 
---
tho utenw. Ancl it io equnlly clear that thara ia a. mini.r:nlm -
point before wllich outviv.71l out.sido the ut<U.-uo is not. 
w 
po~Dibla. A statute dcoigned to prevant thB deotruction 
of fctusea afte;: viv.bility ha~ bacn reached 'i'."'uld ba subject 
to theria ~ncid.crctions. Like tho prcDent: statute, it 
wuld be confc:rrLlg :;~tutory rights on a fetun which doas 
not hava constitutiot~al :righto. Hol7cvcr, thG Dtate interest 
in protecting tha lifo of o. fetus en able of living outside 
the uteruo could bo she"'~ to be mora generally accepted nnd, 
therefore, of 'lW:OC l-tcight in tha constitutiorull sensa tlmn 
. 
the intcrent: i~ prov~"'ltin~ tha cbortion of a. fotus that: i_p 
not viubla. Tho i!iGua might <tmll turn on "\Jhethcr t:ho tima 
period selected could bo ohotJn to pc.mic. ~-vival of tho 
£'otu~ in a ccncrally .ncccptcd ccn~o, rather tho.n for tho 
briof tpan of houro c11d unuor tha Gbnol."''lUll couditiono illUD• 
tt~tod by co~ of tho tltato 1 c ov-ldonco. Ao to the Llttcz-
·. .. •. 
I•' 
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cituationn, 'tha natura of tho otMto interc.ut: might well not 
bo r;cncrnlly accepted. l7inally, and moat impo:rtm1t, cuch 
a. ota.tutG 'tJould r.ot ba a direct nbridgemant of tha ';om.:m' a 
cC'J'IlStitutiorol :i:ight, but at: most n limitation on tho tim3 
"11'lcn her right could be cxorcioed. l'ha proaont ot:at:utc,. 
howovar, docs not present crrq of tho couaiclcrat"'.onu favor~blo 
to tho otata tlult tlight ba found ill either typo of stututa 
of n:.orG limited scope. 
·. For thct;a rcason.G~ wo hold, oo hava tilOGt courta that 
. 11/ .· 
hD.vo conaidexod G:lrrrllm: otntutco, that plaintiffs arc en-
titled to a juc!n;r.1cn~ ·declaring l.>ubli·c Act ~~o. 1 unconstit:u• 
tioi.'llll. Such & juclgwc-ut oooo not: limit tho pow-er of tho 
: ctn.ta to or..act: '1.-c3ccn::ililo regulat:io:to specif-ying the fa.cili• 
tion whcrG abol.""ticms tr.:lY bo performed or tho persolUlol 
qualified to pCjCfor-ul thc:n. For tho rcaoonn net forth in thQ 
prior litigation, 342 l?.Supp. at 812, ~~a nlco hold thnt 
plaint1ffa nro entitled to an injunction prohibiting en• 
1Y 
forc<!ment; of Public Act 1\o. 1. 
; . 
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United Stutes Circuit Judge 
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"Section 1. T'loln public policy of tha atnto and 
tho intcn~ of tho lcgicla~~a ia to protact and 
preoarvc hm.1en lifa from tho moment of conception 
tu1d i.n o:rdm: co cffcct~ca thio public policy an<l 
intent: 
· "(n) N'o perco~ ::~hall givo or .adminioter to any 
female person., advioa or cause her to taka or uao 
anything, o-;.· U3o m-.,y mcnns, 't-1ith in.tcnt to procu:ca 
upon he~ n miocarri~go or abortion, nor shall :my 
female pezsol1 do o-;: cufic.r anything to be dona, 
mth int:ant thczcby U) produc.a upon heraclf a mio-
carringo o~ nbo~tiou. 
· · "(b) No person ~h~ll ocll or ndvortioo m.edicinco 
o~ instr\tmout~ or other dcvicca for tho co~nisoion 
of ::1 mscar..;:inza or u.bortion, except to a licenced 
phyaici~ o:A:' a hoapi·~~l lic~aod by tho utata of 
Connectic~~. · 
"(c) ~11a provir.iono of r;ubn~ct:ions (a) nnd (b) of 
this nocticn clmll not npply to an abo~~ion or 
miccnrriflga po~io~cd by a liccnDed phyaician when 
such nborti01.1 or rriscarriaga iD ncccAsary to prc-
SCl."VO tho phyaic.:ll lif~ of tho mothor and ~1lwa 
GUCh abortion is pcrfo1.i:!lod in o. hoopital liccnsod 
by tho ctat:c of Connecticut. 
tt(d) A violation of thio acction shall be a Clnoo 
D felony. 
"Section 2. If any part of thia l\Ct nhall ho held 
invalid, ouch holding shnll t1ot affect tha valic.lit:y 
of tho 1:cmainin~~ parts of tl1ia net. If a. pnrt of 
tllio act j.s inv~lid in oue oA. . more of: its <:~pplica• 
tiona, the re.uaining \)area of thin act ohull ro-
m~in in effect in all valid applications that uro 
'cvc~~blo fro~ tho inv~lid applications. 
I 
"Section 3. 'Z'ai~ ~ct ::;hall taka cffoct fJ.'"ODl i~r; 
p4SDn&a." 
I 
2:1 i . 
lha motion ~lno so1.1gh~ tl1a inrmrmco of an order rcqui1~in3 
tl10 Govol·11or to nhcH cr~uco wh7 lw DhO\lld 110t bo holtl J.n con ... 
tempt: 2or llio rola :i'.n UJ:g:I.n~ pnGt:Ulf~a of tho nc-u logicda~:Lon. 
~oing tu1anilt-our~ly o:A: tho vio· .. 1 that; tho rcquasc for 11.-uch c.a 
ordor t~aa f:ri vo lou~ • wo d~14iod it frma tho banch. 
•. -r: ,I I 
·, 
' ,t f . , I ' I 1 ' I l I I •• • ; , • ·: t ' ' I • 
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Dcfond.ant:G 'Imvo objected to tho ~co proceeding _ in thio 
fanl1ion,. pointing out tr...a~ a. U(l'i1 suomons wna never iooucd 
upon tho new 11corJ?lnint. u Sea Fed.R.Civ .P. 4(a). l-la foil 
to ooa hO'tv ;.L'TJ :rights of the dofcndm1ta have in Any ltaY 
bct.iln prejudiced. Tho UC'tV' papcn:~ wara all . ocrved upon do-
fancL."lntn • counncl t and defendants have had f-ull and fair 
notico of the clui~ being m3dc ·nnd a 1~11 opportunity to 
be henrd. The .for.::A.-:ll reqmr amcn1: for pernonal servi.co of 
· a sur.lffiOnn .and con.plaint upon defcudant:a alerts them w tho 
possibility thut defnult will enter for failura to :roGpond, 
a proapact of 1.10 ll.pplic::tbilit'7 to thi~ cn"Q• 
. 
Pl:J.intiffG subs~qucntly filed in tha ne't~ c.asa a aubotii.'"Utad 
compl:lintt which wa~ c~vcd upon defcndmltD 1 COU'rulQl. 
!:! 
For the nutho~ o:Z tirlo op:trd.on, ~'Li~ statsncnt of lcr;isL:t• 
tivo pu~~ooc mcltos ~~o iasuo pozcd by plaintiff~' chnllenga 
to Connecticut:'~ um-1 abortiou statuto quitQ different £~~ 
tho insuo raised by the clulllcngo to the prior statutea. 
From my review o£ tho :~:olov.:mt m.ntcl.'"ials I concluded that 
~ho. stato intcrc::;t cough:: to ba advooccd by tho priox 6tatu-
tos \.Jas pl-otoc·cion of the 1mti'1cri s hc\lltb. lio\'lover tha 
oitur•tion roieht ll.:1v0 been in 1860, that. intoreat: coulcl not 
· poosibly just:lfy invnnicra of the mothex:• o right to privncy 
1.11 1972 when 'b.~c i .. m.clispu·tcd r.~dical facts ent:.lolinllcd th.:t&: 
abortion poses a lcsr.m: hcalt.~ rislc. to the mother tl111n doeG 
childbirj;.h. Sil:cc tho. Gtntc intc~ont l.>aing acivanced was 
~actually uncound, it pl..:liuly could not be uncd to jWJtify 
tln abridgemm'lt oi t:.hc mothori n conatitutional l.~ghtn. 342 
1!. Sttpp. nt: VOS-11.. The stata intc:rast nm-1 opecified, how-
over, io t1ot fnct·u.<:l17 u11~o~d. A atut\.tta of thia sor~:, aa 
I previously indicnccd, 342 F.S~. ~t filO and 811 n.lD, 
pooeo ~ fa~ rr~rc difficult question, on0 that I did not 
bolicva ol10uld bo clocidod unless Guch a statuto wao enacted. 
2/ 
Hhila plaintiffs coZ"Ltcnd 'dHJ.t tho stntc cloao 110t conain• 
· toutly protect: tho lifo of tho fct:uo tlll-oU~jhout: its E t:atutca, 
any cuch inconoistcncy docs not :A.rupair tho power of tha 
ntato to protect cl1o intc~ost which thin statuto purporta 
to protect. In ·cl1a nbocnco of cq\~l protection claim3• a 
otntc han powC4:' to ?romot:o a. ctstc intorcsl: cv~n t11ou3h 
other ctat:uta~ U;.il to pro~to tho oamo intcra£'t tUl ;nuch 
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plicitly applied in ~~o situations. Tho first is where a 
· regulation touching upon a fundamental interest or based on 
a suspect criterion is challenged on equal protection grounds 
See, e.g., Sh~niro v. Thomnson, 394 u.s. 618 (1969); Loving 
y. Virginia, 388 u.s. 1 (1967). The second is where a 
regulation impairs the exercise of a constitutional right 
rather than prohibits its mcercise. See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. 
Alabnma, 357 U.S. 4L;9 (1958); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398 (1963). See Brnnzburg v. Hnycs, _U.S. _, at n. 18 
(1972). T'ais case, like GrisHold, fits neither pattern. The 
assertion of a constitutional right to marital privacy stands 
independent of any equal protection claim, and the exercise 
of that right is directly prohibited by Public Act No. 1. 
rather than merely impaired. 
7/ -See also Doc v. Bolton, 319 F.Supp. 1048, 1055 (N.D. Ga. 
1970), prob. ;uris. postnoned to hearing on tho merits, 402 
u.s. 941 (1971). 
While Byrn and McGarvey also expressed the view that the 
extent of protection co be accorded a fetus was appropriately 
a matter of legislative concern, we think this aspect of 
those decisions failed to give adequate recognition to the 
significance of the woman's constitutional right or to the 
variety of personal judgments concerning the state interest 
advanced to abridge her right, which renders the state 
interest insufficient to justify the almost total abridgement 
of tha .woman's right accomplished by the statute here 
chall~~ged. See part B of text, infrn. 
8/ 
-The brief of the amicus cu~iae Planned Parenthood Federation 
of America, Inc., suggests t:v1o other reasons to doubt the 
existence of fourteenth amendment rights in a fetus. TI1ey 
point out that the fourteenth amendn1ent provides for the 
apportionment of members of the House of Representatives 
based on the l-;rhole number of "persons" counted in each state, 
and that fetuses have never been counted for this purpose. 
TI1c argument is of interest but not determinative, since 
corporations are also not counted for apportionment purposes, 
yet nra persons at least for some fourteenth amendment 
rights. Grosjc:Jn v. i\mcricm1 Press Co., 297 u.s. 233, 244 
(1936); cf. Hague v. C.I.a., 307 u.s. 496, 527 (1939); sea 
,D.D.B. Rcnlty Cor:). v. Ucrrill, 232 F.Supp. 629, 637 (D. Vt. 
(1964). They also rely on r·'Iont::1na v. Ror;ers, 278 F.2d 68 (7t l 
Cir. 1960), aff'd sub nom. }iontcma v. Kennedy, 366 u.s. 308 
(1961)',· Hhich held t:huL: a parson born abroad does not nc-
qui~~ 1 Un1tcd Stutos citizcnohip undQr tha ~ourtccnth amend• 
tncnt: bactluoa as a fctur3 .he \'ma in thia oount1-y cluriu13 hio 
mother's proL~oncy. 111at decision involved tho clause of 
tha amendment which confers citiz?nahip on all parsons born 
I •' I ' ! . 
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or naturalized i.~ tho Unit:ad Stat:on; the fat:un w~o plainly 
llot bol.-n in · the United Statc.o whather OJ: not it waa dc~d 
4 per~on ~lG bora. 
•' 
~ . . 
The range of v1c-c1s on thio subject czm ba found not only in 
tho fields of philosoph7 and religion. Thera ia in tho 
.record in this litir,ation substantial evidenco of the variety 
. of viclw hol<.l by highly regarded 't1embara of tho medical p:ro-
£ossion. Plaintiffs have ~ubmittecl a statement by 100 pro-
feasoro of obstetrics a11d gynecology, from nearly all tha 
lc~cling medical schools in the country, 112 Amarican Journal 
of Obotetrics and Gynecology 992-98, Ap:ril l, 1972, n policy 
Dtnt~~t adopted by tho cxccutivo board of the American 
Collcgo of Obstkc~icitins und ~1ccologistn in Augu~t 1970, 
and a resolution cdopt:cd by tha Housa of Delogatca of the 
~mcl-lc~n Hodical t~OTJalJG .t\ua 11 n, Inc., on November 7, 1969, 
all suppa'l:'ting tha ~vom:1n ~a right to un abortion. Dofcnciantg 
h.:::.vo A:'eopondcd with D.ffidavita from 39 doctorat all, ill 
va.ryin3 <k!g:.:oea ~ eA--prezsing c.n oppo~inz view • 
. !91 . 
\·lhila ·va need not mnl<o any finding on this point, wa nota 
that tho affidavit: of D~. Vi~ginill u. Stuennar, of Neu 
11cvcn, sets forth wha.t appcal:'s to ba· a medical conlilcnoua 
that tA'1a fet-us no~-mlly bccom.es viable approldmtcly 28 wceka 
after ccmccption. · 
w ~. 
'l11o cusoo aro collected in tho p-rior decision in this liti• 
gation. 342 F.Supp. ac 803 n.l4. 
l?J 
'.i11a in:Junction will tllso nnlce it certain that jurisdic t:ion 
to con~iclcr nn appeal tukcn by dcfcndanta f'l."om our judgment 
liao di1:octly witll tho Suprema Court.· 23 u.s.c. ~ 1253., 
., . . '. 
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CI.ARIE, District J'udgc, diosontingz 
,• ,. . . . 1 , 
My earlier diaoenting opinion in Abele v. Markle, 
342 F.Supp. 800, 812 (D. Conn. 1972) concluded that the 
Legislature, not tho Judiciary, was designed by our found-
ing fathers to reflect tho standards of human decency which 
must be weighed ·in any ·choice between the competing moral 
values which are to guide governmental policy. By reanact-
ing legislation which ·daclared the paramountcy of the human 
fetus' right to lifo over a woman's right to privacy, except 
where .it could be domonstr~tod that the mother's life would 
bo jeopardized, tho Connecticut Legislature reaffirmed that 
basic choice. 
Separate opinions of the majority declaring tho 
prior statute unconotitutional disclosed conflicting judi• 
cial points of vie\'1. Judge Lumbard found that the 1860 · 
statute was designed to protect the life of the unborn child, 
but considered the statute's purpose to be constitutionally 
insufficient. Judga Newman, on the other hand, found that 
tha protection of tb.e·haalth of the mother was tho primary 
legialativa objective and that such purpose was not suffi-
' 
cicnt to justify a legislative invasion of the mother's con-
stitutional right to privacy. Judge Newman further emplulsi~e·d 
I 
at pag~ 810, 






"If the Connecticut Legislature had made 
a judgment on this issue and had enacted 
· lm~s to accord Duch protection to the un-
bo~~1 onild, tho oonatitutiQnali~y of suon 
' . , ·. ' , ' 
' . , I . . . 
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lawo would pose a legal question of ex-
trema difficulty, since the legialativa 
judgment on this subject would be entitled 
to cnreful consideration." 
In responso to the majority's decision, a Special 
Session of tho Connecticut Legislatur~ was called by tho 
. I 
'Governor to enact a new statute to fill the void. Public 
Act No.· l was .adopted by that Special Session and is the 
' \ 
law which the plaintiffs are presently challenging. The 
preamble of that Act forthrightly . declares tho statute's 
purpose: . ··, .. . ·· .. 
"Section 1: 'The public policy of the 
·. State and the intent of the Legislature 
is to protect and preserve human life 
from the moment of conception •••• " 
The single exception to that protection, is the existence 
of circumstances wherein an ~bortion is required to preserve 
tha physical life of the motha~. 
The diasanting opinion in Abele v. Markle, supra, 
is strengthened by the .recant opinion of the New York Court 
of AI?poal~ in B...¥rn v. Nm·7 York Citz Hcn1 th & 11osp. Corp., 
__ _.N.Y.2d ____ (1972), wherein the constitutionality of 
the New York State Abortion L·aw allowing abortions was chal-
lenged.; . Tha Court silid: ' I ,· 
"These nro, then, real issues, in this 
litigntion, but they aro not legol or jus-
ticiable, · 'J.'ncy nx.·e itHHlCHl outoi.da tha lavl 
uulooo tho Lo8ialatu~a ahould p~oviclo otbo~· 
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· require legal personality for the unborn; 
.. . .. 
' . · · ~ha Lcgiolnturc rnnz, or it may do something 
less, as it does in limited abortion stat-
utes, nnd provide some protection far short 
of conferring leg~l personality." (emphasis 
added). 
The concurring opinion further reinforces this ob-
se~ation, when it addad. 
"As Judge Breitel's opinion recognizes, the 
formidable task of resolving this issue is 
not for tho courts. Rather, the extent to 
which fetal life should be protected 'ia a 
value judgment not committed to the discre-
tion of judges, but reposing instead in the 
ropreoentativc branch of government.' •••• 
Since the Constitution doea not prohibit the 
datermination made by the Legislature and 
thoro in n reasonable baais for it, the valid-
ity of tb.a statute should be &ust.ained." 
The majo41ty lightly bruGhes aside the ttme honored 
separation of poworo and judicially declares ipse dixit that 
an unborn human fetus io not a person and has no constitu-
tional rights requiring recognition. Such a sweeping state• 
roent would include, of courae, .. unborn ·viablo babies, who __ 
are physically able to exist outside the mother's body.: 
Thus, an unborn full tel~ baby could .be killed with impuntty 
in its mother 1 c womb if we \'lore to accept the conclusion tha 
tho human fotuo has no rights until birth. 
Citing no authoritative decision; tho majority ap·. 
pears to rest ito position entirely upon the fourteenth 
I llUlClldluant and Unitccl !Jt~nt:an v. Vtd.tch, 402 u.s, G2 . (1~10). 
:- . 
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Clauso l, ~ l of tha fourteenth amQndment provides1 
,,, 
.. 
"All persona born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to tha jurisdic-
tion thereof. are ·citizens of the United 
St~t:oa and ofthe State wherein they reside." 
Tho majority states that . "(i] f the fetus· su1.--vivea 
tha gestation period, it will be born and then become a 
peraon entitled to tho legal protection of the Constitu-
tion," thereby conotruing birth to be a prerequisite to 
personage. This ~onstruction is compelled neithe~ by logio 
nor the text of tho ·amandmon~~· for by its terms birth ia a 
precondition only to citizenship. The fallacy of the ma-
jority's construction is accentuated by the fact that cor-
porations have long been considered "parsons" within the 
moaning of tho fourteenth amendment despito the fact that 
they ara not born. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac.R.R. 
~., 118 U.S. 394j 396 (1885); ~ague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 
496, 527 (1938); Merced Dredging Co. v. Merced County, 67 
F.Supp. 598, 604 (S.D. Calif. 1946). 
Imperfect though the compariaon may be, the analogy 
between a corpo~ata "person" and a peroon at a fetal stage . 
I 
of development iu of value oince it leads to the concluGion 
I I 
. that creation, rather than birth, defines tha juncture at 
whic~ a person comes into being. The fact that distinction 
have boon drflwn .batween "artifidal" and "natUl.'"al" persons 
'' 'doos not diminish tho analogy• s totcci, sinco noitho~ tho 
•' 
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natura of a fctua nor . tile manner in ~1ich it is created 
·.· ' ,. \ 
~y be deemed artificial. This conclusion is further but• 
. ... ··· tressed by tho eloquence · of tha Declaration. of Independence: 
·' 
. 
"We hold theoe trutho to ba self-evident, .that all men are 
crented equal • • •• •• • (emphasis added). 
The second premise.· upon which the majority con-
eludes that fetal lifo is not constitutionally protected 
ia United States v. Vu'itch, supra. The issue there, it 
~at bo borne in mind, wao whether or not the District of 
Columbia Abortion Law wao unconstitutionally vague, not 
whether fetal lifo shouldbe constitutionally protected. 
··McGnrvcy v. Hsgee-Homan 1s Hospitnl, 340 F.Supp. 751, 753 
(W.D. Pa. 1971). Thus, Vuitch ohould not be viewed as a 
~ silentio constitutional adjudication, but rather a 
deliberate cho±co by tho Court not to comment on fatal life 
in constitutional terma. 
Since Eisenstadt v. Bilird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) and 
Gris~vold v. Connecticut, 381 U.s. 479 (1965) dealt .. with 
state regulation of the distribution and use of contracep-
tive devices, th~ir focuo ,;·ms upoh.~tho choice as to tho be-
. getting of new life and not upon the destruction of life 
alraady begotten, Hence, neither caso ia authority for the 
proposition that fetal :eights um·Tarrnntedly infringe upon 
j . 
a ·mo/hcr'a constitutional 
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"[t]ho family itself is not beyond regula-
tion in the public interest • • • • And 
neither rights of religion nor rightG of 
parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting 
to guard the general interest in youth's 
well being, the state ao pnrcns, patrin~ 
.. 'may restrict: the pc:1rent 'a control by re-
. ·. · · quiring school attendance, regulating or 
prohibiting tho child's labor and in many 
other ways. Its authority ia not nullified 
.merely becauae the parent grounds his claim 
· to control the child • s course of conduct on 
· ~eligion or conscience. • • • Tha right to 
practice religion freely does not include 
liberty to expose tho community or the child 
to communicable disease or tha latter to ill 
health or death." Prince v. N~ssachusetta, 
321 u.s. 158, 166·167 (1943). 
If the perimetcra of first amendment freedoms may be shaped 
by tho valuea of cociety. it followa that the penumbras 
emanating from othar provisions of the Bill of Rights must 
: : be equally malleable. Tnat such rights may be circumscribed 
.. 
by statuto is unquestionable. .2£2_ ~· . Braunfeld v. Brmm, 
. 366 U.S. 599 (1961), Chaplinsky v. New Hnmpshire, 315 U.S. 
568 (1942). And that the benefi~iary of sucn statutory pro-
tection need not itself pooscss constitutional rightG ~ppear · 
established • . United Stntea v. O'Brien, 391 u.s. 367 (1968). 
The only real consideration is whether the state 
poasosscs an interest sufficiently compolling to justify 
' 
an interference with a womsn'a constitutional right. This, i 
is .submitted, is the solo juotioiable issue p~caented. 
· In tho majority'a view, "the compelling state in-
to:~:cat toat oannot bo appl1od 1n thLa 04JPQ in tho a~mQ WC\'f . 
. thnt it hasoocn applied in other caaos 11 sinco tho stato 
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interest is. "subject to such a variety of viewpoint." Ac-
cordingly, it is claimed that a stato interest is sufficient 
ly compelling only when it is ·''broadly accepted" and it is 
broadly accepted only in the absence of "diverse personal 
judgments." The fallacy of this analysis is that. diversity 
of viewpoint. does not diminish state interest but often in· 
tensifies it. It is precisely for this reason that the 
weighing of conflicting values and viewpoints is a legisla-
tive, not a judicisl, task. 
"In n democratic Gociaty legislaturca, not courts, 
a~e constituted to reopond to the will and consaquently the 
moral values of thG people." Furrn.nn v. Georgia, 40 U.S.L.W. 
4968 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). ''ve should not allow our 
personal preferences as to the. wisdom of legislative and 
congressional action • •• to guide our judicial decision." 
~· at 4977 (Blackmun, J., disaenting). That the majority 
bao taken unto itself the legislative task of measuring de• 
greea of public acceptance is evident in its pronouncement 
that "the state interest in protecting tho lifo of a fetus 
capable of living outside tho uterus could bo shown to be 
mora generally accepted and, therefore, of more weight. • • • 
The constitutional structure of our democracy de• 
mnnds judicial restraint \-lhere tho choice of human values 
I -
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· . constitutionally protected rightc. Tha cOnnecticut Legia-
.latura has weighed these factual considerations on society's 
. scale of standa~ds of decency. 
' . The Legislature wan undoubtedly aware that biolo• 
gista, fetologists, and medical science commonly~accopt 
· conception as ·the beginning of human life and the formation 
. of an individual endowed with ita own unique genetic pattern 
1. 
(~~. 205); that the heart functions nnd circulates blood 
throuih the human fetus at three to five weeks (Tr. 286) 
and that blood groupings may ba ascertained at eight weeks 
(Tr. 206); that while nutrients ara fed to the baby from the 
mother through tho placenta and the waste similarly excreted 
tho placenta is really part of the baby (Tr. 284); and that · 
the latter's heart pun1po ita own blood through the umbilical 
vessels ~nd livea as a separate entity suspended in amniotic 
fluid. (Tr. 210). 
They had available to them medical information that, 
aa early as seven weel<s, . brain ' ·Taves are detectible in tha 
unborn child and that it is known to react to drugs (Tr. 212); 
that physical rafl~x~a such as contraction of the limbs, mov ·-
menta of the mouth, tha eyelids, and genoral contraction of I . . . . . 
the body have been elicited ~~om the maturing infant aG 
early as six weeks; and that unborn babies weighing as lit• 
tle as 395 grams (13 ounces) have been known to survive out-
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:. n1odical research in tho fiold of fatal medioino ia a oom• . . 
! paratively new bran.ch of . medic ina (Tr. 252) and that the . 
transplantation of lifo to artificial placentao io preaently 
. . ' 
. . I ....  
baing studied. '. . . . . 
. . ' 
Similarly available to the Connecticut Legiolature 
WCll:a the .. abortion m'.;pericnca statistics of New York City 
.undor that Stata'D sta~ute which allowed abortion upon ra• 
1/ . . . . . . ' 
queot~- During ~e tWalve~onth period from July 1, 1970, 
.. 
through June 30, 1971, ~~ tnat ona city alone, there wera 
. . . '· 2/ 
officially recorded 139,042 induced abortions: snd for the 
aix•month pQ~iod from July 1, 1971, througb December 31, 
' c . ... 3/ 
· 1971. thero ~.;era 111~590. If theoa latta~ statistics wero 
. 
to bo projected on a national population acale, the total. 
number would amount ~o cove~al million induced deaths of· 
innocent victtmo · ~m1u~lly. It is ~ legislative choice of 
' . 
sociotal values, w~ich muot'docida a public policy of sucn 
magnitude. fo~ thnt choice . of valuco could either domean 
hunlan lifo or enobla manlt.ind ~ 0 deot:I.ny. 
All of these considerations ware undoubtedly pon• 
dorcd by the Legislature befora the determination was made . 
; that human lifo should not be compromised · in the nama of 
: I 
: personal comfort or conv~nience. It is notning leas than 
I . 
. judicial usurpation oZ a legiolative prerogative to docido 
·' . ' . ' I . . 
th~t at ona point in fot~l development, through an obocurc 
pl.•ooaao of lcc.ql nlO~L·.moJ:phorJio (i•l tni'o .gape, tho dofi~4oa lin~ 
o 1 I 
' ' 
qucil~ty of ·"public ~ccoptanco11) tho otat~ 'fACAy .consti.tutiouall 
' '' 
' . 
• 'I I I 





\ • :• , ,. •' 
0
0 
' 1 1' : ' '. ·' ' ' ) , ' t .' ·, ~ · tl ' f, 00 ' I 
. , . • • • ' t • • . • ·~ '.. • ' 
' .'• , ' : •: ,1,. ' •: 1 .. ' , • ' ' ' :: I ; I : t ' ' I o ' . '~ I ' 
' , •t ' I I 
' ,·, . I , ' · ' , ", .. · '• . t ' • . t . . ' 
' ... 
,.· .... ,. I .. • . ' ·'' 
'' ' l : ,l. I' 
• '• 
I ! , 
''' I .. , ' I ' ' . o l , t • • l ' ,• ' ' 
I ' I 'o ' 





. "\:. '. 















, . '' 
.,· 
·' 
protect fetal lifat but thut pl:ior to such point in time, 
the atato may not protect wh~t it alao regardo, with aub-
·. stant1al popul~r and uiodical ·justification, as human lifo. 
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11 By a vqte of 79 to 68 in tha Assembly on May 10, 
1972, and 30 to 27 in the Senate tha following day, tho 
NC'ir Yo:cl' State Logislat:u:ca voted to repeal this statut:a. 
Ita action, however» wao vatood by tho Gove~~or of New 
Yo:r::k • . 
2:./ New York City Department of Health, .Bulletin on Abor .. 
tion Program, End of Fi~st Year. Raport, ·at l (June 1~71). 
?_/ Naw York City Depm:tment of Health, : 
tion Program, at l (May 1972). · 
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To: The Chief Justic~ 
Mr · J·ustice Douglas 
Mr. Jvst j ce Brennan 
Mr. Just i ce Stewart 
Mr. Jltst r ce White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Powell~ 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
2nd DRAFT From: Blackmun, J. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED ST~lated:_____./--'-~/,/.~~~:2/-,/L.e!?.:lc_ 
No. 70-18 Recirculated: 
Jane Roe et al., Appellants, On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for 
the Northern District of 
v. 
Texas. Henry Wade. 
I December -, 1972] 
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, Memorandum. 
This Texas federal appeal and its Georgia companion, 
Doe v. Bolton, post --, present constitutional chal-
lenges to state criminal abortion legislation. The Texas 
statutes under attack here are typical of those that 
have been in effect i11 many States for approximately a 
century. The Georgia statutes, in contrast, have a 
modern cast and are a legislative product that, to an 
extent at least, obviously reflects the influences of recent 
attitudinal change, of advancing medical knowledge and 
techniques, and of new thinking about an old issue. 
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensi-
tive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy, 
of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians. 
and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that 
the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's experiences, 
one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's 
religious training, one's attitudes toward life and family 
and their values, and the moral standards one establishes 
and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to 
color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion. 
In addition, population growth, pollution, poverty, 
and racial overtones tend to complicate and not to sim-
plify the problem. 
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Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by consti-.......--...-
tt~t frC'c of emotion and of predilection. 
\Ve seek earnestly to do this, and, because we do, ·we 
ha.ve inquired into, and in this opinion place some 
emphasis upon, medical and medical-legal history and 
what that history reveals about man's attitudes toward 
the abortive procedure over the centuries. We bear in 
mind, too, Mr. Justice Holmes' admonition in his now 
vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 
45, 76 (1905): 
"It rthe Constitution] is made for people of 
fundamentally differing views, and the accident of 
our finding certain opinions natural and familiar 
or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude 
our judgment upon the question whether statutes 
embodying them conflict with the Constitution of 
the United States." 
I 
The Texas statutes that concern us here are Arts. 
1191-1194 and 1196 of the State's Penal Code.1 These 
1 "Article 1191. Abortion 
"If any person slwll designedly administer to a pregnant woman 
or knowingly prorure to be adminiRtered with her consent any drug 
or medicine, or shall use towards her any violence or menns what-
ever externall:v or internally applird, nnd thrreby procure an nbor-
tion, he Rhnll be eonfined in ilw prnit.rntinry not le8s than two nor· 
more than fi\'P yrar.;; if it be done without lwr consent, the punish-
ment shall be doublrd. By 'nhortion' is meant that thr life of the 
fetus or embryo shall be dest ro~·rd in the woman's womb or that a 
prrmature birth thrrrof be cauRed. 
"Art. 1192. Furnishing the rnr:ms 
"Whoever furnishes the mcnns for proruriug an nbortion knowing· 
the purpose intended i~ gnili~· as an accomplice. 
"Art. 1193. Attempt at abortion 
"If the mea.ns nRrd shall fail to produer :m abortion, the offender 
is nevertheless guilty of an attempt to produce abortion, pro\·ided 
70-1S-OPIN 10"01 
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make it a crime to "procure an abortion," as therein 
defined, or to attempt one, except with respect to "an 
abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for 
the purpose of saving the life of the mother." Similar 
statutes are in existence in a majorit;'Onhe States.~ 
it be shown that Rnrh mean~ were calruhted to produce that result, 
and shall be fined not less thnn one hundred nor more than one 
thousanrl dollnr~. 
"Art. 1194. Murder in producing abortion 
"If the death of the mot her is oreaRioned by an abortion so pro-
duced or by an attempt to eJfeet the same it is murder. 
"Art. 1196. By medical ndvire 
"Nothing in this chapter applies to nn abortion procured or at-
tpmptod b~· medirnl advice for 11H' pmpo~e of ~aYiPJ! the life of thP 
mother." 
The foregoing Article>', together with Art. l19!i . c·ompri~e Chnptrr· 
9 of Title ].') of the Pen:d Corle. Arli(')e 119!i, not nttaekrd hrrf' , 
rrads: 
"Art .. 1195. Dr~tro~· ing unborn rhild 
"WhoeYcr shall during parturition of the mother dc.-:;troy thf" 
vitality or life in a child in a state of being born nnd before actual 
birth, which child would otherwise have been born alive, shall bf' 
confined in the penitentiary for life or for not lr~s than five years."' 
~Ariz . Rr1·. ~tnt. Ann. § ]:3-211 (107]): Conn. Pnh. Art. No. 1 
(1\'Ta~- HJ72 sprri:d 8C8~ion) (in 4 Conn. Lr.l!. ~en·. fi77 (]!)72)). and 
Conn. Grn. Rtat. Hl'l' , §§ 5:3-20. 53-30 (10M\) (or nnhorn rhild); 
Td:l110 Coclr § 1~-1.105 (App. lo ~npp. 107]): Ill. Hel'. Rtnt". e. 38, 
§ 2;)-1 (Hl71); Ind. Code § 35-1-.')S-1 (]071): Towa Code § 701.1 
(1071): K~·- Re1·. Rtat. §~3(\.020 (1068); La. Re1·. St:tt . §37:12R5 
(G) (196~) (lo~< of rnrdirnl lirrnsr) (but ~f'e § 14-F:7 (1972 Rupp.) 
ronta.ininp; no rxrcpt ion for I he life of t hr mot her undPr thr ('!'imina] 
sl:ttutc): l\fr. Ht•l'. ~tat. ,\nn. Tit. 17. §51 (19G~); MfiHS. Gen. 
L:tw~ Ann. r. 272. § 19 (1970) (u8ing; thr term "unlawfully," ron-
Rtrnerl to exclude :111 ;1bortion to ~fiYC thr mother'" life, Kudish v. 
Rd. of Registration, 8Mi ~ra~~- 0S, 2~8 ~- E. 2d 26~ (]060)); Mich . 
Comp. Law~§ 750.14 (194F:); ;'1.1inn. Stat.§ G17.1S (1971); Mo. He1·. 
Stat. §559.100 (1909): ~font. HPY. Code·~ Ann. §94-401 (1961); 
1'\eh. Tie1·. Atnt. § 28-~05 (J0o-1): ::\f'1·. Hel'. Ri:1t. § 200:220 (1967): 
1'\. H. TI<'Y. Rtnt. r\nn. § 5S5.1a (1955) ; 1'\. .J. Stat. Ann.§ 2A:87-1 
(1969) ("without lawful juHtifiration"); 1'\. D. Ce11t. Code§§ 12-25-
70-lN-OPII\ION 
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Texas first enacted a criminal abortion statute in 1854. 
Texas Laws 1854. c. 49, ~ 1, set forth in 3 Gammel, 
Laws of Texas, 1502 ( 1898). This was soon morlified 
into language that has remained substantially unchanged 
to the present time. See Texas Penal Code of 1857, 
Arts. 531-536; Paschal's Laws of Texas, Arts. 2192-2197 
(1866); Texas Rev. Stat., Arts. 536-541 (1879); Texas 
Rev. Crim. Stat., Arts. 1071-1076 (1911). The final 
article in each of these compilations provided the same 
exception. as does the present Article 1196, for an abor-
tion by "medical advice for the purpose of saving the 
life of the mother." 3 
01, 12-25--02 (19o0): Ohio Re,·. Code § 2901.16 (1953): Okla. Stat. 
Ann .. Tit. 21, § 861 (1972-1973 Supp.); Pa. Stnt. Ann., Tit. 18, 
§§ 4718, 4719 (19fi3) ("nnlnwful"): R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-3-1 
(1969); S. D. Com]Jiled La\w § 22-17-1 (1967); Tenn. Code Ann. 
§§ 39-301, 39-302 (1955): Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-1, 76-2-2 
(1953); Vt. Stnt. Ann .. Tit. 18, § 101 (1958); W. Va. Code Ann. 
§ 51-2-8 (1965); Wi;;;. Stat.§ 040.04 (1969); W~·o. Stat. Ann.§§ G-77, 
6-78 (1957). 
'1 Long ago a. suggestion wns made that the Texas statutes were 
unconstitutionally Yague because of definitional deficiencies. The 
Texas Court of Criminnl Appeal~ disposed of that suggestion per-
emptorily. saying only, 
"It is also insisted in the motion in arrest of judgment that the stat-
ute i~ unconstitutional and Yoirl in that it docs not sufficiently define 
or clc,.;cribe the oiTrntie of abortion. We do not concm in respect 
to this question." Jackson v. State, 55 Tex. Crim. R 79, 89, 115 
S. W. 262, 2fi8 (1908). 
The snme court rrcentl~· h:t, held again that the State's abortion 
statutes are not nnconstitntionall~· vauge or ovcrbroad. Thompson 
v. State,- Tex. Crim. App. -,- S. W. 2d- (1971), appeal 
pending. The comt held that "the State of Texas has a compelling 
intere~t to protert fetal life": that Art. 1191 "i~ designed to protect 
fetal life"; that the Texas homic·ide statutes, particularly Art. 1205 
of the Penal Code. are intended to protect a per»on "in existence by 
actual birth" and thereby implicitly recognize other human life that 
is not "in existence by actual birth"; that the definition of human 
life is for the legislature and not the courts; that Art. 1196 "is 
70-18-0PINION 
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II 
Jane Roe, 1 a single woman "'·ho was residing in Dallas 
County. Texas, instituted this federal action in March 
1970 against the District Attorney of the county. She 
sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal 
abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face, 
and an injunction restraining the defendant from en-· 
forcing the statutes. 
Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant; 
that she wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abor-
tion "performed by a competent, licensed physician, 
under safe. clinical conditions"; that she was unable 
to get a "legal" abortion in Texas because her life did 
not appear to be threatened by the continuation of her 
pregnancy; and that she could not afford to travel to 
another jurisdiction in order to secure a legal abortion 
under safe conditions. She claimed that the Texas stat-
utes were unconstitutionally vague and that they 
abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the 
First, Fourth , Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. By an amendment to her complaint Roe pur-
ported to sue "on behalf of herself and all other women"· 
similarly situated. 
James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought 
and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In 
more definite that thr District of Columbia statute upheld in runited 
States Y.l Vuitch" (402 U. S. 62); nne! that thr Texas sta tute "is 
not vague nne! inclrfinite or overbroad." A ph~·sici : m's abort ion con-
virtion was affirmed. 
In n. 2, - Trx. Crim. App., at -. - S. iV. 2d. at -. the 
court observrcl that an~· i~sue as to the burdrn of proof undrr the 
rxrmption of Art. 1196 "is not brforr 11~." But !'rc Veevers v. Statr, 
172 Tex. Crim. A11p. Hi2. 168- 169, 354 S. W. 2cl 161 (1962). Cf. 
United States v. l'uitch. 402 U. S. 62, 69-71 ( 1971) . 
'1 Tho nnmr i8 a pscuclOJl~'m. 
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his compla.int he alleged that he had been arrested pre-
viously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes and 
that two such prosecutions were pending against him. 
He described conditions of patients who came to him 
seeking abortions, aud he claimed that for many cases 
he, as a physician, was unable to determine whether 
they fell within or outside the exception recognized by 
Article 1196. He alleged that, as a consequence, the 
statutes were vague and uncertain, in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and that they violated his own 
and his patients' rights to privacy in the doctor-patient 
relationship and his own right to practice medicine, 
rights he claimed were guaranteed by the First, Fourth, 
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
John and Mary Doe," a married couple, filed a com-
panion complaint to that of Roe. They also named the 
District Attorney as defendant, claimed like constitu-
tional deprivations. and sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief. The Does alleged that they \\"<'rc a childless 
couple; that Mrs. Doc was suffering from a "neural-
chemical" disorder; that her physician had "advised her 
to avoid pregna.ncy until such time as her condition 
has materially improved" (although a pregnancy at the 
present time would not present "a serious risk" to her 
life); that, pursuant to medical advice, she had dis-
continued use of birth control pills; and that if she 
should become pregnant, she would v.:ant to terminate 
the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent, 
licensed physician under safe, clinical conditions. By 
an amendment to their complaint, the Does purported 
to sue "on behalf of themselves and all couples similarly 
situated." 
The two actions were consolidated and heard together 
by n. duly convened three-judge district court. The 
suits thus presented the situations of the pregnant single 
5 These n:1mco nrc pseudouyms. 
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woman, the childless couple, with the wife not pregnant, 
a11d the licensed practicing physician, all joining in the 
attack on the Texas criminal abortion statutes. Upon 
the filing of affida.vits, motions were made to dismiss 
and for summary judgment. The court held that Roc 
and Dr. Hallford, and members of the1r respective 
classes. ha<T sta'nding to sue. at~esentcd justiciable con-
tro~crsieS.I:mt that the Does had fa.ilcd to allege facts 
sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have 
stH nding. It cone] uded that. with respect to the re-
quests for a declaratory judgment, abstention was not 
warranted. On the merits. the District Court held thnt 
the "fundmnental right of singrc-womcn~d married 
persons to choose "·hether to have children is protected 
by the Ninth Amendment, through the Fourteenth 
Amendment," and that the Texas criminal abortion stat-
utes were void on their lace be~a~1se they were both 
-.........__.....___....~ ~ ~- --- - - - - -
unconstitutionally vagueancl constituted an overbroad 
i1ilii'ngement of t e p. a.intiffs' Ninth Amendment right;. 
The court then held that abstention was warranted with 
respect to the requests for an injunction. It thereforf' 
dismissed the Doe complaint, declared the abortion stat-
utes void, and dismissed the application for injunctive 
relief. 314 F. Supp. 1217 (ND Tex. 1970). 
The plaintiffs Roc and Doc and the intervenor Hall-
foro. pursuant to 28 U. S. C. ~ 1253. have appealed to 
this Comt from that part of the District Court's judg-
ment denying the injunction. The rlcfenclant District 
Attorney has purported to cross appeal. pursuant to the 
same statute. from the court's grant of declaratory relief 
to Roe and Hallford. Both sides also have taken pro-
tective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held 
in abeyance pending decision here. We postponed de-
cision on jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 402 
u. s. 941 (1971). 
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III 
1t might have been preferable if the defendant, pur-
suant to our Rule 20. had presented to us a petition for 
certiorari before judgment in the Court of API:ieals with 
respect· to the · granting of the plaintiffs' pr.ayer for de-
claratory relief. ·Our decisions in Mitchell v. Donovan, 
398 U.S. 427' (1970), and Gunn v. University Comm'ittee, 
399 U. S. 383 (1970), are to the effect that § 1253 docs 
not authorize an appeal to this Court from the grant or 
denial of declaratory relief alone. We conclude, never-
theless, that those decisions do not foreclose our review 
of both the injunctive and the declaratory aspects of a 
case of this kind \vhen it is properly here, as this one is, on 
appeal under § 1253 from specific denial of injunctive 
relief, and the arguments as to both aspects arc necessarily 
identical. See Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U. S. 320 
(1970); Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. 
Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73, 80-81 (1960). It would be de-
structive of time and energy for all concerned were we 
to rule otherwise. Cf. Doe v. Bolton, post, -. 
IV 
We are next confronted with i~s of justiciability, 
~ng, and abstention. Have Roe and the Does estab-
lished that "personal stake in the outcome of the con-
troversy," Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 ( 1962), 
that insures that "the dispute sought to be adjudicated 
will be presented in an adversary context and in a 
form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolu-
tion," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 101 (1968), and 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,732 (1972)? And 
what effect did the pendency of criminal abortion charges 
against Dr. Hallford in state court have upon the pro-
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A. Jane Roe. Despite the use of the pseudonym, no 
suggestion is made that Roe is a fictitious person. For 
purposes of her case, we accept as true. and as estab-
lished, her existence; her pregnant state, as of the incep-
tion of her suit in March 1970 and as late as May 21 
of that year when she filed an alias affidavit with the 
District Court; and her inability to obtain a legal abor-
tion in Texas. 
Viewiug Roe's case as of the time of its filing and 
thereafter until as late as May, there can be little 
dispute that it then presented a case or controversy and 
that, wholly apart from the class aspects, she, as a 
pregnant single woman thwarted by the Texas criminal 
abortion laws, had standing to challenge those statutes. 
Abele v. Markle, 452 F. 2d 1121, 1125 (CA2 1971); 
Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F. 2d 833, 838-839 (CA6 
1971); Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986, 990-991 
(Kans. 1972). See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915)-
Indeed, we do not read the appellee's brief as really 
asserting anything to the contrary. The "logical nexus 
between the status asserted and the claim sought to be 
adjudicated," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S., at 102, and 
the necessary degree of contentiousness, Golden v. 
Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103 (1969), are both present. 
The appellee notes, however, that the record does 
not disclose that Roe was pre nant at the ti1~e 
District Co~ canng .un May 22, 1970.r. or on the fol-
lowing JW1e 17 when the court's opinion and judgment 
were filed. And he suggests that Roe's case must now 
be moot because she and all other members of her class 
are no longer subject to any 1970 pregnancy. 
6 The appellee twice state~ in hi~ brief that the hearing before the 
District Court was held on .July 22. 1970. Appellee'~ Brief 1:'~. The 
docket entries, Appendix, n t 2, and the 1 nllll'cript, Appendix, at 76, 
Jm·cal this to he an error. The .Tuly date appmr~ to be the time 
of the reporter'~ tran~eription. Sec Appendix, at 77. 
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The usual rule in federal cases is that an actual con-
tr~~ist ;:t;i1 st~es of appellate or certior~ri 
re~w, and not simply at the date the action is initiated. 
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950); 
Golden v. Zwickler, supra.; SEC v. Medical Committee 
for Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403 (1972). 
But when, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in 
the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation 
period is so snort that the pregnancy will come to term 
before the u~ual appellate process is complete. If that 
termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation 
seldom will survive much beyond the trial stage, and 
appellate review will be effectively denied. Our law 
should not be that rigid. Pregnancy often comes more 
th;;once to the Same \VOman, and in the general popu-
lation, if man is to survive, it will always be with us. 
Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclu-
sion of nonmootness. It truly is "capable of repetition, 
yet evading review." Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. 
ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). See Moore v. Ogilvie, 
394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969); Carroll v. President and Com-
missioners, 393 U.S. 175, 178-179 (1968); United States 
v. W. 1'. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 632-633 (1953). 
W c therefore agree with the District Conrt that Jane ( 
Roe had standmg to undertake this litigation, that ';he 
presented a j~e controversy, and that the ter-
mination of her 1970 pregnancy has not rendered her 
case moot. 
B. Dr. Hallford. The doctor's position is different. 
He entered Roe's litigation as a plaintiff-intervenor 
alleging in his complaint that he: 
"In the past has been anested for violating 
the Texas Abortion Laws and at the present time 
stands charged by indictment with violating said 
laws in the Criminal District Court of Dallas 
County, Texas to-wit: (1) The State of Texas vs. 
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James H. Hallford, No. C-69-5307-III, and (2) The 
State of Texas vs. James H. Hallford, No. C-69-
2524-H. In both cases the defendant is charged 
with abortion .... " 
In his application for leave to intervene the doctor 
made like representations as to the abortion charges 
pending in the state court. These representations were 
also repeated in the affidavit he executed and filed in 
support of his motion for summary judgment. 
Dr_Hallford is therefore in the position of seeking, 
in a federal c~rt. declaratory and ID.J unctive relief \vith 
r~ttothc same statutes under wh!Ch he stands 
chargee in criminal prosecutions simult~sly pending 
in state court. Although he stated that he has been 
arrested in the past for violating the State's abortion 
laws, he makes no allegation of any substantial and 
immediate threat to any federally protected right that 
cannot be asserted in his defense against the state prose-
cutions. Neither is t;bere any a1legation of harassment 
or bad faithprosecution. In o'ITi'erto escape the rule, 
~
articulated in the cases cited in the next paragraph of 
this opinion, that, absent harassment and bad faith, a 
defendant in a pending state criminal ca"'e cannot affirma-
tively challenge in federal court the statutes under which 
the State is prosecuting him, Dr. Hallford seeks to 
distinguish his status as a present state defendant from 
his status as a "potential future defendant" and to assert 
only the latter for standing purposes here. 
\Ye sec no merit in that distinction. Our decision in 
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66 (1971), compels the 
conclusion that the District Court erred when it granted 
declaratory relief to Dr. Hallford instead of refraining 
from so doing. The court, of course. "·as correct in re-
fusing to grant injuctive relief to the doctor. The rea-
sons supportive of that action, however. arc those ex-
pressed in Samuels v. 111 ackell, supra, and in Younger v. 
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Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U. S. 
77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82 (1971); and 
Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). See also Dom-
browski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 (1965). We note. in 
passing. that Younger and its companion cases were de-
cided after the three-judge District Court decision m 
this case. 
Dr. Ha11forcl's complaint in interventioll, therefore, is 
to be dismissed.' I-Iei"S7emitteCl to Ilis defenses m tile 
state cnmmal proceedings against him. vV c reverse the 
judgment of the District Court insofar as it granted Dr. 
Hallford relief and failed to dismiss his complaint in 
intervention. 
C. The Does. In view of our ruling as to Roc's stand-
ing in 1iefease, the issue of the Does' standing in their 
case has little signifi'Cance. The claims they ~ssert-are 
essentiaiiYthe s-;;:;; ~s those of Roe, and they attack the 
same statutes. N everthcless, we briefly note the Does' 
posture. 
Their pleadings present them as a childless married 
couple, the wornan not being pregnaut, who have no 
desire to have children at this time because of their hav-
ing received medical advice that Mrs. Doe should avoid 
pregnancy, and for "other highly personal reasons." But 
7 We need not consider what different re~ult, if any, \YOuld follow 
if Dr. Hallford's intervention were on behalf of a clas~. His com-
plaint in intervention does not purport to assert a class suit and 
makes no reference to any cla~s apart from an allegation that he 
"and others similarly situated" must necessarily guess nt the mean-
ing of Art. 1196. His applira1ion for leave to intrrvene goes 8ome-
what further for it asserts that plai111iff Roe docs not adeqnatcly pro-
tect the interest of the doctor "and the class of people who are 
physicians ... and the cbs~ of people who are ... patients .... " 
The leave application, however, is not the complaint. Despite the 
Di~trict Court's statement to the contrary, 314 F. Supp., at 1225, we 
fail to perceive the essentiab of a class suit in the Hallford complaint. 
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they "fear ... they may face the prospect of becoming 
parents." And if pregnancy ensues. they "would want 
to terminate" it by an abortion. They assert an inability 
to obtain a11 abortion legally in Texas and. consequently, 
the prospect of obtaining an illegal abortion there or of 
going outside Texas to some place where the procedure 
could be obtained legally and competently. 
We thus have as plaintiffs a married couple who have, 
as their asserted immediate and present injury, only an 
alleged "detrimental effect upon [their] marital hap-
piness" because they are forced to "the choice of refrain-
ing from normal sexual relations or of endangering Mary 
Doe's health through a possible pregnancy." Their claim 
is that sometime, in the future, Mrs. Doe might become 
pregnant because of possible failure of contraceptive 
measures, and at that time in the future, she might want 
an abortion that might then be illegal under the Texas 
statutes. 
This very Jhrasin · of tl e Does' osition reveals its 
speculative character. Their alleged injury rests on pos-
sible future contraceptive failure, possible future preg-
nancy, possible future unpreparedness for parenthood, 
and possible future impairment of health. Any one or 
more of these several possibilities may not take place 
and all may not combine. In the Does' estimation, these 
possibilities might have some real or imagined impact 
upon their marital happiness. But we are not prepared 
to say that the bare allegation of so indirect an injury is 
sufficient to present an actual case or controversy. 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S., at 41-42; Golden v. Zwickler, 
394 U.S. , at 109-110 (1969); Abele v. Markle, 452 F. 2d, 
at 1124-1125; Crossen Y. Breckenridge, 446 F. 2cl, at 839. 
The Does' claim falls far short of those resolved other-
wise in the cases that the Docs urge upon us, namely, 
lllvestment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) ;. 
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Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970); 
and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). See also 
Truax v. Raich, supra. 
The Does therefore arc not appropriate plaintiffs in 
this litigation. Their complaint was properly dismissed 
by the District Court, :mel \\'C affirm that dismissal. 
v 
The princ!.Pal thrust of ap12cllant's attac~ on the Tg.xas 
statutes is that they improperly invade a right, said to 
be possesscc y the pregnant "·oman, to chOose to ter-
minate her pregnancy. Appellant would discover this 
rightii~pt of personal "liberty" embodied in 
the Fourteenth AmendmenTs Due Process Clause; or in 
personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to 
be protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, 
sec Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); R?'sen-
stadt Y. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); id., at 460 (WHI'l'E, 
J., concurring); or among those rights reserved to the 
people by the Ninth Amendment. Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U. S., at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Before 
addrc:<sing this claim. we feel it desirable briefly to 
survey, in several aspects. the history of abortion. for 
~insight as that history i'nay aft'ord us, and then to 
examine the state purposes and interests behind the 
criminal abortion laws. 
VI 
It perhaps is not generally appreciated that the re-
strictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority 
of States today arc of relatively recent vintage. Those 
la,Ys, generally proscribing abortion or its attempt at 
any time during pregnancy except when necessary to 
preserve the pregnant woman's life, arc not of ancient 
or even of common law origin. Instead, they derive 
from statutory changes effected, for the most part, in 
the latter half of the 19th century. 
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1. A 11dent attitudes. These are not capable of precise 
determination. We arc told that at the time of the Persian 
Empire abortifacients were known and that criminal 
abortions were severely punished.~ \¥ e arc also told, 
however. that abortion ",:as practiced in Greek times as 
well as in the Roman Era/' and that "it was resorted 
to without scruple." 10 The Ephesian, Soranos, often 
described as the greatest of the ancient gynecologists, 
appears to have been generally opposed to Rome's pre-
vailing free-abortion practices. He found it necessary 
to think first of the life of the mother, and he resorted 
to abortion when, upon this standard, he felt the proce-
dure advisable_,, Greek and Roman law afforded little 
protection to the unborn. If abortion was prosecuted in 
some places, it seems to have been based on a concept 
of a violation of the father's right to his offspring. 
Ancient religion did not bar abortion.'~ 
2. The Hippocratic Oath. What then of the famous 
Oath that has stood so long as the ethical guide of the 
medical profession and that bears the name of the great 
Greek (460(?)-~77(?) B. C.). who has been described 
as the Father of Medicine, the "wisest and the greatest 
R A. Cnf\1iglioni .. \ Tli~tor~· of ::\Jrdirinr S-t (2d rd. 19-+7) , K 
Krumhh:ut r , tnm~l:1tor n nd l'ditor (hrrrina ftrr "Cn~t iglioni" ). 
n .T. Ricci, The C:f'nraloa:o~· of C:~·nnrcolog~· 52. R-t. 113. 149 (2d eel. 
Hl!iO) (hrrrinaftrr "Hicei''); L. Lndrr. Abortion 7.5-77 (19Go) (herr-
in:1ftrr "Lach•r") : 1(. Xi .-<mtltdrr. Mrdical Ahortion Prncticr~ in thP" 
Fnitrcl State.•. in Abortion :llld thr Lnw 27. :~i\-40 (D. Smith, editor, 
1007): C:. William~, Thr ~anctit~· of Lifr 1-tR (1%7) (hf'rrinafter 
"William~"); J. :Xoon.1u .• \n Almost Absolute Yalur in History , in 
Thr Morality of .\bortion 1. 3-7 (.J. l\oon:m rd. 1970) (hrrrinnf1rr 
"Noonan"); E. Qun~· . .fn,tifiahh- .\hortion-Mf'clif':tl nnd Legal 
Foundntion~. IT , 49 Gro. L . .T. 395, 406-422 (1961) (hereinafter 
"Qnny"). 
10 L. Edrl..;trin. Tlw Tlipporratie Onth 10 (19-+3) (hereinafter 
"Edelstein") . But 8CP ca~tiglioni 227. 
,t Edrbtrin 12: Ricci 11:)- 114, 118-119 ; Noonan 5. 
J~ Edrlstein 13-14. 
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practioner of his art," and the "most important and 
most complete medical personality of antiquity," who 
dominated the medical schools of his time, and who 
typified the sum of the medical knowledge of the past? 1 3 
The Oath varies somewhat according to the par-
ticular translation, but in any translation the content 
is clear: "I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if 
asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner 
I will not give to a woman a peEJsary to produce abor-
tion," 11 or "I ·will neither give a deadly drug to any-
body if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to· 
this effect. Similarly, I will not give to a woman an 
abortive remedy." 1 5 
Although the Oath is not mentioned in any of the 
principal briefs in this case or in Doe v. Bolton, post, 
it represents the apex of the development of strict ethical 
concepts in medicine, and its influence endures to this 
day. Why did not the authority of Hippocrates dissuade 
abortion practice in his time and that of Rome? The 
late Dr. Edelstein provides us with a theory: 16 The 
Oath was not uncontested even in Hippocrates' day; only 
the Pythagorean school of philosophers frowned upon 
the related act of suicide. Most Greek thinkers, on the 
other hand, commended abortion, at least prior to via-
bility. See Plato, Republic, V, 461; Aristotle, Politics, 
VII, 1335 b 25. For the Pythagoreans, however, it 
was a matter of dogma. For them the embryo was 
animate from the moment of conception, and abortion 
meant destruction of a living being. The abortion clause 
of the Oath, therefore, "echoes Pythagorean doctrines," 
and "[i 1 n no other stratum of Greek opinion were such 
1 a Castiglioni 148. 
14 !d., at 154. 
1 5 Edelstein 3. 
' 6 I d. , at 12, 15-18. 
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views held or proposed in the same spirit of uncom-
promising austerity." 17 
Edelstein then concludes that the Oath originated in 
a group representing only a small segment of Greek 
opinion and that it certainly was not accepted by all 
ancient physicians. He points out that medical writings 
down to Galen (130-200 A. D.) "give evidence of the 
violation of almost every one of its injunctions." 18 But 
with the end of autiquity a decided change took place. 
Resistance against suicide and against abortion became 
common. The Oath came to be popular. The emerg-
ing teachings of Christianity were in agreement with 
the Pythagorean ethic. The Oath "became the nucleus 
of all medical ethics" and "was applauded as the embodi-
ment of truth." Thus, suggests Dr. Edelstein, it is "a 
Pythagorean manifesto and not the expression of an 
absolute standard of medical conduct." 19 
This, it seems to us, is a satisfactory and acceptable 
explanation of the Hippocratic Oath's apparent rigidity. 
It enables us to understand, in historical context, a long 
accepted and revered statement of medical ethics. 
3. The Common Law. It is undisputed that at the 
common law, abortion performed before "quickening"-
the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, 
appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th week of 
pregnancy 20-was not an indictable offense."[ The ab-
17 Id., at 18; Lader 76. 
18 Edelstein 63. 
19 I d., at 64. 
20 Dorland's Illustrated 1\fedicnl Dictionary 1261 (24th ed. 1965) . 
"t E. Coke, Instituies III -::·so (1648); 1 W. Hawkins. Pleas of the 
Crown c. 31, § 16 (1762); 1 Blacblone, Commeniaries -::-129-180 
(1765); l\1. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 433 (1778). For discussions 
of the role of the quickrning concept in English common law, sre 
Lader 78 ; Noonan 223-226; C. Me:ms, The Law of New York Con-
cerning Abortion and the S1alus of the Foetus, 1064-1968: A Case 
·-
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sence of a common law crime for pre-quickening abor-
tion appears to have developed from a confluence of 
earlier philosophical, theological, and civil and canon 
lMY concepts of when life begins. These disciplines 
variously approached the question in terms of the point 
at which the embryo or fetus became "formed" or rec-
ognizably human. or in terms of when a "person" came 
into being, that is, infused with a "soul" ot· "animated." 
A loose consensus evolved in early English law that these 
events occurred at some point between conception and 
live birth.~~ This was "mediate animation." Although 
of Cr~sation of Co11~titutiowdit~·, 14 N.Y. L. Forum 411 , 41R-428 
(1!)(i8) (hrrrimftrr ":\Iran~ I"): L. Strrn, .\hm·tion: Rrform and 
t!H' Law, .')9 .J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 8-1- (19HS) (hrrrinaftrr "Strrn"); 
Qun~· 430-4~2: Willinm~ 152. 
~"Earl~· philosophrr~ lwlirYrd that the rmbryo or fetu~ did not 
bcromc formrd and hrgin to lin' until :1t lr:1~t 40 da~'" nl'trr eonrrp-
tion for n mnlc, nncl SO to 90 da~·~ for n frm:dr. Scr. l'or rxamplr, 
Ari~totlr. Hi~t. Anim. 7.~.!}8:~b: C:c•n. Anim. 2.:~.7:3ti. 2 .. 1.741: Hip-
porrntc~. Lih. dr -:\:~t. Purr .. No. 10. Aristotlr's thinking drrin•d 
from hi~ thrrr-~t:q:rr them·~· ol' lifr: wgrtnblr. nnimnl, rntionnl. Thr 
vrgrtablr ~tngr w:t~ rr:trhrd at conrrpt ion. thr :mimal nt "nnimat imt," 
:111d the rntionnl ~oon aftrr liYe birth. Thi~ thc··m·~·. togrthcr with the 
40j 80 cia~· l'il'w, rnmr to hr :tcc·rplrcl b~· rnrl~ · Chri~tian thi11krr.,;. 
Thr thrologir:1l drbntr wa" rrflrdrd in tiH• writing.• of St. Augus-
tinr, who mnclc- n distitwtion brtwrrn rmb'I'!/O immimatus. not ~·rt 
rndowecl with a ~oul, nncl cmbr!JO animatv8. HP m:1~· h:11·r dr~wn 
upon Exodn~ xxi , 22. At onr point , howC'I'<'I', hr rxprr,-~r~ thr 1·irw 
t lw t. human powrr::; cannot drt rrminr t hr ]Joint dminf!; frt:d dr,·rlop-
mrnt at whirh thr criticnl chnngr orc·ur~ . Srr Angu~tinr. ])p Origine-
Anim:lc 4.4 (Pub. L:nv 44.f>:2i). Rrp al~o Timn~· . Thr Crr:ttion of th<' 
Humnn Son!, r. 2 nncl ~:3-8() (18:~2): Hn."C'I', Thr Crime of Abortion 
in Common L:tw 15 (C:1tholi1• 1.'ni1·. of .\mrrir:1 , Cnnm1 Law Studies 
No. 162. W:1~hington. n. C. Hl42). 
G:lirn. in thrrc•trrati,-r~ rrl:1trd to rmbr~·olo~~· . nC!'rptrd thr think-
ing of Aristotle :md hi~ folloiVPI':". Qun~· 42fi-42i . Latrr . . -\ugu:"tinc 
on abortion wn~ inrorporn t rd IJ.1· C: 1':1 tinn into t hr Drrr!'1nm. pnb-
li~hcd about 1140. Denctum .:\fnp;i,-tri C:ratiani 2.:):2.:2.7 to :2.:12.2.10, 
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Christian theology and the canon la\Y came to fix the 
point of animation at 40 days for a male and 80 days 
for a female, a view that persisted until the lOth cen-
tury, there was otherwise little agreement about the 
precise time of formation or animation. There was 
agreement. however, that prior to this point the fetus 
was to be regarded as part of the mother and its de-
struction, therefore, 'vas not homicide. Due to con-
tinued uncertainty about the prcci!"e tirne '"hen anima-
tion occmred. to the lack of any empirical basis foy· 
the 40-80 clay view. and perhaps to Acquinas' def-
inition of movement as one of the two first principles 
of life, Bra.cton focused upon quickening as the critical 
point. The significance of quickening was echoed by 
later common law scholars and found its way into the 
received common law in this country. 
Whether abortion of a quick fetus \vas a felony at 
common law, or even a lesser crime, is still disputed. 
Bracton. writing early in the 13th century, thought it 
homicicle.2 " But the later and predominant view, fol-
lowing the great common law scholars, has been that 
in 1 Corpn~ .Tmi~ C'anoniri 1122. 112:-3 (2d rd. Frirdbrrg; rd. 1879) . 
Grati:1n. lop;rthrr wilh thr drrrrt:ll~ th:1t followrd. wrre rrrop;nizrd 
ns thr definitin· bod~· of r·anon In\\' until thr nc\\' Coclr of 1!)17. 
For clil'rn~sion~ of tlw ranon l:nv trr:1 tmrnt , sre l\lrnns T. at 411-
412: Koonan, 20-2fi: Q11n~· 42fi-430 ; "('!' :d~o Noonan. Contrnrrplion: 
A Hi8tor~· of Its Trrnlmrnt b~· thr Cntholie Throlop;inn~ nnd Cnn-
onists 18-29 ( 1963). 
~:: Brarton took thr po~ition that abortion by blow or poiHon was 
homirirlr "if thr foetus br alrrnd.' · formrcl Hncl :mimaled, ::mel pnr-
lil'ulnrl~· if it br nnimnted." 2 H . Brnelon , De Lep;ibul' et Con-
snetuclinibu~ Anp;line 279 (T"·i~~ rd. 1879) , or, ns n liitrr tran~lation 
put;-; it, " if thr fortH" .i~ alr<'nd~· formed or quirkened , e~prrially if 
it i~ quiekrnecl ," IT Hrarton. On thr Lnll'~ and Cu,tom~ of Enp;lancl 
:-341 (Thorne eel. 190S). 8l'r Quay 4:31; ~rr nl~o 2 Fleln GO-Gl (Book 
I, r. 2:1) (Srlclen Soeicl.'· ed. 1955). 
70-lR-OPINION 
20 ROE v. WADE 
it was at most a lesser offense. In a frequently cited 
passage, Coke took the position that abortion of a woman 
"quick with childe" is "a great misprision and no 
murder." 24 Blackstone followed, saying that while abor-
tion after quickening had once been considered man-
slaughter (though not murder), "modern law" took a 
less severe view.25 A recent review of the common law 
precedents argues, however, that those precedents con-
tradict Coke and that even post-quickening abortion 
was never established as a common law crime.26 This 
is of some importance because while most American 
courts ruled, in holding or dictum, that abortion of an 
unquickenecl fetus was not criminal under their received 
common law/7 others followed Coke in stating that abor-
~"E. Coke, In~titutr~ Ill ':·50 (1048). 
2 " 1 Blarkstonr, Commrnt:1rir" ·X·I29-130 (1755). 
2G C. Mr::t.ns, The Phoenix of Ahortional Frcrdom: Is a Prmnnbrnl 
or Ninth-Amrnclmrnt Ri11.ht About to Ari~o from thr NinetC'rnth-
Ccnt ury Lt?gi~lnt ivr ARhC's of fl Fourtrrnth-Ct?ntur~· Common-Lnw 
Librrty?, 17 X. Y. L. Forum 335 (1971) (hrrrinaftrr "l\1cnns II"). 
Tho author rxamincs thr two 11rinripal prrccdcnts citrd marginally 
hr Cokr. both contran· to hi~ dictum, and tracC's thE' trentmrnt of 
11mm and otht?r cnsrs b~· rarlirr commrntator~. HI? conrludrs that 
Coke, who himsC'If participatrd as an advocate in an abortion cnsc 
in 1501, may haw intrntionall~· mi~stnted thE' law. Thr author t?vrn 
suggrsts n reason: Cokr's strong frrlings about abortion, coup!t?d 
with his rclurt:mcc to nclnww!Pdgr common law (secular) jurisdic-
tion to assess rwn::tltirs for an offt?ncc that traditionally hnd been an 
exclusively errlt?sinstical or canon l::tw crime. Sec al~o Lnder 78-79, 
who notes that some scholars doubt the common law CYE'r wal'! ap-
plied to abortion; that t ht? Engli~h rcclc~iastiral courts St?t?m to have 
lo~t. interest in the problem aftC'r 1527; and that the preamble to the 
English lt?gislation of 1803, 4;{ Geo. 3, c. 58, § 1. at 20::!, rrfrrrcd to 
in the tt?xt, infm, ~tatcs that "no adequnte menns have been hitherto 
provided for the pren:·ntion and puni~hment of such offrnsrs." 
" 7 Commonwealth v. Bangs, 9 ·Mas~. 887, 388 (1812); Cammon-
walth v. Parker, 50 l\fn~R. (9 Met.) 263, 255-266 (1845); State v. 
Cooper, 22 N . .T. L. 52, 58 (1849); Abm.ms v. Foshee, 3 Iowa 274, 
278-280 ( 1856); Smith v. Gafjard, 31 Ala. 45, 51 (1857); MitcheLl 
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tion of a quick fetus ·was a "misprision," a term they 
translated to mean "misdemeanor." "8 That their reli-
ance on Coke on this aspect of the law was uncritical 
and , apparently in all the reported cases, dictum (due 
probably to the paucity of common la''" prosecutions 
for post-quickening abortion), makes it now appear 
doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as 
a common la.w crime even with respect to the destruc-
tion of a quick fetus. 
4. The English statutory law. England 's first criminal 
abortion statute, Lord Ellenborough's Act, 43 Geo. 3, 
c. 58, came in 1803. It made abortion of a quick fetus, 
§ 1, a capital crime, but in § 2 it provided lesser penal-
ties for the felony of abortion before quickening, and 
thus preserved the quickening distinction. This con-
trast was continued in the general revision of 1828, 9 
Geo. 4, c. 31, § 13, at 104. It disappeared, however, 
together with the death penalty, in 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 
1 Vic .. c. 85, § 6, at 360, and did not reappear in the 
Offenses Against the Person Act of 1861, 24 & 25 Vic. , 
c. 100, §59, at 438, that formed the core of English 
anti-abortion law until the liberalizing reforms of 1967. 
In 1929 the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 19 & 20 
Geo. 5, c. 34, came into being. Its emphasis was upon 
the destruction of "the life of a child capable of being 
born alive." It made a willful act performed with the 
necessary intent a felony. It contained a proviso that 
v. Commonwealth. 7R K~· . 204, 210 (1879); Eggart v. State, 40 Fh. 
527 , 532 . 25 So . 144, 145 (1R98) ; State v. Alr"orn, 7 Idaho 599, 606, 
64 P. 1014, 1016 (1901) ; Edwards Y. State, 79 NC'b. 251 , 252, 112 
N. W. 611, 612 (1907): Gray v. State, 77 Tex. Crim. H. 221 , 224,. 
178 S. W. a37 , 338 (1915) ; Miller v. B ennett. 190 Ya . 162, 169. 56 
S. E . 2d 217, 221 (1949). Contrn, Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 
631, G33 (1850) ; Slate v. Slagle, 83 N. C. 630, 632 (1880) . 
~8 Sor Smith v. State, 33 Mr. 48 , 55 (1851) ; E vans v. People, 40 
N. Y. 86, 88 (1872) ; Lamb v. State, 07 l\Jd. 524, 533, 10 A. 208 
(1887). 
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one was not to be found guilty of the offense "unless 
it .is proved that the act which caused the death of the 
child was not done in good faith for the purpose only 
of preserving the life of the mother." 
A seemingly notable development in the English law 
was the case of Hex v. Bourne, 110391 1 K. B. 687. This 
case apparently answered in the affirmative thr question 
whether an abortion necessary to preserve the life of 
the pregnant woman " ·as excepted from the criminal 
penalties of the 1861 Act. In his instructions to the 
jury Judge Macnaghten referred to the 1920 Act, and 
observed, p. 691, that that Act related to "the case 
where a child is killed by a willful act at the time \Yhen 
it is be.ing delivered in the ordinary course of nature." 
Id., at 91. He concluded that the 1861 Act's use of 
the word "unlawfully," imported the same meaning ex-
pressed by the specific proviso in the 1929 Act even 
though there was no mention of preserving the mother's 
life in the 1861 Act. He then construed the phrase 
"preserving the life of the mother" broadly, that is, 
".in a reasonable sense," to include a serious and per-
manent throat to the mother's health, and instructed 
the jury to acquit Dr. Bourne if it found he had acted 
.in a good faith belief that the abortion \Yas necessary 
for this purpose. Id., at 693-694. The jury did acquit. 
Recently Parliament enacted a new abortion law. 
This is the Abortion Act of 1067. 15 & 16 Eliz. 2. c. 87. 
The Act permits a licensed physician to perform an 
abortion where two other licensed physicians agree (a) 
"that the continuance of the pregnancy would involYc 
risk to the life of the pregnant " ·oman, or of injury 
to the physical or mental health of the prcgnan t woman 
or any existing children of her family, greater than if 
the pregnancy were terminated," or (b) "that there is 
a substantial risk that if the child were bom it would 
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suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as 
to be seriously handicapped." The Act also provides 
that, in making this determination, "account may be 
taken of the pregnant woman's actual or reasonably 
forseeable environment." It also permits a physician , 
without the concurrence of others, to terminate a preg-
nancy where he is of the good faith opinion that the 
abortion "is immediately necessary to save the life or 
to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or 
mental health of the pregnant woman." 
5. 'l'h e American law. In this country the law in effect 
in all but a few States until mid-10th century was the 
pre-existing English common law. Connecticut, the 
first State to enact abortion legislation, adopted in 1821 
that part of Lord Ellenborough's Act that related to a 
woman "quick with child." "" The death penalty was 
not imposed. Abortion before quickening ''"as made a 
crime in that State only in 1860."" In 1828 K ew York 
enacted legislation '" that, in two respects, was to serve 
as a model for early anti-abortion statutes. First, while 
barring destruction of an unquickened fetus as well as 
a quick fetus , it made the former only a misdemea.JlOr, 
but the latter second-degree manslaughter. Second, it 
incorporated a concept of therapeutic abortion by pro-
viding that an abortion was excused if it "shall have 
been necessary to preserve the life of such mother, or 
shall have been advised by two physicians to be nec-
essary for such purpose." By 1840, whell Texas had 
received the common law."" only eight American States 
~ 9 Conn . Stnt ., Tit . 20 . * 14 (1821). 
"° Conn. Pub. Arts. f· . 71 , § J (1860). 
'
11 N . Y. R r1·. Rlnl .. pl. lY, r . I. Tit . U . Arl. 1, §0 , at 661 , nnd 
Tit. VI.§ 21. at fi!)-t (1829). 
"" Art of .Tnnnar~ · 20. 1840. § 1. set forth in 2 G::nnmrl , Laws of' 
T rxns 177-178 (1898); ~rr Grigsby v. Rcib, 105 Tex. 597, 600, 1.'53' 
S. W. 1124, 1125 (1013). 
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had statutes dea.ling with abortion.~" It was not until 
after the War Between the States that legislation began 
generally to replace the common law. Most of these 
initial statutes dealt severely with abortion after quick-
ening but were lenient with it before quickening. Most 
punished attempts equally with completed abortions. 
While many statutes included the exception for an abor-
tion thought by one or more physicians to be neces-
sary to save the mother's life, that provision soon 
disappeared and the typical law required that the pro-
cedure actually be necessary for that purpose. 
Gradually, in the middle and late 19th century the 
quickening distinction disappeared from the statutory 
law of most Sta.tes and the degree of the offense and 
the penalties were increased. By the end of the 1950's, 
a large majority of the States banned abortion, however 
and whenever performed, unless done to save or pre-
serve the life of the mother. 04 The exceptions. Alabama 
and the District of Columbia, permitted abortion to pre-
serve the mother's health.'1" Three other States per-
mitted abortions that were not "unlawfully" performed 
or that were not "without lawful justification." leaving 
interpretation of those standards to the courts.'1c In 
the past several years, however, a trend towarclliberaliza-
"~The Pnrly statute's nrc di~ru~sC'd in Quay 435-431\. SC'C' also 
LadPr 85-RR; Stern 85-86: and l\Ieans II 375-376. 
84 Criminal abortion r:;tatntcs in effect in the States as of 1961. to-
gethN with historical statui or~· devdopment and important judicial 
interprrtations of the stntc ~tatutP~. are cited and quoted in Quay 
447-520. SeC' Note , A Snrvr~' of thr PrC'sent Statutory nnd Case 
Law on Abortion: The Contradietion~ and thr Problrms, 1972 Ill. 
L. Forum 177, 179, clasr:;ifying the nbortion statutes and listing 25 
Rtates as permitting abortion only if necessary to sa.vr or presC'rve 
the mothC'r's life. 
:lG Ala. Code, Tit. 14, § 9 (1958); D. C. Code Ann.§ 22-201 (1967). 
:w Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 272, § 19 (1970); N. J. Rev. Stnt. 
Ann. 2A:87-1 (1969); Pa. Stnt. Ann., Tit. 18, §§ 4718, 4719 (1963). 
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tion of abortion statutes has resulted in adoption, by 
about one-third of the States, of less stringent laws, most 
of them patterned after the ALI Model Penal Code, 
§ 230.3,'" set forth as Appendix B to the opinion in 
Doe Y. Bolton, post --. 
It is thus apparent that ~t commollJaw, at the time 
of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout 
the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was 
vif'wed with less disfavor than under most American 
statutes currently in effect. Phrasing it another way, 
a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to ter-
minate a pregnancy than she does in most States today. 
At least with respect to the early stage of pregnancy. 
and very possibly without such a limitation, the oppor-
tunity to make this choice was present in this country 
H
7 Fonrtrrn Statr~ have ado11ted somr form of the ALI statute. 
Ser Ark. Stat. Ann. ~~ 41-~03 to 41-~ 10 (Snpp. 1971): Calif. Health 
nnd Safety C'odr ~~ 25950-25955.5 (Wr' t Snpp. 1972); Colo. Rev. 
StatR. Ann. ~~ 40-2-50 to 40-2-53 (Perm. Cnm. Sunp. 1967); D<'l. 
Cod<' Ann .. Tit. 24, ~~ 1790-179~ (Snpp . Hl72); Florida L:nv of 
Apr. 1~ . 1972. r. 72-196, 1972 Fla. SP~~. Law Sen· .. at 380-382; Ga. 
CodP §~26-1201 to 26-1203 (1972): Knn . Stnt. Ann. §21-3407 
(Snp11. 1971) ; Md. Ann. Code. Art. 4~. ~~ 137- 139 (Rep!. 1971) ; 
Miss. Code Ann. ~ 2223 (Snpp. 1972) : N. M. Sta t. Ann. §§ 40A-5-1 
to 40A-5-3 (Renl. 1972); N.C. Gen . Stat.§ 14-45.1 (Snpp. 1971) ; 
Ore. Rev. Stnt. ~~ 43.5.405 to 4~.5.495 (1971); S.C. Codr Ann.§§ 16-
82 to 1G--89 (Snnp. 1971): Va. Codr Ann. ~§ 18.1-62 to 18.1-62.3 
(Supp . 1972). Mr. Justi ce Cbrk dr~rribrd some of thrsr States as 
having "lrrl thr way." Religion , 1\'Iornlitr and Abortion: A Con-
~titutionnl Appraisn l, 2 Lo~·ola U. (L. A.) L. RC'\'. 1, 11 (1969). 
By thr end of 1970. four other States had rrprnlecl criminal pen-
nlties for nbortion~ performed in rarly prrgnnnr~· b~· a lirrnsrd 
physicinn . snbj<'rt to stat <'d prorrclural nnd hrnlth r<'qnirements. 
Alm-;ka Stnt. § 11.15.060 (1970): Haw. R<'v . Stat. § 458-Hi (Snpp . 
1971); N. Y. Penn! Coclr § 125.0.5 (1\irKinnr~- Snpp. 1972-1973) ; 
Wash. Tie\·. Codr §§ 9.02.060 to 9.02.080 (Snpp. 1972). The precise 
statu~ of rriminnl nbortion la~w in somr States i8 maclr unrlrnr by 
rrrcnt decisions in stn t·e nnd frdera l courts striking clown existing 
~intc laws, in who!\' or in part. 
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\\·ell into the 10th century. Even later, the law con-
tinued for some time to treat less punitively an abortion 
procured in early pregnancy. 
6. 'The posi6orz of the American Medical Assodation. 
The anti-abortion mood prevalent 111 this country in 
the late 19th century was shared by the medical pro-
fession. Indeed, the attitude of the profession may have 
played a significant role ill the enactment of stringent 
criminal abortion legislation during that period. 
An AMA Committee on Criminal Abortion was ap-
pointed ill May 1857. It presented its report, 12 Trans. 
of the Am. Med. Assn. 73- 77 (1859). to the Twelfth 
Annual Meeting. That report observed that the Com-
mittee had been appointed to investigate criminal abor-
tion ''\yith a view to its general suppression." It 
deplored abortion and its frequency and it listed three 
causes "of this general demoralization": 
"The first of these causes is a wide-spread popu-
lar ignorance of the true character of the crime-
a belief, even among mothers themselves. that the-
foetus is not aliw till aftC'r the period of quickening. 
"The second of the agC'nts alluded to is thC' fact 
that the profession themselves arc frequently sup-
posed carC'lC'!'S of foC'tal life .... 
"The third reason of the frightful extent of this 
crime is found in the grave defects of our laws, 
both common and statute, as regards the inclcpcncl-
C'nt and actual existence of the child before birth,. 
as a living being. These errors, "·hich arc suffi-
cient in most instances to prevent conviction, are· 
based, and only based. upon mistaken and exploded 
medical dogmas. ·with strange inconsistency. the 
law fully acknowledges the foetus in utero and its 
inherent rights, for civil purposes; \Yhile personally 
and as criminally affected, it fails to recognize it" 
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and to its life as yet denies all protection." !d., 
at 75-76. 
The Committee then offered, and the Associatiou 
adopted, resolutions protesting "against such unwarrant-
able destruction of human life," calling upon sta.te legis-
latures to revise their abortion laws, and requesting 
the cooperation of state medical societies "in pressing 
the subject." !d., at 28, 78. 
In 1871 a long and vivid report "·as submitted by the 
Committee on Criminal Abortion. It ended with the 
observation, "We had to deal with human life. In a 
matter of less importance we could entertain no com-
promise. An honest judge on the bench \Yould call 
things by their proper names. We could do no less." 
22 Trans. of the Am. Med. Assn. 258 (1871). It prof-
fered resolutions, adopted by the Association, id., at 
38-39, recommending, among other things, that it "be 
unlawful and unprofessional for any physician to induce 
abortion or premature labor, without the concurrent 
opinion of at least one respectable consulting physician, 
and then always with a view to the safety of the child-
if that be possible," and calling "the attention of the 
clergy of all denominations to the perverted viev1s of 
morality entertained by a large class of females-aye, 
and men also, on this important question." 
Except for periodic condemnation of the criminal abor-
tionist, no further formal AMA action took place until 
1967. In that year the Committee on Human Repro-
duction urged the adoption of a stated policy of oppo-
sition to induced abortion except when there is 
"documented medical evidence" of a threat to the health 
or life of the mother, or that the child "may be born 
with incapacitating physical deformity or mental de-
ficiency," or that a pregnancy "resulting from legally 
established statutory or forcible rape or incest may con-
stitute a threat to the mental or physical health of the 
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patient," and t\\'o other physicians "chosen because of 
their recognized professional competence have examined 
the patient and have concurred in writing," and the 
procedure "is performed in a hospital accredited by the· 
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals." The 
providing of medical information by physicians to state 
le~rislatures in their consideration of legislation regard-
ing therapeutic abortion was "to be considered consistent 
"·ith the principles of ethics of the American Medical 
Association." This recommendation was adopted by the 
House of Delegates. Proceedings of the AMA House 
of Delegates, 40--51 (June 1967). 
In 1970, after the introduction of a variety of pro-
posed resolutions, and of a report from its Board of 
Trustees, a reference committee noted "polarization of 
the medical profession on this controversial issue"; divi-
sion among those who had testified; a difference of 
opinion among AMA councils and committees; "the 
remarkable shift in testimony" in six months, felt to be 
influenced "by the rapid changes in state la,Ys and by 
the judicial decisions which tend to make abortion more 
freely available;" and a feeling "that this trend will 
continue." On June 25. 1970, the House of Delegates 
adopted preambles and most of the resolutions proposed 
by the reference committee. The preambles emphasized 
"the best interests of the patient," "sound clinical judg-
ment," and "informed patient consent," in contrast to 
"mere acquiescence to the patient's demand." The reso-
lutions asserted that abortion is a medical procedure 
that should be performed by a licensed physician in an 
accredited hospital only after consultation with two 
other physicians and in conformity with state law, and 
that no party to the procedure should be required to 
violate personally held moral principles:1R Proceedings 
" 8 "WhcrPas, Aboriion, likr an~· othrr mrdical prorcdme, should 
not be performed when contrary to the be . ;t interc,;ts of the patirnt 
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of the AMA House of Delegates 221 (June 1970). The 
AMA Judicial Council rendered a complementary 
opinion.39 
7. The position of the American Public Health Asso-
ciation. In October 1970, the Executive Board of the 
APHA adopted Standards for Abortion Services. These· 
"·ere five in number: 
"a. Rapid and simple abortion referral must be 
readily available through state and loca 1 public 
since ~ood medical prncticr requirf's duC' con~idrration for thr pa-
tient's welfnrr nnd not merr nrquir~rrncr to thr patirnt's drmand; 
:md 
"Whereas, Thr ~tand:nd~ of ~ound clinical judgmrnt, which, to-
grthrr with informrd pntirnt consrnt Rhould be determinative ac-
cording to the mrrits of rach individual cnsr; thereforr br it 
"RBSOLVED. That abortion is a mrdical procedure and should 
br performed only b~· a duly licensrd ph~·sician and surgeon in an 
accredited ho~pital aeting only after consultation with two other· 
physicians chosen because of their profr~sional competency and in 
conformance with standard~ of good medical practice and the Medi-
cal Practicr Act of his Statr; and be it furthrr 
"RESOLVED, That no ph~·sician or othrr professional personnel' 
shall be compelled to perform any act which violates his good med-
ical judgment. N'either ph~·~ician, hospital, nor hospital per~onnel 
shall be required to prrform any act violative of personally-held' 
moral principles. In thr~!' circumstances good medical practice re-
quires only that the physician or other professional personnel with-
draw from the casr so lon!J; as the withdrawal is consi~tent with 
good medical practice." Proceedings of the A~1A House of Dele-
gates 221 (June 1970). 
39 "The Principlrs of l\Irdical Ethics of thr AMA do not prohibit 
a physician from performing an abortion that is performed in a.c-
cOJ·dance with good medical practice and undrr circum~tances that 
do not violalr the laws of the community in which he practices. 
"In the matter of abortions, as of any other medical procedure, 
the Judicial Council becomes im·olvrd whenever there is allrged Yio-
lation of the Principles of l\Icdical Ethics a~ e,;tabli~hecl by the 
House of Drlegates." 
30 
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health departments, medical societies, or other non-
profit organizations. 
"b. An important function of counseling should 
be to simplify and expedite the provision of abor-
tion services; it should not delay the obtaining 
of these services. 
"c. Psychiatric consultation should not be man-
datory. As in the case of other specialized medical 
services, psychiatric consultation should be sought 
for definite indications and not on a routine basis. 
"d. A wide range of individuals from appropri-
ately trained, sympathetic volunteers to highly 
skilled physicians may qualify as abortion counselors. 
"e. Contraception and/ or sterilization should b!" 
discussed with each abortion patient." Recom-
mended Standards for Abortion Services, 61 Am. 
J. Pub. Health 396 (1971). 
Among factors pertinent to life and health risks asso-
ciated with abortion were three that "are recognized as 
important": 
"a. the skill of the physician, 
"b. the environment in which the abortion is 
performed, and above all 
"c. the duration of pregnancy, as dctenninecl by 
uterine size and confirmed by menstrual history." 
!d., at 397. 
It was said that "a well-equipped hospital" offers 
more protection "to cope with unforeseen difficulties. 
than an office or clinic without such resources. . . . The 
factor of gesta.tional age is of overriding importance." 
Thus it was recommended that abortions in the second 
trimester and early abortions in the presence of existing 
medical complications be performed in hospitals as in-
patient procedures. For pregnancies in the first tri-
mester, abortion in the hospital with or without overnight 
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stay "is probably the safest practice." An abortion in 
an extramural facility, however, is an acceptable alter-
native "provided arrangements exist in advance to admit 
patients promptly if unforeseen complications develop." 
Standards for an abortion facility were listed. It was 
said that at present abortions should be performed by 
physicians or osteopaths ''"ho a.re licensed to practice 
and "·ho have "adequate training." Id., at 308. 
8. The position of the American Bar Association. At 
its mecting""ti1February 1972 the ABA House of Dele-
gates approved. with 17 opposing vote"'. t}w Uniform 
Abortion Act that had been drafted and approved the 
pr~eoing August by the Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws. 58 A. B. A. J. 380 ( 1972). 
'J \Ye set forth the Act in full ·n the margin.40 The 
4° C "PNTFOHl\'T ABOTITTOX AC 
"SE(''I'ION 1. rAbiirtioli JJcjmed; 'Jt'h-Nt-A-tr 10rizrd.l 
"(n) '.1\hortion' mr:m~ 1hr trrminntinn of humnn ]Jl'C'f!Jlanry with 
nn int rnt ion of IH·r than to prod uri' n li\·r hirt h or to rrmo\·r n drnd 
frt u~ . 
"(h) An nhort ion m:1~· hr prrformrd in 1 hi~ ~tn te on]~· if it i~ 
prrformNl: 
" (1) h~· n ph~·~ ir·ian lirrn~rd to prnr1if'(' mf'dirin(' ror o~t!'opnthyl 
in thi~ ~f.'lfr or h~· fl. ph~·~ irinn ]ll'fl('fieing mrdieinr ror o~tropath~·l 
in thr rmplo~· of thr go\·rrnmrnt of thr LTnitrd Rt:llr~ or of this 
st:-ttr. r:1ncl thr nhortion i" prrformrd 1 in thl' ph~·~ iri:m's offirc or in 
a mrdirnl rlinir. or] in a l10~pit:il nppro\·rd b~· thr rDrpnrtnwnt or 
Hraltbl or oprrntNl h~· thr Pnitrd Rtntrs. thi~ stntr. or nny dqxnt-
ment, :1g!'nr~·. or politir:il ~uhdi\·i~ion of f'ithrr:l or b~· n frmnle 
U]Jon hrr~c·ll' upon thr nch·ic<' of 1hr ph~·~ irian: :md 
"(~) within j'20l \Yrrb nftrr tlw rommrnrrmrnt of thr prrg;nmu·y 
ror n.f't~O] wrf'k~ onl~· if thr ph~·~ ic·inn ha~'< ren~onablr rnu~r to 
h~r®h!'rf' i~ n ~tnnt~.; lh:tl rontinunnrf' of thr preg-
nnnrY would C'Jl(J:ingrr thr lil'r of thr mothrr or would graveh· im-
p~ .thr pl!_y~irnl or mrnt~llh-;ftlie muth-;r,((Ti})th.'lt thr-;-hild 
would br horn \Yith gm\·r ph~·,-iral or mental drfc:M , or @")that 
thr,..Q!:~ r:.'Il£~~~t, or illirit intercourse with 
a .e:irl undrr thr age of 10 ~·rar~ of nge]. 
"REC'I'IO!';" 2. I'Penalty.l A11~· prr~on who pcrformH or prorurrH 
an nbortion othrr than nuthorizrd h~· thi~ Art i~ guilty of a [felony] 
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Conference has appended an enlightening Prefatory 
Note.~' 
VII 
Three reasons have been advanced to explain histor-
ically the enactment of criminal abortion laws in the 
19th century and to justify their continued existence. 
:mel, upon rom·irtion thrrrof, may hr ~rntencrd to Pfl:'" n fine not 
rxcrrding rs1,0001 or to irnprisonmrnt rin the state penitrntiary] 
not rxrerdin~?: rs ~·r;m;l, or both. 
"SEC'J'ION 3. runijormity of Interp1·etation.] This Art shall be 
con~trned to effertuntr it~ grnrral purpo~r to mnkr uniform thr law 
with rrspert to the subjrct of this Act nmong thosr stntes which 
rnn ct it. 
"SECTION 4. rshort Title.] This Art mn~· be citrd ftS the Uniform 
Abort ion Act. 
SE('1'TON 5. rsn•erability.l If an:'" proYiRion of this Act or the 
application thereof to flll~' prr~on or circumstance is held invalid, 
the invalidity doC':< not nffcct othC'r pro,·i,.ions or applirations of 
this Act which ran bC' givC'n effect without the invalid provision or 
applirntion, and to thi~ rnd tlw provisions of this Art arc severable. 





[Time of Taking Effect.] "SEC'l'ION i. 
effrrt------" 
This Art shall take 
41 "This Act is baRrel lnr~?:cl~· upon the New York abortion act fol-
lowing a review of thr more recent laws on abortion in sevrral states 
and upon recognition of a more liberal trend in laws on this subject. 
Recognition was ~?:iYrn also to thC' ~rvrral deci~ions in state and fed-
eral courts which show a further trend toward liberalization of 
abortion laws, rspeciall~· during thC' fin;t trimester of pregnancy. 
"Recognizing that a number of prob!Pms appearrd in New York, a 
~horler time period for 'unlimited' abortion:; wns advisable. The 
time period was bracketed to permit the vnriou~ states to insert a 
figure more in ker11ing with the diffPrent ronditiom; that might exist 
among the statr~. Likrwi;o;r, the language limiting 1 hr plare or 
placr::; in which abortion~ ma~· be performed was nlso bracketed to 
account for different conditions among thr states. In addition, limi-
tations on abortions after the initial 'unlimit cd' period were placed 
70-18-0PINION 
ROE v. WADE 33" 
It has been argued occasionally that these laws were· 
the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage 
illicit sexual conduct. Texas, however, does not advance 
this justification in the present case, and it appears that 
no court or commentator has taken the argument seri-
ously.'2 The appellants and amici contend, moreover, 
that this is not a proper state purpose at all and suggest 
that, if it were. the Texas statutes are overbroad in 
protecting it since the law fails to distinguish between 
married and unwed mothers. 
A second reason is concerned with abortion as a med-
ical procedure. When most criminal abortion laws were 
first enacted, the procedure was a hazardous one for 
the woman.• ~ This was particularly true prior to the 
development of antisepsis. Antiseptic techniques, of 
course, were based on discoveries by Lister, Pasteur, and 
others first a.nnounced in 1867, but were not generally 
accepted and employed until about the turn of the cen-
tury. Abortion mortality was high. Even after 1900, 
and perhaps until as late as the development of antibiotics 
in the 1940's, standard modern techniques such as clila-
in brackets so thnt individual state~ rna~· adopt all or any of these· 
reasons, or place fur t hr r rc·~t rictions upon abortions after the initial 
period . 
"This Act docs not contain any provision rrlating to medical re-
view rommittrrH or prohibitions ngainst sanctions impo~ed upon 
medirnl personnel rrfu ~ ing to partiripatc in abortions because of 
religious or other similar rra~ons, or the likr. Such provisions, while 
related, do not direc t]~· Jx>rtain to when , where, or by whom abor-
tions may be performed : howcwr, the Act iH not drafted to exclude 
such a provision by a ~ tntc ''"ishing to enact thr ~arne." 
12 Sec, for examplE', YWCA v. Kugler. a42 F. Supp. 1048, 1074 
(N . . T. 1972): Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 805-806 (Conn. 
1972) (Newman, .T. , concnrring) : Walsingharn v. Florida, 250 Ro . 
2d 857, 86:3 (En·in , .J ., concurring) (Fla. Sup. 1972) ; State v. Ged-
icke, 4::3 N . . T. L. 86, 80 (Sup. Ct. 1881); l\lenns II, nt 381-382. 
•Ja Sec C. Haagenson & W. Lloyd, A Hundred Years of Medicine-
19 (1943) . 
70-1S-OPINION 
3-t ROE v. \VADE 
tion a11d curettage ·were not nearly so safe as they arc 
today. Thus it has been argued that a State's real 
concern in enacting a criminal abortion law was to 
protect the pregnant woman, that is, to restrain her 
from submitting to a procedure that placed her life 
in serious jeopardy. 
Modern medical techniques have altered this situa-
tion. Appellants and various amici refer to medical 
data. indicating that abortion in early pregnancy, al-
though not without its risk, is now relatively safe. 
Mortality rates for women undergoing early abortions. 
where the procedure is legal, appear to be as low as or 
lower than the rates for normal childbirth .'' ' Conse-
quently. any interest of the State in protecting the 
woman from an inherently hazardous procedure. except 
when it would be equally dangerous for her to forgo it, 
has largely disappeared. Of course, important state 
interests in the area of health and medical standards 
do remain. The State has a legitimate interest in :-:eeing 
to it that abortion. like any other medical procedure, 
is performed under circumstances that insure maximum 
safety for the patient. This interest obviously extends 
at least to the performing physician and his staff, to the 
facilities involved, to the availability of after-care. and 
to adequate provision for any complication or emer-
gency that Jnigh t arise. The prevalence of high mor-
tality rates at i1legal "abortion mills" strengthens, rather 
11 Pott~. Po,t ronrrption Control of FPrtilit~·. S Tnt'] .T . of G. & 0. 
~H57, 9fi7 (1970) (Eng:lnnd :1nfl Wnlr~): Abortion Mortulit~·. 20 -:\'for-
hidit~· and Mora lity. 20S, 209 (.Tul~· 12. 1971) (U. R. Drpt. of HEW, 
l'ublir ITrn.!t h Rrn·icP) (N<·"" York Cit~·): TirtzP. rnitrd Rtrrt<'~: 
Thrrnprut ir Abort ion ~. 19(i:)-] 9CiS. 50 Rtudir~ in F:nnil.'· Pl:mning 5, 
7 (1970): Tir tzt'. 1\Tort:dih· ll"ilh ConiT<~crption and Inclurrd Abor-
tion. 4ii Rtudir" in Fnmil~·l'i:lnning: G (19Ci9) (.Tnp:m, Czrcho,:loYnkin, 
Jlung:nr~· ) ; Tirtz(' & L r hfr ldt . LPg:al Abortion in F;,,tprn F.mopr, 
175 .J. A. 1\T. A. 11-+9, 1152 (.\pril HlCi1) . Othrr ~ourrr~ :ur dis-
rn~~rd in Laclr r 17-2:). 
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than weakeus, the State's interest in regulating the con-
ditions under which abortions are performed. More-
over. the risk to the woman increases as her pregnancy 
continues. Thus the State retains a definite interest 
in protecting the woman's own health and safety when 
an abortion is proposed at a late stage of pregnancy. 
The third reason is the State's interest-some phrase 
it in tcmiS of duty-in protecting prenatal life. Some 
of the argument for tills .J ust1fication rests on the theory 
that a new human life is present from the moment of 
conception.'" The State's interest and general obliga-
tion to protect life then extends. it is argued, to pre-
natal life. Only "·hen the life of the pregnant mother 
herself is at stake. balanced against the life she carries 
" ·ithin her, should the interest of the embryo or fetus 
not prevail. Logically, of course. a legitimate state in-
terest in this area need not stand or fall on acceptancP 
of the belief that life begins at conception or at some 
other point prior to live birth. In assessing the State's 
interest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claim 
that as long as at least polent1'al life is involved. the 
State may assert interests beyond the protection of the 
pregnant woman alone. 
Parties challenO'iJ10' state abortion laws have shar )ly ( 
dis )Uted in some courts the contentiOn that a 1ur )OSC 
of these la,vs. when enacted. was tQ..__protect Jrr.c.u.a.tal 
lif~inting to the absence of legislative history to 
support the contention, they claim that most state laws 
,\·ere designed solely to protect the woman. Because 
medical advances have lessened this concern, at least 
1 "8rC' Brid of Amicu~ Nntionnl Hi~ht to Life Foundation; JL 
Drinan, Thr Im·iolnbilit~· of 1lw Hi~ht to Be Born, in Abortion and 
the Ln,w 107 (D. Smith. rditor, HHii); Loui~cll. Abortion, Tlw Prac-
tice of Mrdicinc , and the Due Prorr.-~ of Law, 16 UCLA L. HeL 
2:)3 ( HJG9) : N oomm 1. 
•n Ser, e. g., Abele Y. Ma1'1:lc, ;)42 F. Supp. 800 (Conn. 1972). 
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with respect to abortion in early prrgnancy, they argue 
that with respect to such abortions the la\YS can no 
longer be justified by any state interest. There is some 
scholarly support for this view of original purposr. '7 The 
few state courts called upon to interpret their laws in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries did focus on the 
Rtate 's interest in protecting the "·oman's health rather 
than in preserving the embryo and fetus.~ ·~ Proponents 
of this view point out that in many States, including 
Texas ,49 by statute or judicial interpretation, the prrg-
nant woman herself could not be prosecuted for self-
abortion or for cooperating in an abortion performed 
upon her by another.50 They claim that adoption of 
the "quickening" distinction through received common 
law and state statutes tacitly recognizes the greater 
health hazards inherent in late abortion and impliedly 
repudiates the theory that life begins at conception. 
It is with these interests, and the weight to be at-
tached to them, that this case is concerned. 
VIII 
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right 
of~cy. In a line of deCiswns, however, going back 
47 Sre disru~siom; in l\'Iem1~ I and Mrans II. 
•~ Srr, e. g .. State v. JIJu rphy. 27 X . J. L. 112. 114 (1R58). 
4 0 Watson v. State, 9 T rx. App. 237, 244-245 (1880): Moore v. 
State, 37 Tex. Crim. R 552 , 5tH , 40 S. W. 287 , 290 (1897) ; Shaw 
v. State, 73 Trx. Crim . R 337, 339 , 155 S. W. 930, 9::n (1914); 
Fondren v. State, 74 Tex. Crim. R. 552 , 557 , 1fi9 S. W. 411 , 414 
(1914) ; Gray v. State, 77 TPx. Crim . R 221, 229, 178 S. W. 337, 341 
(1915). There is no immunit~· in Trxas for the fnthrr who is not 
mnrrird to the mothr r. Jlammett Y. State, 84 Tex. Crim. R. 535, 
209 S. W. G51 (1919) : Thompson Y. State, - Trx. Crim. R. -
(1971), appeal pending. 
no Ser Smith v. State. 3:l !.1r. 48, 55 (1851) ; In re Vinr e, 2 N . J _ 
443 , 450. 67 A. 2cl 141 , 144 ( 1949). A Hhort cli;,cu~~ ion of thr modern 
law on this issur iH C'Ontnined in the Comment to the ALI's Model 
Penni Code § 207.11 , nt 158 and nn . 35- 37 (Tent. Draft No.9, 1959) . 
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perhaps as far as Um'on Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 
U. S. 250, 251 (1891), the Court has recogoized that a 
right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas ---------------or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. 
In varying contexts the Court or individual Justices 
have indeed found at least the roots of that right in 
the First Amendment, fitanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 
557, 564 (1969); in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 8'-9 ( 1968), Katz Y. United 
States, '389 U. S. 347, 350 (1967), !!..gyd v.--u;;ited Stales, 
116 U. S. 616 (1886), sec ~fNd. v. Uniled States, 
277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dif!'senting); in 
the penumbras of the Bill of Rights. Griswold v. Con-• - _............,. 
necticut, 381 U. S. 470, 484-485 (1965); in the Ninth 
Amendment, id., at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); or 
in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, see ~lea, 
262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923). These decisions make it 
clear that o~erso~~} righ~ that can be deemed "~­
damental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," 
P(i:[JWV. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937), ~ 
in luded in this ·uarantee of ersonal privacy. They 
also make 1t clear that the right as some extension to 
activities relating t marriag, Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U. S. 1, 12 (1967) , )rocreati9ti, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 
316 U. S. ~35, 541-542 (1942),Gontraccptio~ F?isen-
stadt v. Bmrd, 405 U. S. 438. 453- -454(!912); ~d., at 
460, 463-465 (WHITE, J., concurring), family relation-
ships, Prince v. Massachusetts 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), 
and ild rearin and education Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 1 25) , Meyer \'. i\"ebraska, 
supra. 
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the 
Fourteenth Amendirumt's conceptOr )ersona.l liberty 
and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it 1s or, as 
the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amend--
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ment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad 
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not 
t;terminateher pregnancy. The detriment that the 
State ,\·ould impose upon the pregnant woman by deny-
ing this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and 
direct harm medically diagnosable even in early preg-
nancy may be involved. Maternity. or additional off-
spring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and 
future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental 
and physical health may be taxed by child care. There 
is also the distress. for all concemed, associated with 
the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bring-
ing a child into a famil~le. l~sycf;DJ;giciilly ----~- ----------:' and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases. as in tlus 
on~dditio~lties and continuing stigma 
of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are 
factors the woman and her responsible physician neces-
sarily ·will consider in consultation. 
On the basis of elements such as these. apl?ellunts and 
some amici argue "that' the woman 's right is absolute 
and that she lSCI-ititlcd to ternunate her pregnancy in 
whatever way and for whatever reason she alone chooses. 
W~ee. Appellants' arguments that 
Texas either has no valid interest at all in regulating 
the abortion decision, or no interest strong enough to 
support any limitation upon the " ·oman 's sole deter-
mination , is unpersuasive. The Court's decisions recog-
nizing a right of privacy al~1e 
sta e r 1. a wn m areas protected by t 1at right is a )pro-
p~. As noted above. a state may properly assert 
important interests in safeguarding health, in maintain-
ing medical standards, and in protectinl!' potential life. 
At some point in pregnancy, these interests become suffi-
ciently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors 
that govern the abortion decision. The privacy right 
f#lll' .. :;;:....-
involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute. In 
J 
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fact, it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by 
some amici that one has an unlimited right to do with 
one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to 
the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's 
decisions. The Court has refused to recognize an un-
limited right of this kind in the past. Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, 107 U. R. 11 (1905) (vaccination); Buck 
\'.Bell, 274 r. S. 200 (1927) (sterilization). 
We therefore conclude that the right of personal pri-~~ 
vacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right 
is not unqualified and must be considered against impor-
tant state interests in regulation. 
We note that those federal and sta.te courts that have 
recently considered abortion law challenges have reached 
the san1e conclusion. A majority, in addition to the 
District Court in the present case, have held state la\YS 
unconstitutional, at least in part, because of vagueness, 
or overbreadth and abridgemellt of rights. Abele v. 
Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (Conn. 1972), appeal pend-
ing; Abele v. Markle, - F. Supp. - (Conn. 1972); 
Doe "· Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (KD Ga. 1970), 
appeal clecicled today, post -; Doe "· Scott, 321 F. 
Supp. 1385 (ND Ill. 1971). appral pending; Poe 
"· Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986 (Kan. Hl72); YWCA "· 
Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (NJ 1972); Babbitz Y. 
McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (ED Wis. 1970), appeal 
dismissed. 400 U. S. 1 (1970); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 
2d 954, 458 P. 2d 194 (1969), cert. denied. 397 U. S. 
915 ( 1970); State v. Barquet, 262 S. 2d 431 (Fla. 1972). 
Others have sustained state statutes. Crossen v. 
Attorney General, 344 F. Supp. 587 (ED Ky. Hl72). 
appeal pending; Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of 
Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (ED La. 1970). 
appeal pending; Co1·key v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 
(WDNC 1971), appeal pending; Steinberg v. Brown, 
I~ 
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321 F. Supp. 741 (ND Ohio 1970); Doe v. Ramplon, 
-F. Supp.- (Utah 1971), appeal pending; Cheaney 
v. Indiana, - Ind. -, 285 N. E. 2cl 265 ( 1972); 
Spears v. State, 257 So. 2d 876 (Miss. 1972); State v. 
JJ1unson, - S. D. -, 201 N. W. 2d 123 ( 1972), appeal 
pending. 
Although the results are divided, most of these courts 
have agreed that the right of privacy, however based, 
is broad enough to cover the abortion decision; that the 
right, nonetheless, is not absolute and is subject to some 
limitations; and that at some point the state interests 
as to protection of health, medical standards, and pre-
natal life, become dominant. We agree with this 
approach. 
Where certain "fundamental rights" are involved, the 
Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may 
be justified only by a "compelling state interest." Kramer 
Y. Union Free School District, 395 U. S. 621. 627 (1969); 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 634 (1969), Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 406 ( 1963), and that 
legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to ex-
press only the legitimate state interests at stake. Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Aptheker 
v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 508 (1964); Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 307-308 ( 1940); see 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 460, 463- 464 ( 1972) 
(WHITE, J., concurring). 
In the recent abortion cases, cited above, courts have 
recognized these principles. Those striking down state 
la\VS have generally scrutinized the State's interest in 
protecting health and potential life and have concluded 
that neither interest justified limitations, or at least 
broad limitations, on the reasons for which a physician 
and his pregnant patient might decide that she should 
have an abortion in the early stages of pregnancy. 
Courts sustaining state laws have held that the State's 
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determination to protect prenatal life is dominant and 
constitutionally justifiable. 
IX 
The District Court held that the appellee failed to 
meet his burden of demonstrating that the Texas stat-
ute's infringement upon Roe's rights was necessary to 
support a compelling state interest, and that, although 
the defendant presented "several compelling justifi-
cations for state presence in the area of abortions.' r 
the statutes outstripped these justifications and swept 
"far beyond any areas of compelling state interest." 
314 F. Supp., at 1222-1223. Appellant and appellee 
both contest that holding. Appellant. as has been in-
dicated, claims an absolute right that bars any state 
imposition of criminal penalties in the area. Appel-
lee argues that tho State's determination to recognize 
and protect prenatal life from and after conception con-
stitutes a compelling state interest. As noted above, 
we do not agree fully with either formulation. 
A. The appellee and certain amici argue that the 
fetus is a "person" within the language and meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this they 
outline at length and in detail tho well-known facts 
of fetal development. If this suggestion of personhood 
is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, 
for the fetus' ri ht to 'fe is then guaranteed specifically 
by the Amendment. The appe ant conceded as much 
on reargument."1 On the other hand, the appellee con-
ceded on reargument "" that no case could be cited that 
holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Constitution does not define "person" in so many 
words. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment con-· 
51 Tr. of Rrnrg. 20-21. 
5" Tr. of Rrarg. 24. 
70-1~-0 PI.XION 
IHYE v. \VADE 
tains three references to "person." The first, in defining 
"citizens," speaks of "persons born or naturalized in 
the United States." The word also appears both in 
the Due Process Clause and in the Equal Protection 
Clause. "Person" is used in other places in the Con-
stitution: in the listing of qualifications for representa-
tives ancl sPnators. Art. I. ~ 2. cl. 2. and ~ 3. cl. 3; in 
the Apportionment Clause. Art. I, ~ 2. cl. 3; "" in the 
Migration and Importation provision, Art. I. ~ !), cl. 1; 
in the Emolument Clause, Art. I, ~ 9, cl. 8; in the Elec-
tors provisions. Art. TT, ~ 1. cl. 2. and the supersE'clE'd 
cl. 3; in the provision outlining qualifications for the 
office of Pre8idcnt. Art. II. ~ 1. cl. 5; in the Extradition 
provisions, Art. IV, ~ 2, cl. 2, and the supersedE'd Fugi-
tive Slave cl. 3; and in the Fifth. Twelfth. and Twenty-
Sf'concl Amendments as well as in §~ 2 and 3 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. But in nearly all these in-
stances. the usc of tlw \Yore! is such tha.t it has applica-
tion only postnatally. None indicates , \vith any 
assurance. that it has any possible pre-natal application.:;• 
:;:~ \Vr arr not n.mtrr th:tt in t hr tn king of nn~· rrn~u~ 1mdrr this 
rltl\1~<'. :1 frtn~ hn~ r1·rr brrn roun1 rd. 
"'' Whrn Trxn~ urgr~ thnt n frt11" i" rntitlrd to Fomtrrnth Amrnd-
mrnt protrrtion ~~~ a. Jlrr,on. it f:t<·r~ n dilrmm:1. \'rithrr in Trxm: 
nor in nn~· othrr Stntr :trr [!]J [lbortion~ prohibitrd. Dr,pitf' broad 
pro~rript ion. :m rxcrp1 ion :tlwaY:.: rxi"t". Thr rx('rpt ion ront :1 in eel 
in Art. lHHl, for an :1hortion pro('111'rcl or attrmptrd b~· mrdiral [lcl-
Yicr for ihr Jlllfjl0~(' of ~: JI' ill~ thr Jjfr Of thr ll10fhrr . i" t~·pirnJ. nut 
if thr f!'tll" j, a. ]Wr,on \\'ho i~ not to br clrpri,·rcl of lifr ll'ithm1t dnr 
prorr:.:" of l:11r. and if thr mothrr'" <"onclition i" thr Po lr drtC'l'minant , 
clo r;-; not thr Trx:t,.: rxc<'ption npprar to br out of lim• ll'ith thr 
c\mrndmrnt ',; eomm:md '? 
Thrrr nrr othrr incon"i"t<·nci<'" br f11·rpn Fomtrrnth .\mrndmrnt 
~tatu~ and thr t~·pic·:tl abortion ~tatutr. It h[l ~ alrr:td~· brrn pointed 
out, n. 49 , supra. that in Tl'x:t~ thr 11·omnn i:.: 11ot a princ·ipnl or Ml 
:H'rOm]Jlie<' with rr,.: p<'rt to :111 nhortion upon hrr. If th<' frtu~ is 
:1 prr~on, ll'b~· i~ thr woman not a prinripnl or nn arC'omplirc? 
Furthrr. thr prlt : tlt~· for rriminal nhortion ~prrifit'd bY Art. 1195 
i~ ~ignifirnnt ly lr~~ than til(' mnximum prnalt~· for murder prr,eribrd 
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All this. together " ·ith our observation. supra, that 
throughout the major portion of the 19th century pre-
vajJing legal abortion practices \Yerc far freer than they 
arc today. persuades us that the \Yord "person." as used 
in the Fourteenth Amendment, docs not include the 
unborn."'' This is m accord with the results reached 
in those few cases where the issue has been squarely 
presented. McGarvey v. Magee-Womens Hospital, 340 
F. Supp. 751 (WD Pa. 1072); Byrn Y. New York City 
Health & Hospitals Corp., 31 N. Y. 2d 194, 286 N. E. 
2d 887 (1972). appeal pending; Abele v. Markle, -
F. Supp.- (Conn. 1972). Com.parc Cheaney v. Indi-
ana,- Incl .. -, 285 N. E. 265, 270 (1972); Montana 
Y. Rogers, 278 F. 2cl 68, 72 (CA7, 1960), aff'd sub. nom. 
Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U. S. 308 (1961); Keeler v. 
Superior Court, - Cal. -, 470 P. 2d 617 (1970); 
State v. Dickinson, 23 Ohio App. 2d 259, 275 N. E. 2d 
599 (1970). Indeed. our decision in Unded States v. 
V'l.l'itch, 402 U. S. 62 ( 1971), inferentially is to the same 
effect, for we there would not have indulged in statutory 
interpretation favorable to abortion in specified circum-
stances if the necessary consequence \Yas the termina-
tion of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection. 
This conclusion, however, docs not of itself fully 
answer the contentions raised by Texas. and we pass 
on to other considerations. 
B. The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her 
privacy. She carries an embryo and , later. a fetus, if 
011e accepts the medical definitions of the developing 
hy Art. 1257 of ihr T(•xn~ P(•nal Coc!P. If tlw frtu.'i i~ a prr~on, may 
i hr ]WnnltiP~ lw difTNrnt? 
"" Cf. thP \Vi~ron~in abortion ~tntutr. clrfining " unborn C'hilcl" 
to mrnn "a hum:m bring from thr timr of ronC'rption until it is born 
:tli,·r." \Yi~ . Stnt. § 9-W.O-! (fi) (1959). nnd thr nr\Y ConnPrtirut i'tnt-
utr, Publir Art N'o. 1, Mn)· 1972 Sprrinl Rr~~ion , clrc·l:lring it to hr 
thr public polir)' of thr Rtatr nne! thr lrgi~lati\ ·e intrnt "to protect 
and prr~rrve human lifr from the moment of conreption." 
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young in the human uterus. Sec Dorland's Illustrated 
Medical Dictionary, 478-470, 547 (24th eel. 1965). The 1 
situation therefore is inherently different from marital 
intimacy, or bedroom possession of obscene material, or 
marriage, or procreation, or education, with ·which Eisen- . 
stadt, Giswold, Stanley, Loving, Skinner, Pierce, and 
Meyer were respectively concerned. As we have inti-
mated above, it is reasonable nd ap ropriatc for a 
State to decide that at some point in time ano er 
interest, that of potentia liuman life, becomes signffi-
c~ve . lie "·oman's privacy is~ 
and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured 
accordingly. 
Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, life begins at conception and is present through-
out pregnancy, and that. · therefore, the State has a 
compelling interest in protecting that life from and 
after conception. We need not resolve the difficult ques-
tion of when life begms. When t ose trained in t 1e 
re~medicine, philosophy, and theol-
ogy are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, 
at this point in the development of man's knowledge, 
is not in a position to speculate as to the answer. 
It should be sufficient to note briefly the wide diver-
gence of thinking on this most sensitive and difficult 
question. There has always been strong support for the 
view that life does not begin until live birth. This was 
the belief of the Stoics."" It appears to be the pre-
dominant, though not the unanimous, attitude of the 
Jewish faith. 5 ' It may be taken to represent also the 
position of a large segment of the Protestant community, 
insofar as that can be ascertained; organized groups that 
5a Edelstein 16. 
r.; Lader 97-99; D. FC'Idmnn. Birth Control in Jewi~h Law 251-
29-J. (1968). For a stricter view, sec I. Jakobovit~, Jcwi~h View~:~ on 
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have taken a formal position on the abortion issue have 
generally regarded abortion as a matter for the conscience· 
of the individual and her family."8 As we have noted. 
the common law found greater significance in quickening. 
Physicians and their scientific colleagues have regarded 
th-at' event with less interest ru1d have tended to focus 
either upon conception or upon live birth or upon the 
interim point at which the fetus become13 "viable" that 
is, potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, 
albeit with artificial aid. "0 Viability is usually placed 
at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, 
e:ven at 24 weeks. 00 The Aristotelian theory of "mediate 
animation" that held sway throughout the Middle Ages 
and the Renaissance in Europe continued to be official 
Roman Catholic dogma until the 19th century, despite 
opposition to this "ensoulment" theory from those in the 
Church who would recognize the existence of life from 
the moment of conceptiotl. 01 The latter is now, of course, 
the official belief of the Catholic Church. As one of the 
briefs amicus discloses, this is a view strongly held by 
many non-Catholics as well, and by many physicians. 
Substantial problems for precise definition of this view 
are posed, however, by new embryological data that pur-
port to indicate that conception is a "process" over time, 
r~1t, and by new mec 1ca techniques 
such as menstrual extraction, the "morning-after" pill, 
::;s Amicus Brief for tho American Ethical Union ot al. :For the 
position of the National Council of Churches and of other denomina-
tions, see Lader 99-101. 
::;o L. Hellman & J. Pritchard, William~ Obstetric~ 493 (14th ed. 
1971); Dorland';; Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1689 (24th od. 
1965). 
00 Hollman & Pritchard, wpm, n. 58, at 493. 
01 For discussion~ of tlH' development of tho Roman Catholic po-
::;ilion, sec D. Callahan, Abortion: Law, Choice and Morality 409-
447 (1970); Noonan 1. 
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implantation of embryos, artificial insemination, and even 
artificial wombs."~ 
In areas other than criminal abortion the lav,· has 
been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we 
recognize it, begins before live birth or to accord legal 
rights to the unborn except in narrowly defined situations 
and except "·hen the rights arc contingent upon live 
birth. For example, the traditional rule of tort law had l 
denied recovery for pr<'natal injuri<'s <'ven though the 
child was bom alive."" That rule has been changed in 
almost every jurisdiction. In most States recovery is said 
to be permitted only if the fetus was viable, or at least 
quick, "·hen the injuries "·ere sustained, though few 
courts have squarely so held."'' In a recent development, 
generally opposed by the commentators, some States per-
mit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an action 
for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries. 0 " Such 
an action, however, "·oulcl a.ppear to be one to vindicate 
the parents' interest and is thus consistent with the 
vi<'\Y that the fetus. at most, represents only the potential-
ity of life. Sitnilarly. unborn children have been recog-
';" 8<•c D. Brodir. ThP 'Xl'w Biolog~· nnd thc Prcnatal Child.!) .T. 
Fam. L. 291. :m7 (1970): n. Gornc~·. Thr 'XPW Biolog~· and thP 
Fnturr of Man, 1fl UCLA L. Rr1·. 278 (190, ); Xote. Criminal Law-
Abortion-Thr ''1\Torning-Aftrr" Pill nml Othrr Prr-Tmpl:mtntion 
Birth-Control l\Trtlwd~ :mel tlH· La11·, 4() Orr. L. Jlr,·. 211 (1907); 
C. T:1~·lor. Thr Bi(llogirnl Timr Bomb 32 (19GR); A. Ro~rnf'dd, Th~ 
Roeond GrnE'~i~ 181\-139 (lflfirl); G. Smith. Through a Tr~t Tuh<:> 
D:1rkl)· : Artifi<'ial In~rminntion nnd the Law. (l7 :\firh. L. Rr1·. 127 
(19GR); KotP, Mtifiri:1l ln~<'minntion and thr Lnw, U. Ill. L. F. 2m 
(19GR). 
""Prosser, Handbook of thr Lnw of Tort~ 3:35-::ns (1971); 2 
Harprr & .Tamr~. Thr Law of Tort~ 1021-1-10:n (195fi); Xotr, 63 
IT:l!'l'. L. H<'Y. 17:l (19~9). 
n• RPr ra~r,; ritrd in Pro~~l'r. supro. n. G2, :11 2:3(1- :ns: .\nnotation , 
. \rtion for Dr:ilh of rnborn Child. 15 A. L. H. 3d 992 (19fl7). 
nr. Pro~~rr. suwn. n. !i2. at :):ls: Xotr, Th<' Lnw :1ncl thr Unborn 
Child. 4() Kotrr Dnmr Law. :l~9, :~54-300 (1971). 
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nizecl as acquiring rights or interests by ''"ay of inheri-
tance or other devolution of property. and have been 
represented by guardians ad lile111.';1' Perfection of the 
interests involved. agai11, has generally been contingent 
upon live birth. In short, the unborn have never been ~ 
recogizecl in th0 law as persons in the whole sense. 
As a consequence. we clo not agree that by adopting 
one theory of life Texas may override the rights of the 
1)regnant woman that are at stake. \Ye repeat that the 
State docs have an important and legitimate interest in 
the potentiality of human life and that this interest grmvs 
i11 strength as the "·oman approaches term. At some 
point thi interest becomes "compelling." We 'IiX1liat 
point at. or at any timr after. the end of the fir~ttrimester, 
as--tfie Sta~1i11e. ~­
mester, the attending physician decides in consultation 
with his patient that in his best medical judgment 
her pregnancy should be terminated. that judgment is 
sufficient. 
Since Art. 1196 restricts legal abortions to those "pro-
cured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose 
of saving the life of the mother." it sweeps too broadly 
by any appropriate constitutional measure. The statute 
makes no distinction between abortions performed early 
in pregnancy and those performed at a later stage, and 
it limits to a single reason, "saving" the mother's l.ife; 
hmvever that may be interpreted, the legally acceptable 
justifications for the procedure. 
This conclusion makes it unnecrssary for us to consider 
the attack made on the Texas statute on grounds of 
vagueness. See United States Y. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62, 
67-72 (1971). 
r:r: D. Loui~ell, Abortion , The Prnctirr of l\1rdirine, nncl the Dur 
Prore~s of Law, 1() rCL.A L. He\'. 2~:3. 2:35-2~8 (19GO); Note, 5f\ 
Iowa L. Rev. 994, 999-1000 (1971); Kote, Thr Law nncl the Unbom 
Child, 4G Kotrr D:nne Law. 349, 351-354 (1971). 
/ 
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To summarize: 
1. A state criminal abortion statute. of the Texas 
type. that excepts from criminality only a l?'f e saving 
procedure on behalf of the mother. without regard to 
pregnancy stage and without recognition of other inter-
ests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause-
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
2. For the stage prior to the end of the tyst trimester, j · 
a state criminal abortion statute, in order/.~o meet con-
stitutional requirements. must do .!l2...!!.1ore than to leave 
the abortion decision to the best medical judgment of 
the pregnant woman's attending physician. 
3. For the stage subsequent to the first trimester, the 
S~y, if it chooses, determine a point beyond which ) 
it restricts legal abortions i;; stateareasonabTe1Jlerai)euT~ 1 
~ulated with sufficient clarity so \ 
that a physician is able to predict what conditions fall ) 
within the stated classifications. 
4. A criminal abortion statute of the type involved in 
United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), excepting 
from criminality, at all stages of pregnancy, only an abor-
tion "necessary for the preservation of the mother's life 
or health and under the direction of a ... licensed prac-
titioner of medicine." and construed as that statute had 
been, is constitutional and meets the requirements speci-
fied in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3. 
5. The State may define the term "physician," as we 
have employed it in the preceding numbered paragraphs, 
to mean only a physician currently licensed by the State, 
and may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not 
a physician as so defined. 
In Doe v. Bolton, post, procedural requirements em-
braced in one of the modern abortion statutes are con-
sidered. That opinion and this one, of course, are to be 
read together. 
i0- 1~-0Pl::\lO~ 
ROE v. '\VADE 49 
This holding, we feel , is consistent " ·ith the relative 
weight of the respective interests involved, ·with the 
lessons and example of medical and legal history, with 
the lenity of the comrnon la"·, and with the demands of 
the profound general problems of the present day. The 
decision also vindicates the important rights of the physi-
cian to administer medical treatment according to his 
best professional judgment up to the point where im-
portant state interests provide a compelling justification 
for intervention. Up to that point the abortion dccisio11 
inherently is a medical one. and the responsibility for 
that decision must rest with the physician. If an in-
dividual practitioner abuses the privilege of exercising 
proper medical judgment. the usual remedies, both ju-
dicial and intraprofessional, arc available. 
XI 
Our co11clusion that Art. 1196 is unconstitutional 
means, of course that the Texas abortion statutes, as a 
unit. must fall. The exception of Art. 1196 cannot be 
stricken separately, for then the State is left with a stat-
ute proscribing all abortion procedures no matter how 
medically urgent the case. 
Although the District Court granted plaintiff Roe 
declaratory relief. it stopped short of issuing an injunc-
tion against enforcement of the Texas statutes. The 
Court has recognized that different considerations enter 
into a federal court's drcision as to declaratory relief, on 
the one hand, and injunctive relief, on the other. Zwick-
ler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241. 252- 255 (1967); Dombrow-
ski Y. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 (1965). We are not dealing 
with a statute that, on its face, appears to abridge free 
Pxpres ion, an area of particular concern under Dom-
browski and refined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S., at 
50. 
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We find it unnecessary to decide whether the District 
Court erred in withholding injunctive relief, for we as-
sume the Texas prosecutorial authorities will give full 
credence to this decision that the present criminal abor-
tion statutes of that State are unconstitutional. 
The judgment of the District Court as to intervenor-
Hallford is reversed, and Dr. Hallford's complaint in 
intervention is dismissed. In all other respects the judg-
ment of the District Court is affirmed. Costs are allowed 
to the appellee. 
It is so ordered_ 
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Memorandum of MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN. 
In this appeal the criminal abortion statutes recently 
enacted in Georgia are challenged on constitutional 
grounds. The statutes are ~§ 26-1201 through 26-1203 
of the State's Criminal Code, formulated by Georgia 
Laws, 1968 Session, 1249, 1277-1280. In Roe v. Wade, 
ante -, we today have struck down, as constitutionally 
defective, the Texas criminal abortion statutes ·that arc 
representative of provisions long in effect in a majority of 
our States. The Georgia legislation, however, is different 
and merits separate consideration. 
I 
The statutes in question are reproduced as Appendix A, 
post - .1 As the appellants acknowledge," the 1968 
statutes are patterned upon the American Law Institute's 
MOaer Penal Code, § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 
19~ as Appendix B, post -. The ALI 
proposal has served as the model for recent legislation 
in approximately one-fourth of our States. 3 The new 
1 The portion~ italicized in Appendix A arc those held unconstitu-
tional by the District CourL. 
"Appclluut~' Brief 25 n. 5; Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. 
:l See Roe v. lVade, ante- n. 37. 
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Georgia provisions replaced statutory law that had been 
in effect for more than 90 years. Georgia Laws 1876, 
No. 130, § 2, at 113.1 The predecessor statute para.llcled 
the Texas legislation considered in Roe v. Wade, ante, 
and made all abortions criminal except those necessary 
"to preserve the life" of the pregnant woman. The new 
statutes have not been tested on constitutional grounds 
in the Georgia courts. 
Section 26- 1201, with a referenced exception , makes 
abortion a crime, and ~ 26-1203 provides that a person 
convicted of that crime shaH be punished by imprison-
ment for not less than one nor more than 10 years. Sec-
4 The nrtin' prO\· i~ion ~ of tlw l~iO st[1tutr 1vrrr: 
"Rrrtion 1. Be it ennctPd. etr .. Tklt from nne! nftrr thr pns~ngc 
of thi8 Art. the wilful killing of an unborn rhild, ~o fnr drnloprd as 
to he ordinarii!· rnllrd 'quirk.' h1· nn!· injnrv to thr mothrr of ~urh 
child. which would hr murdrr if it rr~ultrd in thr denth of Rnrh 
mother. skdl he guilt!· of :1 l'p]ml\' . :mel puni~lwhlr. b~· drath or 
impri~omnrnt for Jifr . n~ the .im!· ti'-'·ing thr rn~r mn~· rerommrnd . 
"Rrr. n . Be it fnrth rr rn rrrtcd. That ('\'('!'!' prr~on \Yho Rhnll 
ndmini~trr to an~· " ·oman prrgnnnt with a rhild. [In~· medirinr. drng. 
or ~uhst:mcr " ·hnt r Hr , or ~ hall u~r or rmplo~· an~· in~trumrnt or 
othrr m ran8, with i11trnt thrrrh.1· to dr~tro~· ~urh rhild. unle~s thr 
S{l me ~hall ha1·r hrrn nrrr8~:1r~ · tn prr~rrH thr life of ~ nch mother. 
or ~hnll hnYr brrn ach· i ~rcl h!· two ph~·~ieinns to be nrrr~~n r!' for surh 
pmposr, sklll. in rn~e tlw den th of ~urh child or mothrr hr thrreby 
produrrd , he drrbrrd guilt!· of [1 11 n~~ault with intrnt to murder. 
"Srr . III. Be it furth er eurrrtcd. Thnt nn~· prr~on who ~ hnll wil-
ful!~- ndmini~trr to n n~- prr!!n :l!lt womnn an~- mrdirinr, dmg or sub-
stnnc·r , or [m~ · thing whntr1·rr . or ~kdl rmplo~- [ill~ - in~t n11nrnt or 
mrnns whutrHr , with intrnt thNl'h-'· to proc·11rr the mi~c:1rriagr or 
:1hortion of anY ~urh 11·omnn. uniP"" fh p ~n nw shnll hnYe hren lleres-
sn r,\' to pn',;en·p t]l(' lifP of s1wh \\·om:m . or ~ hall han' ])('rn nch· i ~Pd 
h~- two ph~·~ irinn ~ to })(' nrrP•~:11'~ · for that pmpo~P. ~ hall. upon ron-
virtion , hr puni,Jwd : 1~ pn' •i·rihr rl in ~Prt ion ..J :no of thr HP1· i ~rd 
CodP of Ceorgi:1." 
Tt should be notrd that thP ~Prond ~Pe lion, in rontm~t to t}l(' fir~t . 
m:tkPs no sperifi r rrfPrenrr to quickrning . Thr srr t ion was soon 
ronst rurd, howrHr. to po."Sf'o'~ t hi;: linr of drm[lrr:lf ion . 'l'aylnr v. 
State, 105 Ca. ~4fi , 83 S. E. 190 (1~99). 
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tion 26- 1202 (a) sta.tes the exceptiou and removes from 
§ 1201's definition of criminal abortion, and t~s makes 
l10J;criminal , Ull abOi·tl.on 17perfu~med by a physician duly 
licens<'d" in Georgia ~,,~J{en. "based urm11 hiSbe-st-clinical 
judgment ... an abortion is_~ary because 
" ( 1) A continuation of the pregnancy ·would en-
danger ~e life of the pregnant woman or would 
s<'riously J!.llil permanently injure her health, or 
"(2) The fetus would very likely be born with 
a grave, permanent, and irremediable mental or 
physical defect, or 
"(3) The pregnancy resulted from forcible or 
statutory rape." 5 
Section 26-1202 also requires, by numbered subdivisions 
of its subsection (b), that. for an abortion to be author-
ir,ecl or p<'rformed as a noncriminal procedure, additional 
c~must be fulfilled. These are (1) a.nd (2) resi-
dence of the "·oman in Georgia; (3) reduction to writing 
of the performing physician's medical judgment that an 
abortion is justified for one or more of the reasons speci-
fied by ~ 26-1202 (a), with written concurrence in that 
judgment by at least two other Georgia-licenseQ_J2bysi-
cians, based upon their separate persona.! medical exam-
inations of the woman; ( 4) performance of the abortion 
in a hospital licensed by the State Board of Health and 
also a~he Joint Commission on Accredita-
tion of Hospitals; ( 5) advance approval by an abortion 
co1nmittee of not less than ~rn ers o the hos-·-pital's staff; (6) certifications in a rape situation; and 
(7), (8). and (9) maintenance and confidentiality of 
records. There is a provision (subsection (c)) for judi-
r. Tn rontrnsl 11·ith tlw ALT moclPI. thP GPorgia ~ tntute mnkes no 
sperifir rC'ferrnre to prrg;nm1ey rr~ulting from inrr~t. "\Vc were nR-
surecl b~· the State ut rrargnmrnl th:il thiR wn~ brcnu>'r the stntutc'~ 
rrferrnrr lo "mpe" wn" intendrd to inrludr ill(wt. Tr. of Renrg. 32. 
•. 
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cial determination of the legality of a. proposed abortion 
on petition of the judicial circuit law officer or of a close 
relative. as therein defined. of the unborn child. and for 
expeditious hearing of that petition. There is also a 
provision (subsection (e)) giving a hospital the right not 
to admit an abortion patient and giving any physician 
and any hospital employee or staff member the right, on 
moral or religious grounds, not to participate in the 
procedure. 
II 
On April 16, 1970, Mary Doe,6 23 other individuals 
(nine described as Georgia-licensed physicians, seven as 
nurses registered in the State, five as clergymen, and two 
as social workers), and two nonprofit Georgia corpora-
tions that advocate abortion reform, instituted this fed-
eral action in the Northern District of Georgia a.gainst 
the State's attorney general, the district attorney of 
Fulton County, and the chief of police of the city of 
Atlanta. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgrnent 
that the Georgia abortion statutes were unconstitutional 
in their entirety. They also sought injunctive relief 
restraining the defendants and their successors from en-
forcing the statutes. 
Mary Doe alleged: 
" ( 1) She was a 22-year-old Georgia citizen, mar-
ried, and nine weeks pregnant. She had three living 
children. The two older ones had been placed in a 
foster home because of Doe's poverty and inability 
to care for them. The youngest, born July 19, 1969, 
had been placed for adoption. Her husband had 
recently abandoned her and she was forced to live 
with her indigent parents and their eight children. 
She and her husband, however, had become recon-
6 Appellants by their rompbint , Appendix 7, allege that the name 
is a pseudonym. 
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ciled. He was a construction worker employed only 
sporadically. She had been a mental patient at the 
State Hospital. She had been advised that an abor-
tion could be performed on her with less danger to 
her health than if she gave birth to the child she 
was carrying. She would be unable to care for or 
support the new child. 
"(2) On March 25, 1970, she applied to the Abor-
tion Committee of Grady Memorial Hospital, At-
lanta, for a therapeutic abortion under § 26-1202. 
Her application was denied 16 days later, on April 
10. when she was eight weeks pregnant. on the-
ground that her situation was not one described in 
§ 26-1202 (a).7 
"(3) Because her application was denied. she was 
forced either to relinquish 'her right to decide when 
and how many children she will bear' or to seek an 
abortion that was illegal under the Georgia statutes. 
This invaded her rights of privacy and liberty in 
matters related to family, marriage, and sex, and 
deprived her of the right to choose whether to 
bear children. This was a violation of rights guar-
anteed her by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments. The statutes also denied 
her equal protection and procedural due process and, 
because they were unconstitutionally vague, de-
terred hospitals and doctors from performing abor-
tions. She sued 'on her own behalf and on behalf 
of all others similarly situated.' " 
The other plaintiffs alleged that the Georgia statutes 
"chilled and deterred" them from practicing their respec-
tive professions and deprived them of rights guaranteed 
7 In an~wrr::; to interrogatories Doc ~Uttrd I hat her application for 
an abortion waH npproyed at Grorgia Bapli~l HoHpit;d on May 5, 
1970, but that she was not approved aH a eharit~· patient there nnd 
had no money to pay for an abortion. Appendix 64. 
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by the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
These plaintiffs also pmported to sue on their own behalf 
and on behalf of others similarly situated. 
A three-judge district court was convened. An offer 
of proof as to Doe's identity was made, but the court 
deemed it unnecessary to receive that proof. The case 
was then tried on the pleadings and interrogatories. 
The District Court. 7Jer curiam, 310 F. Supp. 1048 
(ND Ga. 1970) , held that all the plaintiffs had standing 
but that only Doc presented a justiciable controversy. 
On the merits, the court concluded that the limitation 
in the Georgia statute of the "number of reasons for 
which an abortion may be sought," id., at 1056, improp-
erly restricted Doe's rights of privacy articulated in 
Griswold Y. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965) , and of 
"persona 1 liberty," both of which it thought "broad 
enough to include the decision to abort a pregnancy," 
id., at 1055. As a consequence, the court held invalid 
those portions of ~~ 26-1202 (a) and (b)(3) limiting 
legal abortions to the three situations specified; ~ 26-
1202 (h) ( 6) relating to certifications in a rape situation; 
and ~ 26- 1202 (c) authorizing a court test. Declaratory 
relief " ·as granted accordingly. The court, ho,Ycver. held 
that Georgia's interest in protection of health, and the 
existence of a "potential of independent human exist-
ence" (emphasis in original) , id., at 1055. j ustifiecl state 
regulation of "the manner of performance as well as 
the quality of the final decision to abort." id., at 1056. 
and it refused to strike clown the other provisions of 
the statutes. It denied the request for an injunction , 
id., at 1057. 
Claiming that they "·ere entitled to an injunction and 
to broader relief. the plaintiffs took a direct appeal pu~­
suant to 28 U. S. C. ~ 1253. We postponed decision on 
.i urisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 402 U. S. 941 
(1971). The defendants also purported to appeal, pm-
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suant to § 1253, but their appeal was dismissed for want 
of jurisdiction. 402 U. S. 936 (1971). We are advised 
by the defendant-appellees, Brief 42, that an alternative 
appeal on their part is pending in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The extent, 
therefore. to \Yhich the District Court decision was ad-
verse to the defendants. that is, the extent to which 
portions of the Georgia statutes were held to be uncon-
stitutional, technically is not now before us." Swarb v. 
Lennox, 40.3 U. S. 191, 201 (1972). 
III 
Our decision in Roe v. }Vade, ante -, establishes 
(1) t~despite her pseudonym. we may acceptas true, 
for this case. Mary Doe's existence and her pregnant 
state on April 16, 1970; (2) that tho constitutional issue 
is substantial; (3) that tho interim termination of Doe's 
and all other Georgia. pregnancies in existence in 1970 
has not rendered the case moot; and ( 4) that Doe pre-
sents a justiciable controversy and has standing to main-
tain the action. 
Inasmuch as Doe and her class arc recognized, the 
question whether tho other appellants-physicians, 
nurses, clergymen. social workers, and corporations-
present a justiciable controversy and have standing is 
perhaps a matter of no groat consequence. We conclude, 
however. that the physician-appellants, who are Georgia-
licensed doctors consulted by pregnant women, also pre-
sent a justiciable controversy and do have standing de-
spite the fact that the record docs not disclose that any 
one of them has been prosecuted. or threatened with 
prosecution, for violation of the State's abortion statutes. 
The physician is the one against whom these criminal 
statutes directly operatE' in the event he procures an 
H \Yhat. w(' ckridr ioda~· oh1 · iou~ly has implirations for ill<' iR~llf'H 
rai~ecl in lll<' dd<'nd:mts' npp<'al pending in th<' Fifth Cirrnit. 
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abortion that does not meet the statutory exceptions 
and conditions. The physician-~~ll~1ts, therefore, I 
assert a sufficiently direct threat of personal detriment. 
They should not be reqmre to await anc undergo a 
criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief. 
Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F. 2d 833, 839-840 (CA6 
1971); Poe v. M e11ghini, 339 F. Supp. 986, 990-991 
(Kans. 1972). 
In holding that the physicians, while theoretically pos-
sessed of standing, did not present a justiciable contro-
versy, the District Court seems to have relied prim.arily 
on Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 ( 1961). There a 
sharply divided Court dismissed an appeal from a state 
court on the ground that it presented no real contro-
versy justifying the adjudication of a constitutional issue. 
But the challenged Connecticut statute, deemed to pro-
hibit the giving of medical advice on the use of contra-
ceptives, had been enacted in 1879, and, apparently with 
a single exception, no one had ever been prosecuted under 
it. Georgia's statute, in contrast, is recent and not 
moribund. Furthermore, it is the successor to another 
Georgia abortion statute under which. we are told,0 
physicians were prosecuted. The present case, therefore, 
is closer to Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968), 
where the Court recognized the right of a school teacher, 
though not yet charged criminally, to challenge her 
State's anti-evolution statute. See also Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U. S., at 481. 
The parallel claims of the nurse, clergy, social worker, 
and corporation-appellants are another step removed and 
as to them, the Georgia. statutes operate less directly. 
Not being licensed physicians, the nurses and the others 
are in no position to render medical advice. They would 
be reached by the abortion statutes only in their capacity 
!I Tr. of Oral Arp.;. 21-22. 
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as accessories or as counselor-conspirators. We conclude 
that we need not pass upon the status of these-aacri-
tional appella1rts in - thi;'Suit,for the. issues -ru-e -;uffi-
ciently and adequately presented by Doe and the physi-
cian-appeflanfs,a:na nothing ·Is gained or lo.st by_ tho 
presencCQ;'" a.bsen~. of the nurses~h;-clergymen, the 
social workers, and the corporations. See Roe v. Wade~ 
ante, at-. 
IV 
The appellants attack on several grounds those por-
tions of the Georgia abortion statutes that remain after 
the District Court decision: undue restriction of a right 
to personal and marital privacy; vagueness; deprivation 
of substantive and procedural due process; improper re-
striction to Georgia residents; and denial of equal 
protection. 
A. Our decision today in Roe v. Wade, ante, sets forth 
our conclusion~ tl1at apregnant woman does not have an 
absolute constitutiOnal right to an abortion on her de-
n1and. What is said tliere is applicable here and need' 
IlOtDe repeated. 
B. The appellants go on to argue, however, that the 
present Georgia statutes must be viewed historically, 
that is, from the fact that prior to the 1968 Act an 
abortion in Georgia was not criminal if performed t(} 
"preserve the life" of the mother. It is suggested that 
the present statute, as well, has this emphasis on the 
mother's rights, not on those of the fetus. Appellants 
contend that it is thus clear that Georgia has given little, 
and certainly not first, consideration to the unborn child .. 
Yet it is the unborn child's rights that Georgia asserts 
in justification of the statute. Appellants assert that 
this justification cannot be advanced at this late date. 
Appellants then argue that the statutes do not ade-
quately protect the woman's right. This is so because 
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it would be physically and emotionally damaging to Doe 
to bring a child into her poor "fatherless" ' 0 family, and 
because advances in medicine and medical techniques 
have made it safer for a woman to have a medically 
induced abortion than for her to bear a child. Thus, "a 
statute which requires a woman to carry an unwanted 
pregnancy to term infringes not only on a fundamental 
right of privacy but on the right to life itself." Brief 27. 
The appellants recognize that a century ago medical 
knowledge was not so advanced as it is today, that the 
techniques of antisepsis were not known, and that any 
abortion procedure was dangerous for the woman. To 
restrict the legality of the abortion to the situation where 
it was deemed necessary, in medical judgment, for the 
preservation of the woman's life was only a natural con-
clmion in the exercise of the legislative judgment of that 
time. A State iR not to lw reproached. hmvcver. for a 
past judgmental determination made in the light of then-
existing medical knowledge. It is perhaps unfair to 
argue. as the appellants do. that because the early focus 
was on the preservation of the woman's life. the State's 
present professed interest in the protection of embryonic 
and fetal life is to be downgraded. That argument de-
nies the State the right to readjust its vimvs and em-
phases in the light of the advanced knowledge and 
techniques of the day. 
C. Appellants argue that ~ 26- 1202 (a) of the Georgia 
statute, as it has been left by the District Court's deci-
sion, is unconstitutionally vague. This argument centers 
in the proposition that. with the District Court's having 
stricken the statutorily specified reasons, it still remains 
a crime for a physician to perform an abortion except 
when. as ~ 26- 1202 (a) reads, it is "based upon his best 
clinical judgment that an abortion is necessary." The 
10 Appellant s' Brirf 25. 
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appellants contend that the word "necessary" does not 
warn the physician of what conduct is proscribed; that 
the statute is wholly without objective standards and is 
subject to diverse interpretation; and that doctors will 
choose to err on the side of caution and "·ill be arbitrary. 
The net result of the District Court's decision is that 
the abortion determination, so far as the physician is 
concerned, is made in the exercise of his professional, that 
is. his "best clinical'' judgment in the light of all the 
attendant circumstances. II e is not now restricted to 
the three situations originally specified. Instead, he may 
range farther afield wherever his medical judgment, prop-
erly and professionally exercised, so dictates and directs 
him. 
The vagueness argument is set at rest by the decision 
in United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62. 71-72 (1971), 
where the issue was raised with respect to a District of 
Columbia statute making abortions criminal "unless the 
same were done as necessary for the preservation of the 
mother's life or health and under the direction of a 
competent licensed practitioner of medicine." That stat-
ute has been construed to bear upon psychological as 
w~n:5emg. 'l'h1s bemg so. the C~rt 
conCJuaea that the tern1 "health" presented no problem. 
of vagueness. "Indeed, whether a particular operation 
is necessary for a patient's physical or mental health is 
a judgment that physicians are obviously called upon 
to make routinely whenever surgery is considered." 402 
tr. S., at 72. This conclusion is equally applicable here.) 
\Vhether, in the words of the Georgia statute, "an abor-
tion is necessary," is a professional judgment that the 
Georgia physician will be called upon to make routinely. 
We a<Tree with the District Court, 319 F. Supp., at 
1058, that the medical judgment may be exercised in the 
light of--arrl'actors-physiCal, emotional, psychological, 
f~ wo~s age-relevant to the well-
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being of the patient. All these factors may relate to 
:health. This aTIOws the attending physician the room he 
Jleeas to make his best medical judgment. And it is 
room that operates for the benefit, not the clisarlvantage, 
of the pregnant woman. 
D. The appellants next argue that the District Court 
should have declared unconstitutional three procedural 
demands of the Georgia statute: (1) that the abortion 
be performed in a hospital accredited by the Joint Com-
mission on Accreditation of Hospitals: 11 (2) that the 
procedure be approved by the hospital staff abortion 
committee; and (3) that the performing physician's 
judgment be confirmed by the independent examinations 
of the patient by two other licensed physicians. The 
appellants attack these provisions not only on the ground 
that they unduly restrict the woman's right of privacy, 
but also on procedural clue process and equal protection 
grounds. The physician-appellants also argue that, by 
subjecting a doctor's individual medical judgment to 
committee approval and to confirming consultations, the 
statute impermissibly restricts the physician's right to 
practice his profession and deprives him of due process. 
1. JCAH Accreditation. The Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals is an organization without 
governmental sponsorship or overtones. No question 
whatever is raised concerning the integrity of the organi-
zation or the high purpose of the accreditation proccss.1 2 
11 We wrre advi~rd nt rra rgumrnt, Tr. of Rearg. 10, that only 54 
of Georgia's 159 rounti rs haw a .TCAH accrrditccl ho8pital. 
1 2 Since its founding , .TCAH ha ~< pur~uccl thr "rlu~<in• goal" of 
drfining the "optimal ,-; r t ting" for "qua lit~· of ~crvirr in ho~pitals ." 
J CAH. Accredit at ion l\f:mua l for Ho~pi tn b , Foreward (Dec. 1970) . 
The Manual'H Introdnrtion state~ the orgnnizniion 'H purpo~c to est ab-
lish standards and conduct accreditation programs that will a!Tord 
quality medi cal carr "to givr patients the optimul benefit s that med-
ical science has to offer." This ambitiou~ and admirable goal i ~ 
illustratrd by JCAII '~ dcri~ion in 19Gfl " to rai~e and ~ trengthen the 
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That process. however, has to do with hospital standards 
generally and has no present particularized concern ""ith 
abortion as a medical or surgical procedure.13 In Geor-
gia there is no restriction of the performance of non-
abortion surgery in a hospital not yet accredited by the 
JCAH so long as other requirements imposed by the 
State, such as licensing of the hospital and of the operat-
ing surgeon, are met. See Georgia Code ~~ 88-1901 (a) 
and 88-1905 (1971) and 84-907 (Supp. 1971). Further-
more, accreditation by the Commission is not granted 
until a hospital has been in operation at least one year. 
The Model Penal Code, § 230.3, Appendix B hereto, con-
tains no requirement for JCAH accreditation. And the 
Uniform Abortion Act (Final Draft, August 1971),11 aP: 
pr~can Bar Association in February 
1972,contains 1;; JCAH accredited hospital specifica-
tion.15 &ill1eco~sllave held that a JCAH accredita-
standards from thrir j)I'P~cnt lrvel of minimum c~srntial to thP lrvPl 
of optimum achiPYnhlP .... " Somp of these "optimum achievnble" 
!';(andnrds required nrc: cliRclof;urc of ho~pitnl ownership and con-
trol; a dietetic service and written dictrtic policies; n written dis-
aster plnn for mass emergencirs: a nuclear medical sen·ices program; 
facilities for hematolog~·, rhcmi~try, microbiology, clinical microscopy, 
and sera-immunology; a profcRRional librar~r and document delivery 
service; a radiology j)rogram: a social sen ·ices plnn admini~terrd by 
a qualified social worker ; and a special care unit. 
1 :1 "The Joint Commission neither advocates nor opposes any 
particular position with rc~peC't to electi\·e abortion~." Letter dated 
July 9, 1971, from .John L. BrcwPr, M. D., Commissioner, JCAH, 
to the Rockefeller Foundation. Brief for amici, American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, et al., p. A-3. 
J 4 Sec Roe v. Wade. ante-, n. 40. 
15 Some state statutes do not have the JCAII nccreditntion re-
quirement. Alaska Stat. § 11.15.060 (1970) ; Hawaii Rev. Stnt. 
§ 453.16 (Supp. 1971) ; N. Y. Penal Code § 125.05.:~ (McKinney 
Supp. 1972-197:)). WaRbington hm; the requirement but couples it 
with thr alternatin of "a mrdieal facility approved ... by the state 
board of health." Wash. Rev. Code § 9.02.070 (Supp. 1972). Flor-
icln's new ~tatute ha~ a ~imilar pro\·i~ion. Law of Apr. 13, Hl72, c. 
'. 
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tion requirement is an overbroad infringement of funda-
mental rights because it does not relate to the particular 
medical problems and dangers of the abortion operation. 
Poe v. Menghini, 330 F. Supp. 986, 993-994 (Kan. 
1972); People v. Barksdale, 96 Cal. Rptr. 265, 273-274 
(Cal. App. 1971). 
\Ve hold that the JC'AH accreditation requirement does 
not. \\Tthstand constitutional scruti n in the prcsen on-
text=- n is a requirement that simply is not "based on 
differences that are reasonably related to the purposes of 
the Act in \rhich it is found." Morey \'. Doud, 354 U. S. 
457,465 (1957). 
This is not to say, as the appellants themselves con-
cede, Brief 40. that Georgia may not or should not adopt 
standards for licensing all facilities ·where abortionsrnay 
be perfo1~ong as those standards arc legitimately 
related to the objective the State seeks to accomplish. 
The appellants contend that such a relationship would 
be lacking even in a lesser requirement that an abortion 
be performed in a licensed hospital, as opposed to a fa-
cility, snch as a clinic, that may be required by the State 
to possess a1l the staffing and services necessary to per-
form. an abortion safely (including those adequate to 
handle serious complir.ations or other emergency. or ar-
rangements with a nearby hospital to provide such serv-
ices). Appellants and various amici have presented us 
with a mass of data pmporting to demonstrate that some 
institutions other than hospitals are entirely acleqL~at<' to 
perform abortions if they possess these qualifications. 
72-196, § 1 (2). Othrr" ront:1in 1hr ~prrifiration. Ark. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 41-303 to 41-:no (~11pp. l!l7l): Cal. Hralih ami RafP1y CociP 
§§ 25050-259:)5.5 (Y'i'r~t Rupp. 1072): Colo. Rrv. S1:ds. Ann. §§ 40-
2-50 to 40-2-."\3 (Prrm. Cum. R11pp. 19()7): Knn. Rtat. Ann.§ 21-3047 
(Supp. 1071): :\Tel. Ann. Codr Ar1. 4:~. §§ 137-1::\9 (TI('pl. Hl/1). 
Cf. Del. Codr Ann. §§ 1700-179:) (Rnpp. 1070) ~prcil\ini{ ''a nn-
1ionnll~· rerognizrd mrdicnl or ho~pital nrrrrditntion :mthorit~·," 
§1790(a). 
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The StatE', on the othrr hand, has not presented persua-
sive data to show that only hospitals meet its acknowl-
edged interest in insuring the quality of the operation 
and the full protection of the patient. IY c feel compelled 
to agrrc ''"ith appellants that the State must show more 
than it has shown to prove that only the full resources 
of a licensed hospital. rather than tl1osr of some other 
appropriately licensed institntion, satisfy these health in-
terests. lYe hold that the hospital requirement of the 
Ge,orgia law is also invalic . n so 10 c mg we naturaDy 
express no opinion on the medical judgment involved in 
any particular case, that i:-. whether the patient's situa-
tion is such that an abortion should be prrformed in a 
hospital rather than in some other facility. 
2. Committee Approval. The second aspect of the 
appellants' procedural attack relates to the hospital abor-
tion committee ancl to tho pregnant wo1nan's asserted 
lack of access to that committee. Relying primarily on 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1070), concerning the 
termination of welfare benefits. and Wisconsin v. Con-
stantineau, 400 U. S. 433 (1071). concerning the posting 
of an alcoholic's name, Doc first argues that she was doniocl 
due process because she could not make a presentation 
to tho committee. It is not clear froJn the record, how-
ever, whether Doc's own consulting physician \Yas or was 
not a member of the committee or dicl or did not pre-
sent her case, or, indeed. whether she herself "·as or "·as 
not thoro. vYc see nothing in the Georgia statute that 
explicitly denies access to the committee by or on behalf 
of the woman. If the access point alone wore inYolved, 
we would not be persuaded to strike clown the committee 
provision on the unsupported assumption that access is 
not provided. 
Appellants attack the discretion tho statuto leaves to, 
the committee. The most concrete argument they ad-
vance is their suggestion that it is still a badge of infamy 
"in many minds" to bear an illegitimate child, and that 
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the Georgia system enables the committee members' per-
sonal views as to extramarital sex relations, and punish-
ment therefor, to govern their decisions. This approach 
obviously is one founded on suspicion and one that dis-
doses a lack of confidence in the integrity of physicians. 
To say that physicians will be guided in their hospital 
committee decisions by their predilections on extramarital 
sex unduly narrows the issue to pregnancy outside mar-
riage. (Doe's own situation did not involve extrmnarital 
sex and its product.) The appellants' suggestion is neces-
sarily somewhat degrading to the conscientious physician, 
particularly the obstetrician, whose professional activity 
is concerned with the physical and mental welfare, the 
woes, the emotions, and the concern of his female patients. 
He, perhaps more than anyone else, is knowledgeable in 
this area of patient care, and he is aware of human frailty, 
so-called "error," and needs. The good physician-de-
spite the presence of rascals in the medical profession, as 
in all others, we trust that most physicians are "good" 
-will have a sympathy and an understanding for the 
pregnant patient that probably is not exceeded by those 
who participate in other areas of professional counseling. 
It is perhaps worth noting that the abortion committee 
has a function of its Ov\"11. It is a committee of the hos-
pital and it is composed of members of the institution's 
medical staff. The membership usually is a changing 
one. In this way its work burden is shared and is more 
readily accepted. The committee's function is protective. 
It enables the hospital appropriately to be advised that 
its posture and activities are in accord with legal re-
quirements. It is to be remembered that the hospital 
is an entity and that it, too, has legal rights and legal 
obligations. 
Saying all this, however, does not settle the issue of 
the constitutional propriety of the committee require-
ment. Viewing the Georgia statute as a whole, we see ---
... 
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no constitutionally justifiable pertinence in the structure-
~~-·-for the advance approval by the abortion committee. -----~ ----· - - - ------ -- - --------------With regard to the protection of potential life, the med-
ical judgment is already completed prior to the committee· 
stage, and review by a committee once removed from di-
agnosis is basically redundant. We are not cited to any 
other surgical procedure made subject to committee ap-
proval as a matter of state criminal la\v. The woman's 
right to receive medical care in accordance with her li-
censed physician's best judgrnent and the physician's right 
to administer it are substantially limited by this stat-
utorily imposed overview. And the hospital itself is 
otherwise fully protected. Under ~ 26-1202 (e) the hos-
pital is free not to admit a patient for an abortion. It is 
even free not to have an abortion committee. Further, 
a physician or any other employee has the right to refrain, 
for moral or religious reasons, from participating in the 
abortion procedure. These provisions obviously are in 
the statute in order to afford appropriate protection to the 
individual and to the denominational hospital. Section 
26-1202 (e) affords adequate protection to the hospital 
and little more is provided by the committee prescribed 
by ~ 26- 1202 (b)(5). 
We conclude that the interposition of the hospital abor-
tion committee is unduly restrictive of the patient's rights 
and needs that, at this point, have already been medically 
delineated and substantiated by her personal physician. 
To ask more serves neither the hospital nor the State. 
3. Two-Doctor Concurrence. Tho third aspects of tho 
appellants' attack centers on the "time and availability 
of adequate medical facilities and personnel." It is said 
that the system imposes substantial and irrational road-
blocks and "is patently unsuited" to prompt determina-
tion of tho abortion decisio11. Time, of coun:e, is critical 
iu abortion. Risks during the first trimester of preg--
nancy arc admittedly lmver than during later months. 
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Tho appellants purport to show by a local study '" of 
Grady Memorial Hospital (serving indigent residents in 
Fulton and DoKalL Counties) that tho "mechanics of 
the system itself forced ... discontinuation of the abor-
tion process" because the median time for the workup 
was 15 days. Tho same study shows, however, that 27 o/o 
of the candidates for abortion were already 13 or more 
weeks pregnant at the time of application, that is, they 
were at the end of or beyond the first trimester "·hen they 
made their applications. It is too much to say, as ap-
pellants do. that these particular persons "were victims 
of [a] system over which they rhacl] no control." If 
higher risk was incurred because of abortio11s in the 
second rather than the first trimester, much of that risk 
" ·as due to delay in application, and not to the alleged 
cumbersomeness of tho system. vV e note, in passing, 
that appellant Doc had no delay problem herself; the 
decision in her case \YaS made well within the first 
tri1 nester. 
It should be manifest that our rejection of the ac-
credited hospital requirement and, more important, of 
the abortion committee's advance approval eliminates the 
major grounds of the attack based on the system's delay 
and the lack of facilities. There remains, however, the 
required confirmation by two Georgia-licensed physicians 
in addition to the recommendation of the pregnant wo-
man's O\Vll consultant (making under the statuto, a total 
of six physicians involved. including the three on the 
hospital's abortion committee). We conclude that this 
provision. too, must fall. 
The statute's emphasis, as has been repetitively noted, 
is on the attending physician's "best clinical judgment 
that an abortion is necessary." That should be sufficient. 
IG L. lhker & :\T. Frrem~m, Abortion Smwillnnr0 nt Gr~d.\· l\Tr-
morial Hospittl Cr11tcr for Di~casc Control (.Tunc ~nd .Tuiy 1971) 
(U. S. Dept. of IlEW . .PHS). 
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The reasons for the presence of the confirmation step in 
the statute arc perhaps apparent, but they arc insufficient 
to ·withstand constitutional challenge. Again, no other 
voluntary medical or surgical procedure for which Georgia 
requires confirmation by t\vO other physicians has been 
cited to us. If a physician is licensed by the State, he 
is recognized by the State as capable of exercising accept-
able clinical judgment. If he fails in this, professional 
censure or clepri vation of his license are available reme-
dies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has no 
rational connection with a patient's needs and unduly 
infringes on the physician's right to practice. The at-
tending physician will know when a consultation is ad-
visab1c-thc doubtful situation, the need for assurance 
\vhen the medical decision is a delicate one, and the like. 
Physicians have followed this routine historically and 
kno"· its usefulness and benefit for all concerned. It is 
still true today that "r r J eliancc must be placed upon the 
assurance given by his license. issued by an authority 
competent to j udgc in that respect, that he [the physi-
cian l possesses the requisite qualifications." Dent v. 
Trest 11irginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122-123 (1889). Sec United 
States v. 11uitch, 402 U. S., at 71. 
E. The appellants attack the residency requirement 
of the Georgia law, ~ § 26-1202 (b) ( 1) and (b) (2), as 
violative of the right to travel stressed in Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618. 629-631 (1969), and other 
cases. \Vc sec in the sta ute n undue restriction on the 
travel rigliL~ One is no less free, because of tho 
statute, to come to or to depart from the State of Georgia. 
Further, it cannot be said that the residency require-
ment might not have a possible relationship to the 
availability of post-procedure medical care for the aborted 
patient. 
Kevertheless, we do not uphold the constitutionality of 
the residence rcqciremenl It is not based on any policy ---
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of preserving state-supported facilities for Georgia resi-
dents, for the bar also applies to private hospitals and 
to privately retained physicians. There is no intimation, 
either. that Georgia facilities are utilized to capacity in 
caring for Georgia residents. .Just as the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, Canst. Art. IV, ~ 2, protects persons 
who enter other States to ply their trade, Ward v. Mary-
land, 79 U. S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870); Blake v. 
McClung, 172 U.S. 239.248-256 (1898). so must it pro-
tect persons who enter Georgia seeking the medical serv-
ices that are available there. See Toomer Y. Witsell, 334 
U. S. 385, 396-397 (1948). A contrary holding would 
mean that a State could limit to its own residents the 
general medical care available within its borders. This 
we could not approve. 
F. The last argument on this phase of the case is one 
that often ~ly, that the Georgia system is vio- -7 
lative of equal protection because it discriminates against 
the poor. The appellants do not ' urge that abortio"l1s 
shoulabe performed by persons other than licensed physi-
cians, so we have no argument that because the wealthy 
can better afford physicians, the poor should have non-
physicians made available to them. The appellants ac-
kno>vleged that the procedures arc "nondiscriminatory 
in ... express terms" but they suggest that they have pro-
duced invidious discriminations. The District Court re-
jected this approach out of hand. 319 F. Supp., at 1056. 
r'he 'Iman y on the accreditation and approval and 
confirmation requirements, discussed above, and on the 
assertion that most of Georgia's counties have no ac-
credited hospital. We have set aside the accreditation, 1· 
approval, and confirmation requirements, ho\Yever, and 
with that, the discrimination argument collapses in all 
significant aspects. 
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The appellants complain, finally, of the District Court's 
denial of injunctive relief. A like claim was made in 
Roe v. Wade, ante. We declined decision there insofar 
as injunctive relief was concerned, and we decline it here. 
We assume that Georgia's prosecutorial authorities will 
give full recognition to the judgment of this Court. 
In summary, we hold that the JCAH accredited hos-
pital provision and the requirements as to approval by 
the hospital abortion committee, as to confirmation by 
two independent physicians, and as to residence in 
Georgia are all violative of the Fourteenth Amendment .. 
Specifically, the following portions of § 26- 1202 (b) , re-
maining after the District Court's judgment, are invalid: 
(1) Subsections (I) and (2). 
(2) That portion of Subsection (3) following the words 
"such physician's judgment is reduced to writing." 
(3) Subsections ( 4) and (5). 
The judgment of the District Court is modified ac-
cordingly and, as so modified, is affirmed. Costs are 
allowed to the appellants. 
APPENDIX A 
Crimillal Code of Georgia 
(The it:dirizrd portion~ nre tho~r lwld ltnron~titutional b~, the 
Ui~t ric'( Cot1rl) 
CHAPTEH 26-12, ABORTION, 
26-120L Criminal Abortion, Except as otherwise 
provided in section 26-1202, a person commits criminal 
abortion when he administers any medicine, drug or 
other substance whatever to any woman or when he uses 
any instrument or otlwr means whatever upon any woman 
with intent to produc(• a miscarriage or abortion, 
26- 1202, ExceptiolL (a) Section 26-1201 shall not 
apply to an abortion performed by a physician duly 
licensed to practice medicine and surgery pursuant to 
Chapter 84-9 or 84-12 of the Code of Georgia of 1933, 
as amended, based upon his best clinical judgment that 
an abortion is necessary because: 
(1) A continuation of the pregnancy would endanger 
the life of the pregnant woman or would seriously and 
permanently injure her health,' or 
( 2) The fetus would very likely be born with a grave, 
permane11t, and irremfdiable mental or physical defect,, 
or 
(.'3) 'Phe pregna11cy resulted from forcible or statutory 
rape, 
(b) No abortion is authorized or shall be performed 
under this section unless each of the following conditions 
'is met; 
( 1) The pregnant woman requesting the abortion cer-
tifies in writing under oath and subject to the penalties 
of false swearing to the physician who proposes to per-
form the abortion that she is a bona fide legal resident 
of the State of Georgia. 
22 
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(2) The physician certifies that he believes the woman 
is a bona fide resident of this State and that he has no 
information which sh01ild lead him to believe otherwise. 
(3) Such physician's judgment is reduced to writing 
and concurred in by at least two other physicians duly 
licensed to practice n1edicine and surgery pursuant to 
Chapter 84-0 of the Code of Georgia of 1933, as amended, 
who certify in \\Titing that based upon their separate 
personal medical examinations of the pregnant woman, 
the abortion is, in their judgment, necessary because of 
one or more of the reasons emtmerated above. 
( 4) Such abortion is performed in a hospital licensed 
by the State Board of Health and accredited by the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. 
(5) The performance of the abortion has been ap-
proved in advance by a committee of the medical staff 
of the hospital in vvhlch the operation is to be performed. 
This committee must be one established and maintained 
in accordance with the standards promulgated by the 
Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals, and 
its approval must be by a majority vote of a membership 
of not less than three members of the hospital's staff; 
the physician proposing to perform the operation may 
not be counted as a member of the committee for this 
purpose. 
(6) If the proposed abortion is considered necessary 
because the woman has been raped, the woman makes a 
written statement under oath, and subject to the penalties 
of false swearing, of i lw date, time and place of the rape 
and the name of the rapist, if known. There must be 
attached to this statement a certified copy of any report 
of the rape made by any law enforcement officer or 
agency and a statement by the solicitor general of the 
judicial circuit where the rape occurred or allegedly oc-
curred that, accordinu to his best information, there is 
pmbable cause to believe that the rape did occur. 
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(7) Such written opinions, statements, certificates, and 
concurrences are maintained in the permanent files of 
such hospital and are available at all reasonable times 
to the solicitor general of the judicial circuit in which 
the hospital is located. 
(8) A copy of such written opinions, statements, cer-
tificates, and concurrences is filed with the Director of 
the State Department of Public Health within ten (10) 
days after such operation is performed. 
(9) All written opinions, statements, certificates, and 
concurrences filed and maintained pursuant to paragraphs 
(7) and (8) of this subsection shall be confidential rec-
ords and shall not be made available for public inspection 
at any time. 
(c) Any solicitor ueneral of the judicial circuit in 
which an abortion is to be performed under this section,. 
or any person who would be a relative of the child within 
the second degree of consanguinity, may petit?'on the su-
perior court of the county in which the abortion is to be 
performed for a declaratory judgment whether the per-
formance of such abortion would violate any constitu-
tional or other legal nghts of the fetus. Such solicitor 
general may also petition such court for the purpose of 
taking issue with coutpliance with the requirements of 
this section. The physician who proposes to perform the 
abortion and the pregnant woman shall be respondents. 
The petition shall be heard expeditiously and if the court 
adjudges that such abortion would violate the consti-
tutional or other legal rights of the fetus, the court shall 
so declare and shall restrain the physician from perform-
ing the abortion. 
(d) If an abortion is performed in compliance with 
this section, the death of the fetus shall not give rise to 
any claim for wrongful death. 
(e) Nothing in this section shall require a hospital to 
admit any patient u11der the provisions hereof for the 
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purpose of performing an abortion, nor shall any hospital 
be required to appoint a committee such as contemplated 
under subsection (b) ( 5). A physician, or any other 
person who is a member of or associated with the staff 
of a hospital, or any employee of a hospital in which an 
abortion has been authorized, who shall state in writing 
an objection to such abortion on moral or religious 
grounds shall not be required to participate in the medical 
procedures which will result in the abortion, and the· 
refusal of any such person to participate therein shall 
not form the basis of any claim for damages on account 
of such refusal or for any disciplinary or recriminatory 
action against such person. 
26-1203. Punishment. A person convicted of crim-
inal abortion shall be punished by imprisonment for not 
less than one nor more than 10 years. 
'·· 
APPENDIX B 
American Law Institute 
MODEL PE:\TAL CODE 
Section 230.3. Abortion. 
(1) Unjustified Abortion. A person who purposely 
and unjustifiably terminates the pregnancy of another 
otherwise than by a live birth commits a felony of the 
third degree or, where the pregnancy has continued be-
yond the twenty-sixth week. a felony of the second degree. 
(2) Justifiable Abortion. A licensed physician is justi-
fied in terminating a pregnancy if he believes there is sub-
stantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would 
gravely impair the physical or mental health of the 
mother or that the child would be born with grave 
physical or mental defect, or that the pregnancy resulted 
from rape, incest, or other felonious intercourse. All 
illicit intercourse with a girl below the age of 16 shall be 
deemed felonious for purposes of this subsection. Justi-
fiable abortions sha 11 be performed only in a licensed 
hospital except in case of emergency when hospital fa-
cilities are unavailable. 'f Additional exceptions from the 
requirement of hospitalization may be incorporated here 
to take account of situations in sparsely settled areas 
where hospitals are not generally accessible.] 
(3) Physicians' Certificates; PresU?nption frorn Non-
Compliance. No abortion shall be performed unless two 
physicians, one of whom may be the person performing 
the abortion, shall have certified in writing the circum-
stances which they believe to justify the abortion. Such 
certificate shall be submitted before the abortion to the 
hospital where it is to be performed and, in the case of 
abortion following felonious intercourse. to the prosecut-
ing attorney or the police. Failure to comply with any 
26 
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of the requirements of this Subsection gives rise to a 
presumption that the abortion was unjustified. 
( 4) Self-Abortion. A " ·oman '"hose pregnancy has 
continued beyond the t1wnty-sixth week commits a felony 
of the third degree if she purposely terminates her own 
pregnancy othenYise than by a live birth, or if she uses 
instruments, drugs or violence upon herself for that pur-
pose. Except as justified under Subsection (2), a person 
who induces or knowingly aids a woman to use instru-
ments, drugs or viole11ce upo11 herself for the purpose of 
ter111inating her pregnancy otherwise than by a live birth 
commits a felony of the third degree whether or not the 
pregnancy has continued beyond the twenty-sixth week. 
(5) Pretended Abortion. A person commits a felony 
of the third degree if, representing that it is his purpose 
to perform an abortion. he docs an act adapted to cause 
abortion in a pregnant woman although the woman is 
in fact not pregnant, or the actor does 110t believe she is. 
A person charged w·ith Ulljustified abortion under Sub-
section (1) or an attrmpt to commit that offense may be 
convicted thereof upon proof of conduct prohibited by 
this Subsection. 
(6) Distribution of Abortifacients. A person who 
sells, offers to sell. possesses with intent to sell, advertises, 
or displays for sale anything specially designed to termi-
nate a pregnancy, or held out by the actor as useful for 
that purpose, commits a misdemeanor, unless: 
(a) the sale, offer or display is to a physician or drug-
gist or to an iHtermediary in a chain of distribution to 
physicians or druggists; or 
(b) the sale is made upon prescription or order of a 
physician; or 
(c) the possesf'ion is with in tent to sell as authorized 
in paragraphs (a) and (b) ; or 
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(d) the advertising is addressed to persons named in 
paragraph (a) and confined to trade or professional chan-
nels not likely to reach the general public. 
(7) Section Inapplicable to Prevention of Pregnancy. 
Nothing in this Section shall be deemed applicable to the 
prescription, administration or distribution of drugs or 
other substances for avoiding pregnancy, whether by pre-
venting implantation of a fertilized ovum or by any other 
method that operates before, at or immediately after 
fertilization. 
. ' . 
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No. 70-18 
Jane Roe et al., Appellants, On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for 
the Northern District of 
v. 
Texas. Henry Wade. 
[December --, 1972] 
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, Memorandum. 
This Texas federal appeal and its Georgia companion, 
Doe v. Bolton, post --, present constitutional chal-
lenges to state criminal abortion legislation. The Texas 
statutes under attack here are typical of those that 
have been in effect in many States for approximately a 
century. The Georgia statutes, in contrast, have a 
modern cast and are a legislative product that, to an 
extent at least, obviously reflects the influences of recent 
attitudinal change, of advancing medical knowledge and 
techniques, and of new thinking about an old issue. 
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensi-
tive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy, 
of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, 
and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that 
the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's experiences, 
one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's 
religious training, one's attitudes toward life and family 
and their values, and the moral standards one establishes 
and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to 
color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion. 
In addition, population growth, pollution, poverty, 
and racial overtones tend to complicate and not to sim-
plify the problem. 
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Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by consti-
tutional measurement free of emotion and of predilection. 
\Ve seek earnestly to do this, and, because we do, we 
have inquired into, and in this opinion place some 
emphasis upon, medical and m.edical-legal history and 
what that history reveals about man's attitudes toward 
the abortive procedure over the centuries. We bear in 
mind, too, Mr. Justice Holmes' admonition in his now 
vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 
45, 76 (1905): 
"It [the Constitution] is made for people of 
fundamentally differing views, and the accident of 
our finding certain opinions natural and familiar 
or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude 
our judgment upon the question whether statutes 
embodying them conflict with the Constitution of 
the United States." 
I 
The Texas statutes that concern us here are Arts. 
1191- 1194 and 1196 of the State's Penal Code.' These 
1 "Article 1191. Abortion 
"If any person shall designedly administer to a pre~nant woman 
or knowingly procure to be administered with her ron ent any drug 
or medicine, or shall use towards her any violence or nwans what-
e1·er rx1ernally or internally applied, and thereby procure an abor-
tion, he shall be confined in the penitentitu.v not less than two nor 
more than five years; if it bP done without her consPnt, the punish-
ment shall be doubl0d. By 'abortion' is meant that the life of the 
fetus or embryo shall be destro~·ed in the woman's womb or tha.t a 
premature birth ther0of be caused. 
"Art. 1192. Furnishing the means 
"Whoever furnishes the mrans for proruring an abortion knowing 
the purpose intended is guilty as an accomplice. 
"Art. 1193. Attempt at abortion 
"If the means used shall fail to produce an abortion, the offender 
is nevertheless guilty of an attempt to produce abortion, provided 
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make it a crime to "procure an abortion," as therein 
defined, or to attempt one, except with respect to "an 
abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for 
the purpose of saving the life of the mother." Similar 
statutes are in existence in a majority of the States.2 
it be shown that snrh means were calculated to produre that result, 
:mel shall be fined not less th:m one hundred nor more than one 
1 hou8and dollar~. 
"Art. 1194. Murder in producin~J; abortion 
"If the death of the mother is occasioned by an abortion so pro-
duced or by nn attempt to effect the same it is murder. 
"Art. 1196. By medical advice 
"Nothing in this chapter applies to an abortion procured or at-
tempte.d br medical ad1·ice for the purpose of snYing the life of thr 
mother." 
The foregoing Article~. togrther with Art. 119.5. compri~e Ch:1pter 
() of Tit!<.> 15 of 1 he Prnal Code. Artirlr 110.5, not attnrked here, 
reads: 
"Art. 119!5. DrRt ro~·ing uuborn child 
"Whoever shnll during parturition of the mother destroy the 
vitality or life in a child in a state of being born and before actual 
birth, which child would otherwise haYe been born alive, shall be 
confined in the p<'nitentiary for life or for not less than five years." 
2 Arir.. Re1·. St:lt. Ann. § 13-211 (1971): Conn. Pub. Act. No. 1 
(May 1972 sperial seR~ion) (in 4 Conn. Lrg. SerY. 677 (1972)), and 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §§ !53-29, 53-30 (1961\) (or unborn child); 
Idnho Code § 18-1.505 (App. to Supp. 1971); 111. Rev. Stats. c. 38, 
§ 23-1 (1971); Ind. Code § 35-1-58-1 (1971); Iowa Code § 701.1 
(1971); Ky. Rev. Stat. §436.020 (1963); La. Rev. Stat. §37:1285 
(G) (1964) (los~ of medical license) (but see § 14-87 (1972 Supp.) 
containing no exception for the life of the mother und<'r the criminal 
statute); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 17, §51 (1964); Mas~. Gen. 
Laws Ann. c. 272, § 19 (1970) (u,;ing the trrm "unlawfull~r," con-
strued to exclude an abortion to save the mother's life, Kudish v. 
Bd. of Registration, 356 Mass. 98, 248 N. E. 2d 264 (1969)); Mich. 
Comp. Laws§ 750.14 (1948); Minn. Stat.§ 617.18 (1971); Mo. Rev .. 
Stat. § 559.100 (1969); l\font.. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-401 (1961); 
Neb. Rev. Stat.§ 28-405 (1964); Nev. Rev. Stat.§ 200:220 (1967); 
N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 585.13 (1955); N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 2A:87-1 
(1969) ("without lawful justification"); N. D. Cent. Code §§ 12-25-
; 
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Texas first enacted a criminal abortion statute in 1854. 
Texas Laws 1854. c. 49, § 1, set forth in 3 Gammel, 
La\\'s of Texas. 1502 (1898). This was soon modified 
into language that has remained substantially unchanged 
to the present time. See Texas Penal Code of 1857, 
Arts. 531-536; Paschal's Laws of Texas, Arts. 2192- 2107 
(1866); Texas Rev. Stat., Arts. 536-541 (1879); Texas 
Rev. Crim. Stat., Arts. 1071- 1076 (1911). The final 
article in each of these compilations provided the same 
cxrrption, as docs the present Article 1196, for an abor-
tion by "medical advice for the purpose of saving the 
life of the mother." 3 
01, 1~-25-02 (1900): Ohio Hr1·. Codr § 2901.Hi (195~): Okla. Rtnt. 
Ann .. Tit. 21, § RM (1972-107:1 Rupp.): Pn. Rtat .. <\nn. , Tit. 1R, 
§§ 471R. 4719 (19ftn ("unlawful"): n. t. Grn. L:ms Ann. § 11-3-1 
(19fi9); R. D . C'ompilrcl Law~ § 22-li-l (1001): Trnn. C'odr Ann. 
§§ ~9-301. 39-302 (HJ;3fl): Utnh Code Ann. §§ 76-2-1, 7G-2-Z 
(105~) ; Vt. Rtat. ,\nn. , Tit. 13 , § 101 (1%R) ; \V. Va. Code Ann. 
§ fil·-~-R (Hlflfl): Wi,;. Rt:tt. § 0-W.O-l (HlllO): W~·o. Rtnt. Ann.§§ fi-77, 
6-7R (1957) . 
~ Long ago :t "uggr~tion wn~ maliC' thai thr Trxa~ ,;tatutr:; wrrr 
mwom;t itntionall~· Yngnr brra u:'r of drfinit ion:ll clcfirirnric . ..; . The 
Trxa s Court of Criminal A ppra l~ di,po,;rcl of that ~ugge:.:t ion prr-
rmptoril~·. ~aying on!~·. 
'·It is also in ,; i;;trd in thr motion in :lJTr:.; t of .iudgmcnt that thr ~ tat­
utr is unron~tit ntionnl :mel 1·oid in i hat it doc~ not ,;uffici rnt lv define 
or drsrribc the offense of abortion. \Vr do not ronrnr in re,;pect 
to thi" qur . .;tion." Jackson Y. State, !)5 Tex. Crim. n. 79 , SO, 115· 
S. W . 203, 2fiS (190S). 
Tho sumo c·onrt rorrntl~ · ha~ hc, lcl agnin that the SlatP'~ abortion 
statutes arP 11o t nnron~titntionallr Yattgr or oYcrbroad. 'Thmn]Json 
Y. Stale.- Tex. Crim. App. --.- R. W. 2d- (1971) , appral 
pending. Tlw romt held t kil '·thr Rtafp of Texas hn,; n romprlling 
intl'I'Pst to protect fptal lifP": that .\rt. 11!)1 " i~ dc>s ignrcl to protect 
fptal life" : that the TP"Xa:; homicide st atntPs, p;II' tirnlarl~· Art. 1205 
of tho P on;l[ Codr. arc intru ded to protrri a prr~on '·in Pxi~tC'mc by 
art ual birth" and thrrrhr impli<'it !~ · rrC'ognizr ot lwr hum;m Jifp t hut 
i ~ not " .in Pxistrnro b~· artnal birth"; that the definition of human 
lifp i" for the kgi,.J:ttnrr :md not the comts: that Art. 1196 "i~ 
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II 
Jane Roe,' a single woman "·ho was residing in Dallas 
County, Texas, instituted this federal action in March 
1970 againl"t the District Attorney of the county. She 
sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal 
abortion stat11tes were unconstitutional on their face, 
and an injunction restraining the defendant from en-
forcing the statutes. 
Roc alleged that she was umnarriccl and pregnant; 
that she ·\\"ished to terminate her pregnancy by an abor-
tion "performed by a competent, licensed physician, 
u11der safe. clinical conditions''; that she \Yas unable 
to get a "legal" abortion in Texas because her life did 
not appear to be threatened by the continuation of her 
prrgnancy; ancl that she could not afford to travel to 
another jurisdiction in order to secure a legal abortion 
under safe conditions. She claimed that the Texas stat-
utes were unconstitutiona1ly vague and that they 
abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the 
First, Fourth, Fifth, Kinth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. By an amendment to her complaint Roc pur-
ported to sue "on behalf of herself and all other ,,-omen" 
similarly situated. 
James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought 
and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In 
morr dd'initc that the Di,triet or Columbia ~t:dutr uphC'ld in runited 
Stat C's v.] l'uiich" (40:2 U. R. o2): and thnt the' Texas statute "is 
not Yngur and indC'finitr or o\·rrbro:1cl." .\ ph~·~icinn'~ abortion ron-
Yirt ion w:1~ nffinnrd. 
In 11. 2 , - Trx. Crim. App. , at -. - R. IV. 2d, at -, thC' 
roml oh~rrHd th:1t an~· i~suc ns to thr hurrlrn of proof under the 
rwmption of .\rt. 1HJG "i~ not lwforr u~.·· But ~re VeevC'ts v. State , 
172 Trx. Crim. App. 162 , lGR-169 , 354 S. W. 2d 161 (1962). CL 
United 8taLC's Y. Vuitrh. 402 U.S. 62, 69-71 (1971). 
4 Tho 11:1tnc i~ a pscnclonym. 
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his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested pre-
viously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes and 
that two such prosecutions were pending against him. 
He described conditions of patients who came to him 
seeking abortions, and he claimed that for many cases 
he, as a physician, was unable to determine whether 
they fell within or outside the exception recognized by 
Article 1196. He alleged that, as a consequence, the 
statutes were vague and uncertain, in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and that they violated his own 
and his patients' rights to privacy in the doctor-patient 
relationship and his own right to practice medicine, 
rights he claimed were guaranteed by the First, Fourth, 
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
John and Mary Doe,5 a married couple, filed a com-
panion complaint to that of Roe. They also named the 
District Attorney as defendant, claimed like constitu-
tional deprivations, and sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief. The Does alleged that they were a childless 
couple; that Mrs. Doe was suffering from a "neural-
chemical" disorder; that her physician had "advised her 
to avoid pregnancy until such time as her condition 
has materially improved" (although a pregnancy at the 
present time would not present "a serious risk" to her 
life); that, pursuant to medical advice, she had dis-
continued use of birth control pills; and that if she 
should become pregnant, she would want to terminate 
the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent, 
licensed physician under safe, clinical conditions. By 
an amendment to their complaint, the Does purported 
to sue "on behalf of themselves and all couples similarly 
situated." 
The two actions were consolidated and heard together 
by a duly convened three-judge district court. The 
suits thus presented the situations of the pregnant single 
5 These names arc pseudonyms. 
i 
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woman, the childless couple, with the wife not pregnant, 
and the licensed practicing physician, all joining in the 
attack on the Texas criminal abortion statutes. Upon 
the filing of affidavits, motions ;vere made to dismiss 
and for summary judgment. The court held that Roc 
and Dr. Hallford, and members of their respective 
classes, had standing to sue, and presented justiciable con-
troversies, but that the Does had failed to allege facts 
sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have 
standing. It concluded that, with respect to the re-
quests for a declaratory judgment, abstention was not 
warranted. On the merits, the District Court held that 
the "fundamental right of single women and married 
persons to choose whether to have children is protected 
by the Ninth Amendment, through the Fourteenth 
Amendment," and that the Texas criminal abortion stat-
utes were void on their face because they were both 
unconstitutionally vague and constituted an overbroad 
infringement of the plaintiffs' Ninth Amendment rights. 
The court then held that abstention was warranted with 
respect to the requests for an injunction. It therefore 
dismissed the Doe complaint, declared the abortion stat-
utes void, and dismissed the application for injunctive 
relief. 314 F. Supp. 1217 (ND Tex. 1970). 
The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hall-
ford, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253, have appealed to 
this Court from that part of the District Court's judg-
ment denying the injunction. The defendant District 
Attorney has purported to cross appeal, pursuant to the 
same statute, from the court's grant of declaratory relief 
to Roe and Hallford. Both sides also have taken pro-
tective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held 
in abeyance pending decision here. We postponed de-
cision on jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 402. 
U.S. 941 (1971). 
; 
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1t might have been preferable if the defendant, pur-
suant to our Rule 20, hacl pref'cntcd to us a petition for 
certiorari before judgment in tlH' Court of Appeals with 
respect to the granting of the plaintiffs' prayer for de-
claratory relief. Our decisions in Mitchell \". Donovan, 
398 U. R. 427 (1970), and GunnY. University Committee, 
399 U. 8. 383 ( 1970). are to the effect that § 1253 does 
not authorize an appeal to this Court from the grant or 
denial of declaratory relief alone. vYc conclude, never-
theless, that those decisions clo not foreclose our review 
of both the injunctive and the declaratory aspects of a 
case of this kind "·hen it is properly here. as this one is. on 
appeal under ~ 12.53 from specific denial of inj uncti \'e 
relief, and the arguments as to both aspects are necessarily 
identical. Sec Carter v. Jury Co/1)11/ission, 396 U. S. 320 
(1970); Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. 
Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73. 80 81 (1960). It \vould be de-
structive of time and energy for all concerned were we 
to rule othcnYif'e. Cf. Doe Y. Bolton, post,-. 
IV 
\Ye are next confronted \Yith issues of justieia!Jility, 
standing, and abstention. Have Roc and the Docs cstab-
llshecl that "perso11al stake in the outcome of the con-
troversy," Baker Y. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962), 
that insmes that "the dispute sought to be adjudicated 
will be presented in au adversary context and in a 
form historically vimrcd as capable of judicial rPsolu-
tion," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 101 (1968), and 
Sierra Club v.JYiorton, 405 U.S. 727,732 (1972)? And 
what effect did the pendency of criminal abortion charges 
against Dr. Hallford in state court have upon the pro-
priety of the federal court's granting relief to him as 
a plaintiff-intervenor? 
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A. Jane Roe. Despite the usc of the pseudonym, no 
sugg<'stion is made that Roe is a fictitious person. For 
purposes of her case, " ·e accept as true, and as estab-
lished , her existence; her pregnant state, as of the incep-
tion of her suit in March 1070 and as late as May 21 
of that year "·hen she filed an alias affidavit with the 
District Court; and her inability to obtain a legal abor-
tion in Texas. 
Vie"·ing Hoc's case as of the time of its filing and 
thereafter until as late as May, there can be little 
dispute that it then presented a case or controversy and 
that, ,,·holly apart from the class aspects, she, as a 
pregnant single woman thwarted by the Texas criminal 
abortion laws, had standing to challenge those statutes. 
Abele Y. Markle, 452 F. 2d 1121, 1125 (CA2 Hl71); 
Crossen Y. Breckenridge, 446 F. 2d 833, 838- 830 (CAo 
1071); Poe Y. M eng him:, 330 F. Supp. 986, 900- 991 
(Kans. 1072). Sec 'Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). 
IPdeecl , " ·c do not read the appellee's brief as really 
asserting anything to the contrary. The "logical nexus 
between the status asserted and the claim sought to be 
adjudicated," Flast Y. Cohen, 302 U. S., at 102. and 
the necessary degree of contentiousness, Golden v. 
Ztt•ickler, 394 U. S. 103 (1960) , arc both present. 
The appellee notes, however, that tho record docs 
not disclose that Roe "·as pregnant at the time of the 
District Court hearing on May 22, 1070." or on the fol-
lowing June 17 when tho court's opinion and judgn1ent 
wore filed. And he suggests that Roo's case must now 
be moot because she and all other members of her class 
arc 110 longer subject to any 1070 pregnancy. 
6 The apprllrr iwirr ~tatr~ in hi,.: hrirf llwt ihr hraring bcforr the 
Di~trid Coml m1~ hrld on .Tul~· 22, Hl70. .\pprllrr's Brirf 13 . The 
dorkrt rntrir~. Apprndi'i. :1t 2, and the trnnH('ript, Appendix, at 76, 
Je,·ra l thiH to br an error. Thr .Tul~· date :1pprars io be thr time 
of the reporter'~ tr:mHrription. Rrc Apprndix, at 77. 
; .. 
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The usual rule in federal cases is that an actual con-
troversy must exist at all stages of appellate or certiorari 
review, and not simply at the date tho action is initiated. 
United States Y. Munsingwear, I nc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950); 
Golden v. Zwickler, supra; SEC Y. Medical Committee 
for H·uman Rights, 404 U. S. 403 ( 1972). 
But when, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in 
the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation 
period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term 
before the usual appellate process is complete. If that 
termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation 
seldom will survive much beyond tho trial stage, and 
appellate review will be effectively denied. Our law 
should not be that rigid. Pregnancy often comes more 
than once to the same \VOman, and in the general popu-
lation, if man is to survive, it will always be with us. 
Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclu-
sion of nonmootness. It truly is "capable of repetition, 
yet evading review." Southern Pacific 1'erminal Co. v. 
ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). See Moore Y. Ogilvie, 
394 U. S. 814, 816 (1969); Carroll v. President and Com-
missioners, 393 U.S. 175, 178-179 (1968); United Slates 
v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 632-633 (1953). 
We therefore agree with the District Court that Jane 
Roe had standing to undertake this litigation, that she 
presented a justiciable controversy, and that tho ter-
mination of her 1970 pregnancy has not rendered her 
case moot. 
B. Dr. Hallford. The doctor's position is different. 
He entered Roe's litigation as a plaintiff-intervenor 
alleging in his complaint that he: 
"In the past has been arrested for violating 
the Texas Abortion Laws and at the present time 
stands charged by indictment with violating said 
laws in the Criminal District Court of Dallas 
County, Texas to-wit: ( 1) The State of Texas vs. 
.. ... 
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James H. Hallford, No. C-69-5307-IH, and (2) The 
State of Texas vs. James H. Hallford, No. C-69-
2524--H. In both cases the defendant is charged 
"·ith abortion . ... " 
In his application for leave to intervene the doctor 
made like representations as to the abortion charges 
pending in the state court. These representations were 
also repeated in the affidavit he executed and filed in 
support of his motion for summary judgment. 
Dr. Hallford is therefore in the position of seeking, 
in a federal court, declaratory and injunctive relief with 
respect to the same statutes under which he stands 
charged in criminal prosecutions simultaneously pending 
in state court. Although he stated that he has been 
arrested in the past for violating the State's abortion 
laws, he makes no allegation of any substantial and 
immediate threat to any federally protected right that 
cannot be asserted in his defense against the state prose-
cutions. Neither is there any allegation of harassment 
or bad faith prosecution. In order to escape the rule, 
articulated in the cases cited in the next paragraph of 
this opinion, that, absent harassment and bad faith, a 
defendant in a pending state criminal case cannot affirma-
tively challenge in federal court the statutes under which 
the State is prosecuting him, Dr. Hallford seeks to 
distinguish his status as a present state defendant from 
his status as a "potential future defendant" and to assert 
only the latter for standing purposes here. 
We see no merit in that distinction. Our decision in 
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66 (1971), compels the 
conclusion that the District Court erred when it granted 
declaratory relief to Dr. Hallford instead of refraining 
from so doing. The court, of course, was correct in re-
fusing to grant injuctivc relief to the doctor. The rca-
sons supportive of that action, however, are those ex-
pressed in Snrnuels v. M ackell, supra, and in Younger v. 
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Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U. S. 
77 (1971); Pere.z \". Ledes111n, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); and 
Byrne v. Karale;ris, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). See also Dom-
browski \". Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 (1965). We note, in 
passing, that Younger and its companion cases "·ere clc-
ciclcd after the three-judge District Collrt decision in 
this case. 
Dr. Hallford's com11laint in intervention, therefore, is 
to be dismissed.' He is remitted to his defenses in the 
state criminal proceedings against him. \Ye reverse the 
j uclgmcnt of the District Conrt insofar as it gran ted Dr. 
Hallford relief and failed to dismiss his complaint in 
intervention. 
C. 'l'he Does. In vic,,· of our rulitw as to Roc's stand-
ing in her case, the issue of the Docs' standing in their 
case has little significance. The claims they assert arc 
essentially the same as those of noe, and they attack the 
same statutes. X everthclcss. "·c briefly note the Does' 
posture. 
Their pleading<; present them as a childless 111arried 
couple. the woman not being pregnant, \Yho have no 
desire to ha vc children at this time because of their hav-
ing received medical advice that Mrs. Doc should avoid 
pregnancy, and for "other highly 11ersonal reason:::." But 
7 \Vn nrcd not con~idrr \\"h:il different re:'ult, if any. would follow 
if Dr. Hallford'~ intern·ntion \\"Ne 011 brh:df of a ria~~- His rom-
plaint in inten·ention clor,; not purport to a~:'rrt a rlfls,; snit and 
m:1kr" no rrfrrrncr to 1111~· cl:t>'~ apart from an alkgation th:tt he 
"and othrr,; ~ imilarl~· f'ituntrd" mu>'t nrrr,;~arii~· gur~s nt tbr mmn-
ing of Art. 119G. Ili>' appiirat ion for lr:tYP to intrrl"!mr gor~ ~ome­
whnt furthrr for it a~-rrt~ that pinintirT Hor dor~ not adrquatd;.· pro-
trrt the intrrc~t of thr doctor "and ihr r·i:t~" of propir who are 
ph~·~ ici:ms ... and thr rla~~ of proplr who :trr ... pntirnts .... " 
Thr lenxe :tppiiration. howr1·rr, i~ not thr c·ompiaint. Drspitr the 
Di~trirt Court',; ~tatrmrnt to thr rontrar~·, :n.t F. Supp., nt 1225, we 
f:1ilto prrcri1·r thr c•."'srntial>' of n ria~" ~uit in thr ITnllforcl compi:tint. 
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they "fear ... they may face the prospect of becoming 
parents.'' And if pregnancy ensues, they '".vould want 
to t.ern1inate" it by an abortion. They assort an inability 
to obtain an abortion lcga11y in Texas and, consequently, 
the prospect of obtaining an illegal abortion there or of 
going outside Texas to some place where the procedure 
coulcl be obtai11ecl legally ancl competently. 
\Ve thus have as plaintiffs a married couple \vho have, 
as their asserted immediate ancl present injury, only an 
alleged "detrimental effeet UJ)Ol1 [theirl marital hap-
piness" because they arc forced to "the choice of refrain-
ing from normal sexual relations or of endangering Mary 
Doe's health through a possible pregnancy." Their claim 
is that sometime, in the future, 1\!Irs. Doe might become 
pregnant because of possible failure of contraceptive 
measures, and at that time in the future. she might want 
an abortion that might then be illegal under the Texas 
statutes. 
This very phrasing of the Does' position reveals its 
speculative character. Their alleged injury rests on pos-
sible future contraceptive failme. possible future preg-
nancy, possible future unpreparedness for parenthood, 
and possible future impairment of health. Any one or 
more of these several possibilities may JJot take place 
and all may not combine. Jn the Docs' estimation, these 
possibilities might have some real or imagined impact 
upon their marital happiness. But vve are not prepared 
to say that the bare allegation of so indirect an injury is 
sufficient to present an actual case or controversy. 
Youngen·. Harris, 401 U.S., at41- 42; Golden v. Zwickler, 
394 U.S .. at 109-110 (1969); Abele Y. Markle, 452 F. 2cl, 
at 1124- 1125; Crossen v. Breckemidge, 446 F. 2d, at 839. 
The Docs' claim falls far short of those resolved other-
"·ise in the cases that the Docs urge upon us, namely, 
Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); 
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Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970); 
and Epperson v. Arkansas, 303 U.S. 97 (1968). Sec also 
Truax v. Raich, supra. 
The Does therefore arc not appropriate plaintiffs in 
this litigation. Their complaint \vas properly dismissed 
by the District Court, and we affirm that dismissal. 
v 
The principal thrust of appellant's attack on the Texas 
statutes is that they improperly invade a right, said to 
be possessed by the pregnant woman, to choose to ter-
minate her pregnancy. Appellant would discover this 
right in the concept of personal "liberty" embodied in 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause; or in 
personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to 
be protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, 
see GriswoLd v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisen-
sta-dt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); id., at 460 (WHITE, 
J., concurring); or among those rights reserved to the 
people by the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S., at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Before 
addressing this claim, we feel it desirable briefly to 
survey, in several aspects, the history of abortion, for 
such insight as that history may afford us, and then to 
examine the state purposes and interests behind the 
criminal abortion laws. 
VI 
It perhaps is not generally appreciated that the re-
strictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority 
of States today are of relatively recent vintage. Those 
laws, generally proscribing abortion or its attempt at 
any time during pregnancy except when necessary to 
preserve the pregnant woman's life, are not of ancient 
or even of common law origin. Instead, they derive 
from statutory changes effected, for the most part, in 
the latter half of the 19th century. 
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1. Ancient attitudes. These are not capable of precise 
determination. We are told that at the time of tho Persian 
Empire abortifacients \rere known and that criminal 
abortions wore severely punished.s We are also told, 
however, that abortion was practiced in Greek times as 
>voll as in the Roman Era/ and that "it was resorted 
to without scruple." ' 0 Tho Ephesian, Soranos, often 
described as the greatest of the ancient gynecologists, 
appears to have been generally opposed to Rome's pre-
vailing free-abortion practices. He found it necessary 
to think first of the life of the mother, and he resorted 
to abortion when, upon this standard, he felt the proce-
dure advisab1e.11 Greek and Roman law afforded little 
protection to the unborn. If abortion was prosecuted in 
son1e places, it seems to have been based on a concept 
of a violation of the father's right to his offspring. 
Ancient religion did not bar abortion.12 
2. The Hippocratic Oath. What then of the famous 
Oath that has stood so long as the ethical guide of the 
medical profession and that bears the name of the great 
Greek (460(?) - 377(?) B. C.), who has been described 
as the Father of Medicine, the "wisest and the greatest 
8 A. Castiglioni. A Hi:-:tory of Mrdicine 84 (2d rd. 1047), E. 
Krnmbhnnr, trnnslator nncl rclitor (hrrrinafter "Ca~tiglioni"). 
0 J. Hicci, The Grm•alogo~· of Gynareology 52, 84, 113, 149 (2cl eel. 
1950) (hrrrinnfter "Hicci"); L. Lader, Abortion 75-77 (1966) (here-
inafter "Ladrr"); IC. Niswnnclrr, Mrdiral Abortion Practices in the 
United StatrR, in Abortion and the Law 27, 38-40 (D. Smith, editor, 
1967) ; G. Williams, The Sanctity of Life 148 (1957) (herrinafter 
"Williams"); J . Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in History, in 
The Morality of Abortion 1, 3-7 (.T. Noonan eel. 1970) (hereinafter 
"Noonan"); E. Qua~·, .Tu~tifiable Abortion-l\frclicnl and Legal 
Foundations, IT , 49 Geo. L. J. 395, 406-422 (1961) (hereinafter 
"Quay"). 
10 L. EclPlstrin, Thr HiPJlOeratic Oath 10 (19-!3) (hereinaftrr 
"Edrlstein"). But ser Castiglioni 227. 
11 Eclrlstein 12 ; Ricci 113-114, 118-119; Noonan 5. 
12 Edelstein 13-14. 
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practioner of his art," and the "most important and 
most complete medical personality of antiquity," who 
dominated the medical schools of his time, and who 
typified the sum of the medical knowledge of the past? 1 3 
The Oath varies somewhat according to the par-
ticular translation, but in any translation the content 
is clear: "I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if 
asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner 
I "·ill not give to a woman a pessary to produce abor-
tion,"'' or "I will neitlwr give a deadly drug to any-
body if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to 
this effect. Similarly, I will not give to a woman an 
abortive remedy." 1 " 
Although the Oath is not mentioned in any of the 
principal briefs in this case or in Doe v. Bolton, post, 
it represents the apex of the development of strict ethical 
concepts in medicine, and its influence endures to this 
day. Why did not the authority of Hippocrates dissuade 
abortion practice in his time and that of Rome? The 
late Dr. Edelstein provides us with a theory: ' a The 
Oath was not uncontested even in Hippocrates' day; only 
the Pythagorean school of philosophers frowned upon 
the related act of suicide. Most Greek thinkers, on the 
other hand, commended abortion, at least prior to via-
bility. See Plato, Re7;ublic, V, 461; Aristotle, Politics, 
VII, 1335 b 25. For the Pythagoreans, ho\\·evcr , it 
"·as a matter of dogma. For them the embryo \\'US 
animate from the moment of conception, and abortion 
meant destruction of a living being. The abortion clause 
of the Oath, therefore, "echoes Pythagorean doctrines," 
and "fi]n no other stratum of Greek opinion were such 
1:l CD stiglioni 148. 
1 '1 ld., at 154. 
1 " Edelstein 3. 
'" ld .. at 12. 15-18. 
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Vle\YS held or proposed in the same spirit of uncom-
promising austerity." 17 
Edelstein then concludes that the Oath originated in 
a group representing only a small segment of Greek 
opinion alld that it certainly was not accepted by all 
ancient physicians. He points out that medical writings 
clown to Galen (130- 200 A. D.) "give evidence of the 
violation of almost every one of its injunctions." 18 But 
with the end of antiquity a decided change took place. 
Resistance again st suicide and against abortion became 
common. The Oath came to be popular. The emerg-
ing teachings of Christianity were in agreement with 
the Pythagorean ethic. The Oath "became the nucleus 
of all medical ethics" and "was applauded as the embodi-
ment of truth." Thus, suggests Dr. Edelstein, it is "a 
Pythagorean manifesto and not the expression of an 
absolute standard of medical conduct." lH 
This, it seems to us, is a satisfactory and acceptable 
explanation of the Hippocratic Oath's apparent rigidity. 
It enables us to understand , in historical context, a long 
accepted and revered statement of medical ethics. 
3. The Common Law. It is undisputed that at the 
common law, abortion performed before "quickening"-
the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, 
appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th week of 
pregnancy ~ 0-1·ras not an indictable offense. ~ ' The ab-
17 !d., a t 18 ; Lnder 75. 
1 8 Edelstein G3 . 
19 !d., nt 64. 
20 D orlnml's I!lu ~tralrd :\Trdi r:d Dirlion::u· ~ · 1251 (24ih rd. 1955) . 
2 1 E. Cokr. lm;tilnt r" ITT -::-so (16-tR): 1 \Y. Il:lwkins, Pleas of the 
Crown e. 31, § 1G (1702): 1 B!a ek~ ton r, Commentarie~ ·::-129- 130 
(1755); l\L H :1 lr , Plras of 1hr C'ro\\'n 488 (177R). For discus~ion~ 
of the rolr of the qnit·krning ronrrpt in Engli .->h common lnw, sec 
Ladr r 78 ; N oonan 228-22G: C. l\Tcans , The Law of Nrw York Con-
rPrniug Abortion :1 nd the Status of the Foetus, 1664- 1968 : A Case 
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sence of a common law crime for pre-quickening abor-
tion appears to have developed from a conflue11ce of 
earlier philosophical, theological, and civil and canon 
law concepts of when life begins. These disciplines 
variously approached the question in terms of the point 
at which the embryo or fetus became "formed" or rec-
ognizably human, or in terms of when a "person" came 
into being, that is, infused with a "soul" or "animated." 
A loose consensus evolved in early English law that these 
events occurred at some point between conception and 
live birth.22 This was "mediate animation." Although 
of Ccssahon of ConRtitutionali!~·, 14 N. Y. L. Forum 411, 418-428 
(1968) (hcrcinaftrr ":\TeRns I"): L. Strrn, Abortion: Reform and 
the Law, 59 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 84 (1968) (hcreinaftrr "Stern"); 
Quay 430-432 ; Will in ms 152. 
~~Early philosophrrs bclirvcd that the embryo or fetns did not 
become formed and begin to liYC until at least 40 days after concep-
tion for a male, and 80 to 90 day~ for a female. See, for example, 
Aristotle, Hist. Anim. 7.3.588b; Gen. Anim. 2.3.736, 2.5.741: Hip-
porratrs, Lib. de l\at. Puer., l\o. 10. Aristotle's thinking derived 
from his three-stage theor~· of lifr: vegrtable, animal, rational. The 
vrgetable stnge wns reachrd at ronrcption, the animal at "animation," 
and the rational soon after livr birth. This theor~·, together with the 
40/80 day view, ramo to be accepted by early Christian thinkers. 
The theological debate waR reflected in the writings of St. Augus-
tinE', who made a distinction betwe2n embryo inanimatus, not yet 
endowed with a soul, and embryo animatus. He may have drawn 
upon Exodus xxi, 22. At one point, however, he expresses the view 
that human powers cannot detrrminc the point during fetal dcYelop-
mcnt at which the critical change occurs. Sec Augustine, De Origine 
Animae 4.4 (Pub. Law 44.527). Sre also Reany, The Creation of the 
Human Soul, c. 2 and 83-86 (1932); Huser, The Crime of Abortion 
in Common Law 15 (Catholic Univ. of America, Canon Law Studies 
No. 162, Washington, D. C. 1942). 
Grllen, in three treatises related to embryology, accepted the think-
ing of Aristotle and his followers. Quay 426-427. Later, Augustine 
on abortion was incorporatrd by Gratian into the Decretum, pub-
lished about 1140. Decretum Magistri Gratiani 2.32.2.7 to 2.32.2.10, 
70-18-0PINION 
ROE v. WADE 19 
Christian theology and the canon Jaw came to fix the 
point of animation at 40 days for a male and 80 days 
for a female, a view that persisted until the 19th cen-
tury, there was otherwise little agreement about the 
precise time of formation or animation. There was 
agreement, however, that prior to this point the fetus 
was to be regarded as part of the mother and its de-
struction, therefore, was not homicide. Due to con-
tinued uncertainty about the precise time when anima-
tion occurred, to the lack of any en1pirical basis for 
the 40-80 day vie\Y, and perhaps to Acquinas' def-
inition of movement as one of the two first principles 
of life, Bracton focused upon quickening as the critical 
point. The significance of quickening was echoed by 
later common law scholars and found its way into the 
received common law in this country. 
Whether abortion of a quick fetus was a felony at 
common law, or even a lesser crime, is still disputed. 
Bracton, writing early in the 13th century, thought it 
homicide. 23 But the later and predominant view, fol-
lowing the great common law scholars, has been that 
in 1 Corpus Juris Canoni('i 1122, 1123 (2d ed. Friedberg cd. 1879). 
Gratian, together with the decrctals that followed, wrrc recognized 
as the definitive bod~· of canon law until the new Code of 1917. 
For discussions of the canon law trentment, sec Means I, at 411-
412; Noonan, 20-26; Qnay 426-430; see also Noonan, Contraception: 
A History of Its Treatment by the Cntholic Theologians and Can-
onists 18-29 ( 1965). 
23 Bracton took the position that abortion by blow or poison was 
homicide "if the foetus be already formed and animated, and par-
ticularly if it be nnimated." 2 H. Bracton, De Lcgibus et Con-
suetudinibus Angline 279 (Twi;::s eel. 1 79), or, ns a later translation 
puts it, "if the foctu~ is already formed or quickened, especially if 
it is quickened," II Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England 
341 (Thorne rd. 1968). See Quay 431; sec also 2 Fleta 60-61 (Book 
I, c. 23) (Selden Soricty ed. 1955). 
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it was at most a lesser offense. In a frequently cited 
passage, Coke took the position that abortion of a woman 
"quick with childe" is "a great misprision and no 
murder." "4 Blackstone followed, saying that '"hile abor-
tion after quickening had once been considered man-
slaughter (though not murder), "modern law" took a 
less severe view."" A recent revievv of the common law 
precedents argues, however, that those precedents con-
tradict Coke and that even post-quickening abortion 
was never established as a. common la."· crime.~a This 
is of some importance because while most American 
courts ruled, in holding or dictum, that abortion of an 
unquickencd fetus was not criminal under their rcceiYed 
common l:n\',"7 othNs followed Coke in stating that abor-
"' R Cokr. Institntc·' ITT -::·so (Hl.f, ). 
"" 1 Blacbtonc. Commc•nl:tric.• ''T20-1:~o (17Gti). 
""C. \fr~m~. Thr Phoenix of Ahorlionttl Frredom: J, n Penumbral 
or Ninth-Amendmrnt Tiip;lt1 About to Ari'r from tbr Ninrleenth-
Crntur_,. Legi,lati,·r _-\~hr" of :1 FomtPrnth-Centm~- Common-L~1w 
Libert~·?, 17 ~- Y. L. Forum :):i5 (1071) (hrrein:1ftrr "\Ir:m~ H") . 
The anthor ex:tmines the two principal wec·('(lent" citrcl marginally 
h~- Cokr, both contrar~- to hi~ dietnm, nnd trnce~ thr tre~ttmrnt of 
1 he~r :mel othrr c:t,r,.; bY r:1rlirr comnwn t:tl or,.;. He concludes that 
Coke, who him,rlf pnrtic·ipated n' :Ill nlh·orntr in an abortion case 
in 1G01. may hn,·r intentional!~- mi~~t:t1ed thr !;n,·. Thr author eYen 
f'uggpsts a rrnson: Cokr'" ~trong frrling,.; about nbortion. conpled 
with his rrlnrt:mer to acknowlrdgr common lnw ('rc·ular) ,iuri~dic­
tion to n~~r,;~ pen~t!tief' for ~m ofl'rnrr ihnt trndition:t!l~- h:td brr11 nn 
rxdui'i\·c]~· rrclr~in~tiral or e:tnon 1:1\\' c·rimr. Srr al~o Lader 71\-79, 
who notes that ~omr ~C'holar~ douht thr rommm1 bw c\·rr \\'H~ np-
plircl to nbortion: th:tt 1 hr En_gli"h rrC'bin~tical rourt~ ~eem to lun·e 
lo~t intrrr~t in thr problrm nftrr 1527: and thnt ihr prramblc to thr 
Engli"h legi~l:ttion of 1R0:3. 4::; Gro. :3. r .• iR. § 1. :1! 2m , rrfrrrrd to 
in thr text, infm. HffltP~ th:tt ''no acll'qnatr nw:m,.: h:l\'C bern hithrrto 
pro,·ided for thr prc,·rntion nnd puni•hmrnt of such ofTrll"<'H." 
" 7 C'ommonwea/th v. Bangs. 9 Mn'"· :3Si, 3SR (1S12): ('ommon-
1cralth v. Pa.rkrr, 50 l\Iai'~. (!) J\fpt.) 2G:). 2o5-2Go (lil-L5): State v. 
Cooprr. 22 N . .T. L. 52, 58 (1S.f9): Abmms v. Ji'oshee, :) Iowa 274, 
278-280 (18;3G); Smith Y. Ga!Jrml. :31 Aln. 45 , 5J (1857); !tiitchPll 
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tion of a quick fetus \ras a "misprision," a term they 
translated to mean "misdemeanor." "8 That their reli-
ance on Coke on this aspect of the ]a,,· was uncritica.l 
and, apparently in all the reported cases, dictum (due 
probably to the paucity of common la"· prosecutions 
for post-quickening abortion), makes it now appear 
doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as 
a common law crime even with respect to the destruc-
tion of a quick fetus. 
4. The English statutory law. England's first criminal 
abortion statute, Lord Ellenborough's Act, 43 Geo. 3, 
c. 58, came in 1803. It made abortion of a quick fetus, 
~ 1, a capital crime, but in § 2 it provided lesser penal-
tics for the felony of abortion before quickening, and 
thus preserved the quickening distinction. This con-
trast was continued in the general revision of 1828, 9 
Geo. 4, c. 31, § 13, at 104. It disappeared. however, 
together 'vith the death penalty. in 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 
1 Vic., c. 85. ~ 6, at 360. and did not reappear in the 
Offenses Against the Person Act of 1861, 24 & 25 Vic., 
c. 100, §59, at 438, that formed the core of Euglish 
anti-abortion law until the liberalizing reforms of 1967. 
In 1929 the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 19 & 20 
Geo. 5, c. 34, came into being. Its emphasis was upon 
the destruction of "the life of a child capable of being 
born alive." It made a willful act performed with the 
necessary intent a felony. It contained a proviso that 
v. Comrno11.wealth, 78 K~· . 204. 210 (1879); Eggart v. State, 40 Fla .. 
.'527. 5~12. 25 So. 14-1-. 14.'5 (1808); State v. Alr·om. 7 Idaho 509, 606 , 
04 P. 1014. 1016 (1901); Edtcan1s Y. State. 79 1'\rb. 251, 252 , 112' 
N. W. fill. G12 (1907): Orau \'. State. 77 Trx. Crim. R. 221, 224, 
178 S. IV. 337. 8:18 (19].5); i11illcr \'. Rcnnett. 190 Va. 162 , 169. 5fi. 
S. E. 2cl 217 , 221 (1949). Contra, llfills v. Commonwealth , 13 P:t. 
631. 630 (18.50); State Y. Slagle, 83 N. C. 630, 632 (1880) . 
" 8 Srr SmithY. Stale. :):i 1\If'. 411 , 55 (1851); Evans v. People, 49 
N. Y. SG. RS (1R72); Lamb v. State, G7 Md. 524. 533, 10 A. 208-
( 1887). 
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one was not to be found guilty of the offense "unless 
it is proved that the act which caused the death of the 
child was not done in good faith for the purpose only 
of preserving the life of the mother." 
A seemingly notable development in the English law 
was the case of Rex v. Bourne, [1939 -1 1 K. B. 687. This 
case apparently answered in the affirmative the question 
whether an abortion necessary to preserve the life of 
the pregnant woman was excepted from the criminal 
penalties of the 1861 Act. In his instructions to the 
jury Judge Macnaghten referred to the 1929 Act, and 
observed, p. 691, that that Act related to "the case 
where a child is killed by a willful act at the time when 
it is being delivered in the ordinary course of nature." 
!d., at 91. He concluded that the 1861 Act's use of 
the word "unlawfully," imported the same meaning ex-
pressed by the specific proviso in the 1!)29 Act even 
though there was no mention of preserving the mother's 
life in the 1861 Act. He then construed the phrase 
"preserving the life of the mother" broadly, that is, 
"in a reasonable sense," to include a serious and per-
manent threat to the mother's health, and instructed 
the jury to acquit Dr. Bourne if it found he had acted 
in a good faith belief that the abortion was necessary 
for this purpose. I d., at 693-694. The jury did acquit. 
Recently Parliament enacted a new abortion law. 
This is the Abortion Act of 1967, 15 & 16 Eliz. 2, c. 87. 
The Act permits a licensed physician to perform an 
abortion where two other licensed physicians agree (a) 
"that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve 
risk to the life of the pregnant woman, or of injury 
to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman 
or any existing children of her family, greater than if 
the pregnancy were terminated," or (b) "that there is 
a substantial risk that if the child were born it would 
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suffer from such physical or me11tal abnormalities as 
to be seriously handicapped." The Act also provides 
that, in making this determination, "account may be· 
taken of the pregnant woman's actual or reasonably 
forseeable environment." It also permits a physician, 
"·ithout the concurrence of others, to terminate a preg-
nancy where he is of the good faith opinion that the· 
abortion "is immediately necessary to save the life or 
to prevent grave permanent illjury to the physical or 
mental health of the pregnant woman." 
5. The American law. In this country the law in effect 
in all but a few States until mid-19th century was the 
pre-existing English common law. Connecticut, the 
first State to enact abortion legislation, adopted in 1821 
that part of Lord Ellenborough's Act that related to a 
woman "quick with child." 29 The death penalty was 
not imposed. Abortion before quickening was made a 
crime in that State only in 1860."0 In 1828 New York 
enacted legislation 31 that, in two respects, was to serve 
as a model for early anti-abortion statutes. First, while 
barring destruction of an unquickened fetus as well as 
a quick fetus, it made the former only a misdemeanor, 
but the latter second-degree manslaughter. Second, it 
incorporated a concept of therapeutic abortion by pro-
viding that an abortion was excused if it "shall have 
been necessary to preserve the life of such mother, or 
shall have been advised by two physicians to be nec-
essary for such purpose." By 1840, when Texas had 
received the common law/2 only eight American States 
29 Conn. Stat ., Tit. 20, § 14 (1821). 
3° Conn. Pub. ArtR. r. 71, § 1 (1860). 
3 1 N. Y. Rev. Stat., pt. rr, r. I , Tit. II, Art. 1, § 9, at 6(31 , and 
Tit. VI, § 21, :1.t 694 (1829) . 
32 Act of January 20, 1840, § 1, set forth in 2 Gammel, Laws of 
Texas 177-178 (1898); Ree Grigsby v. R cib, 105 Tex. 597, 600, 153. 
S. W. 1124, 1125 (1913) . 
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had statutes dealing with abortion."" It was not until 
after the \Var Between the States that legislation began 
generally to replace the common law. Most of these 
initial statutes dealt seyerely with abortion after quick-
ening but ·were lenient with it before quickening. Most 
punished attempts equally with completed abortions. 
\Yhile many statutes included the exception for an abor-
tion thought by one or more physicians to bC' neces-
sary to saYe the mother's life, that provision soon 
disappeared and the typical law required that the pro-
cedure actually be necessary for that purpose. 
Gradually, in the middle and late 19th century the 
quickening distinction disappC'ared from the statutory 
law of most States and the degree of the offense and 
the penalties \Yere increased. By the end of the 1950's, 
a large majority of the States banned abortion, ho\\·ever 
and whenever performed, u11less done to save or pre-
serve the life of the mother."' The exceptions. Alabama 
and tile District of Columbia, permitted abortion to pre-
serve the mother's health.'"' Three other States per-
mitted abortions that \Yere not "unlawfully" performed 
or that were not '\yithout lawful justification." leaving 
interpretation of those standards to the courts."n In 
the past several years, hO\Yever, a trend toward libernliza-
"" Thr <':trl,· stnitt1r~ nrr di~r·tt""rd in Qna~· 48.'5-·18~. Rrr also 
Ladrr ~!i-~~: ~Hrrn R5-SH: and :\Tr:m" 1I 8715-870. 
" 'Criminal abortion ~tnt ut<'" in rffrrt in the Statr~ as of 1961. to-
g<'t hrr with historical ~tn tnt or~· de,·<>lopmrn t :mel import n n t .iuclirial 
int<>rprrtatiom; of the ~tatr ~iaiutrs. nrr cited nnrl quotrcl in Quny 
447-520. Rrr Notr. A Stll'\·r~· of t hr Prr,rnt Rtatutor~· :md Ca~c 
La1Y on Abort ion: Thr Cont r:tdir-t ion:< all(\ the Prob\rm" . 1972 Ill. 
L. Fornm 177, 179, c!;t~,il\ing tlw abortion ~tatnir' :mel Ji,ting 25 
State:; :1~ prrmiiting abortion on\~· if n<'<'<'""ttr~ · to ~aYe or pn'"etTe 
the mothrr's lifr. 
:~:; Ai:l. Code, Tit. 1-t, ~ 9 (10.'1," ): D. C. C'odr .\nn. § 22-201 (19G7). 
"r. l\1n~~. Grn. Law~ Ann .. r. 272. ~ 19 (1970): ~ .. T. Hr1·. Stat. 
Ann. 2.'\:87-1 (19flfl): Pa. ~i:tt. Ann., Tit. 18, §§ ..(il~. 4719 (1903). 
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tion of abortion statutes has resulted in adoption, by 
about one-third of the States, of less stringent laws, most 
of them patterned after the ALI Model Penal Code, 
~ 230.:1,"' set forth as Appendix B to the opinion in 
Doe Y. Bolton, post --. 
1t is thus apparent that at common law, at the time 
of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout 
the major portion of tho 19th century, abortion was 
viewed " ·ith less disfavor than under most American 
statutes currently in effect. Phrasing it another way, 
a "·oman enjoyed a substantially broader right to ter-
minate a prC'gnancy than she docs in most States today. 
At least " ·ith respect to the early stage of pregnancy, 
and very possibly without such a limitation, the oppor-
tunity to make this choice \Yas present in this country 
'" Fomtrrn Rt:i!r."' han' acloptrd f'omr form of thr ALI f:tntutr. 
Rrr Ark. Rtat. Ann.~~ (1 -808 to -l-1-810 (R11pp. 1971): Calif. Hrnlth 
nnd Rafrt,· C'odr ~~ 2.'i0.'i0-2.'195.'5.5 (Wr,:t Rnpp. 1972): Colo. Tirv. 
Rtn,t~. Ann. ~~ 40- 2-50 to 40-2-Ml (Prrm. Cnm. S11pp. 1967): Drl. 
Code .\nn .. Tit. 24. ~~ 1700- 170:'; (Rupp. 1972): Floridn Law of 
Apr. 18. Hl/2. r. 72- 19o. 1972 Fla . Rr.-'~. T,;n,· Rrn· .. nt 3R0-8R2: Gn . 
C'odr §~ 2G- 1201 to 2o- 12o:J (1072): T\::111. Rtat. Ann. § 21-3407 
(Supp . 1971): Md. Ann. Codr. Art. 48. ~~ 187- 189 (Rrpl. 1071) : 
:\fif:~. Coclr .\nn . ~ 2:.!28 (Rupp. 1972) : ~- "!\f. Rtnt. Am1. §~ 40A-.')-1 
to 40:\.-.')-8 (Rrpl. 1972): XC'. Grn. Rtnt. ~ 14- -l-5.1 (Rupp. 1971) ; 
Orr. Rc,·. Rtnt. ~§ 48.5.405 to 4:'; .1.495 (Hl71): R. C. Cock Ann.§§ 16-
R2 to JG-S0 (Rupp. 1971): Yn. Codr Ann . §§ 1EU- o2 to 1S.1-62.8 
(Supp. 1972). Mr . .Tn~tirr Cl:trk rk.-rribrd ~omr of thr~r Statrs ns 
haxing "lrd the "·n~· ." Rrligion, !\Iorn litY and Abortion: A Con-
f:titution:ll . \pprai ~al. 2 Lo~·oln F. (L . • \.) L. Rr,·. 1. 11 (1969). 
Tly the rnrl of 1970. four othr-r Stntr~ hac! rrprnlrd rriminal prn-
altir~ for nhort ion~ prrformrrl i11 r:nl~· prr.gn:mc~' b~ · n lirrnsrd 
phv,.:iriall, ~uh,i<>C"t to :-;I a trd procrdural and lwa lt h rrquirrmrnt s. 
Alnska Stat. § J1.1.5.0fi0 (1070): Haw. Tirv. Stat. § 458-16 (Snpp. 
1971): N. Y. PC'nnl Coc!r § 125.05 (:\lrKinnr~· Rnpp. 1972-1978); 
Wn~h. Hr1·. C()(!r ~§ 9.02.000 to 9.02.01'0 (Rnpp. 1972). The prrrisn 
status of criminnl abortion law.~ in Homr Rtti!rs i ~ made unrlrnr by 
rrcrnt drr ision ,.: in ~tate aml frdrrnl rourts striking down cxi~ting 
~t ntc ln\\"s, in wholr or in p:ut. 
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well into the 19th century. Even later, the law con-
tinued for some time to treat less punitively an abortion 
procured in early pregnancy. 
6. The position of the American Medical Association. 
The anti-abortion mood prevalent in this country in 
the late 19th century was shared by the medical pro-
fession. Indeed, the attitude of the profession may have 
played a significant role in the enactment of stringent 
criminal abortion legislation during that period. 
An AMA Committee on Criminal Abortion was ap-
pointed in May 1857. It presented its report, 12 Trans. 
of the Am. Med. Assn. 73-77 ( 1859), to the T"·elfth 
Annual Meeting. That report observed that the Com-
mittee had been appointed to investigate criminal abor-
tion "with a view to its general suppression." It 
deplored abortion and its frequency and it listed three 
causes "of this general demoralization": 
"The first of these causes is a wide-spread popu-
lar ignorance of the true character of the crime-
a belief, even among mothers themselves, that the 
foetus is not alive till after the period of quickening. 
"The second of the agents alluded to is the fact 
that the profession themselves are frequently sup-
posed careless of foetal life .... 
"The third reason of the frightful extent of this 
crime is found in the grave defects of our laws, 
both common and statute, as regards the independ-
ent and actual existence of the child before birth, 
as a living being. These errors, which are suffi-
cient in most instances to prevent conviction, are 
based, and only based, upon mistaken and exploded 
medical dogmas. With strange inconsistency, the 
law fully acknowledges the foetus in utero and its 
inherent rights, for civil purposes; while personally 
and as criminally affected, it fails to recogmze it, 
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and to its life as yet denies all protection." I d., 
at 75-76. 
The Committee then offered, and the Association 
adopted, resolutions protesting "against such unwarrant-
able destruction of human life," calling upon state legis-
latures to revise their abortion laws, and requesting 
the cooperation of state medical societies "in pressing 
the subject." Id., at 28, 78. 
In 1871 a long and vivid report was submitted by the 
Committee on Criminal Abortion. It ended with the 
observation, ""We had to deal "·ith human life. In a 
matter of less importance we could entertain no com-
promise. An honest judge on the bench would call 
things by their proper names. We could do no less." 
22 Trans. of the Am. Med. Assn. 258 (1871). It prof-
fered resolutions, adopted by the Association, id., at 
38-39, recommending, among other things, that it "be 
unlawful and unprofessional for any physician to induce 
abortion or premature labor, without the concurrent 
opinion of at least one respectable consulting physician, 
aud then always with a view to the safety of the child-
if that be possible," and calling "the attention of the 
clergy of all denominations to the perverted vie>YS of 
morality entertained by a large class of females-aye, 
and men also, on this important question." 
Except for periodic condemnation of the criminal abor-
tionist, no further formal AMA action took place until 
1967. In that year the Committee on Human Repro-
duction urged the adoption of a stated policy of oppo-
sition to induced abortion except when there is 
"documented medical evidence" of a threat to the health 
or life of the mother, or that the child "may be born 
with incapacitating physical deformity or men tal de-
ficiency," or that a pregnancy "resulting from legally 
established statutory or forcible rape or incest may con-
stitute a threat to the mental or physical health of the· 
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patient,'' and t\YO other physicians "chosen because of 
their recognized professional competence have examined 
the patient and have concurred in writing," and the 
procedure "is performed in a hospital accredited by the 
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals." The 
providing of medical information by physicians to state 
legislatures in their consideration of legislation regard-
ing therapeutic abortion was "to be considered consistent 
·with the principles of ethics of the American Medical 
Association." This recommendation \Yas adopted by the 
House of Delegates. Proceedings of the AMA House 
of Delegates, 40-51 (June 1967). 
In 1970, after the introduction of a variety of pro-
posed resolutions, and of a report from its Board of 
Trustees. a reference committee noted "polarization of 
the medical profrsl'ion on this controversial issue"; divi-
sion among those \\·ho had testified; a difference of 
opinion among AMA councils and committees; "the· 
remarkable shift in testimony" in six months. felt to be 
influenced "by the rapid changes in state la\YS and by 
the judicial decisions "·hieh tend to make abortion more 
freely available;" and a feeling "that this trend will 
continue." On June 25, 1970, the House of Delegates 
adopted preambles and most of the resolutions proposed 
by the reference committee. The preambles emphasi:r.ed 
"the best interests of the patient," "sound clinical judg-
ment," and "informed patient consent," in contrast to· 
"mere acquiescence to the patient's demand." The rrso-
lutions asserted that abortion is a m.edical procedure 
that should be performed by a licensed physician in an 
accredited hospital only after consultation "·ith t\YO 
other physicians and in conformity " ·ith state la\Y, and 
that no party to the procedure should be required to 
violate personally held moral principles. ~ 8 Proceedings 
~s "Whrrra.~. Ahortiou. likr an~· othrr mrdiral proerrlurr, ohould 
not br pr·rformed \\'hrn routrnn· to thr hr~t iutNrst~ of thr patirnL 
·' 
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of the AMA House of Delegates 221 (June 1970). Tlw 
AM A. Judicial Council rendered a complementary 
opinion .an 
7. The ]Josition of the AmeTican Public Health Asso-
ciation. 1n October 1970, the Executive Board of the 
APHA adopted Standards for Abortion Services. Thcsc 
"·crc fi vc in number: 
"a. Rapid and simple abortion referral must be 
readily available through state and local public 
~in<·c good mcdiral prnrtirc require~ due ron~idcration for the p~t ­
iicnt'~ wrlfnrr nml not mrrc nrqnir~crncr to thr patirnt's drmand ; 
nnd 
"\Yherr:t~. The ~tnmLml~ of ~ound rlinirnl .iudg;mrnt. whirh , io-
grthrr with informed pniirnt ron~ent ~houlcl br drirrminnti1·e nc-
rorrling to the merit~ of rnch indi1·idu:tl ra,r; thereforr br it 
" R!t80[,1'RD. That :1hortion i~ a mrdic:tl proredm·r and. shonld 
hr prrfornwd onlY h:· n dul.1· liern~rd 11h:·~ ician :mrl ~mg;eon in :m 
arrrerlitrrl ho,:pit:!l nrting onlY :1fter ron"nltntion with two othrr 
phY~ici:m" cho~rn hrc:mor of thrir profr,~ionnl competenrY nnd. in 
conform:111rr' with ~t:mrl:1rrl" of good mrdirnl pmrtirr and the l\'Trdi-
r:tl Practi rr .\rt of hi" StntP: nnd he it fmther 
"RR80TA'l?D. Th:ll no ph:·,:ic ian or othrr profr,:~ionnl per,;omwl 
f'hall hr romprllerl to perform :tn:· :H' t whirh 1·ioln tr~ hi~ good mrd-
ic:l l .indgmrni. K rit hrr ph:·~ iri:m. ho~pita 1. nor ho,:pita 1 prr~onnrl 
Rhall he rrquirrd to 11erfonn :mY net 1·iohtiw of personally-hrld 
moral prinriplr~. In thr~r rirrum~tnncr~ p:ood mrdicnl prncticc re-
quirr~ onl:· that thr ph:·~ieinn or othrr profe~~ionnl pPr~onncl with-
draw from thr cn~r ~o long a>< tllP wilhdr:nval i>< ron~istent with 
~ood medirnl pr:1 C't icc." Prorredin~~ of the A :\1A House of Delr-
gn.tr~ 221 (.Tunr 19i0). 
:w "The Principle'~ of l\'Trdi ra l Ethir~ of the A~I.\ do not wohibit 
fl ph~·,: i ri:m from performing nn abortion i h:ll is prrformrd in ae-
conlnnrc with good mrdiral JW:l rlic·e and nndrr rirrum~lnnces t hal 
do not Yiolnte thr law,; of thr commnnit:· in \Yhich hr practicrs. 
"In the m:1ttrr of abortim1s, ::1.~ of nn:· other medical procedure, 
the .Juditiiil Council brromrs im·olved. whrnr1·er thrrr is n Urged Yio--
lati on of thr Principle~ of l\'Irdirnl Ethics as ri'tnhli"hrd by the 
ITomr of Drlrgatr~." 
30 
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health departments, medical societies, or other non-
profit organizations. 
"b. An important function of counseling should 
be to simplify and expedite the provision of abor-
tion services; it should not delay the obtaining 
of these services. 
"c. Psychiatric consultation should not be man-
datory. As in the case of other specialized medical 
services, psychiatric consultation should be sought 
for definite indications and not on a routine basis. 
"d. A wide range of individuals from appropri-
ately trained, sympathetic volunteers to highly 
skilled physicians may qualify as abortion counselors. 
"e. Contraception and/or sterilization should be 
discussed with each abortion patient." Recom-
mended Standards for Abortion Services, 61 Am. 
J. Pub. Health 396 ( 1971). 
Among factors pertinent to life and health risks asso-
ciated with abortion were three that "are recognized as 
important": 
"a. the skill of the physician, 
"b. the environment in which the abortion is 
performed, and above all 
"c. the duration of pregnancy, as determined by 
uterine size and confirmed by menstrual history." 
!d., at 397. 
It was said that "a well-equipped hospital" offers 
more protection "to cope with unforeseen difficulties 
than an office or clinic without such resources. . . . The 
factor of gesta.tional age is of overriding importance." 
Thus it was recommended that abortions in the second 
trimester and early abortions in the presence of existing 
medical complications be performed in hospitals as in-
patient procedures. For pregnancies in the first tri-
mester, abortion in the hospital with or without overnight 
"·· 
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stay "is probably the safest practice." An abortion in 
an extramural facility, however, is an acceptable alter-
native "provided arrangements exist in advance to admit 
patients promptly if unforeseen complications develop." 
Standards for an abortion facility were listed. It was 
said that at present abortions should be performed by 
physicians or osteopaths who are licensed to practice 
and who have "adequate training." !d., at 398. 
8. The position of the American Bar Association. At 
its meeting in February 1972 the ABA House of Dele-
gates approved, with 17 opposing votes, the Uniform 
Abortion Act that had been drafted and approved the 
preceding August by the Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws. 58 A. B. A. J. 380 (1972). 
We set forth the Act in full in the margin.40 The 
40 "UNIFORM ABORTION ACT 
"SJ,CTION 1. [Abortion Defined; When Authorized.] 
"(a) 'Abortion' means the trrmination of hum:m pregn::mcy with 
:tn intention other than to produre a live birth or to remove a dead 
fetus. 
"(b) An abortion m~ty be performrd in this state only if it is 
performed: 
" ( 1) by a physirian licensed to practire medicine [or osteopathy] 
in this state or by n physician prartiring medicine [or osteopathy] 
in the employ of the government of the United States or of this 
state, [and the abortion is performrd fin the physician's office or in 
a medical clinic, or] in a hospital approvPd by the [Department of 
Health] or operated by the United States, this state, or any depart-
ment, agency, or politiral subdivision of either;] or by a female 
upon herself upon the advice of the physician; and 
"(2) within [20] weeks after the commencemrnt of the pregnancy 
[or after [20] week~:; only if the physician has rra~onable cause to 
believe (i) there is a substantial risk that continuance of the preg-
nnacy would endanger the life of the mother or would gnwely im-
pair the physical or mental health of the mother, (ii) that the child 
would be born with grave phy~ical or mental defect, or (iii) that 
the pregnancy resulted from rape or incc\-;t, or illicit intercourse with 
a girl under the ;1gc of Hi years of age j. 
"SEC'l'ION 2. r Penalty.] Any pcr~on who performs or procures 
an abortion other than authorized by thi~ Act is guilty of a [felony] 
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Conference has appC'nded an enlightening Prefatory 
Note.41 
VII 
Three reasons have been advanced to explain histor-
ically the enactment of criminal abortion laws in the 
19th century and to justify their continued existence. 
[tnd, upon ronYiction thereof, mA!' be sentenced to pa!' a fine not 
exceeding [$1,000] or to imprisonment [in the state penitenti:uy] 
not exceeding [.5 ymr;;], or hoth. 
"8EC'I'TON 3. r Uniformity of lnterprrtation.l This Art sh:lll be 
ronstrncd to effectunte it8 genernl pmpose to make uniform the law 
with rccipcct to the snhjC'et of this Art among those states which 
en:-~rt it. 
"SEC"I'!ON 4. [Short Title.l This Act m:1~· be cited ilR the Uniform 
Abortion Act. 
"SECTION 5. [Se1•erabilitu.l If an~· proYision of thi~ Act or the 
applicntion thereof to an~· pcrRon or eircumRtanre is hrlcl inYalid. 
the im·alidity doe~ not nffcrt other provi~ion~ or npplieations of 
this Art which rnn br given effcrt. \Yithout the im·alid prol'ision or 
npplirntion. and to thi~ end the prO\·i,ion~ of this Ad nrc ~rwrable. 





"REC1'TON 7. [Timr of Taki11g Effert.l Thi~ Art shall take 
effect------
.n "This Act is bnsrcl large]~· upon the New York nborlion ad fol-
lowing a reYicw of the more rerrnt l:lw" on abortion in seYeral stntes 
:Jncl upon recognition of :1 mon· lihrral trend in laws on this ~uh,iert. 
Recognition was gi1·en nl~o to the Renral cleci~ion~ in slnic :mrl fed-
er:ll courts whirh show :1 fnrt her trrnd toward lihemlization of 
abortion laws, espC'cinll~· clming the firRt trimester of prrgnanr~·. 
"Rccogni;~ing that n number of problems npprnrcd in New York, a 
shorter time prriocl for 'nnlimit eel' nhort ion~ w:Js ach·is:Jb!e. The 
i imc period w:J~ hrnrkrt rei to prnnit t hr ya riou,- stn tes to in~ert a 
figure more in kcrping with the different conditions that might exist 
:11nong the stntcs. Likf'wise. the bnguflge limiting the plnre or 
pl:1cc~ in which abort ion~ ma~· be prrformed was nlso brnrkctrd to 
account for di!Tercnt conditions among the statr~. In nddition, limi-
tations on abortions n fter the inil ial 'unlimited' period \\·ere placed 
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It has been argued occasionally that these laws "·ere 
the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage 
illicit sexual conduct. Texas, however, docs not advance 
this justification in the present case, and it appears that 
no court or commentator has taken the argument seri-
ously.' " The appellants and amici contend, moreover, 
that this is not a proper state purpose at all and suggest 
that, if it were, the Texas statutes are overbroad in 
protecting it since the law fails to distinguish bet"·een 
married and unwed mothers. 
A second reason is concerned with abortion as a med-
ical procedure. ·when most criminal abortion laws were 
first enacted, the procedure was a hazardous one fot· 
the woman.' " This was particularly true prior to the 
development of antisepsis. Antiseptic techniques, of 
course, were based on discoveries by Lister, Pasteur, and 
others first announced in 1867, but were not generally 
accepted and employed until about the turn of the cen-
tury. Abortion mortality was high. Even after 1900, 
and perhaps until as late as the development of antibiotics 
in the 1940's, standard modern techniques such as dila-
in br:-trkC't s ~o tl1at indi,·idunl ~talc•" ma~· ndopt all or :m.1· of thC'i'P 
renRon~ . or phH'C' fnrt hrr rr~d rirtion ~ upon n hort ion~ n ft rr 1 hC' initin I 
pC'riod . 
"Thi~ Art doC'" 110t contain :m~· lli'OI·i.•ion rrl:11in~ to mcclicnl rc-
,·irw commit t rC's or wohibit im1" n~!l in ~ t sanction,; impo~cd upon 
mrdirrrl pC'rc'OllllC'l rdn~in~ to pnrticip:ltC' in n bortions l1C'causo of 
rcli~ious or othrr ~imibr rcn .-on", or thr like. Rurh proYi~ion" , while 
rolatcd, do not directly pcrtnin to whrn . where, orb~· whom abo r-
tions m1~' ])(' J1C'rformrd: hom'1·rr. the Art i ~ not drafted to exclude 
suc·h a pro1·isim1 h~· :1 ~tatC' wi~hin~ to cnnct the 8flmr." 
'1 ~ Sec, for cx:.nnplc, YWCA \'. K11gla , ~42 F. Supp. 1048, 1074 
(N' . .T . 19i2) : Abele " · J!arklc. ~~2 F. Supp. 800. 805-806 (Conn . 
1072) (\"r\\'man .. T. , rorwurrin~). appr:tl pending: TValsingham "· I 
fi'lorida, 2.)0 So. 2d 8:3i. 8fl8 (Ervin , .T.. ('Oncurring) (Fla . Supp _ 
10i2) : State\'. Gedicke, 4~ :\' . .T. L. 86,80 (Rnp. Rt. 1881) ; l\Ir: 1n~ II, 
at. ~81-382. 
''" Sro C. ITaagcnHcn & 'iV. Lloyd, A Hundred Year~ of Medicine· 
19 (1943) . 
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tion and curettage were not nearly so safe as they are 
today. Thus it has been argued that a State's real 
concern in enn.cting a criminal abortion law "·as to 
protect the pregnant woman, that is, to restrain her 
from submitting to a procedure that placed her life 
in serious jeopardy. 
Modern medical techniques have altered this situa-
tion. Appellants and various amici refer to medical 
data indicating that abortion in early pregnancy, that r 
is, prior to the end of first trimeste-r. although not 
without its risk, is now relatively safe. Mortality rates 
for women undergoing early abortions, "·here the 
procedure is legal, appear to be as low as or lower 
than the rates for normal childbirth.44 Consequently, 
any interest of the State in protecting the women from 
an inherently hazardous procedure, except when it would 
be equally dangerous for her to forgo it, has largely 
disappeared. Of course, important state interests in 
the area of health and medical standards do remain. 
The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that 
abortion, like any other medical procedure, is per-
formed under circumstances that insure maximum safety 
for the patient. This interest obviously extends at 
least to the performing physician and his staff, to the 
facilities involved, to the availability of after-care, and 
to adequate provision for any complication or emer-
gency that might arise. The prevalence of high mor-
tality rates at illegal "abortion mills" strengthens, rather 
4 '1 Potts, Postconrcption Control of Fertility, 8 Int'l J. of G. & 0. 
957, 967 (1970) (England and Walrs); Abortion Mortality, 20 Mor-
bidity and Morali1y, 208, 209 (July 12, 1971) (U. S. Dept. of HEW, 
Public Health Scn·icc) (New York City); Tietze, United States: 
Therapeutic Abortions, 1963-1968, 59 Studies in Family Plnnning 5, 
7 (1970); Tietze, Mortality with Contraception and Induced Abor-
tion, 45 Studies in Family Planning 6 (1969) (Japan, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary); Tietze & Lehfcldt, Legal Abortion in Eastern Europe, 
175 J. A. M. A. 1149, 1152 (April 1961). Other sources are dis-
cussed in Lader 17-23. 
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than weakens, the State's interest in regulating the con-
ditions under which abortions are performed. More-
over, the risk to the 'voman increases as her pregnancy 
continues. Thus the State retains a definite interest 
in protecting the woman's own health and safety when 
an abortion is proposed at a late stage of pregnancy. 
The third reason is the State's interest-some phrase 
it in terms of duty-in protecting prenatal life. Some 
of the argument for this justification rests on the theory 
that a new human life is present from the moment of 
conception.'" The State's interest and general obliga-
tion to protect life then extends, it is argued, to pre-
natal life. Only v,·hen the life of the pregnant mother 
herself is at stake, balanced against the life she carries 
within her, should the interest of the embryo or fetus 
not prevail. Logically, of course, a legitimate state in-
terest in this area need not stand or fall on acceptance 
of the belief that life begins at conception or at some 
other point prior to live birth. In assessing the State's 
interest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claim 
that as long as at least potential life is involved, the 
State may assert interests beyond the protection of the 
pregnant woman alone. 
Parties challenging state abortion laws have sharply 
disputed in some courts the contention that a purpose 
of these laws, when enacted, was to protect prenatal 
life.46 Pointing to the absence of legislative history to 
support the contention, they claim that most state laws 
were designed solely to protect the woman. Because 
medical advances have lessened this concern, at least 
45 See Brief of Ami(·us :National Ri!l;ltt to Life Foundation; R. 
Drinan, The InYiolability of thr RighL to Be Born, in Abortion and 
the Law 107 (D. Smith, editor, 1967); Loui~rll , Abortion, The Prac-
tice of Medicine, and the Dur Proces~ of Law, Hi UCLA L. Rev. 
233 (1969); Noonan 1. 
·w Sec, e. g., Abele v. Markle, 3.t2 F. Supp. 800 (Conn. 1972) ~ 
1 appeal pending. 
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with respect to abortion in early pregnancy, they argue 
that "·ith respect to such abortions the laws can no 
longer be justified by any state interest. There is some 
scholarly support for this view of original purpose. 4 ' The 
few state courts called upon to interpret their la\\"S in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries did focus on the 
State's interest in protecting the ,,·oman's health rather 
than in preserving the embryo and fetus.'' 8 Proponents 
of this view point out that in many States, including 
Texas,40 by statute or judicial interpretation, the preg-
nant woman herself could not be prosecuted for self-
abortion or for cooperating in an abortion performed 
upon her by another."0 They claim that adoption of 
the "quickening" distinction through received common 
law and state statutes tacitly recognizes the greater 
health hazards inherent in late abortion and impliedly 
repudiates the theory that life begins at conception. 
It is with these interests, and the \\·eight to be at-
tached to them. that this case is concerned. 
VIII 
The Constitution docs not explicitly mention any right 
of privacy. In a line of decisiOilS, hO\\"C\W, going back 
"17 Sec disrus~ions in 1\Teans I :mel Means TI. 
48 Ree, e. g .. State v. lthtr]Jh?f. 27 1'\. .T. L. 112 , 114 (1R51'). 
40 Watson v. State, 9 Tex. App. 237, 244-245 (1RRO): Moore v. 
State. 37 Trx. Crim. R. .5.52. 5ill. 40 S. IV. 2.'17. 290 (1S97); Shaw 
v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. R. 337, 339. Hl5 S. W. 930. 931 (1914); 
Fondren v. State, 74 Tex. Crim. n. 552, 557, 169 S. IV. 411. 414 
(1914); Gray v. StaLl', 77 TPx. C'rim. R. 221, 229, 178 S. W. 337. 341 
(1915). ThNP is no immnnit~· in TPx:1s for the father who is not 
mnrriccl to the mother. Jlmmnctt v. State, R+ Tex. Crim. R. 6::l5, 
209 R. W. u(il (1919); Thrmi]J801l \'. State, -- TPX. Crim. n.-
( 1971), appea.l pending. 
" 0 See Smith v. State. 3::l :'If e. ~8. 5.5 (lf\.51): In re Vince, 2 N. J. 
443, 450, 67 A. 2d 1~1, 144 (1949). A ~hort di~eu~~ion of the modern 
b"· on this i~~uc i~ contninecl in the Comment to the ALI'~ Model 
Pcnnl Code§ 207.11, ut 15S and nn. 35-87 (Tent. Drnft No.9, 1959). 
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perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. Y. Botsford, 141 
U. S. 250, 251 (18~H), the Court has recognized that a 
right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas 
or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. 
In varying contexts the Court or individual Justices 
have indeed found at least the roots of that right in 
the First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 304 U. S. 
557, 564 (1969); in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 
Terry Y. Ohio, 302 U. S. 1, 8-9 (1968), Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967), Boyd\'. United States, 
116 U. S. 616 ( 1886), sec Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting); in 
the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 F. S. 470, 484-485 (1965); in the Ninth 
Amendment, id., at 486 (Goldberg. J., concurring); or 
in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U. S. 300, 309 (1923). These decisions make it 
clear that only personal rights that can be deemed "fml-
damental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," 
Palko , .. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 32i5 (1937). arc 
included in this guarantee of personal privac:v. They 
also make it clear that the right has some extension to 
activities relating to marriagP, Lov'ing Y. Virginia, 388 
U. S. 1, 12 (1967), procreation, Skinner Y. Oklahoma, 
316 U. S. 535, 541-542 (1942). contraception. Eisen-
stadt Y. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453-454 (1972); 1'd., at 
460, 463-465 (WHITE, J., concurring). family relation-
ships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 ( 1944), 
and child rearing and education, Pierce Y. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925), Meyer Y. JYebraska, 
supra. 
This right of privacy, whether it be founded i11 the 
Fourteenth Amondme11t's concept of personal liberty 
and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as 
the District Court determined, in the Ninth Ameud-
.• 
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ment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad 
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not 
to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the 
State would impose upon the pregnant woman by deny-
ing this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and 
direct harm medically diagnosable even in early preg-
nancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional off-
spring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and 
future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental 
and physical health may be taxed by child care. There 
is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with 
the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bring-
ing a child into a family already unablr, psychologically 
and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this 
one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma 
of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are 
factors the woman and her responsible physician neces-
sarily will consider in consultation. 
On the basis of elements such as these, appellants and 
some amici argue that the woman's right is absolute 
i and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at 
I '"hatever time, in whatever way, and for vvhatever reason 
she alone chooses. With this we do not agree. Appel-
lants' arguments that Texas either has no valid interest 
at all in regulating the abortion decision, or no inter-
est strong enough to support any limitation upon 
the woman's sole determination, is unpersuasive. The 
Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy also 
acknowledge that some state regulation in areas pro-
tected by that right is appropriate. As noted above, a 
state may properly assert important interests in safe-
guarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and 
in protecting potential life. At some point in pregnancy, 
r these respective interests become sufficiently compelling 
to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abor-
tion decision. The privacy right involved, therefore, 
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cannot be said to be absolute. In fact, it is not clear 
to us that the claim asserted by son1.e amici that one has 
an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases 
bears a close relationship to the right of privacy pre-
viously articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court 
has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind 
in the past. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 
(1905) (vaccination); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) 
(sterilization). 
We therefore conclude that the right of personal pri-
vacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right 
is not unqualified and must be considered against impor-
tant state interests in regulation. 
We note that those federal and state courts that have 
recently considered abortion law challenges have reached 
the same conclusion. A majority, in addition to the· 
District Court in the present case, have held state laws 
unconstitutional, at least in part, because of vague-
r ness or because of overbreadth and abridgement of rights. 
Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (Conn. 1972), ap-
peal pending; Abele v. Markle,- F. Supp.- (Conn. 
f Sept. 20, 1972) , appeal pending; Doe v. Bolton, 319 
F. Supp. 1048 (ND Ga. 1970) , appeal decided today, 
post-; Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (ND Ill. 1971), 
appeal pending; Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986 
(Kan. 1972); YvVCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (NJ 
1972); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (ED Wis. 
1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U. S. 1 (1970); People v. 
Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954,458 P. 2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 
397 U. S. 915 ( 1970); State v. Barquet, 262 S. 2d 431 
(Fla. 1972). 
Others have sustained state statutes. Crossen v. 
Attorney General, 344 F. Supp. 587 (ED Ky. 1972) , 
appeal pending; Rosen v. Louisiana Slate Board of 
Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (ED La. 1970) , 
appeal pending; Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248. 
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(WDNC 1971), appeal pending; Steinberg Y. Brown, 
321 F. Supp. 741 (KD Ohio 1070); Doe v. Ra.mplon, 
-F. Supp.- (Utah 1971), appeal pending; Cheaney 
Y. Indiana, - Ind. -. 285 N. E. 2d 265 ( 1972); 
Spears v. Slate, 257 So. 2d 876 (Miss. 1972); State v. 
J.lfunson, - S.D.-, 201 N. W. 2d 123 (1972), appeal 
pending. 
Although the results are divided, most of these courts 
have agreed that the right of privacy, hmYever based, 
is broad enough to cover the abortion decision; that the 
right, nonetheless, is not absolute and is subject to some 
limitations; and that at some point the state interests 
as to protection of health, medical standards, and pre-
natal life, become dominant. We agree "·ith this 
approach. 
'\Vherc certain "fundamental rights" are involved, the 
Court has held that regulation limiting thef'e rights may 
be justified only by a "compelling state interest." Kramer 
v. Union Free School D?'strict, 395 P. S. 621, 627 (1960); 
Shapiro Y. Thompson, 394 P. S. 618, 634 (1969), She?·-
bert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 40G (1963), and that 
legislative enactments must be narrmYly clra wn to ex-
press only the legitimate state interests at stake. Gris-
wold Y. Connect·icut, 381 U.S. 479. 485 (1965); Aplhcker 
v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 508 (1964); Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 206, 307- 308 (1940); see 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 460, 463- 464 ( 1072) 
(WHITE, J. , concurring). 
In the recent abortion cases. cited above, courts have 
recognized these principles. Those striking clown state 
la\\·s have generally scrutinizcrl the State's interest in 
protecting health and potential life and have concluded 
that neither interest justified broad limitations on the \ 
reasons for which a physician a.ncl his pregnant pati<'nt 
might decide that she should have au abortion in the 
early stages of pregnancy. Courts sustaining state laws 
the State's determinations to protect health or prenatal 
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have hC'ld that the State's determinations to protect I 
health or prenatal life arc dominant and constitutionally 
.i ustifiablc. 
IX 
The District Court held that the appellee failed to 
meet his burden of demonstrating that the Texas stat-
ute's infringement upon Roc's rights \\·as necessary to 
support a compelling state interest. and that, although 
the defendant presented "several compelling justifi-
cations for state presence .in the area of abortions," 
the statutes outstripped these .i ustifications and swept 
"far beyond auy areas of compelling state interest." 
314 F. Supp .. at 1222- 1223. Appellant and appellee 
both contest that holding. Appellant. as has been in-
dicated , claims an absolute right that bars any state 
imposition of criminal penalties in the area. Appel-
lee argues that the State's determination to recognize 
and protect prenatal life from and after conception con-
stitutes a compelling state interest. As noted above, 
we do not agree fully with either formulation. 
A. The appellee and certain amici argue that the 
fetus is a "person" within the language and nlC'aning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this they 
outline at l<'ngth and iu detail th<' "·ell-kno"·n facts 
of fetal development. If this suggestion of personhood 
is established. the appellant's case. of course, collapses, 
for the fetus' right to life is then guaranteed specifically 
by the Amendment. The appellant conceded as much 
on reargument."' On the other hand , the a11pellee con-
ceded on reargument ·'" that no case could be cited that 
holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Constitution does not define "person" in so many 
words. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment con-
"' Tr. of Rrarg . 20-21. 
"" Tr. of Rca.rg. 24. 
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tains three references to "person." The first, in defining 
"citizens," speaks of "persons born or naturalized in 
the United States." The word also appears both in 
the Due Process Clause and in the Equal Protection 
Clause. "Person" is used in other places in the Con-
stitution: in the listing of qualifications for representa-
tives and senators, Art. J, ~ 2. cl. 2, and ~ 3, cl. 3; in 
the Apportionment Clause, Art. I, ~ 2, cl. 3; 5 'l in the 
Migration and Importation provision, Art. J, ~ 9, cl. 1; 
in the Emolument Clause, Art. I, ~ 9, cl. 8; in the Elec-
tors provisions, Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, and the superseded 
cl. 3; in the provision outlining qualifications for the 
office of Presirlent, Art. II, ~ I, cl. 5; in the Extradition 
provisions, Art. IV, ~ 2, cl. 2, and the superseded Fugi-
tive Slave cl. 3; and in the Fifth, Twelfth, and Twenty-
second Amendments as well as in ~§ 2 and 3 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. But in nearly all these in-
stances, the use of the word is such that it has applica-
tion only postnatally. None indicates, with any 
assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal application. 54 
53 'Vr arr not aw:ue tint in thr taking of any census under this 
clausr. 11 fptm has ever been count rd. 
54 When 'Tr'"as urgrs that a fetus is entitled to Fomternth Amend-
ment protr""ion ns a ]Wr~on, it facrs a dilrmma. Nrilher in Texas 
nor in any nthPr Stnte nre all abortions prohibitrd. Despite broad 
proscript ion an exception always exiRts. The excPption contained 
in Art. 110fl for an abortion procured or attrmpted by medical ad-
vice for thr 1'11rpose of saving the life of the mother, is typical. But 
if the fetus i' a prrson who is not to be deprived of life without due 
process of l·• w, and if the mothN's condition is the sole determinant, 
does not the Texas except ion apprar 1 o be out of line with the 
Amendment's command? 
There are other inconsi~tcncies bet ween Fourteenth Amendment 
status and the typical abortion statute. It has :1lready been pointed 
out, n. 49, supra, that in Texas the woman is nol a principal or an 
accomplice with respect to an abortion upon her. If lhe fetus is 
a person, why is the woman not a princip:1l or an accomplice? 
Further, the penalty for criminal abortion specified by Art. 1195 
is significantly less than the maximum penalty for murder prescribed 
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All this, together with our observation, supra, that 
throughout the major portion of the 19th century pre-
vailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they 
are today, persuades us that the word "person," as used 
in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the 
unborn."5 This is in accord with the results reached 
in those few cases "·hero the issue has been squarely 
presented. McGarvey Y. Magec-Womens Hospital, 340 
F. Supp. 751 (WD Pa. 1972); Bym v. New York City 
Health & Hospitals Corp., 31 N. Y. 2cl 194, 286 N. E. 
2d 887 (1972), appeal pending; Abele v. Markle, -
F. Supp. - (Conn. Sept. 20, 1972), appeal pending. / 
Compare Cheaney v. Indiana, - Ind. -, 285 N. E. 
265. 270 ( 1972); M on tan a v. Rogers, 278 F. 2cl 68, 72 
(CA7 1960), aff'd sub nom. Montana. v. Kennedy, 
366 U. S. 308 (1961); Keeler v. Superior Co'urt, -
Cal. -, 470 P. 2d 617 (1970); State v. Dickinson, 23 
Ohio App. 2d 259, 275 N. E. 2d 599 (1970). Indeed, our 
decision in United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), 
inferentially is to the same effect, for we there would 
not have indulged in statutory interpretation favorable 
to abortion in specified circumstances if the necessary 
consequence was the termination of life entitled to Four-
teenth Amendment protection. 
This conclusion, however, docs not of itself fully 
answer the contentions raised by Texas, and we pass 
on to other considerations. 
B. The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her 
pnvacy. She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if 
by Art. 1257 of the Texas Penal Code. If the fetus i~ a 11erson, may 
the penalties be diiierent? 
55 Cf. the Wiscon~in abort ion statui.r, defining "unborn child" 
to mean "a human bring from the time of conception until it is born 
alive," Wis. Stnt. § 9-W.O-l (fi) (19G9), and the new Connecticut stat-
ute, Public Act No. 1, May 1972 Special Ses.,ion, deehring it to be 
the public policy of the StLtte and the lrgi~lative intent "to protect 
and prescn·e human life from the moment of conception." 
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one accepts the medical definitions of the developing 
young in the human uterus. See Dorland's Illustrated 
Medical Dictionary, 478-479, 547 (24th eel. 1965). The 
situation therefore is inherently different from marital 
intimacy, or bedroom possession of obscene material, or 
marriage, or procreation, or education, IYith which Eisen-
stadt, Giswold, Stanley, Loving, Skinner, Pierce, and 
Meyer were respectively concerned. As >Ye have inti-
mated above, it is reasonable and appropriate for a 
State to decide that at some point in time another 
interei"t. that of health of the mother or that of potC'n- j 
tial human life. becomes significantly involved. The 
woman's privacy is no longer sole and any right of 
privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly. 
Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, life begins at conception and is present through-
out pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a 
compelling interest in protecting that life froJn and 
after conception. \Ve need not resolve the difficult ques-
tion of when life begins. When those trained in the 
respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theol-
ogy are unable to arrive at any collSensus, the judiciary, 
at this point in the development of man's knovdedge, 
is not in a position to speculate as to the answer. 
It should be sufficient to note briefly the wide diver-
gence of thinking on this most sensitive and difficult 
question. There has ah,·ays been strong s11pport for the 
view that life docs not begin until live birth. This was 
the belief of the Stoics."" It appears to be the pre-
dominant, though not the unanimous, attitude of the 
Jc"·ish faith."' It may be taken to represent also the 
position of a large segment of the Protestant community, 
r.n Edelstein lf\. 
"
7 Lader 97-99; D. Feldmrm, Birth Control in JewiRh Law 251-
294 (1968). For <l st rirter Yiew, sec I. Jakobovits. Jewish Virws on 
Abortion , in Abortion :md the Law 124 (D. Smith ect. 1967). 
. .. 
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insofar a that can be af'certainecl; organized groups that 
have taken a formal position on the abortion issue have 
generally regarded abortion as a matter for the conscie11ce 
of the individual and her family."' As \\·e have noted, 
the common law found greater significance in quickening. 
Physicians and their scientific colleagues have regarded 
that e\·cnt '"ith kss interest and have tended to focus 
either upon conception or upon live birth or upon the 
interim point at ,,·hich the fetus becomes "viable," that 
is. potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, 
albeit with artificial aid."" Viability is usually placed 
at about seven months (28 ,,·eeks) but may occur earlier, 
even at 24 weeks."" The Aristotelian theory of "mediate 
animation," that held sway throughout the Middle Ages 
and the Renaissance in Europe, continued to be official 
Roman Catholic dogma until the 19th century, despite 
opposition to this "ensoulment'' theory from those in the 
Church \\·ho \\'Ould recognize the existence of life from 
thr moment of conception."' The latter is now, of course, 
the official belief of the Catholic Church. As one of the 
briefs am-icus cliseloscs, this is a view strongly held by 
m.any non-Catholics as \\'Cll. and by many physicians. 
Rubstantial problems for precise definition of this view 
arc posed. ho\\·ever. by new embryological data that pur-
port to indicate that conception is a "process" over time, 
rather than an event, allCl by nm\' medical techniques 
such as menstrual extraction, the "morning-after'' pill, 
r.R Amicu~ Brief for the .\mrrir:1n Ethical Union rt al. For the 
po8ition of the N:t t.ion:t l Counril of Clmrchr~ :1 nd of o1 hrr drnomina-
1ionR, sre LndPr 90-101. 
r.n L. Hellman &: J. Prit('hard. WillimM Obstetric~ 498 (1~th ed. 
1971); Dorland'~ Illu~tratccl ;.rrdirnl Dirtionarr 1689 (24th ed. 
19G5). 
co Hellm:m & l'ril<'hnrd, ~upra, n. 5R. at ~98. 
(n For di~enssion~ of tlw dc\Tiopmcnt of the Roman Catholic po-
::;ition, sec D. Callahan, Abortion: Law, Choire and Morality 409-
447 (1970); 'Noon:m 1. 
70--1R-OPINION 
4(} ROE v. WADE 
implantation of embryos, artificial insemination, and even 
artificial wombs.0~ 
In areas other than criminal abortion the law has 
been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we 
recognize it. begins before live birth or to accord legal 
rights to the unborn except in narrowly defined situations 
and except when the rights are contingent upon live 
birth. For example, the traditional rule of tort law had 
denied recovery for prenatal injuries even though the 
child was born alive.u~ That rule has been changed in 
almost every jurisdiction. In most States recovery is said 
to be permitted only if the fetus was viable, or at least 
quick, when the injuries were sustained, though few 
courts have squarely so held.(;" In a recent development, 
generally opposed by the commentators, some States per-
mit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an action 
for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries.r." Such 
an action, however, would appear to be one to vindicate 
the parents' interest and is thus consistent 'vith the 
view that the fetus, at most, represents only the potential-
" 2 Sec D. Brodie, Tho New Biology and the Prenatal Child, 9 J. 
Fam. L. 391, 397 (1970); R. Gorney, The New Biology and the 
Future of Man, 15 UCLA L. Re1·. 273 (1968); Note, Criminal Law-
Abortion-The "Morning-After" Pill and Other Pre-Implantation 
Birth-Control Method· and the Law, 46 Ore. L. Rev. 211 (1967); 
G. Taylor, The Biological Time Bomb 32 (1968); A. Rosenfeld, The 
Second Genesis 138-139 (1969); G. Smith, Through a Test Tube 
Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 127 
(1968); Note, Artificial Insemination and the Law, U. Ill. L. F. 203 
(1968) 0 
03 Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 335-3:38 (1971); 2 
Harper & James, The Law of Torts 1028-1031 (1956); Note, 63 
Ilarv. L. Rev. 17:3 (1949). 
04 See cases riled in Prosser. supra, n. 62, at 336-338; Annotation, 
Action for Death of Unborn Child, 15 A. L. R. 3d 992 (1967). 
65 Prosser, supra, n. 62, at 338; Note, The Law and the Unborn 
Child, 46 Notre Dame Law. 349, 354-360 (1971). 
' ' 
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ity of life. Similarly, unborn children have been recog-
nized as acquiring rights or interests by \vay of inheri-
tance or other devolution of property, and have been 
represented by guardians ad litem. 66 Perfection of the 
interests involved, agaiu, has generally been contingent 
upon live birth. In short, the unborn have never been 
recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense. 
X 
In view of all this, '""e do not agree that, by adopting 
one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the 
pregnant \voman that arc at stake. We repeat, however, 
that the State docs have an important and legitimate 
interest in preserving and protecting the health of the 
pregnant woman, whether she be a resident of the State 
or a nonresident who seeks medical consultation and 
treatment there, and that it has still another important 
and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of 
human life. These interests are separate and distinct. 
Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches 
term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes 
"compelling." 
With respect to the State's important and legitimate 
interest in the health of the mother, the "compelling" 
point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at 
approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so 
because of the now established medical fact, referred to 
above at p. 34, that until the end of the first trimester 
mortality in abortion is less than mortality in normal 
childbirth. It follo\\·s that, from and after this point, 
a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent 
66 D. Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of Medicine, and the Due 
Process of Law, 16 UCLA L. Rev. 233, 2:35-238 (1969); Note, 56 
Iowa L. Rev. 994, 999-1000 (1971); Note, The L::nv and the Unborn 
Child, 46 Notre Dame Law. 349, 351-354 (1971) . 
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that the regulation reasonably relates to the preserva-
tion and protection of maternal health. Examples of 
permissible state regulation in this area are requirements 
as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform 
the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to 
the farility in which the procedure is to be performed, 
that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic 
or some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to 
the licensing of the facility; and the like. 
This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of 
pregnancy prior to this "compelling" point, the attending 
physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to 
determine, without regulation by the State, that in his 
medical judgment the patient's pregnancy should be 
terminated. If that decision is reached. the judgment 
may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by 
the State. 
With respect to the State's important and legitimate 
i11terest in potential life, the "compelling'' point is at 
viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably 
has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's 
womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after 
viability thus has both logical and biological justifica-
tions. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life 
after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion 
during that period except when it is necessary to preserve 
the life or health of the mother. 
Measured against these standards, Art. 1 Hl6 of the 
Texas Penal Code. in restricting legal abortions to those 
"procured or attempted by medical advice for the pur-
pose of saving the life of the mother," s"·eeps too broadly. 
The statute makes no distinction between abortions per-
formed early in pregnancy and those performed later, 
and it limits to a single reason, "saving" the mother's 
life, the legal justification for the procedure. The 
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statute, therefore, cannot survive the constitutional 
attack made upon it here. 
This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to consider 
the additional challenge to the Texas statute asserted on 
grounds of vagueness. Ree United Stales v. Yuilch, 402 
U. S. 62. 67-72 (1971). 
XI 
To summarize and to repeat: 
1. A state criminal abortion statute of the current 
Texas type, that excepts from criminality only a life 
saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard 
to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other 
interests involved , is violative of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
2. For the stage prior to approxin1atoly the end of the 
first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation 
must be left to tho medical judgment of the pregnant 
"·oman's attending physician. 
3. For the stage subsequent to approximately the end 
of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest 
in the health of the mother. may. if it chooses, regulate 
the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related 
to maternal health. 
4. For the stage subsequent to viability the State, in 
promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, 
may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe. abortion 
except wher0 it is necessary, in appropriate medical judg-
ment, for the preservation of the life or health of the 
mother. 
5. The State may define the term "physician ," as it 
has been employed in the preceding numbered paragraphs 
of this Part XT of this opinion , to mean only a physician 
currently licensed by the State, and ucn e any 
abortion by a person "·ho is not a physician as so defined. 
In Doe v. Bolton, post, procedural requirements con-
tained in one of the modern abortion statutes arc con-
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sidered. That opinion and this one, of course, are to be 
read together.67 
This holding, we feel, is consistent with the relative 
m~ights of the respective interests involved. with the 
lessons and example of medical and legal history, with 
the lenity of the common law, and with the demands of 
the profound problems of the present clay. The decision 
leaves the State free to place increasing restrictions on 
abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens, so long 
as those restrictions are tailored to the recognized state 
interests. The decision vindicates the right of the phy-
sician to administer medical treatment according to his 
professional judgment up to the points where important 
state interests provide compelling justifications for inter-
vention. Up to those points the abortion decision in all 
its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, 
and basic responsibility for it must rest with the phy-
SICian. If an individual practitioner abuses the privilege 
of exercising proper medicn,l judgment, the usual reme-
dies, judicial and intra-professional, are available. 
XII 
Our conclusion that Art. 1196 is unconstitutional 
means, of course that the Texas abortion statutes, as a 
unit, must fall. The exception of Art. 1196 cannot be 
n7 Nrithrr in this opinion nor in Doe v. Bolton, ]Jost, do we dis-
cuHs thr fnther's rights, if an~· rxist in the constitutional context, in 
the abortion deci~ion . l'\o patrrnal right has been assertrd in either 
of the ca~es, and the Texas and the Georgia statut es on their face 
take no rognizanrr of the father. We are aware that some sta tutes 
recognize the father under certain circumstances. North Carolina, 
for rxample, 1B N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1971) , requires 
writ ten permission for the abortion from the husband when the 
woman is a married minor, thnt is, when she is less than 18 years 
of age, 41 N. C. A. G. 489 (1971); if the woman is an unmnrricd 
minor, written permis~ion from the p:urnts is required. We need 
not now decide whether 11rovisions of this kind nrc constitutional. 
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stricken separately, for then the State is left with a stat-
ute proscribing all abortion procedures no matter how 
medically urgent the case. 
Although the District Court granted plaintiff Roe 
declaratory relief, it stopped short of issuing an injunc-
tion against enforcement of the Texas statutes. The 
Court has recognized that different considerations enter 
into a federal comt's decision as to declaratory relief, on 
the one hand, and injunctive relief, on the other. Zwick-
ler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 252- 255 (1967); Dombrow-
ski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). We are not dealing 
"·ith a statute that, on its face, appears to abridge free 
expression, an area of particular concern under Dom-
browski and refined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S., at 
50. 
We find it unnecessary to decide whether the District 
Court erred in withholding injunctive relief, for we as-
sume the Texas prosecutorial authorities will give full 
credence to this decision that the present criminal abor-
tion statutes of that State are unconstitutional. 
The judgment of the District Court as to intervenor 
Hallford is reversed, and Dr. Hallford's complaint in 
intervention is dismissed. In all other respects the judg-
ment of the District Court is affirmed. Costs arc allowed 
to the appellee. 
It is so ordered .. 
To Chief Justice 
Justice Douglas 
Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
v1tr . Justice Powell 
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MR. JusTICE REHNQUIS'l', dissenting. 
The Court's opinion brings to the decision of this trou-
bling question both extensive historical fact and a wealth 
of legal scholarship. While its opinion thus commands 
my respect, I find myself nonetheless in fundamental dis-
agreement with those parts of it which invalidate the 
Texas statute in question, and therefore dissent. 
I 
The Court's opinion decides that a State may impose 
virtually no restriction on the performance of aborti011s 
during the first trimester of pregnancy. Our previous 
decisions indicate that a necessary predicate for such an 
opinion is a plaintiff who was in her first trimester of 
pregnancy at some time during the pendency of her law-
suit. While a party may vindicate his own constitu-
tional rights, he may not seek vindication for the rights 
of others. Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163 (1972); 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 (1972). The 
Court's statement of facts in this case makes clear, how-
ever, that the record in no way indicates the presence of 
such a plaintiff. We know only that plaintiff Roe at 
the time of filing her complaint " ·as a pregnant \voman; 
for aught that appears in this record, she may have been 
in her last trimester of pregnancy as of the date the com-
plaint was filed. 
Nothing in the Court's opinion indicates that Texas 
might not constitutionally apply its proscription of abor-
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tion as written to a vvoman in that stage of pregnancy. 
Nonetheless, the Court uses her complaint against the 
Texas statute as a fulcrum for deciding that States may 
impose virtually no restrictions on medical abortions 
performed duri11g the first trimester of pregnancy. In 
deciding such a hypothetical lawsuit the Comt departs 
from the longstanding admonition that it should never 
"formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is 
required by the precise facts to ·which it is to be ap-
plied." Liverpool, New York and Phila.delphia Steam-
ship Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33. 
39 (1885). See also Ashwander v. TVA, 29;(U. S. 288./-j.l 
345 (1~) (Brandeis concurring). L---'l/ 
II 
Even if there were a plaintiff in this case capable of 
litigating the issue which the Comt decides, I ,,·ou1cl reach 
a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Court. I 
have difficulty in concluding. as the Court does. that the 
right of "privacy" is involved in this case. Texas by 
the statute here challenged bars the performance of a 
medical abortion by a licensed physician on a plaintiff 
such as Roe. A transaction resulting in an operation 
such as this is not "private" in the ordinary usage of that 
word. Nor is the "privacy" which the Court finds here 
even a distant relative of the freedom from searches and 
sei:mres protected by the Fourth Amendment to the Con-
stitution which the Court has referred to as embodying 
a right to privacy. Katz v. United Slates, 389 U. S. 347 
(1967). 
If the Court means by the term "privacy" no more 
than that the claim of a person to be free from unwanted 
state regulatioll of consensual transactions may be a form 
of "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
there is no doubt that similar claims have been upheld 
in our earlier decisions on the basis of that liberty. I 
ugree with the statement of MR. JusTICE STKWART in 
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his concurring opinion that the "liberty," against de-
privation of which \Yithout due process the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects, embraces more than the rights 
found in the Bill of Rights. But tha.t liberty is not 
guaranteed absolutely against deprivation, but only 
against deprivation '"ithout due process of law. The 
test traditionally applied in the area of social and eco-
nomic legislation is '"hethcr or not a law such as that 
challenged has a rational relation to a valid state objec-
tive. ·williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 491 
( 1955). The Due Process Cla usc of the Fourteenth 
Amendment undoubtedly does place a. limit on legislative 
pO\Ycr to enact laws such as this. albeit a broad one. If 
the Texas statute were to prohibit an abortion even where 
the mother's life is in jeopardy, I have little doubt that 
such a statute would lack a rational relation to a valid 
state objective under the test stated in Williamson, supm. 
But the Court's s\veeping invalidation of any restrictions 
on abortion during the first trimester is impossible to 
justify under that standard, and the conscious \Ycigbing 
of competing factors which the Court's opinion ap-
parently substitutes for the established test is far more 
appropriate to a legislative judgmcn t than to a judicial 
one. 
The Court eschews the history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in its reliance on the "compelling state in-
terest" test. See JVeber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 179 (1972) (dissenting opinion). But 
the Court adds a new \\Tinkle to this test by transposing 
it from the legal considerations associated with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to this 
case arising under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Unless I misapprehend the con-
sequences of this transplanting of the "compelling state 
interest test," the Court's opinion will accomplish the 
seemingly impossible feat of leaving this area of the 
law more confused than it found it. 
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While the Court's opinion quotes from the dissent of 
Mr. Justice Hohncs in Lochner -r. l\"ew York, 198 U. S. 
45 (1905), the result it reaches is more closely attuned 
to the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Peckham in tha.t 
case. As in Lochner and similar cases applyi11g sub-
stantive due process standards to economic and social 
welfare legislation, the adoption of the compelling state 
interest standard will inevitably require this Court to 
examine the legislative policies and pass on the wisdom 
of these policies in the very process of deciding \Yhether 
a particular state interest put forward may or may not 
be "compelling." The decision here to break the term 
of pregnancy into three distinct terms and to outline the 
permissible retrictions the State may impose in each one, 
for example, partakes more of judicial legislation than 
it docs of a determination of the intent of the drafters 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The fact that a majority of the States, reflecting after 
all the majority sentiment in those States, have had re-
strictions on abortions for at least a. century seems to me 
as strong an indication there is that the asserted right 
to an abortion is not "so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," 
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). Even 
today, when society's views on abortion are changing, the 
very existence of the debate is evidence that the "right" 
to an abortion is not so universally accepted as the 
appellants would ha\'e us believe. 
To reach its result the Court necessarily has had to 
find within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment a 
right that was apparently completely unknown to the 
drafters of the Amendment. As early as 1821, the first 
state law dealing directly with abortion was enacted by 
the Connecticut legislature. Conn. Stat. Tit. 22, ~§ 14, 
16 ( 1821). By the time of the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment in 1868 there were at least 36 laws 
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enacted by state or territorial legislatures limiting abor-
tion.1 While many States have amended or updated 
their laws, 21 of the laws on the books in 1868 remain 
1 State~ having enacted abortion laws prior to the adoption of 
tho Fourternth Amendment in 18fi8: 
1. Alabamn-Ain. Act~ , c. 6, § 2 (1840-1841). 
2. Arizona.-Howell Code, c. 10, § 45 (18fl5). 
3. Arkan~as-Ark. Ro\·. Stat., c. 44, div . III , Art. II, § 6 (1838). 
4. California-Cal. SC'ss. Stats., c. 99, § 45, at 23:3 (1849-1850). 
5. Colorado (Trrr.)-Colo. Grn. Laws of Terr. of Colo., 1st Soss.,. 
§42, at 296-297 (1861). 
G. Connecticut-Conn. Stat. Tit. 22 , §§ 14, 16, at 152 , 153 (1821). 
By 1868 this stntute had bPen replaced by another abortion law. 
Conn. Pub. Acts, c. LXXI ,§§ 1, 2, nt 65 (1860). 
7. Florida-Fla. Acts 1st Srss., c. 1637, III, § 10, § 11, VIII, § 9, 
§ 10. § ll, as amended now in Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 782.09 , 782.10, 
797.01, 797.02, 782.16 (1944). 
8. Georgia-Ca. Pen. Code §§56, 57, 58, 67, 68, 69 (1833). 
9. Kingdom of Hawnii-Hawnii Pen. Code §§I, 2, 3 (1850). 
10. Iclnho (Terr.)-Iclaho (Terr.) Laws §§ 33, 34, 42, at 435 
(1863) . 
11. Illinois-Ill. Rev. Code §§ 40, 41, 46, at 130, 131 (1827). By 
1868 thi~ stntute had been replaced by a subsequent enactment. 
Ill. Pub. Laws §§ 1, 2, 3, at 89 (1867) . 
12. Inclinna-lnd. Rev. Stnt. §§ 1, 3, nt 224 (1838). By 1868 
this stnt uto hnd been superseded by a subsequent enactment. Ind. 
LawK c. LXXXI, § 2 (1859). 
13 . Iown (Terr.)-Iowa (Terr.) Stat. l~t Legis., 1st Sess., § 18, at 
145 (1838). By 1868 this statute had been superseded by a sub-
sequent enactment. Iowa (Terr.) Rev. Stat. §§ 10, 13 (1843). 
14. Kansns (Terr.)-Kan. (Torr.) Stnt. c. 48, §§ 9, 10, 39 (1855). 
By 1861\ this statute hnd been super;;cdod by a subsequent enactment. 
Knn. Gen. Laws c. 28, §§ 9, 10 (1859). 
15. Louisiann-Lu. Rev. Stat. § 24, at 131\ (1856). 
16. I\laine-l\lc. Rrv. Stat. c. 160, §§ 11, 12, 13 , 14 (1840). 
17. IVIaryland-:-Id. Laws c. 179, § 2, at :118 (lSGS). 
18. Mns~nehusett:s-l\T:18s. Aet;; & Heo:olYos c. 27 (1845). 
19. Michip;:m-l\Iich. Re\·. Stat. c. 15:3, §§ 32, 33, 34, at o62 
(184f5). 
:20. Minn. (Torr.)-Minn. (Torr.) He\". Stat. c. 100, §§ 10, 11, at 
493 (1851) . 
[Footnote 1 continued on p. O] 
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in effect today." Indeed, the Texas statute struck do\\'n 
today was, as the majority notes, first enacted in 1857 
and "has remained substantially unchanged to the pres-
ent time." Ante, at -. 
21. :\fissi~~ippi-:\Iis~. Coclr §§ R. 9. n.t 95R (1R48). 
22. Mis~ouri-l\To. Rev. Rtat. Art. II.§§ 9, 10, 36 , at lfi8 (1835) . 
2:3. l\1ontnn:\. (Terr.)-:\font. (Trrr.) LnwR § 41. at 184 (1864). 
2·L ~r1·adn (Trrr.)-NeY. (Trrr.) Lmr~ c. 28, § 42, at ()3 (1861). 
2.5. Nrw Ibmp~hire---N. H. Law~ c. 743, § 1, at 708 (1848). 
2(i. Nr11· .Trr~r.1 ·-'\ . .T. Law~. :1t 266 (1849) . 
27. New York-N. Y. Rr1·. Rtat. pt. IV, r. I, Tit. II. §§ 8, 9, at 
5.'i0 (lc28). B~· 18(), thi~ ~tatute hnd brrn ~nper~rdrd by snb-
i:iequrnt c•mctmrnt~. N. Y. L:t\\'~ r. 260, §§ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, G. at 285 
(184!i); N.Y. Lttl''" c. 22. § 1, at 19 (1846). 
28. Ohi(}---Ohio Gen. Rtnt. §§ 111 (1), 112 (2), :1t 252 (1R41). 
29. Orr!!on-Ore. Gen. Law;; , Crim. Codr, r. 4:3, § 509, at 528 
( 184.1-1Rfl4) . 
30. Pcnnsyh:1nia-Pa. L:tws No. 374, §§ 87, RR , 89 (18f)Q). 
31. Tcxa~-Tr--:. Gen. Stat. Di~. c. VTI, Arti". 531-53(), nt 524 
(Oidh:tm & \Yhite 1859). 
:32. Ycrmont-Yt. .\rts l\"o . 33, § l (184fi). H~· 18()8 thi~ r;tntutc 
h:td been nmended b.1· :1 ~ubc<equrnt rnactnwnl. Yt. Arts No. 57 , 
§§ 1, 3 (1867). 
:33. Vir~inin-\':t. Ad~ Tit. II, c. 3, § 9, :1t !J6 (1848). 
:34. l·rn:;hin~ton (Trrr.)-Wn~h. (Terr.) Stats. c. II , §§ 37, 38, nl 
81 (1854). 
35. \Vrst Virp;inia-Va. Acts. Tit. II, c. 3, § 9, at 96 (1R48). 
36. Wi,.;con"'in-Wi~. Hr1·. ~tat. c. 1:33, §§ 10, 11 (1849). By 
1868 thic statutr had lwen supPr~cdrd b~· a i<nhsrqucnt rnactmrnt'. 
\Vi~. Rr1·. Rtt\1. r.l64, §§10, 11; r.1G9, §§58, 59 (1858). 
"Abortion law~ in rffcrt in 18Cl8 and ~~ill ftpplicablc a" of Au-
~u~t. 1970: 
1. Arizon::t ( l.SG5) . 
2. Connecticut. (18GO). 
:3. Floricb (1868). 
4. Idnho (1863). 
5. Inclinn::t (1838). 
6. Iow::t (1, 43). 
7. l\Iainc (1840). 
8. Ma8sarhu~ett::; (1845). 
9. Mirhignn (1846). 
I Footnote 2 continued on ]J. 7j 
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There apparently was no question concermng the 
validity of this provision or of any of the other state 
statutes when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. 
The only conclusion possible from this history is that 
the drafters did not intend to have the Fourteenth 
Amendment withdraw from the States the power to legis-
late with respect to this matter. 
III 
Even if one were to agree that the case which the Court 
decides were here, and that the enunciation of the sub-
stantive constitutional law in the Court's opinion were 
proper, the actual disposition of the case by the Court is 
still difficult to justify. The Texas statute is struck 
do\\"n in toto, even though the Court apparently con-
cedes that at later periods of pregnancy Texas might 
impose these selfsame statutory limitations on abortion .. 
My understanding of past practice is that a statute found 
to be invalid as applied to a particular pla.intiff, but not 
unconstitutional as a whole, is not simply "struck clown" 
but is instead declared unconstitutional as applied to the 
fact situation before the Court. Yick W o v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356 (1886); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 5,75 
( 1969). 
For all of the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
10. Minnesota (1851). 
11. Mi~souri (1835). 
12. Montana (1864). 
13. Nevada (1861). 
14. New Hampshire (1848). 
15. New Jersey (1849). 
16. Ohio (1841). 
17. Pennsyh·ania. (1860). 
18. Texas (1859). 
19. Vermont (1867). 
20. West Virgin in (1848). 
21. Wisconsin (1858). 
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MH. Jus'riCE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the \ 
Court. 
This Texas federal appeal and its Georgia companion, 
Doe v. Bolton, post --, present constitutional chal-
lenges to state criminal abortion legislation. The Texas 
statutes under attack here are typical of those that 
have been in effect in many States for approximately a 
century. The Georgia statutes, in contrast, have a 
modern cast and are a legislative product that, to an 
extent at least, obviously reflects the influences of recent 
attitudinal change, of advancing medical knowledge and 
techniques, and of new thinking about an old issue. 
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensi-
tive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy, 
of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, 
and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that 
the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's experiences, 
one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's 
religious training, one's attitudes toward life and family 
and their values. and the moral standards one establishes 
and seeks to observe. are all likely to influence and to 
color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion. 
In addition, population growth, pollution, poverty, 
and racial overtones tend to complicate and not to sim-
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Our task, of course, 1s to resolve the issue by constiJ 
tutional measurement free of emotion and of predilection. 
We seek earnestly to do this, and, because we do, we 
have inquired mto, and m this opinion place some 
Pmphasis upon, medical and medical-legal history and 
what that history reveals about man's attitudes toward 
thf' abortive procedure over the centuries. We bear in 
mind, too, Mr. Justice Holmes' admonition .in his now 
vindicated dissent 1n Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 
45, 76 (1905·) 
·• It l the ConstitutiOn] IS made for people of 
fundamentally differing views, and the accident of 
our finding certam opinions natural and familiar 
or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude 
our JUdgment upon the question whether statutes 
embodying them conflict with the Constitution of 
t.he United Rtates." 
The Texas statutes that concern us here are Arts. 
1191-1194 and 1196 of the State's Penal Code.1 These 
1 ''Article 1191. AbortiOn 
.,If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman 
or knowmgly procure to be admmistcred with her consent any drug 
or medicme, or shall use towards her any violence or means what~ 
ever externally or mternally applied, and thereby procure an abor-
tiOn, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor 
more than five years ; if 1t be done without her consent, the punish-
ment shall be doubled . By 'abortion' is meant that the life of the 
fetus or embryo shall be destroyed m the woman's womb or that a 
premature birth thereof be caused 
"Art. 1192. Furnishmg the means 
"Whoever furmshes the means for procurmg an abortion knowing 
the purpose intended is guil~y as an accomphce 
"Art 1193. Attempt at abortion 
"If the means used shall fail to produce an abortion, the offendel' 
'"' nevertheless gmlty of an attempt to produce abortion, providect 
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make 1t a cnme to "procure an abortion," as therein 
defined, or to attempt one, except with respect to "an 
abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for 
the purpose of saving the life of the mother." Similar 
statutes are in existence in a majority of the States. 2 
rt be shown that such means were calculated to produce that result, 
and shall be fined not less than one hundred nor more than one· 
thousand dollars. 
'Art. 1194. Murder m producmg abortion 
" If the death of the mother IS occasioned by an abortion so pro-
duced or by an attempt to effect the same it is murder. 
"Art. 1196. By medical advice 
"Nothing in this chapter applies to an abortion procured or at-
tempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the 
mother " 
The foregomg Articles , together with Art. 1195, comprise Chapter 
9 of Title 15 of the Penal Code. Article 1195, not attacked here, 
reads . 
" Art. 1195. Drstroying unborn child 
"Whoever shall durmg parturition of the mother destroy the 
vrtality or life in a child in a state of being born and before actual 
b1rth, which child would otherwise have been born alive, shall be 
confined in the penitentiary for life or for not less than five years."· 
2 Anz. Rev. Stnt. Ann. § 13-211 (1971); Conn. Pub. Act. No. 1 
(May 1972 special scsswn) (m 4 Conn. Leg. Serv. 677 (1972)), and 
Conn. Grn. Stat. Rev. §§ 53-29, 53-30 (1968) (or unborn child); 
Idaho Code § 18-1505 (App. to Supp. 1971); Ill. Rev. Stats. c. 38, 
§ 23-1 (1971), Ind. Code § 35-1-58-1 (1971); Iowa Code § 701.1 
(1971); Ky. Rev. Stat. §436.020 (1963); La. Rev. Stat. §37:1285 
(6) (1964) (loss of medical license) (but see § 14-87 (1972 Supp.) 
contammg no exception for the hfe of the mother under the criminal 
statute), Mr. Hev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 17, §51 (1964); Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. c. 272, § 19 (1970) (usmg the term "unlawfully," COIIr 
strurd to excludr an abortion to save the mother's life, Kudish v. 
Bd of Registration, 356 Mass. 98, 248 N. E. 2d 264 (1969)); Mich. 
Comp. Laws § 750.14 (1948); Minn. Stat.§ 617.18 (1971); Mo. Rev, 
Stat. § 559.100 (1969); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-401 (1961), 
Neb. Rev. Stat.§ 28-405 (1964); ev. Rev. Stat.§ 200:220 (1967); 
N H. Rrv. Stnt. Ann. § 585.13 (1955); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:87-l 
t196?l. ("w1thont lawful justificatiOn"); N. D. Cent. Code §§ 12-25-
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Texas first enacted a criminal abortion statute in 1854. 
Texas Laws 1854, c. 49, § 1, set forth in 3 Gammel, 
.Laws of Texas, 1502 (1898). This was soon modified 
mto language that has remained substantially unchanged 
to the present time. See Texas Penal Code of 1857, 
Arts. 531-536; Paschal's Laws of Texas, Arts. 2192-2197 
(1866); Texas Rev. Stat., Arts. 536-541 (1879); Texas 
Rev. Crim. Stat., Arts. 1071-1076 (1911). The final 
article in each of these compilations provided the same 
exception, as does the present Article 1196, for an abor-
tion by "medical advice for the purpose of saving the 
life of the mother." ~ 
01, 12-25-02 (1960); OhiO Rev. Code§ 2901.16 (1953); Okla. Stat. 
Ann., Tit. 21, § R61 (19i2-1973 Supp.); Pa. Stat. Ann ., Tit. 18, 
§§ 4718, 4719 (196:3) ("unla~ful"); R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-3-1 
(1969); S. D. Compiled Laws § 22-17-1 (1967) ; Tenn. Code Ann. 
§§ 39-301, 39-30:2 (1956); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-1, 76-2-2 
(1953); Vt. Stat. Ann., Til. 18, § 101 (1958); W. Va. Code Ann. 
§ 61-2-8 (1966); Wis. Stat.§ 940.04 (1969) ; Wyo. Stat. Ann.§§ 6-77, 
f\-78 (1957) 
3 Long ago a suggP~t IOn was mad<' that the Texas statutes were 
unconstitutionally vague bPcause of dPfinitional deficiencies. The 
Texas Court of C'nminal Appea ls disposed of that suggestion per-
emptonly, saymg on ly, 
·' It IS also In~u;tpd in the motwn m arrest of judgment that the stat-
ute is nnronslitutwnal and void in 1 hat it docs not sufficiently define 
or descnbe the ofTense of abort ion. We do not concur in respect 
to this question." Jackson v. State, 55 Tex. Crim. R. 79, 89, 115 
S. W. 262, 268 (1908) . 
The samr court recently has held again that the State's abortion 
~tatutPs arr not unconstJtut ionally vagup or overbroad. Thompson 
v. State, - Tex. Crim. App. -,- S. W. 2d - (1971), appeal 
pending. Tlw court hdd that "t he Statr of Texas has a compelling 
mterrst to prot ret frtal Jifp"; t hat Art. 1191 "is designed to protect 
frtal life"; that t ht• Trxas homicidr statutes, particularly Art . 1205 
of the Penal Codr, arr mt rnded to protect a person "in existence by 
actual birth" and therPby nnplicitly recognize other human life that 
IS not "in cxistenrr by actual birth"; that the drfinition of human 
hfr 1s for thr legu.,Jature and not the courts; that Art. 1196 "is 
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II 
.Jane Roe,' a smgle woman who was residing in Dallas 
County, Texas, instituted this federal action in March 
19'70 against the District Attorney of the county. She 
sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal 
abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face, 
and an injunction restraining the defendant from en-
forcing the statutes. 
Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant; 
that she wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abor-
tion "performed by a competent, licensed physician, 
under safe, clinical conditions"; that she was unable 
to get a "legal" abortion in Texas because her life did 
not appear to be threatened by the continuation of her 
pregnancy; and that she could not afford to travel to 
another JUrisdiction in order to secure a legal abortion 
under safe conditions. She claimed that the Texas stat-
utes were unconstitutionally vague and that they 
abridged her nght of personal privacy, protected by the 
First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. By an amendment to her complaint Roe pur-
ported to sue "on behalf of herself and all other women" 
similarly situated 
James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought 
and was granted leave to intervene m Roe's action. ln 
more defimte that the D1stnct of Colnmbw statute upheld m [United 
States v.j VUitch" t 402 U. 8 . 62); and that the Texas statute "is 
not vague and mdcfimte or overbroad." A phys1cian's abortion con-
VICtiOn wa~ affirmed . 
in n. :2, -- - Tex. Cnm. App., at-, - 8. W. 2d, at-, the 
court observed that any 1ssuc as to the burden of proof under the 
(•xemptwn of Ar1. 1196 "1s not before us.'' But see Veevers v. State, 
172 Tex. Cnm. App. Hi2, 168-169, 354 S. W. 2d 161 (1962) . Cf 
United States v. Vu!tch, 402 U. 8. 62, 69-71 (1971) 
• Tlw name IS a psf'pdonym 
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~js compla.mt he alleged tha.t he ha.d been arrested pre-· 
v10usly for violations of the Texas abortion statutes a.nd · 
t,ha.t two such prosecutions were pending against him. 
He described conditions of patients who came to him 
seeking abortiOns, and he .claimed that for many cases 
he, a.s a. physic1a11, was unable to determine whether 
they fell within or outside the exception recognized by 
Article 1196. He alleged that, as a consequence, the 
statutes were vague and uncertain, in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and that they violated his own 
and his patients' rights to privacy in the doctor-patient 
relationship and his own right to practice medicine, 
nghts he claimed were guaranteed by the First, Fourth, 
Fifth, Ninth, a.nd Fourteenth Amendments. 
John a.nd Mary Doc,r' a married couple, filed a com-
panion complaint to that of Roe. They also named the 
District Attorney as defendant, claimed like constitu-
tiOnal depnvations, and so1,1ght declaratory and injunc-
tJve relief. The Does alleged that they were a childless 
couple; that Mrs. Doc was suffering from a "neural-
chemical" disorder; tha.t her physician had "advised her 
to avoid pregnancy until such time as her condition 
has materially improved" (although a pregnancy a.t the 
present time would not present "a serious risk" to her 
life) ; that, pursuant to medical advice, she had dis-
contm ued use of birth control pills; and that if she 
should become pregnant, she would want to terminate 
the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent, 
licensed physician under safe, clinical conditions. By 
an amendment to thmr complaint, the Does purported 
to sue "on behalf of themselves and a.ll couples similarly 
sJtuated. " 
The two a.ctwns were consolidated and heard together 
by a duly convened three-judge district court. The 
suits thus presentee] the situations of the pregnant single 
' These nn mr~ ;t re pH<'udonym~ 
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woman, the childless couple, with the wife not pregnant, 
and the licensed practicing physician, all joining in the 
attack on the Texas criminal abortion statutes. Upon 
the filing of affidavits, motions were made to dismiss 
and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe 
and Dr. Hallford, and members of their respective 
classes, had standing to sue, and presented justiciable con-
troversies, but that the Does had failed to allege facts 
sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have 
standing. It concluded that, with respect to the re-
quests for a declaratory judgment, abstention was not 
warranted. On the merits, the District Court held that 
the "fundamental right of single women and married 
persons to choose whether to have children is protected 
by the Ninth Amendment, through the Fourteenth 
Amendment," and that the 'l'exas criminal abortion stat-
utes were void on their face because they were both 
unconstitutionally vague and constituted an overbroad 
infringement of the plaintiffs' Ninth Amendment rights. 
The court then held that abstention was warranted with 
respect to the requests for an in junction. It therefore 
dismissed the Doe complamt, declared the abortion stat-
utes void, and dismissed the application for injunctive 
relief. 314 F. Supp. 1217 (ND Tex. 1970) . 
The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hall-
ford, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. ~ 1253, have appealed to 
this Court from that part of the District Court's judg-
ment denying the inj unctiou. The defendant District 
Attorney has purported to cross appeal, pursuant to the 
same statute, from the court's grant of declaratory relief 
to Roe and Hallford. Both sides also have taken pro-
tective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held 
In abeyance pending decision here. We postponed de-
cision on jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 402 .: 
u. s. 941 ' (1971) 
70-18-0PINION 
HOE v WADE 
llf 
It might have been preferable if the defendant, pur-· 
suant to our Rule 20, had presented to us a petition for 
certiOrari before judgment in the Court of Appeals with 
respect to the granting of the plaintiffs' prayer for de-
claratory relief. Our decisions in Mitchell v. Donovan, 
398 U. S. 427 (1970), and Gunn v. University Committee, 
399 U. S. 383 (1970), are to the effect that § 1253 does 
not authorize an appeal to this Court from the grant or 
denial of declaratory relief alone. We conclude, never-
theless, that those decisions do not foreclose our review 
of both the injunctive and the declaratory aspects of a 
case of this kind when it is properly here, as this one is, on 
appeal under § 1253 from specific denial of injunctive 
relief, and the arguments as to both aspects are necessarily 
Identical. See Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U. S. 320' 
(1970); Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, inc. v. 
Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73, 80-81 (1960). It would be de-
structive of time and energy for all concerned were we 
t.o rule otherwisf>. Cf. Doe v. Bolton, post, -
IV 
We are next confronted with Issues of justiciability, 
standing, and abstention. Have Roe and the Does estab-
lished that "personal stake in the outcome of the con-
troversy," Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 ( 1962), 
that insures that "the dispute sought to be adjudicated 
will be presented in an adversary context and in a 
form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolu-
tion,'' Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 101 (1968), and 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,732 (1972)? And 
what effect did the pendency of criminal abortion charges 
against Dr. Hallford in state court have upon the pro-
priety of the federal court's granting relief to him as · 
a plaintiff-intervenor? 
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A. Jane Roe . Desp1te the use of the pseudonym, no 
suggestion is made that Roe is a fictitious person. For 
purposes of her case, we accept as true, and as estab-
lished, her existence; her pregnant state, as of the incep-
tion of her suit in March 1970 and as late as May 21 
of that year when she filed an alias affidavit with the 
District Court; and her inability to obtain a legal abor-
tion in Texas. 
Viewing Roe's case as of the time of its filing and 
thereafter until as late as May, there can be little 
dispute that it then presented a case or controversy and 
that, wholly apart from the class aspects, she, as a 
pregnant single woman thwarted by the Texas criminal 
abortion laws, had standing to challenge those statutes. 
Abele v. Markle, 452 F. 2d 1121, 1125 (CA2 1971); 
Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F. 2d 833, 838-839 (CA6 
1971) ; Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986, 990-991 
(Kans. 1972). See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). 
Indeed, we do not read the appellee's brief as really 
asserting anythmg to the contrary. The "logical nexus 
between the status asserted and the claim sought to be 
adjudicated," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S., at 102, and 
the necessary degree of contentiousness, Go~den v. 
Zwickler, 394 U S. 103 (1969), are both present. 
The appellee notes, however, that the record does 
not disclose that Roe was pregnant at the time of the 
District Court hearing on May 22, 1970,6 or on the fol-
lowing June 17 when the court's opinion and judgment 
were filed. And he suggests that Roe's case must now 
be moot because she and all other members of her class 
are no longer subJect to any 1970 pregnancy 
6 The appellee tw1ce states m hiS bnef that the hearmg before the 
D1stnrt Court was held on July 22, 1970. Appellee's Brief 13. The 
docket entnes, Appendix, at 2, and the transcript, Appendix, at 76, 
reveal this to be an error. The July date appears to be the time. 
pf the. t:ero~ter'~ transcnpt1on . SPe Appendix. a.t 77 
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The usual mle m federal cases 1s that an actual con-
troversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari 
review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated. 
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950); 
Golden v. Zwickler, supra; SEC v. Medical Committee 
for Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403 (1972). 
But when, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in 
the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation 
period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term 
before the usual appellate process is complete. If that 
termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation 
seldom will surv1ve much beyond the trial stage, anq 
appellate review will be effectively denied. Our law 
should not be that rigid. Pregnancy often comes more 
than once to the same woman, and in the general popu-
lation, if man is to survive, it will always be with us. 
Pregnancy provides a classic JUStification for a conclusion 
of nonmootness. It truly could be "capable of repetition, l 
yet evading review." Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. 
ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). See Moore v. Ogilvie, 
394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969); Carroll v. President and Com-
missioners, 393 U. S. 175, 178- 179 (1968); United States 
v W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 632- 633 (1953). 
We therefore agree with the District Court that Jane 
Roe had standing to undertake this litigation, that she 
presented a justiciable controversy, and that the ter-
mmation of her 1970 pregnancy has not rendered her 
case moot. 
B. Dr. Hallford. The doctor's position is different. 
He entered Roe's litigation as a plaintiff-intervenor 
alleging in h1s complaint that he. 
"In the past has been arrested for violatmg 
the Texas Abortion Laws and at the present time 
stands charged by indictment with violating said 
laws in the Criminal District Court of Dallas. 
County, Texas to-wit : (1) The State of Texas vs .. 
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James H . Hallford, No. C-69~5307-IH, and (2) The 
State of Texas vs. James H. Hallford, No. C-69-
2524--H. In both cases the defendant is charged 
w1th abortion , , ," 
1 n his application for leave to intervene the doctor 
made like representations as to the abortion charges. 
pending in the state court. These representations were 
also repeated in the affidavit he executed and filed in 
support of his motion for summary judgment. 
Dr. Hallford Is therefore in the position of seeking, 
m a federal court, declaratory and injunctive relief with 
respect to the same statutes under which he stands 
charged in criminal prosecutions simultaneously pending· 
m state court. Although he stated that he has been 
arrested in the past for violating the State's abortion 
laws, he makes no allegation of any substantial and 
immediate threat to any federally protected right that 
cannot be asserted in h1s defense against the state prose-
cutions. Neither is there any allegation of harassment 
or bad faith prosecution. In order to escape the rule, 
articulated in the cases cited in the next paragraph of 
this opinion, that, absent harassment and bad faith, a .. 
defendant in a pending state criminal case cannot affirma-
tively challenge in federal court the statutes under which 
the State is prosecuting him, Dr. Hallford seeks to 
distinguish his status as a present state defendant from 
his status as a "potential future defendant" and to assert 
only the latter for standing purposes here. 
We see no merit in that distinction. Our decision in. 
Samuels v. M ackell, 401 U. S. 66 (1971), compels the· 
conclusion that the District Court erred when it granted· 
declaratory relief to Dr. Hallford instead of refraining· 
from so doing. The court, of course, was correct in re-
fusing to grant injuctive relief to the doctor. The rea-
sons supportive of that action, however, are those ex-
_pressed in Samuels v M ackell, supra, and in Younger v .. _ 
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Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U. S. 
77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82 (1971); and 
Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). See also Dom-
browski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 (1965). We note, in 
passing, that Younger and its companion cases were de-
cided after tht> three-judge District Court decision in 
this case. 
Dr. Hallford's complaint m mtervention, therefore, is 
to be dismissed. 7 He is remitted to his defenses in the 
state criminal proceedings against him. We reverse the 
.Judgment of the District Court insofar as it granted Dr. 
Hallford relief and failed to dismiss his complaint in 
intervention 
C. The Does. In view of our ruling as to Roe's stand-
mg in her case, the issue of the Does' standing in their 
case has little significance. The claims they assert are 
essentially the same as those of Roc, and they attack the 
same statutes. Nevertheless, we briefly note the Does' 
posture. 
Their pleadings present them as a childless married 
couple, the woman not being pregnant, who have no 
desire to have children at this time because of their hav-
mg received medical advice that Mrs. Doe should avoid 
pregnancy, and for "other highly personal reasons.'' But 
7 We nrrd not con:;u.ler what diffrrrnt rrsult, 1f any, would follow 
if Dr. Ilnllford's h1tervention wrrc on behnlf of a class. H1s com-
plninL m interventiOn doeH not purport to assert a class suit and 
make::; no reference to nny rlass npart from an allegation that he 
''and others snnilnrly Ritunted" must nerrssarily guess at the mean-
Ing of Art. 1196. H1s applicatwn for leave to intervene goes some-
what furthrr for lt a~::;ert;; that plamtiff Roe dors not adequately pro-
tect the mt<>rest of the doctor "and the class of people who are 
physiCians . . and the clar:;:; of prople who are . . patients . ••· 
The leave apphcat10n, however, 1::; not the complamt. Despite the 
D1strict Court's statemrnt to the contrary, 314 F. Supp., at 1225, we· 
fml to prrce1vr thr rssrntJ;d;; of a class suit m the Hallford complaint ~ 
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they "fear . . . they may face the prospect of becoming 
parents." And if pregnancy ensues, they "would want 
to terminate" it by an abortion. They assert an inability 
to obtain an abortion legally in Texas and, consequently, 
the prospect of obtaining an illegal abortion there or of 
going outside Texas to some place where the procedure 
could be obtained legally and competently. 
We thus have as plaintiffs a married couple who have, 
as their asserted immediate and present injury, only an 
alleged "detrimental effect upon [their] marital hap-
piness" because they are forced to "the choice of refrain-
ing from normal sexual relations or of endangering Mary 
Doe's health through a possible pregnancy." Their claim 
is that sometime, in the future, Mrs. Doe might become 
pregnant because of possible failure of contraceptive 
measures, and at that time in the future, she might want 
an abortion that might then be illegal under the Texas 
statutes. 
This very phrasmg of the Does' position reveals its 
speculative character. Their alleged injury rests on pos-
sible future contraceptive failure, possible future preg-
nancy, possible future unpreparedness for parenthood, 
and possible future impairment of health. Any one or 
more of these several possibilities may not take place 
and all may not combine. In the Does' estimation, these 
possibilities might have some real or imagined impact 
upon their marital happiness. But we are not prepared 
to say that the bare allegation of so indirect an injury is 
sufficient to present an actual case or controversy, 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S., at 41-42; Golden v. Zwickler, 
394 U. S., at 109- 110 (1969); Abele v. Markle, 452 F. 2d, 
at 1124-1125; Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F. 2d, at 839, 
The Does' claim falls far short of those resolved other-
wise 111 the cases that the Does urge upon us, namely, 
[nver!tment Co Institut e v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) ; 
• ' I 
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Data Process'ling Servwe v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970); 
and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). See also· 
Truax v. Raich, supra. 
The Does therefore are not appropriate plamtiffs in 
th1s litigation. Their complaint was properly dismissed 
hy t,he District. Court, and we affirm that dismissal. 
The principal thrust of appellant's attack on the Texas 
statutes is that they improperly mvade a right, said to 
be possessed by the pregnant woman, to choose to ter-
minate her pregnancy. Appellant would discover this 
nght in the concept of personal "liberty'' embodied in 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause; or in 
personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to 
he protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, 
see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); id., at 460 (WHITE, 
.J ., concurring); or among those rights reserved to the 
people by the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U. S., at 486 (Goldberg, J ., concurring). Before 
addressing this claim, we feel it desirable briefly to 
survey, m several aspects, the history of abortion, for 
such insight as that history may afford us, and then to 
examine the state purposes and interests behind the 
r.riminal abortiOn laws 
VI 
It perhaps 1s not generally appreciated that the re-
stnctive criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority 
of States today are of relatively recent vintage. Those 
laws, generally proscribing abortion or its attempt at 
any t1me during pregnancy except when necessary to 
preserve the pregnant woman's life, are not of ancient 
or even of common law ongm. Instead, they derive 
from statutory changes effected, for the most part, in: 
the latter half of the 19th century 
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Ancient attitudes. These are not capable of precise 
determination. We are told that at the time of the Persian 
Empire abortifacients were known and that criminal 
abortions were severely punished.8 We are also told, 
however, that abortion was practiced in Greek times as 
well as in the Roman Era,0 and that "it was resorted 
to without scruple." 10 The Ephesian, Soranos, often 
described as the greatest of the ancient gynecologists, 
appears to have been generally opposed to Rome's pre-
vailing free-abortion practices. He found it necessary 
to think first of the life of the mother, and he resorted 
to abortion when, upon this standard, he felt the proce-
dure advisable.11 Greek and Roman law afforded little 
protection to the unborn. If abortion was prosecuted in 
some places, it seems to have been based on a concept 
of a violation of the father's right to his offspring. 
Ancient religion did not bar abortion.' 2 
2. The Hippocratic Oath. What then of the famous 
Oath that has stood so long as the ethical guide of the 
medical profession and that bears the name of the great 
Greek (460(?)-377(?) B. C.), who has been described 
as the Father of MediCme, thP "wisest and the greatest 
" A CastJghom, A H1~tory ol Medicme 84 (2d ed. 1947), E 
Krumbhaar, translator and editor (heremafter "Castigliom") 
n .J. Ricci , The Genealogoy of Gynaecology 52, 84, 113 , 149 (2d ed . 
1950) (heremafter "Ricci"); L. Lader, Abortion 75-77 (1966) (herc-
wafter "Lader''), R . Niswander, Medical Abortion Practices m the 
Umted States, m AbortiOn and the Law 27, 38-40 (D. Smith, editor, 
1967) , G. Williams, The Sanctity of Life 148 (1957) (hercmafter 
'Wi lham::;"), J Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in History, m 
The Morality of AbortiOn l , 3-7 (J . Noonan ed . 1970) (hereinafter 
'Noonan"), E. Quay, .Justifiable Abortwn-Medical and Legal 
Foundatwns, Jl , 49 Geo L .J 395. 406-422 (1961) (heremafteP 
' Quay") 
'" L. Edelstein, The H1ppoeratJc Oath 10 (1943) ( heremafter .. 
" Edelstem") But see Castigliom 227 
''Edelstem 12, Ricci 113-ll4. 118-119, Noonan 5. 
' : Edelstem Jg- 14 · 
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practwner of his art," and the "most important and~ 
most complete medical personality of antiquity," who· 
dominated the medical schools of his time, and who 
typified the sum of the medical knowledge of the past? 1 3 
The Oath varies somewhat according to the par-
ticular translation, but m any translation the content 
is clear . "I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if 
asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner 
I will not give to a woman a pessary to produce abor-
tion," " or "I will neither give a deadly drug to any-
body if asked for It, nor will I make a suggestion to 
this effect. Similarly, I will not give to a woman an 
abortive remedy" · ~ 
Although the Oath 1s not mentioned in any of the 
principal briefs in this case or in Doe v. Bolton, post, 
it represents the apex of the development of strict ethical 
concepts m medicine, and its influence endures to this 
day Why did not the authority of Hippocrates dissuade 
abortwn practice m his time and that of Rome? The 
late Dr. Edelstein provides us with a theory: 'a The 
Oath was not uncontrstrd even in Hippocrates' day; only 
the Pythagorean school of philosophers frowned upon· 
the related act of suicide. Most Greek thinkers, on the 
other hand, commended abortion, at least prior to via-
bility. See Plato, Republic, V, 461; Aristotle, Politics, 
vn' 1335 b 25. For the Pythagoreans, however, It 
was a matter of dogma. For them the embryo was 
animate from the moment of conception, and abortion 
meant destruction of a living being. The abortion clause 
of the Oath, therefore, "echoes Pythagorean doctrines,,. 
and "[i ·1 n no other stratum of Greek opinion were such 
'" Cashghom 14b 
11 l d., at 154 
15 Edelstrm 3. 
" 1 ld. at 12, 15-li-
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views held or proposed m the same sp1rit of uncom~ 
promising austerity." 11 
Edelstein then concludes that the Oath originated in 
a group representing only a small segment of Greek 
opinion and that it certainly was not accepted by all 
ancient physicians. He points out that medical writings 
down to Galen (130-200 A. D.) "give evidence of the 
violation of almost every one of its injunctions." 18 But 
with the end of antiquity a decided change took place. 
Resistance against suicide and against abortion became 
common. The Oath came to be popular. The emerg-
ing teachings of Christianity were in agreement with 
the Pythagorean ethic. The Oath "became the nucleus 
of all medical ethics" and "was applauded as the embodi-
ment of truth." Thus, suggests Dr. Edelstein, it is "a 
Pythagorean manifesto and not the expression of an 
absolute standard of medical conduct." 10 
This, it seems to us, is a satisfactory and acceptable 
explanation of the Hippocratic Oath's apparent rigidity. 
It enables us to understand, in historical context, a long 
accepted and revered statement of medical ethics. 
3. The Common Law. It is undisputed that at the 
common law, abortion performed before "quickening"-
the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, 
appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th week of 
pregnancy 20-was not an indictable offense. 2 ' The ab-
17 !d., at 18; Lndrr 7fi 
1 8 Edelstem fi3 
19 ld., at 64 
20 Dorland's Illustrated Medical DictiOnary 1261 (24th ed. 1965) 
21 E. Coke, Institutes III *50 (1648) ; 1 W. Hawkins , Pleas of the 
Crown c. 31, § 16 (1762); 1 Blackstone, Commentanes ·*129-130 
(1765); M. H::lle, Pleas of the Crown 433 (1778). For discussions 
of the role of the quickening concept m English common law, se£> 
Lader 78; Noonan 223-226; C. Means, The Law of New York Con-
cernmg AbortiOn and the Status of the Foetus, 1664-1968: A CaRe ~ 
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sence of a common law cnme for pre-qmckemng abor•· 
tion appears to have developed from a confluence of' 
earlier philosophical, theological, and civil and canon 
law concepts of when life begins. These disciplines 
variously approached the question in terms of the point 
at which the ernbryo or fetus became "formed" or rec-
ognizably human, or in terms of when a "person" came 
into being, that is, infused with a "soul" or "ammated." 
A loose consensus evolved in early English law that these 
events occurred at some point between conception and 
live birth. 22 This was "mediate animatiOn." Although 
of Cessahon of Constitutionality, 14 N. Y. L. Forum 411, 418-42t{ 
(1968) (heremafter "Mrans I"), L. Stern, Abortion: Reform and 
the Law, 59 J. Cnm. L. C. & P. S. 84 (1968) (hereinaftPr "Strrn") 
Quay 430-432; Williams 152. 
" 2 Early philosophers believed that the embryo or fetus d1d not; 
become formed and begin to live until at least 40 days aftrr concep-
tion for a male, and 80 to 90 days for a frmale. See, for example, 
Anstotle, Hist. Amm. 7.3.583b; Gen. Amm. 2.3.736, 2.5.741; Hip-
pocrates, Lib. de Nat. Puer., No. 10. Anstotle's thmking clenved 
from his three-stage theory of hfe: vegetable, animal, ratwnal. The 
vegetable stage was rrached at conceptiOn, the ammal at ''ammat10n,' 
and the rational soon after live buth. Tl11S theory, together w1th tht>o 
40/ 80 day v1ew, came to be accepted by early Christian thmkers . 
The theological debate was reflected in the writings of St. Augus-
tme, who made a distinctiOn between embryo manimatus, not yet 
endowed w1th a soul, and embryo animatus. He may have drawn 
upon Exodus xx1, 22. At one point, however, he expresses the v1ew 
that human powers cannot determine the point during fetal develop-
ment at which the critical change occurs. Sec Augustine, De Origine 
Animae 4.4 (Pub. Law 44.527). See also Reany, The Creatwn of the 
Human Soul, c. 2 and 83-86 (1932); Huser, The Crime of AbortiOn 
in Common Law 15 (Catholic Umv. of Amenca, Canon Law StudiCs 
No. 162, Washington, D. C. 1942). 
Galen, m three treat1srs related to embryology, accepted the thmk-
ing of Anstotle and his followers. Quay 426-427. Later, Augustin(-t 
on abortion was mcorporated by Grahan mto the Decretum, pub--
lished about 1140 Decretum l\1ag1t;tn Gratiani 2.32.2.7 to 2.32.2.10, 
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Christian theology and the canon law came to fix the 
point of animation at 40 days for a male and 80 day& 
for a female, a view that persisted until the 19th cen~ 
tury, there was otherwise little agreement about the 
precise time of formation or animation. There was 
agreement, however, that prior to this point the fetus 
was to be regarded as part of the mother and its de-
struction, therefore, was not homicide. Due to con-
tinued uncertainty about the precise time when anima-
tion occurred, to the lack of any empirical basis for 
the 40-80 day view, and perhaps to Acquinas' def-
inition of movement as one of the two first principles 
of life, Bracton focused upon quickening as the critical 
point. The significance of quickening was echoed by 
later common law scholars and found its way into the 
received common law in this country 
Whether abortion of a quick fetus was a felony at 
common law, or even a lesser crime, is still disputed . 
Bracton, writing early m the 13th century, thought It 
homicide. 23 But the later and predominant view, fol-
lowing the great common law scholars, has been that 
in 1 Corpus Juns Canomr1 1122, 1123 (2d ed . .Fnedberg ed. 187\:J) 
Grat1an, together with the decretals that followed, were recogmzed 
as the definitive body of ranon law until the new Code of 1917 
For discussions of the canon law treatment, see Means 1, at 411 -
412; Noonan, 20-26; Quay 426-430 ; see also Noonan, ContraceptiOn I 
A History of Its Treatment by the Cathohc Theologians and Can-
omsts 18-29 ( 1965). 
23 Bracton took the posltlon that abortwn by blow or pOlson wa, 
homicide "if the foetus be already formed and animated, and par .. 
ticularly if 1t be animated." 2 H. Bracton, De Legibus et Con-
suetudinibus Angliae 279 (Tw1ss ed. 1879), or, as a later translatiOn 
puts it, "if the foetus is already formed or quickened, especially 1f 
1t 1s quickened," II Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England 
341 (Thorne ed. 1968) . Sec Quay 431; see also 2 Fleta 60-61 (Book 
L:. c 23) (Selden SoCJety ed 1955) 
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it \Vas at most a Jesser off<'IlS<'. In a frequently cited 
passagP, Cokr took th<' position that abortion of a woman 
"quick with childe" is "a great misprision and no 
murder.""' Blackstone followed, saying that whik abor~ 
tion after quick<'ning had OllCe been COllSiderecl man-
slaughter (though not murder), "modC'rn Ja"·" took a 
Jess severe view." '' A recent review of th<' common law 
precedC'nts argues, however, that thos<' pr<'c<'cl<'nts con-
tradict Coke ancl that <'VCn post-quickt,ning abortion 
was nev<'r established as a common law crimP."" This 
is of som<' importance because \rhile most Am<'rican 
courts ruled, in holding or dictum, that abortion of an 
unquickenecl fetus was not criminal under th<'ir r<'C<'iv<'cl 
common law,"' others followC'cl Cok<' in stating that abor-
"'E. Cokt•, 1n~tttnte~ ILl·::·,')Q (H\-+k). 
":; 1 Black~ton<' , C'ommt•ntaril'~ ·"· 12D-!;~() (liH.5). 
""C. :\]pan~. Til(' l'hoPnix of Abortion:d Fn•t•dom: 1~ :1 h·munhr:d 
or Xinth-"\nJ('ndJTJ('Il( ll ight .\bout to An~<· from ill(' :\inet <'<•nt h-
Centur)· L<·gi~lativ<· A~lw~ of a Fonrtt•t•ttth-('t•nlttl'Y ( 'ommon-L:t\1' 
Liht•rt)··~, 17 :\. Y. L. Fontm :J:J.') (1H71) (ht'rein:d'i<'r ":\lt·an~ IT") . 
TIH• author <'X:tmitH·~ tlH• two principal pn•ced<·nl~ cit<'d margin:tll)· 
h)· Cok<•, both contr:Jr)· to hi~ dictnn1, :tnd tr:t<'<'~ ill(' tn•atmt·nt of 
t lw~<· and ot ht•r r·:t~<·~ 1>.1· t•a rl it•r r'Olllll\l'll t :11 or~ . ll<' t'Otl<'hidt·~ that 
Coke, who him~<·lf partH'lp:lted a~ :111 :HI\'t)(':JI<' in :111 abortion t':J~C' 
in HiOl. lll:t)' l!:tn• intentionally mi,~t:tlt•d tht• l:t\\'. Tlw author <'l·en 
~<llggt·~t:-; :1 n·a~on: C'okp'~ "t rong ft•<'ling~ :d>OIII nhort ion. I'Ollpi<'d 
with hi~ l'<'hl<'t:tn<·t· to :,d::nowi<'dgc <'Oillmon l:m (~<·t·ula r) juri~dic­
tion ton~~<·~~ p<·u:dtit•" for :111 ofTt'nre that tr:cdition:ill)· h:cd ht'<'ll an 
t•xclu~iv<'ly <'<·e!e:-;ia~tic:d or <':1non la11· nimc. ~<'!' :d~o Lndt'r 71{- 7\l, 
who nott·~ that :-;om<• ~<'holar:-< doubt tilt• <'OilllllOil law t'\'<'l' \\':1:-< ap-
pli<'d to :thortion: th:Jt Ill<' Engli~h C'<'l'l<'-"'ia"tic:d t·ourl~ ~<'<'Ill to h:n·<• 
lo~t int<•rP~t in tlw prohl<'lll aft<·r 1.1:27: nnd 1hat the prcamhl<• to 11w 
Engli"h legi"lntion of 1/-:():), .!:) Ut•o. :~. c· . ."i:-:. ~ 1. :II :zo:~. n·f<'IT<'d 1o 
in th<• text, infra. "tat<'" th:d ''no ad<•qu:tte nwnn~ han• ht•t•n hitll<'rto 
providr·d for tht• pn•v<•nt 1011 nnd puni~lnn<'lll of "urh oiT<·n~<'~." 
"' ('olll?llullll'eollh \'. Hm1us, 9 :\fn~"- :J,'-'7, :lSS (lSJ:.!); ('Oiilllloll-
lt'ealth \'. Parker . .')() '\In~"- (\J :\IP1.) 2fi:l. 2fi.'i ~(iii (lS-I!)): State v. 
Coo])l'r, 2'2 :\ . .T. L. ,'):2, .'):-, (li{.H)); Abi'OIIIs \ . Foshc<', :~ low:! '27-t, 
~71-l-21{0 (1S5!i); 8111ith v. Ciaffrmf, :n Ala. -l."i , .')1 (1.<..;,')7); .lfill'lie/l' 
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tion of a quick fetus was a "misprision," a term they 
translated to mean "misdemeanor." 2R That their reli~ 
ance on Coke on this aspect of the law was uncritical 
and, apparently in all the reported cases, dictum (due 
probably to the paucity of common law prosecutions 
for post-quickening abortion), makes It now appear 
doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as 
a common law crime even with respect to the destruc-
tJOn of a quick fetus. 
4. 'The English statutory law. England's first cnmmal 
abortion statute, Lord Ellenborough's Act, 43 Geo. 3, 
c. 58, came in 1803. It made abortion of a quick fetus, 
§ 1, a capital crime, but in § 2 it provided lesser penal-
ties for the felony of abortion before quickemng, and 
thus preserved the quickening distinction. This con-
trast was continued in the general revision of 1828, 9 
Geo. 4, c. 31, ~ 13, at 104. It disappeared, however, 
together with the death penalty, m 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 
1 Vic., c. 85, ~ 6, at 360, and did not reappear 111 the 
Offenses Against the Person Act of 1861, 24 & 25 Vic., 
c. 100, § 59, at 438, that formed the core of English 
anti-abortion law until the liberalizmg reforms of 1967. 
ln 1929 the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 19 & 20 
Geo. 5, c. 34, came into being. lts emphasis was upon 
the destruction of "the life of a child capable of being 
born alive.'' It made a willful act performed with the 
necessary mtent a felony. It contained a proviso that 
1 Commo1~weulth, 78 Ky. 204, 210 ( 1879), Egg art v. State, 40 Fla 
527, 532, 25 So. 144, 145 (1898); State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho 599, 606, 
()4 P. 1014, 1016 (1901), Edwards \'. State, 79 Neb. 251, 252, 112 
N. W. 611, 612 (1907); Gray v. State, 77 TC'x. Cnm. R. 221, 224, 
178 S. W. 337 , 338 (1915); Miller v. Bennett, 190 Va. 162, 169 , 56 
S. E. 2d 217 , 221 (1949). Contra, Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa 
IJ31, 633 (1850); State v. Slagle, 83 N. C. 630, 632 (1880) . 
28 See Smith v. State, 3:~ M0. 48, 55 (1851) ; Evans v. People, 4!:! 
i" . Y. R(i. IIR !1872) . Lamb v State. fl7 Md 524, 53:3, 10 A 20/i .; 
(1Hk7 ! . 
· .. "'· 
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cme was not to be found gmlty of the offense "unlesS!' 
tt is proved that the act which caused the death of the 
child was not done m good faith for the purpose only 
of preserving the life of the mother.'' 
A seemingly notable development in the English law 
was the case of Rex v. Bourne, [ 1939 J 1 K. B. 687. This 
ease apparently answered in the affirmative the question 
whether an abortwn necessary to preserve the life of 
the pregnant woman was excepted from the criminal 
penalties of the 1861 Act. In his instructions to the 
JUry Judge Macnaghten referred to the 1929 Act, and 
observed, p. 691, that that Act related to "the case 
where a child is killed by a willful act at the time when 
tt is being delivered in the ordinary course of nature.'' 
J,d., at 91. He coucluded that the 1861 Act's use of 
the word "unlawfully," imported the same meaning ex-
pressed by the specific proviso in the 1929 Act even 
though there was no mention of preserving the mother's 
life in the 1861 Act. He then construed the phrase 
"preserving the life of the mother'' broadly, that is, 
"i11 a reasonable sense," to include a serious and per-
manent threat to the mother's health, and instructed 
the jury to acquit Dr. Bourne if it found he had acted 
m a good faith belief that the abortion was necessary 
for this purpose. 1 d., at 693-694. The jury did acquit. 
Recently Parliament enacted a new abortion law. 
This is the Abortion Act of 1967, 15 & 16 Eliz. 2, c. 87. 
The Act permits a licensed physician to perform an 
abortion where two other licensed physicians agree (a) 
"that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve 
risk to the life of the pregnant woman, or of injury 
to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman 
or any existing children of her family, greater than if 
the pregnancy were termmated," or (b) "that there 1s 
a substantial risk that if the child were born it would 
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Buffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as 
to be seriously handicapped." The Act also provides 
that, in making this determination, "account may be 
taken of the pregnant woman's actual or reasonably 
forseeable environment." It also permits a physician, 
without the concurrence of others, to terminate a preg-
nancy where he is of the good faith opinion that the 
abortion "is immediately necessary to save the life or 
to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or 
mental health of the pregnant woman.'' 
5. The American law. In this country the law m effect 
m all but a few States until mid-19th century was the 
pre-existing English common law. Connecticut, the 
first State to enact abortion legislation, adopted in 1821 
that part of Lord Ellenborough's Act that related to a 
woman "quick with child." 29 The death penalty was 
not imposed. Abortion before quickening was made a 
crime in that State only in 1860."0 In 1828 New York 
enacted legislation 3 ' that, m two respects, was to serve 
as a model for early anti-abortion statutes. First, while 
barring destruction of an unquickened fetus as well as 
a quick fetus, it made the former only a misdemeanor, 
but the latter second-degree manslaughter. Second, It 
incorporated a concept of therapeutic abortion by pro-
viding that an abortion was excused if 1t "shall have 
been necessary to preserve the life of such mother, or 
shall have been advised by two physicians to be nec-
essary for such purpose." By 1840, when Texas had 
recmved the common law,32 only eight American States 
•>~ Conn. Stat., T1t. 20, § 14 (1821) . 
w Conn. Pub. Acts, c. 71, § 1 (1860) 
.n N Y. Rev. Stat., pt. IV, c. l , T11 II, Art. l , § 9, at 661, and 
T11. Vl, §21, at 694 (1829). 
12 Art of January 20, 1840, § 1, srt forth m 2 GammrJ, Laws of 
Texas 177-178 (1i:->98); sre Griqsby v. Re~f!: 10§ Tex. 597, 600, 15q 
f'/: w !124. 112s (!Hl:r' . 
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had statutes dealmg with abortion.33 It was not until 
after the War Between the States that legislation began 
generally to replace the common law. Most of these 
mitial statutes dealt severely with abortion after quick-
ening but were lenient with it before quickening. Most 
punished attempts equally with completed abortions. 
While many statutes included the exception for an abor-
tion thought by one or more physicians to be neces-
sary to save the mother's life, that provision soon 
disappeared and the typical law required that the pro-
cedure actually be necessary for that purpose. 
Gradually, 111 the middle and late 19th century the 
quickening distinction disappeared from the statutory 
law of most States and the degree of the offense and 
the penalties were increased. By the end of the 1950's, 
a large maJority of the States banned abortion, however 
and whenever performed, unless done to save or pre-· 
serve the life of the mother.:" The exceptions, Alabama 
and the Distnct of Columbia, permitted abortion to pre-
serve the mother's health.~" Three other States per-
rmtted abortions that were not "unlawfully" performed 
or that were not "without lawful JUstification," leaving 
Interpretation of those standards to the courts.~6 In 
the past several years, however, a trend toward liberaliza-
'" Thr E'arly ;;tatute~ arr dt::;cu~:<tlPd m Quay 435-438. i::ler also-
Ltder S5-88; Stern .S5-Rfi: and Mean~ II 375-37fi. 
'''Criminal abortiOn Htatutrs m r!Tect tu tlw Statr::; as of 1961, to-
gethrr with htstoncnl statutory drvrlopmrnt and 1mportant judicial 
intrrpretaltons of the Htatr ~tatutrs, arr citrd nnd quoted in Quay 
447-520. See l\'otC'. A Survey of the Present Statutory and Case 
Law on Abortion: Thr Contradiction;; and the Problrms, 1972 IlL 
L. Forum 177, 179. cla~Htfymg thr abortwn statutes and listing 25 
Statrs as permitt in~~: abortion only tf nrcrssary to savr or presrrve 
fhr mothrr's lifP . 
''"Ala. Codr, Tit. 14, ~ 9 (1958); D. C. Codr Ann.§ 22-201 (1967) 
w Ma~s. Gen. Law~ Ann., c. 272, § 19 (1970); N .. 1. Rev. Stat . 
Ann . 2A:87-l (191)9); 1'11. Stat. Ann .. Tit. 1R, §§ 471R. 4719 (19fi3) .. 
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tlon of abortion statutes has resulted in adoption, by 
about one-third of the States, of less stringent laws, most 
of them patterned after the ALI Model Penal Code, 
~ 230.3,37 set forth as Appendix B to the opinion in 
Doe v. Bolton, post --
It 1s thus apparent that at common law, at the time 
of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout 
the maJor portion of the 19th century, abortion was 
v1ewed with less disfavor than under most American 
statutes currently in effect. Phrasing it another way, 
a wornan enjoyed a substantially broader right to ter-
mmate a pregnancy than she does in most States today. 
At least with respect to the early stage of pregnancy, 
and very possibly without such a limitation, the oppor-
tunity to make this choice was present in this country 
"' Fourteen Stnt r~ havr adoptl'd some form of the ALI stntute. 
Sre Ark. Stat. Ann.§§ 41-303 to 41-:310 (Supp. 1971): Cnlif. Hcn11h 
and Safety Codr §§ 25950-25955.5 (Wrst Supp. 1972); Colo. Rev. 
8tats. Ann. §§ 40-2-50 to 40-2-53 (Perm. Cum. Supp. 1967); DeL 
l'oclr Ann., T1t. :24, §§ 1790-1793 (SuJ1p. 1972); Florida Lnw of 
Apr. 13, 1972, c. 72-196, 1972 Fla. Sess. Lnw Serv., at 380-382; Ga. 
Codr §§ 26-1201 to 26-1203 (1972); Knn. Stat. Ann. § 21-3407 
(Supp. 1971); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 43, §§ 137-139 (Rep!. 1971) ; 
~11~s. Code Ann.§ 2223 (Supp. 1972); N. M. Stat. Ann.§§ 40A-5-1 
to 40A-5-3 (Rrpl. 1972); N.C. Gen. Stnt. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1971), 
Ore. Rev. Stat.§§ 435.405 to 435.495 (1971); S.C. Code Ann.§§ 16-
R2 to Hi-89 (Supp. 1971) ; Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.1-62 to 18.1-62.3 
(8upp. 1972). Mr .. Just1ce Clark dE'~cribrd some of 1 h0se States as 
havmg "IE'd the way.'' Rrhgwn, Morality and Abortion: A Con-
~tltutional Appraisal, 2 Loyola U. (L.A.) 1. Rrv. 1, 11 (1969). 
By the rnd of 1970, four other Statrs had repealed criminal pen-
altl~ for abortwm; pE'rformed 111 rarly prrgnancy by a licensed 
phy:-;ICHln, subjE'ct to statE'd procedural and health reqmrcmcnts . 
Alaska Stat. § 11.15.060 (1970); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 453-16 (Supp. 
1971), N. Y. P0nal Code § 125.05 (McKinney Supp. 1972-1973), 
Wash. Rev. Codr §§ 9.02.060 to 9.02.080 (Supp. 1972) . The precise 
statuR of cnmmal abortiOn laws m somr Stntes is made unclear by 
rrcent. deci~1on~ 111 state nnd frderal courts striking down ex1st1hg: 
f't;i!e liiw~ . m wholr or m part .. 
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wc>ll into the 19th century. Even later, the law con~ 
tJilued for some time to treat less punitively an abortiorl 
procured in early pregnancy. 
li The posit1"on of the American Medical Association. 
The anti-abortion mood prevalent in this country in 
the late 19th cen t1,1ry was shared by the medical pro~ 
fession . Indeed, the attitude of the profession may have 
played a significant role in the enactment of stringent 
cnminal abortion legislation during that period. 
Au AMA Committee on Criminal Abortion was ap-
pointed in May 1857. It presented its report, 12 Trans. 
of the Am. Med. Assn. 73-77 (1859), to the Twelfth 
Annual Meeting. rr'hat report observed that the Com-
rmttee had been appointed to investigate criminal abor-
tion "with a view to its general suppression." It 
dPplored abortion and its frequency and it listed threP 
c·auses "of this general demoralization" : 
''The first of these causes is a wide-spread popu-
lar tgnorance of the true character of the crime--
a belief, even among mothers themselves, that the 
foetus is not alive till after the period of quickening. 
''The second of the agents alluded to is the fact 
that th~ profession themselves are frequently sup-
posed careless of foetal life . . . 
"The third reason of the frightful extent of this 
rnme is found in the grave defects of our laws, 
both common and statute, as regards the independ-
Pnt and actual existence of the child before birth, 
as a living being. These errors, which are suffi-
Cient m most instances to prevent conviction, are 
based, and only based, upon mistaken and exploded 
medical dogmas. With strange inconsistency, the 
law fully acknowledges the foetus in utero and its 
inherent rights, for civil purposes; while personally 
and as criminally affected, it fails to recognize it, 
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l:Lnd to its Life as yet r.lemes all protectwn ." ld., 
at 75- 76 
The C'omm1ttee then offered, and the AssociatiOn 
adopted, resolutions protesting "against such unwarrant-
able destruction of human life," calling upon state legis-
latures to revise their abortion laws, and requesting 
the cooperation of state medical societies "in pressing> 
t,he subject." I d., at 28, 78 
In 1871 a long and vivid report was submitted by the 
( 'ommittce 011 Criminal Abortion . It ended with thf' 
observation , "We had to deal with human life. In a 
matter of less importance we could entertain no com-
promise. An honest judge on the bench would call 
things by their proper names. We could do no less .. ,. 
.22 Trans. of the Am. Med. Assn. 258 (1871). lt prof-
fered resolutiOns, adopted by the Associatwn, id., at 
38- 39, recommending, among other things, that It "be 
unlawful and unprofessional for any physician to mduce 
abortion or premature labor, w1thout the concurrent 
opinion of at least one respectable consulting physician. 
and then always with a view to the safety of the child-
If that be possible," and calling "the attention of the 
clergy of all denominations to the perverted views of 
morality entertained by a large class of females-aye, 
and men also, on this Important question .'' 
Except for periodic condemnatiOn of the crimmal abor.~ 
twmst, no further formal AMA action took place unt1l 
1967. In that year the Committee on Human Repro-· 
duction urged the adoptiOn of a stated policy of oppo-
sition to induced abortion except when there ts 
"documented medical evidence" of a threat to the health 
or life of the mother, or that the child "may be born 
with incapacitating physical deformity or mental de-
ficiency, " or that a pregnancy "resulting from legally 
established statutory or forcible rape or incest may con-
stitute a thrPat to the mental or physical health of th<'\ 
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patient,' ' and two other physicians "chosen because of 
theJr recognized professional competence have examined 
the patient and have concurred in writing," and the 
procedure His performed in a hospital accredited by thP 
.Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals." The 
providing of medical information by physicians to statE' 
legislatures 111 their consideration of legislation regard-
mg therapeutic abortion was "to be considered consistent 
with the principles of ethics of the American Medical 
Associl:j.tion.'' This rec01nmendation was adopted by the 
House of Delegates. Proceedings of the AMA House 
of Delegates, 40--51 (June 1967) 
In 1970, after the introductiOn of a vanety of wo-
posed resolutions, and of a report from its Board of 
Trustees, a reference committee noted "polarization of 
the medical profession on this controversial issue"; divi-
sion among those who had testified; a difference of 
opimou among AMA councils and committees; Hthe 
remarkable shift in testimony" in six months, felt to be 
mfiuenced "by the rapid changes in state laws and by 
the judicial decisions which tend to make abortion more 
freely available;" and a feeling "that this trend will 
continue." On June 25, 1970, the House of Delegates 
adopted preambles and most of the resolutions proposed 
by the reference committee. The preambles emphasized 
"the best mterests of the patient,'' "sound clinical judg-
ment,'' and "informed patient consent," in contrast to 
"mere acqmescence to the patient's demand." The reso-
lutions asserted that abortion is a medical procedure 
that should be performed by a licensed physician m an 
accredited hospital only after consultation w1th two 
other physicians and in conformity with state law, and 
that no party to the procedure should be required to 
vwlate personally held moral pnnciples.~' Proceedings 
~' "When·a~, AbortiOn, like rmy other mcdiCfll procedure, should 
not. bP pNforrned whrn ront rary to the brst mtPrPst~ of t hP pat,iPnt 
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X>f the AMA House of Delegates 221 (June 1970). The 
AMA Judic1al Council rendered a complementary 
0]111110ll :<n 
7 The position of the American Public Health Asso-
cwtion. ln October 1970, the Executive Board of the 
A PHA adopted Standards for Abortion Services. These 
were five 111 number 
"a. Rapid and s1mple abortion referral must be 
readily available through state and local public 
~mce good medical practice reqUJrrs due consideratiOn for the pa· 
ttrnt ':,; welfare and not merr acqmescence to the patient's drmand. 
and 
"Wherra~, The standards of ~ound rhmcal JUdgment, whteh, to-
gNher w1th mformcd pnt1rnt ronsrnt should be determmat1ve ar-
rordmg to the mrnts of each mdividual c::~~e; therefore be it 
"RESOLVED, That ::~bortwn IS a mrdteal procedure and should 
ht> pcrformrd only by a duly licensrd physman and surgf'on m an 
acrrPdtted hosp1tnl actmg only after consultatiOn w1th two other 
phy~JC'I<lllb choArn because of thE'Ir profE'sswnal competf'ncy and m 
conformance w1th standards of good medical practice and the Medi-
eal Prart1rr Act of h1s StatP; and be it fmther 
"RESOLVED, That no phys1cwn or other professiOnal per:;onnel 
:<hall be compelled to pt>rform any net which vwlnte~ h1s good med-
teal ]ltdgmrnt. Nenhrr physician, hospital, nor hospital personnel 
shall be reqmred to perform nny act vwlative of personally-held 
moral pnnc1ples. ln these c1rcumstanres good mediCal practice re-
qUire:; only that the physician or other professiOnal personnel With-
draw from the case ;;o long ::~s the withdrawal IS consistent with 
good medical practwe." Proceedmg~ of the AMA House of Dele 
gate::. 221 (.June 1970 J 
w ' 'Tlw Prmr1ples of Mrd1ral Ethics of the AMA do not prohibit 
n phyHtcum from 1wrformmg an abort JOn that IS performed 111 ac 
C'ordanre w11 h good medical prachre and under circumstances that 
do not vwlate the law:; of the commumty m whtch he practices 
' lu the matter of abortwns, as of any other medical procedure, 
the ,)uchrwl ComlCil beromes mvolvrcl whenever there is alleged vto-
latwu of the Pnnctplrs of Med1ral Eth1cs al:l established by th(· ·-
Hou.::i<' ol Uelc·gntP~ .. 
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health departments, medical societies, or other non-· 
profit organizations. 
' 'h. An Important functiOn of counseling should 
be to simplify and expedite the provision of abor-
t,wn services; it should not delay the obtaining' 
of these servJCes. 
"c Psychiatric consultation should not be m&n-
datory . As in the case of other specialized medical 
services, psychiatric consultation should be sought 
for definite indications and not on a routine basis. 
"rl. A wide range of individuals from appropn-
ately trained, sympathetic volunteers to highly 
skilled physicians may qualify as abortion counselors. 
''f> . Contraception and/or sterilization should be 
discussed with each abortion patient." Recom-
mended Standards for Abortion Services, 61 Am . 
. J Pub Health 396 (1971) 
Among factors pertinent to life and health risks asso-
Ciated with abortion were three that "are recognized as 
1mportant'' 
' 'a. the skill of the physician, 
''b. the env1romnent in which the abortwn Is 
performed, and above all 
"c. the duration of pregnancy, as determined by 
uterine size and confirmed by menstrual history.'' 
!d., at 397 
lt was said that "a well-equipped hospital" offers 
more protection "to cope with unforeseen difficulties 
than an office or clinic without such resources. . . . The 
factor of gestational age is of overriding importance.'' 
Thus it was recommended that abortions in the second 
tnmester and early abortions in the presence of existing 
medical complications be performed iu hospitals as in-
patient procedures. For pregnancies in the first tn-
mester, abortion in the hospital with or without overnight 
HOE" WADE 
stay "Is probably the safest practice." An abortiOn 111 
an extramural facility, however, is an acceptable alter-
native "provided arrangements exist in advance to adm1t 
patients promptly if unforeseen complications develop." 
Standards for an abortion facility were listed. It was 
said that at present abortions should be performed by 
physicians or osteopaths who are licensed to practice 
and who have "adequate traming." ld., at 398. 
8. The position of the American Bar Association. At 
1ts meetmg m February 1972 the ABA House of Dele-
gates approved, with 17 opposing votes, the Umform 
Abortion Act that had been drafted and approved the 
preceding August by the Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws. 58 A. B. A. J. 380 (1972). 
We set forth the Act 111 full 111 the margin.40 The 
'' UNIFOHM ABOHTION ACT 
"Sr,c1'ION l. [Abortwn Defined: When Authorized.] 
·· (a) 'Abortion' mrans the termmatwn of human pregnancy with 
an mtentwn othrr than to produce a hvr btrth or to remove a dead 
t"rt ub . 
'' (b) An abortiOn may bt> JH'rt"ormed 111 tlns state only tl It ts 
pPrformed. 
'' (1) by a phy~t<'Iall hcen~rd to practtce mrchcmr Lor osteopathy] 
lfl tlus state or by a phySICian practtcmg mrdtcme ror osteopathy] 
m tlw rmploy of the governmrnt of the Untted States or of th1s 
~tate, [and thr abortwn IS prrformed [m thr phy8tcwn's oflice or 111 
" nH'd1cal chmr, or] m a hospttal approvPd by the [Drpartment of 
HralthJ or opNated by thr Umted Statrs, thts state, or any depart 
ment , ageney, or politJcal ~ubdtvtswn of etther; j or by a female 
upon hrrself upon the aclvtcr of thr phystrwn ; and 
"(2) wtthin 120] wcrks aftrr the cornmrnremrnt of thr pregnancy 
[OJ' after [20] wrrk~ only If the ph~·strtan has reasonable cause tO 
behove (t) there 1~ a ~ubstanttal rtsk that contmuance of the preg~ 
nnac~ would cndang;rr the life of the mothrr or would gravely im-
patr thr phy~Ical or mental hralth of the mothrr, (ti) that the child 
would br born wtth grave phy~tral or mental drfect, or (tit) that 
thr prrgnanry rP~ttltPd from rape or mce:;t, or tlltcit intercourse w1t h 
a gtrl under thr :tgc of lfj years of ageJ 
'SECTION 2. I J>enalty.J Any person who performs or procurOb· 
;tn abortion othrr than authonzcd by thts Act 1s guilty of a [felony] 
.. 
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Conference has appended an enlip;htening Prefatory 
\f ote .' · 
nr 
Three reasons have been advanced to explam Justor-
ically the enactment of crunmal abortion laws in the 
19th century and to JUStify their continued existence. 
and , upon convict Ion thPreof, may be sentencrd to pay a fine not 
P.XCPE'Chn~ [$1,000] or to nnprtsonmrnt [in the state pcmtenhary] 
not Pxcccdm~ [5 years], or both. 
'H~<;CTlON a [Uniformity of lnter]J1'etatwn.J ThiS Act shall be 
<'Oll~trued to effectuate 1ts ~eneral purpo~r to make uniform the law 
Wit b resprct to thr subject of tim; Act amon!!: thosr states wh1ch 
t'lJH('t It 
"SEC'I'lON 4. [8hort Tttle .J Tim• Act may be c1ted a13 the Umform 
AbortwJI A<'t 
"SECTION 5. [8everabzhty.J If any proviHIOII of this Act or the 
npphcatJOn thereof to an.v per~on or Circumstance IS lwld mvalld, 
t lw mvahdity doP~ not affPct other provisions or applicatiOns of 
1 fn~ Art wh1ch can be giVen effect Without the mvahd provisiOn or 
apphratwn, and to this end the provisions of th1s Act arr severable. 
"SIW'I'ION fi [Repeal.] The followmg; act;. and part~< of act~ an• 
I f'Jl(' ttl<•d 
(II 
(:!1 
\ ;~ J 
SECTION 7. [ Ttrne oj l'akmg Ef)ert.] Th1~ Act. shall take 
(•ffe('t--·----- - · 
11 ''Thl8 Act 1~ ba~ed largely upon the N l'W York abortion a cL I ol~ 
lowm~ a review of the more recen1 Ia ws on abortiOn in several states 
<llld upon reco~mtwn of a more liberal trend m laws on thJH snb.]ect. 
RProgn1t1on wa~ g1ven abo to the several deciSIOns m state and fed-
l'ral l'ourts wluch ~how a furtlwr trend toward ltberalizatwn of 
abort JOn Ia wH, ('Sperwlly durm~ thr fir~t t nmester of prrgnaney 
· nrcO!!;Illzmg thnt a number of problems appeared in Nrw York, :1 
~Jwrtrr tune prnod for 'unlnmtrd' abortiOns was advisable. The 
t1mr pPriOd was brackrtrd to prnmt thr vanous ::;tates to msrrt, a 
hgure morr 1n krrpm~ w1th the diffprrnt conditwm; that m1ght ex1st 
among the state~. Likrw1se, thP lan~uage limttmg thr placP or 
place~ tn wluch abortions rna~· br prrformPd was also bracketed to 
:u•cmu1t for d1fferent condniom; among thr states. ln additwn, lum-
tn t1on>o on abortHms after the mitwl 'nnhm1t rd' pcnod wrrc placrd 
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it has been argued occasiOnally that these laws were 
the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage 
illicit sexual conduct. Texas, however, does not advancE' 
this JUstification in the present case, and it appears that 
110 court or commentator has taken the argument sen-
ously.'2 The appellants and amici contend, moreover, 
that this 1s not a proper state purpose at all and suggest 
that, if it were, the Texas statutes are overbroad in 
protecting It since the law fails to distinguish between 
married and unwed mothers. 
A second reason is concerned with abortion as a med-
Ical procedure. When most criminal abortion laws were 
first enacted, the procedure was a hazardous one for 
the womau.' 3 This was particularly true pnor to the 
development of antisepsis. Antiseptic techmques, of 
course, were based on discovenes by Lister, Pasteur, and 
others first announced in 1867, but were not generally 
accepted and employed until about the turn of the cen-
tury . Abortwn mortality was high. Even after 1900, 
and perhaps until as late as the development of antibiotics 
111 the 1940's, standard modern techniques such as dila-
m bracket::; so that mdividual statrs may adopt all or any of the~o 
rrason~. or place further r0st nctiOnH upon abortiOns aftrr thr mitml 
[ll'riOd . 
'This Act dot·~ not eontam any vrovi~IOn rrlatlll!l; to mechcal re-
VICW commlttrPs or prohibitionH agamst sanctiOns imposed upon 
mPchcaJ pNsonnPI rdusmg to partICipate m n bortions because of 
rehp;Ious or other similar rea~on~, or the like. Such provisiOns, wlulo 
relatrd, do not dm>ctly pertmn to wlwn, when·, or by whom abor-
t 1011~ may be prrformcd; howPvC'r, thr Act IS not drafted to excludo 
~uc!J a provisiOn by a staiP \Vlshmg to C'IIaCt the samr." 
'" 8r0, for example, YWCA v. Kugler, :~42 F. Supp. 1048, 1074 
(to-; ,). 1972); Abele v. Markle, :342 F. Supp. 800, 805-806 (Conn 
1!:J72J (t'-;rwman, .J., concurring), appPal pendmg ; Walsmgham v 
Piorula , 250 :::lo. :2d 857, 8(i;3 (Ervm, .J. , concurring) (Fin. Supp, 
l!:l72); State v. Oedirke, -n N . . 1 L. Nfi. NO (Sup. :::lt. 1881); lVJran;; 11, 
a I ;{/--.1-:~1\:2 
'":::lee C. HaagcJI~en & W Lloyd ,·A Hundred Years ol' Mcdic!lle .. 
1~1. \ lH4;{ 1 .. , 
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tion and curettage were not uearly so safe as they are· 
today Thus 1t has been argued that a State's real 
<"Oncern w enactmg a cnminal abortion law was ta 
protect the pregnant woman, that Is, to restrain her 
from submitting to a procedure that placed her life 
tn serious Jeopardy 
Modern medical techmques have altered this situa-
tiOn. Appellants and various amici refer to medical 
data indicating that abortion 111 early pregnancy. that 
is. prior to the end of first trimester, although not 
w1thout Its risk, IS now relatively safe. Mortality rates 
for women undergoing early abortions, where tht> 
procedure is legal. appear to be as low as or lower 
than the rates for normal childbirth." Consequently. 
any mterest of the State In protecting the woman from \ 
an inherently hazardous procedure, except when it would 
be equally dangerous for her to forgo it, has largely 
disappeared . Of course. Important state interests In 
the area of health anu medical standards do remam 
The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to 1t that 
abortion, like any other medical procedure, is per-
formed under circumstances that insure maximum safety 
for the patient. This interest obviously extends at 
least to the performing physician and his staff. to the 
facilities involved, to the availability of after-care, and 
to adequate provision for any complication or emer-
gency that might arise. The prevalence of high mor-
tality rates at illegal "abortion mills" strengthens, rather 
14 Pott~, Po~tronceptwn Control of Fertility, b lnt'l .J. of U. & 0 
957, 967 (1970) (England and Wales) ; AbortiOn l\Iortahty , 20 Mor-
btdity and Morality, 208,209 (.July 12, 1971) (U S. Dept. of HEW. 
Public Hralth Serv1cr) (Nrw York City); Tietze, United States 
TherapeutJr Abortwns, 196:3-1968, 59 Studies m Family Planning 5, 
7 (1970) , Tietze, l\Iortahty w1th Contrarrption and lndurrd Abor 
lion, 45 ::ltudirs 111 F:umly Planmng 6 (1969) (.Japan, CzrchoslovakJa, 
Hungary) , Tirtze & Lehfeldt , Legal Abortion m Ea~tem Europe. 
175 .) . A. M. A 1149, 1152 (Apnl 1961) Othrr so urcrs nre dlR· 
l'tiR::-rcl 111 Ladf'r 17-2:{ 
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than weakens, the State's mterest m regulatmg the con-
ditions under which abortions are performed. More-
over. the risk to the woman increases as her pregnancy 
continues. Thus the State retains a definite interest 
111 protecting the woman's own health and safety when 
an abortion is proposed at a late stage of pregnancy. 
The third reason IS the State's interest-some phrase 
1t in terms of duty-in protecting prenatal life. Some 
of the argument for this justification rests on the theory 
that a new human life is present from the moment of 
conception.<G The State's interest and general obliga-
tiOn to protect life then extends, it is argued, to pre-
natal life. Only when the life of the pregnant mother 
herself is at stake, balanced against the life she carries 
within her, should the interest of the embryo or fetus 
not prevail. Logically, of course, a legitimate state in· 
terest in this area need not stand or fall on acceptance 
of the belief that life begins at conception or at some 
other point prior to live birth. In assessing the State's 
mterest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claim 
that as long as at least potential life is involved, the 
State may assert mterests beyond the protectiou of thf' 
pregnant woman alone 
Parties challenging state abortwu laws have sharply 
disputed in some courts the contention that a purpose 
of these laws, when enacted, was to protect prenatal 
llfe:n Pointing to the absence of legislative history to 
support the contentiOn, they claim that most state laws 
were designed solely to protect the woman. Because 
medical advances have lessened this concern, at least 
· ~ See Bnef of Amicu~ Natwnal Hight to Life Foundatwn , R 
Drman, The Inviolability of thr Right to Be Born, in Abortwn and 
the Law 107 (D Smith, editor, 1967) , Louisell, Abortion , The Prar-
hce of MediCmc, and the Due ProcrHs of Law. 16 UCLA L Rev 
233 ( 1969), Noonan I 
111 Sre, e. g., Abele v Markle, :H:l F'. 8upp. ~00 (Conn . 1972) ~ 
t' PJH'al prndllll!. 
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w1th respect to abortion m early pregnancy, they argue 
that with respect to such abortions the laws can no 
longer be JUstified by any state interest. There is some 
scholarly support for this view of original purpose! 7 The 
few state courts called upon to interpret their laws in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries did focus on the 
State's interest in protecting the woman's health rather 
than 111 prcservmg the embryo and fetus! 8 Proponents 
of this view point out that in many States, including 
Texas,'11' by statute or JUdicial interpretation, the preg-
nant woman herself could not be prosecuted for self-
abortion or for cooperating in an abortion performed 
upon her by another."0 They claim that adoption of 
the "quickening" distinction through received common 
law and state statutes tacitly recognizes the greater 
health hazards inherent in late abortion and impliedly 
repudiates the theory that life begins at conception. 
It IS with these interests, and the weight to be at-
tachPd to them, that thi.s case is concerned . 
VIIJ 
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right 
of privacy. In a line of decisions, however, going back 
17 SeE' dJHCU8SIOns m Means I and Means 11. 
'"8c<', e. g., State v. Murphy, 27 N. ,J. L. 112, 114 (1858) . 
10 Watson v. State, 9 Tex. App . 237, 244--245 (1880); Moore v, 
.State, :37 Tex. Crim. R . 552, 561 , 40 S. W. 287, 290 (1897); Shaw 
' State, 73 TPx. Cnm. R. 337, :~39, 165 S. W. 930, 931 (1914), 
Fondren v. State, 74 Tex. Cnm. R. 552, 557, 169 S. W. 411, 414 
(1914) ; Gmy v. State, 77 Tex. Crim. R. 221, 229, 178 S. W. 337, 341 
( 1915) There ~~ no 1mmumty m Texa;; for the father who IS not 
mnmE'd to the mother. Hammett v. State, 84 Tex. Crim. Jt. 635, 
209 S. W. 661 (1919) ; Thompson v. State, - Tex Crim. H.-
( 1971) , appeal prndmg. 
" 0 SeP Smith v. State, 33 Nle. 48,55 (1851); In re Vmce, 2 N.J. 
44:3 , 450,67 A. 2d 141, 144 (1949). A Hhort discussion of thr modern 
law on tlus 1ssur 1;; contmnecl m the Commrnt to the ALI'H Model 
!>f~nHI Code~ 207 11. at 158 nnd 1111. 35-37 (Trnt Draft No. 9, 1959). 
i0-18-0PTNION 
HOE ·o WADE 
perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 
U. S. 250, 251 (1891), the Court has recognized that a 
nght of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas 
or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. 
In varying contexts the Court or individual Justices 
have indeed found at least the roots of that right in 
the First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 
557, 564 (1969); in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 8- 9 (1968), Katz v. United 
States, 389 U. S. 347, 350 ( 1967), Boyd v. United States, 
116 U. S. 616 (1886) , see Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting); in 
the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U. S. 479, 484- 485 (1965); in the Ninth 
Amendment, id., at 486 (Goldberg, J. , concurring); or 
111 the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923). These decisions make it 
clear that only personal rights that can be deemed "fun-
damental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, '' 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937) , are 
mcluded in this guarantee of personal privacy. They 
also make It clear that the right has some extension to 
activities relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 
lT. S. 1, 12 (1967) , procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 
316 U. S. 535, 541- 542 (1942), contraception, Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453-454 (1972); id., at 
460, 463-465 (WHITE, J. , concurring), family relation-
ships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944), 
and child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U. 8 . 510, 535 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska. 
supra 
This nght of privacy, whether It be founded in the 
Fourteenth Amendment 's concept of personal liberty 
and restrictwns upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as. 
~ht' District Court. determined, in the Ninth Amend-
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ment's reservatwn of nghts to the people, 1s broad 
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not 
to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the 
State would impose upon the pregnant woman by deny-
ing this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and 
direct harm medically diagnosable even in early preg-
nancy may be involved . Maternity, or additional off-
spring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and 
future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental 
and physical hf'alth may be taxed by child care. There 
ts also the distress, for all concerned, associated with 
the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bring-
mg a child into a family already unable, psychologically 
and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in thiS 
one. the additional difficulties and continumg stigma 
of unwed motherhood may be mvolved. All these are 
factors the woman and her responsible physician nf'ces-
sarily will consider m consultatiOn. 
On the basis of elements such as these, appellants and 
some amici argue that the woman's right is absolute 
and that she IS entitled to terminate her pregnancy at 
whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason 
she alone chooses. With this we do not agree. Appel-
lants' arguments that Texas either has no valid interest 
at all in regulating thf' abortion decision, or no inter-
est strong enough to support any limitation upon 
the woman's sole determination, is unpersuasive. The 
Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy also 
acknowledge that some state regulation in areas pro-
tected by that right is appropriate. As noted above, a 
state may properly aRsert important interests in safe-
guarding health, in mamtaining medical standards, and 
in protecting potential life. At some point in pregnancy, 
these> respective interests become sufficiently compelling' 
to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abor-
twn decision The privacy ri~~:h t involved, therefore,. 
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cannot be said to be absolute. In fact, it 1s not clear 
to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has 
an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases 
bears a close relationship to the right of privacy pre-
viously articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court 
has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind 
in the past. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 
(1905) (vaccination); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) 
(sterilization). 
We therefore conclude that the nght of personal pn-
vacy mcludes the abortion decision, but that this right 
is not unqualified and must be considered against impor-
tant state interests in regulation . 
We note that those federal and state courts that have 
recently considered abortion Jaw challenges have reached 
the same conclusion. A majority, in addition to the 
District Court in the present case, have held state laws 
unconstitutional, at least in part, because of vague-
ness or because of overbreadth and abridgement of rights. 
Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (Conn. 1972), ap-
peal pending; Abele v. Markle,- F. Supp.- (Conn. 
Sept. 20, 1972), appeal pending; Doe v. Bolton, 319 
F. Supp. 1048 (ND Ga. 1970) , appeal decided today, 
post-; Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (ND Ill. 1971). 
appeal pending; Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986· 
( Kan. 1972); YWCA v. K 'ugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (NJ 
1972); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (ED Wis. 
1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U. S. 1 (1970); People v 
Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954,458 P. 2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 
397 U. S. 915 (1970); State v. Barquet, 262 S. 2d 431 
(Fla. 1972) 
Others have sustained state statutes. Crosse11 v 
Attorney General, 344 F. Supp. 587 (ED Ky. 1972), 
appeal pending; Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of 
Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (ED La. 1970), 
appeal pending, Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 
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(WDNC 1971), appeal pending; Steinberg v. Brown,. 
:321 F. Supp .. 741 (ND Ohio 1970); Doe v. Rampton, 
-- F. Supp.- (Utah 1971), appeal pending; Cheaney 
v. Indiana, - Ind. -, 285 N. E. 2d 265 (1972), 
Spears v State, 257 So. 2d 876 (Miss. 1972); State v . 
Munson,-- R. D.--. 201 N W. 2d 123 (1972), appeal 
pending 
Although the results are d1v1ded, most of these courts 
have agreed that the right of privacy, however based, 
is broad enough to cover the abortion decision; that the· 
right, nonetheless, is not absolute and is subject to some 
limitations; and that at some point the state interests 
as to protection of health, medical standards, and pre-
natal life. become dominant. We agree w1th thts 
approach. 
Where certam "fundamental rights '' are Involved, the 
Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may 
be JUStified only by a "compelling state interest," Kramer 
v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 634 (1969), Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 406 (1963), and that 
legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to ex-
press only the legitimate state interests at stake. Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Aptheker 
v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 508 (1964); Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 307-308 (1940); see 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 460, 463-464 (1972) 
(WHITE, J., concurring) 
In the recent abortion cases, cited above, courts have 
recognized these principles. Those striking down state 
laws have generally scrutinized the State's interest in 
protecting health and potential life and have concluded 
that neither interest JUStified broad limitations on the 
reasons for which a physician and his pregnant pat1ent 
n'light decide that she should have an abortion in the 
<•arly stages of pregnancy. Courts sustaining state laws \ 
... 
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have held that the ~tate 's determinatiOns to protect 
health or prenatal liff' arf' dominant and constitutionally 
IUStifiah]P, 
I,\ 
The Distnct Court held that the appellee failed to 
meet his burden of demonstrating that the Texas stat-
ute's mfringement upon Roe's rights was necessary to 
support a compelling state interest, and that, although 
the defendant presented "several compelling justifi-
cations for state presence in the area of abortions," 
the statutes outstripped these justifications and swept 
"far beyond any areas of compelling state interest." 
314 F. Supp., at 1222-1223. Appellant and appellee 
both contest that holding. Appellant, as has been JH-
clicated, claims an absolute right that bars any state 
unposition of criminal penalties 1n the area. Appel-
lee argues that the State's determmation to recogmze 
and protect prenatal life from and after conception con-
~titutes a compelling state interest. As noted above. 
we do not agree fully with either formulation 
A. The appellee and certain amici argue that thl-' 
fetus ts a "person" within the language and meamng of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this they 
outline at length and in detail the well-known facts 
of fetal development. If this suggestiOn of personhood 
IS established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, 
for the fetus' right to life is then guaranteed specifically 
by the Amendment. The appellant conceded as much 
on reargument,5 ' On the other hand, the appellee con-
ceded on reargument "" that no case could be cited that 
holds that a fetus Is a person within thf' meaning of 
thf' Fourteenth Amendment .. 
The Constitution does not define "person " m so many 
words. :SE><'tion I of thE' FourtE'E'n th Amendment ~on . . 
''>~ Tr of HParg . 20-~ I. 
~~ Tr of Hc•a rg 24 
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tains three r-eferences to ''person.' ' The first, in defining' 
"citizens,'' speaks of "persons born or naturalized in 
the United States .. , The word also appears both J n 
the Due Process Clause and in the Equal Protection 
Clause. "Person" is used m other places 111 the Con· 
st1tut10n. 111 the listing of qualifications for rcpresenta.~ 
t1 ves and senators, Art. I, § 2, cl. 2, and § 3, cl. 3; 111 
~he ApportiOnment Clause, Art. I, ~ 2, cl. 3; ·"' 111 thf" 
Migration and Importation provision, Art. I, ~ 9, cl. 1; 
in the Emolument Clause·, Art. I, § 9, cl. 8; m the Elec-
tors provisions, Art. II, ~ 1, cl. 2, and the superseded 
cl. 3; in the provisiOn outlining qualifications for thP' 
office of President, Art. II, ~ 1, cl. 5; in the Extradition 
provisions, Art. lV, ~ 2, cl. 2, and the superseded FugJ-
LJve Slave cl. 3; and in the Fifth, Twelfth, and Twenty-
second Amendments as well as in §§ 2 and 3 of thP 
Fourteenth Amendment. But in nearly all these Ul-
(4tances, the use of the word is such that 1t has applica-
tiOn only postnatally. None mdicates, with any 
assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal apphcatwn. 54 
"'We are not aware that 1n the takmg ot any census undrr th1s 
rlause, a fetus has ever been counted 
~· When Texas urges that a fetus 1s entitled to .Fourteenth Amend-
ment protectiOn as a prrsou, 1t l'aces a dilemma. Neither in Texa~ 
nor m any other State are all abortwns proh1bited. Despite broad 
proscnptwn, an exception always t'XIsts. The exception contnmed 
in Art. 1196, for an abortion prorurrd or attempted by medJcal ad-
vice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother, JS typwal. But 
il the fetus is a prrson who JS not to be depnved of llfe without due 
process of law, and d' the mother's cond1t10n JS the sole determmant, 
does not the Texas exception apprar to be out of line w1th the . 
Amendment's command? 
There are other mcons1stencJes betwreu Fourteenth Ame11drnent. 
"Latus and the typiCal abortion statute. lt has already been pomted 
out, n. 49, supra, that in Texas the woman 1s not a principal or an 
i'!Ccomplic<' with resprct, to an abortwn upon her If the fetus IS 
" person, why 1s the woman not a prmc1pal or an accomplice? 
~~urther, the penalty for criminal abortwn spec1fied by Art. 1195 





All this, together w1th our observatiOn, supra, that, 
throughout the maJor portion of the 19th century pre-
vailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they 
are today, persuades us that the word "person," as used 
In the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include th(' 
l.mborn .55 This 1s in accord with the results reached 
ln those few cases where the issue has been squarely 
pre sen ted. McGarvey v. Magee- W omens Hospital, 340 
F Supp. 751 (WD Pa. 19'7~); Byrn v. New York City 
Health & Hospitals Corp., 31 N. Y . . 2d 194, 286 N. E 
2d 887 ( 1972), appeal pending; Abele v. Markle, --
.F. Supp. -- (Conn. Sept. :20, 1972), appeal pending. 
Compare Cheaney v. Indiana, - lnd. - , 285 N. E. 
265, 270 ( 1972) ; Montana v. Rogers, 278 F. 2d 68, 72 
( CA7 1960), aff'd sub nom. Montana v. Kennedy, 
366 F . S. 308 (1961); Keeler v. Superior Court, -· 
Cal. - - , 470 P. 2d 617 (1970); State v. Dickinson, ~3 
Ohw App. 2d 259, 275 N. E. 2d 599 (1970). Indeed, our 
decisiou in United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971). 
Inferentially IS to the same effect, for we there would 
not have indulged in statutory interpretation favorablE• 
to abortion m specified circumstances if the necessary 
consequence was the termination of life entitled to Four-
tPenth Amendment protection . 
This conclusion, however, does not of Itself fully 
answer the contentions raised by Texas. and we pass 
un to other considerations 
B The pregnant woman cannot be Isolated m her 
privacy. She carries an embryo and , later. a. fetus. If 
hy Art 1257 of thr Texa~ Penal CodP lf the frtus i~ a per;,;on, may 
r he penaltJE•s be difFerent ~ 
'~ C'f the Wisconsm abortiOn statute, definmg '·unborn child " 
to mean "a human being from t.he time of conception unhl1t IS born 
a h.v!:' ,'' Wis . Stat . § 940.04 (6) (1969) , and the new ConnectiCut stat 
ute. Pubhc Act No . 1, May 1972 Specml Sess10n, declaring tt to b!" 
the pub he policy of the State and the legislative mtcnt "to prot ert. 
MHi prf'~~Prve human liffl from thfl moment. of conception ,. 
# 
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one accepts the medical defimtwns of the developing-
young in the human uterus. See Dorland's Illustrated 
Medical Dictionary. 478-479, 547 (24th ed. 1965) . Thf' 
t\ituation therefore is mherently different from marital 
intHnacy, or bedroom possessiOn of obscene material, or 
marriage, or procreatiOn. or educatiOn, with which Eise11-
stadt, Giswotd, Stanley, Loving, Skinner, Pierce, and 
Meyer were respectively concerned. As we have inti-
mated above, it 1s reasonable and appropnate for a 
:-:\tate to decide that at some powt in timf' another 
Interest, that of health of the mother or that of poten-
tial human hfe, becomes significantly mvolved. Thl.:' 
woman's privacy IS no longer sole and any nght of 
privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly 
Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, life begins at conception and 1s present through-
out pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a 
eompelling interest m protecting that life from and 
after conception. We need not resolve the difficult q ues-
twn of when life begins. When those trained 111 the 
respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theol-
ogy are unable to arnvc at any consensus, the Judiciary, 
at this point in the development of man's knowledge. 
Is not m a position to speculate as to the answer 
It should be sufficient to note briefly the wide diver-
gence of thinking on this most sensitive and difficult 
question . There has always been strong support for the 
v1ew that life does not begin until live birth. This was 
the belief of the Stoics."r. It appears to be the pre-
dominant, though not the unanimous, attitude of the 
.Jewish faith.fi 7 It may be taken to represent also tht> 
position of a large se@:ment of the Protestant community. 
"' Edelstem 16 
" 7 Ladrr 97-99; D. Fridman, Hirth Control m Jew1~h Law 251 -
294 (1968) For a stricter view, see 1. .Jnkobovits, Jewi ·h Views on-
Abortion , Ill Ahort10n 'tml tllf' Law 124 (D Sm1th Pel . 1967\ 
: 
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insofar as that can be ascertamed; orgamzed groups that 
have taken a formal position on the abortion issue have 
generally regarded abortion as a matter for the conscience 
of the individual and her family."8 As we have noted, 
the common law found greater significance in quickening. 
Physicians and their scientific colleagues have regarded 
that event with less interest and have tended to focus 
either upon conception or upon live birth or upon the 
interim point at which the fetus becomes "viable," that 
ts, potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, 
albeit with artificial aid. 59 Viability is usually placed 
at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, 
even at 24 weeks. 60 The Aristotelian theory of "mediate 
animation," that held sway throughout the Middle Age~ 
and the Renaissance in Europe, continued to be official 
Roman Catholic dogma until the 19th century, despite 
opposition to this "ensoulment" theory from those in the 
Church who would recognize the existence of life from 
the moment of conception. en The latter is now, of course, 
the official belief of the Catholic Church . As one of the 
briefs amicus discloses, this is a view strongly held by 
many non-Catholics as well, and by many physicians. 
Substantial problems for precise definition of this view 
are posed, however, by new embryological data that pur-
port to indicate that conception is a "process" over time, 
rather than an event, and by new medical techniques 
such as menstrual extraction, the "morning-after'' pill, 
'" Am1cus Bnef for the Amencan Eth1cal Umon et al For the 
ros1t10n of the NatiOnal Counr1l of Chmches and of othE'r cknommn 
t ions, srr Lader 99- 101 
on L. Hellman & .J. Pntcharcl, Wilhams Obstctncs 49a (14th t>d 
l!J71) . Dorland'!' Illust ratrd Mt'chral DJCtwnarv lfiR9 (24th rrl 
1965) 
no HPilman & Pntchard, supra, 11. 5il, at 49~ 
•n For discussiOns of thr drvelopmcnt of thr Roman Catholic po-
,;JtJOn, see D . Callahan, Abortwn Law , Choirr and Moralit.y 40!:) .. 
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lmplantatiou of embryos, artifiCJal Insemination, and even 
artificial wombs "; 
In areas other than crnmnal abortion the law has 
been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we 
recognize it, begms before live birth or to accord legal 
nghts to the unborn except in narrowly defined situations 
and except when the rights are contingent upon live 
b1rth. For example, the traditional rule of tort law had 
denied recovery for prenatal injuries even though the 
child was born alive. 63 That rule has been changed in 
almost every Jurisdiction. In most States recovery is said 
to be permitted only if the fetus was viable, or at least 
quick, when the inJuries were sustained, though few 
courts have squarely so held.61 In a recent development, 
generally opposed by the commentators, some States per-
mit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an action 
for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries.6 r. Such 
an action, however, would appear to be one to vindicate 
the parents' interest and is thus consistent with the 
v1ew that the fetus, at most, represents only the potential-
" 2 8€'e D . Brodie, Thr New Biolog~· and the Pr.enatal Child, 9 J 
Fam. ·L. :391, 397 (1970); R. Gorney, The New· Biology and the 
Future of 1\lan , 15 UCLA L. Rev. 273 (1968); Note, Crimu1al Law--
AbortiOn-The "1Yfornmg-Aft0r" Pill and Other Pre-Implantation 
B1rth-Control Methods and the Law, 46 Ore. L. Rev. 211 (1967); 
C Taylor, Thr Biological Timr Bomb 32 (1968); A. Rosenfeld, The 
Second Grnesu; 138-139 (1969); G. Smith, Through a Test Tube 
Darkly. Artificml lnsemmatwn and the Law, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 127 
(1968); Not€', Artificial Insrmmation and the Law, U. Ill . L. F. 203 
( 1968) 
6 ~ Prossrr, Handbook of tho Law of Torts :335-338 (1971); 2 
Harprr & James, The Law of TortR 1028-1031 (1956); Note, 63 
Harv. L. Rrv. 17:3 (1949) 
,,. See ca~e:; Cited in Prossrr, sup1'a, n. 62, nt 336-338; AnnotatiOn, 
Action for Denth of Unborn Child , 15 A. L. H.. 3d 992 (1967) . 
Go Prosser, supra, n . G2, at 338; Notr , The Law and the Unborn 
Child, 4fi Notrr Dame Law 349, 354-360 (1971) 
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!ty of life. ::)imilarly, unborn children have been recog~ 
nized as acquiring rights or interests by way of inheri-
tance or other devolution of property, and have been 
represented by guardians ad litem. 6u Perfection of the 
mterests involved, again, has generally been contingent 
upon live birth. In short, the unborn have never been 
recogni~ed in tlw law as persons in the whole sense. 
X 
lu view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting 
one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the 
pregnant woman that are at stake. We repeat, however, 
that the Htate does have an important and legitimate 
mtcrest 111 preservmg and protecting the health of the 
pregnant woman, whether she be a resident of the State 
or a nonresident who seeks medical consultatiOn and 
treatment there, and that it has still another important 
and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of 
human life. These interests are separate and distinct. 
Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches 
term and, at a point d unng pregnancy, each becomes 
·'compelling. · 
With respect to the ::)tate's Important and legitimate 
tnterest in the health of the mother, the "compelling" 
pomt, 111 the light of present medical knowledge, 1s at 
approximately the end of the first trimester. Th1s 1s so 
because of the now established medical fact, referred to 
above at p. 34, that until the end of the first trimester 
mortality 111 abortion is less than mortality in normal 
childbirth. It follows that, from and after this point, 
a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent 
~;o D Lom~rJI. Abortwu, The Practice of Med1rme, and the Due 
Prorc~s of Law, 16 UCLA L. Rev . 233, 235- 238 (1969) , Note, 56 
lowa L. Rev. 994, 999-1000 (1971) ; ~ote, The Law and ihe Unborl} 
\Child , 4fi Notrr Dame Law 349 , 351-354 t1971 l 
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that the regulatiOn reasonably relates to the preserva-· 
ttOn and protectiOn of maternal health. Examples of' 
permissible state regulation in this area are requirements 
as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform 
the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to 
the facility m which the procedure is to be performed. 
that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic 
or some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to 
the hcensing of the facility; and the like. 
This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of 
pregnancy prior to this "compelling" point, the attending 
physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to 
determine, without regulation by the State, that in h1s 
medical JUdgment the patient's pregnancy should be 
terminated. If that decision 1s reached, the Judgment 
may be effectuated · by an abortion free of interference by 
the Stat<" 
With respect to the ~tate 's Important and legitimate 
tllterest m potential life, the "compelling" point is at 
viability This is so because the fetus then presumably 
has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's 
womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after 
viability thus has both logical and biological j ustifica-
twns. lf the State is interested in protecting fetal life 
after viability, It may go so far as to proscribe abortwn 
during that period except when it is necessary to preserve 
the life or health of the mother 
Measured against these standards, Art. 1196 of the 
Texas Penal Code, 111 restricting legal abortions to those 
"procured or attempted by medical advice for the pur-
pose of saving the life of the mother," sweeps too broadly 
The statute makes no distinction between abortions per-
formed early in pregnancy and those performed later, 
and it limits to a single reason, "saving" the mother'& 
Jik the legal justification for the procedure. ThP· 
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statute, therefore, cannot survive the constitutional 
attack made upon it here. 
This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to consider 
t,he additional challenge to the Texas statute asserted on 
grounds of vagueness. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 
l' :-::, 62. 67- 72 (1071) 
XI 
To summanze and to repeat . 
l A state criminal abortion statute of the current 
Texas type, that excepts from criminality only a life 
.~aving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard 
to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other 
mterests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
\ (a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the 
first trirnester, the abortion decision and its effectuation 
must be left to the medical JUdgment of the pregnant 
woman's attending physician 
f (b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end 
of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest 
m the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate 
the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related 
to maternal health 
\ (c) For the stage subsequent to viability the State, 111 
promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, 
may, if 1t chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion 
except where It is necessary, 111 appropriate medical j udg-
ment. for the preservation of the life or health of thP 
mother 
\ 2 The State may clefine the term "physician, " as it 
has been employed in the preceding numbered paragraphs 
of this Part XI of this opinion, to mean only a physician 
eurrently licensed by the State. and may proscribe any 
abortion by a person who is not a physician as so defined . 
In Doe v Bolton, post, procedural requirements con-
.t.amed in onf> of th0 modern abortion statutes ar0 co11-
I I 
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siclered. That opmion and this one, of course, are to b(j 
rPad together H' 
This holding, we feel, is consistent with the relative 
weights of the respective interests involved, with the 
lessons and example of medical and legal history, with 
the lenity of the common law, and with the demands or' 
the profound problems of the present day. The decision 
leaves the Rtate free to place increasing restrictions on 
abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens, so long 
as those restrictions are tailored to the recognized state 
Interests. The decision vindicates the right of the phy-
sician to administer medical treatment according to his 
professional judgment up to the points where important 
state interests provide compelling justifications for inter-
vention. Up to those points the abortion decision in all 
Its aspects is i11herently, and primarily, a medical decision, 
and basic responsibility for it must rest with the phy-
siCian. If an individual practitioner abuses the privilegf:" 
of exercising proper medical judgment, the usual reme-
dies. JUdicial and intra-professional, are available 
XlT 
Our conclusiOn that Art. 1196 is unconstitutional 
means, of course, that the Texas abortion statutes. as a 
unit, must fall. The exception of Art. 1196 cannot be 
1" Neithrr 111 tlm; opmwn 11or 111 Doe v. Botton, post, do we dis-
cu~s the father'~ right~. 1f any rxist m the con~titutional context, 111 
the abort1on dec1sion. No p:lternal ngbt has brcn asserted 111 e1thrr 
of thr ca~rs, and the Trxas and the Georgm statutes on thrir face 
take no cogn1zancr of thr father. We arr aware that some statute:, 
rrcogn1ze t hr fa thrr under certain circumstance~. North Carolina, 
for examplr, lB N. C. Grn. Stat. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1971), rrquires 
wntten prrmisswn for thr abortwn from the husband when th0 
woman ~~ a marnrd rmnor , that ~~ . whrn shr 1s less than 18 year:, 
of agr, 41 ;-J , C . A. G. 489 (1971); if the woman 1s an unmamed 
m111or. wnttrn permission from the parents 1;; reqLmed. We need 
uot now drc1de whrther prov1sions of tim; kmd are const1tutwnal , 
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stricken separately, for then the State 1s left w1th a stat-
ute proscribing all abortion procedures no matter how 
medically urgent the case. 
Although the District Court granted plaintiff Roe 
declaratory relief, it stopped short of issuing an injunc-
tion against enforcement of the Texas statutes. The 
Court has recognized that different considerations enter 
mto a federal court's decision as to declaratory relief, on 
the one hand, and injunctive relief, on the other. Zwick-
ler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 252- 255 (1967); Dombrow-
ski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 (1965). We are not dealing 
with a statute that, on its face, appears to abridge free 
expression, an area of particular concern under Dom-
browski and refined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S., at 
,)() 
We find 1t unnecessary to decide whether the District 
Court erred in withholding injunctive relief, for we as-
sume the Texas prosecutorial authorities will give full 
•Credence to this decision that the present criminal abor-
tion statutes of that State are unconstitutional. 
The JUdgment of the District Court as to intervenor 
Hallford is reversed, and Dr. Hallford's complaint in 
intervention is dismissed. In all other respects the judg~ 
ment of the District Court is affirmed. Costs are allowed 
.to the appellf'e 
It ts so ordered . 
' .. 
The Abortion Decision 
It was inevitable that the Supreme 
Court decision voiding the majority of. 
State laws on abortion should arouse 
a storm of reaction. The issue is so 
charged with emotional and religious 
controversy that the response would 
have been as great regardless of how 
the court ruled. 
1 In deciding that the state has no 
• right to · interfere with a woman's de-
f.'> ' I cision to have or not to have a baby 
~ : · during her first six months ' of preg-
o 
nancy, the court followed an im-
v 
peccable line of reasoning: The 
Fourteenth1 Amendment guarantees a 
\:._ : right to privacy to all Amer:icans, in-
cluding women. During the first six 
months of pregnancy, a fetus cannot 
survive independent of its mother's 
body; therefore, a fetus does not con-
stitute a "person" covered by con-
stitutional guarantees. 
The court's logic continued: During 
the first trimester, especially, preg-
nancy is a medical matter, and thus 
any decisions made about that preg-
nancy rightfully rest with the woman 
and her doctor. The efforts of the 
state to infringe on a doctor's practice 
of his profession, through the require-
~ ment for boards of approval, or for 
certification by other physicians, can-
not be permitted under the Con-
stitution. During the second trimester 
of pregnancy, the state can interfere 
only to the point of regulating medical 
circumstances under which aQortions 
are performed, to guarantee a woman 
the best possible medical services. In 
the last trimester, when life theo-
retically could be sustained inde-
pendently of the woman, the state 
has more compelling interests in the 
well-being of both mother and child. 
Given the perceptible trends toward 
more libertarian interpretations of the 
rights of privacy in recent years, the 
court hardly could have ruled any 
other way on the abortion issue and 
maintained any consistency. Granted, 
• abortion is the worst possible means 
• of birth control. In an ideal society, 
there would be no unwanted preg-, 
a.. nancies. Owing to the efforts of family 
planning programs, there are fewer 
1 
tmwanted pregnancies today than ever 
before, but there stiU are too many, 
especially among teen-agers who lack 
even fundamental knowledge of how 
conception occurs. 
Millions of Americans do not believe 
in abortion at any stage of pregnancy. 
That is their right. Millions of other 
Americans do believe that women 
have the right to govern their own 
bodies to the extent of having a legal, 
safe abortion if they choose. Abortipn 
proponents recognize the special ag-
onies that can result from rape, in- I 
cest, or deformed fetuses. Aside from 
these special instances, they also 
know that no birth control method is 
guaranteed to be 100 per cent effec-
tive, and unwanted pregnancies also ' 
can ruin lives and marriages when 
the state exercises absolute control 
over the circumstances' under which 
abortions can be permitted. As in any 
other instance where the state at-
tempts to regulate morals, stringent 
anti-abortion laws merely drive abor-
tionists underground, where quacks 
and amateurs can maim and kill des-
perate women. 
The issue offers no middle ground 
for opinion. Some men, still clinging 
to outdated chauvinistic views of 
women's role in soeiety, feel that. men 
alone should have the ultimate deci-
sion on abortion laws. Yet men never 
experience unwanted pregnancies. 
This may permit them to consider the 
issue dispassionately, but it also leads 
them to cruel conclusions. Catholic 
Olurch leaders may call the high 
court's opinion an "unspeakable trage-
dy," but the Catholic injunction 
against abortion is of rather recent 
origin in a religion two thous~Q.4 
years old. While Catholic spokesmen'·"' 
horror at the decision can be unde 
stood, a majority of the high cou1 
properly recognized tha~ no religio 
has a constitutional license to force its 
beliefs upon others. 
The court's ruling does not compel 
any woman to have an abortion 
against her will. Neither does it pre-
vent any woman from having an abor-
tion under optimal medical conditions 
when she chooses. That decision now 
is hers alone to make. As long as a 
fetus, under the most conservative 
medical interpretation, cannot sustain 
its own life system, the continuation 
of a pregnancy is a medical concern. 
The high court was right in taking the 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Jakubovska, deputy general secretary 
of Poland's Society of Family , Plan-
ning. 
Another criticism is abortion's radi-
cal demographic and economic effects, 
an argument which has some validity. 
Almost overnight, abortion achieves-
and, as in the case of Romania, over-
achieves- population curbs. This is 
worrying such other countries.as Hun-
~ary and East Germany, where there 
are severe labor shortages and slow-
downs in the rural runoff. Since 1958, 
for example, Hungary has had a net re-
production rate (the key figure be-
cause it shows growth in terms of 
new-born girls) of below one. 
However, demographic experts warn 
against leaping to generalizations. Bel-
gium and Austria, with restrictive 
abortion laws, have about ti:J.e same 
birth rates as Hungary. And the Soviet 
Union, with legal ~Jbortion for social 
reasons, has a larger net growth rate 
than the United States. 
The third argument concerns t}le ef· 
fects on morality, pa~ticularly among 
young, unmarried girls. In this regard, 
the East European experience has 
shown that by far the l11rgest group of 
. abortion recipients are married·women 
with several children. Unwed mothers 
still make up a small portion of the 
total. 
'Dubious Doctors 
AS SEEN FROM Eastern Europe, ABORTION, From Page Bl switch is assumed to have been this abortion critics may actually have 
A th f t · th b t" 1 spring's opening of the border with Po-no er ac or m e a or 1on cu • overlooked their strongest argument, 
ture has been th~ large number of land, which put East German house- the medical one. 
k. ( tl 60 6 wives in easy reach of Polish clinics. wor mg women curren Y to 5 per Although doctors concede that legal-
cent in Hungary of those between 15 1' ed b rt·o h d th 1' f A Car or a Baby? z a o 1 n as save e 1ves o 
and 55). The !postwar policy of 'the hundreds of women who formerly died 
Communist regimes has been to draw THE RADICA~ SHIFT in abortion from careless, illegal midwifery out-
on women to increase the available policy in the 1950s probably is a side hospitals, 15 years' eX!perience 
labor pool. Though the original aim central factor in the changing East Eu- still has left many doctors, including 
was purely economic, there undoubt- ropean family, which is smaller than Communist ones, surprisingly dubious 
edly has been a social side-effect. ever and more likely to have a work- about the practice. They note growing 
Women have grown more reluctant to ing mother, if it has a mother present evidence that abortions do have an ef· 
leave their jobs to raise future genera- at all. Although the intr?duction pl. feet on the fertility of women and on 
tn.Joo ... :.··~,-,..,"". !'f w.Q~ , modern c::~ i=s.iive ~e ratio of premature and stillborn 
an df"'fl'li/t·~~~r.-.M*-~~·'''~......... , !dt ta ~ u ~gancj.el, par-
they would continue to work even if feet, demographers agree that it would ticularly when an abortion lias een 
they had the choice of staying home," have been much slower in happening if performed on a woman in her fir.st 
said the editor of a Budapest ladies' not for abortion. · · pregnancy. 
magazine. "When a woman works it The ability to terminate pregnancies Although the evidence is still fairly 
makes her feel equal in her marriage." also has altered attitudes toward fam· unrefined. and sometimes contt·adic-
Tragi-Comedy in Romania 
~E ABRUPT SWITCH in abor· 
J. tlon policy in the 1950s was clothed 
in Marxist ideology and rationalized in 
the framework of socialist emancipa-
tion of women. But abortion policies 
have actually been influenced less by 
ideology than by political climates and 
practical considerations. Most of the 
1950s liberalization occurred after ihe 
strict Stalinist period. It proved to be 
one of the most popular acts in that 
time of thaw. 
Similarly, it was not ideology but 
practicality that prompted Romania in 
1966 to go against the liberal trend. 
Shocked by the fact that abortions 
were virtually threatening to destroy 
its -work force within a couple of dec· 
ades, it implemented a tough anti-abor-
tion law almost overnight. Romanian 
authorities moved to curtail what mav 
have been a world record for abortions 
-1,115,000 in 1965 in a population of 
20 million and about four times the 
number of live births. 
The effects were tragi-comic. Within 
a year the birth rate tripled. Desperate 
Romanian women, who could find no 
modern contraceptives in their own 
stores, turned pleadingly to foreign 
visitors for help in obtaining them 
from abroad. 
It also was not ideology that caused 
the East Germans to wait until this 
year to enact abortion-on-request legis-
lation. East Germany did not partki· 
pate in the general liberalization be· 
cause of the population drain it suf-
fered until the closing of its borders in 
1961. Another factor in its recent 
,, .. 
ily and marriage. For many young cou- tory, it is strong enough for Dr. Egon 
ples, child-rearing seems less of a ra- Szabady, president of the demographic 
tionale for marriage than do conveni· .. , ·committee of the Hungarian Academy 
ence and economic realities. They see of Science, to state that there is a "sig-
abortion a~ a means of maintaining ris- nificant correlation" between prema-
ing living standards. This hesitance to ture births and the incidence of abor-
raise children was depicted in a Hun· tion. Since abQrtion was made availa-
garian cartoon that showed a couple ble in Hungary in 1956, the rate of pre-
standing in front of an automobile and mature births has doubled from 5 to 10 
pram and posed the question: "Which per cent. Dr. Szabady cautions that nu-
one?" merous factors may be responsible for 
That choice is perhaps more difficult 
than ever as people sense that a better 
material life is finally in sight. 
Women in particular seem reluctant 
to give up the fulfillment of careers 
for a child they do not want until 
later. 
The Moral Issue 
ALL THIS IS NOT to say that abor-tion does not have its problems 
and its critics in Eastern Europe. It 
has both, with the critics tending-to at-
tack abortion on three points. 
One, of course, is the moral issue 
that it takes life. A Belgrade doctor, 
who routinely certifies women for 
abortion but refuses to perform the op-
eration himself, describes the act as 
"genocide," just as many do in the 
United States. He is not a Catholic, 
and his revulsion seems to be shart!d 
by many East European doctors who 
spend much time removing embrvos 
from women. Some Catholic doctors 
refuse to perform abortions or to pre-
scribe modern contraceptives. 
But ,bY and large the moral issue 
seems to have evaporated in this part 
, of the world. "The moral discussion 
ended in the 1950s," says Mrs. Wanda 
this phenomenon, but he is convinced 
that free aborton is one of them. 
Tentative studies of women patients 
at the Academy of Medicine's Warsaw 
Clinic for Women's Disease tend to 
bear this out. According to Prof. Iren-
ousz Roszkowski, premature births run 
about 1 in 10 for women who had 
abortion before their first birth and 
about 7 in 10 for women who have 
had more than three abortions. The 
mortality rate for premature babies is 
also dramatic; the clinic's deaths 
among premature babies run 6.06 per 
cent for children of women with no 
abortions, and 21.05 per cent for women 
who have had one or more abortions. 
Though the correlation between in-
fertility and abortions so far ap~ears 
to lack definitive statistical proof in 
most of the countries, Dr. Dragomir 
Mladenovic, chief of the Belgrade 
Gynecological Clinic, is certain enough 
of a connection that he routinely tells 
prospective mothers that termination 
of their pregnancy could cause infer· 
tility. As an added incentive for them 
to keep their babies, he often sends 
them to visit an outpatient clinic 
where infertile women are receiving 
hormone and other treatment;. 
Polish planned parenthood people, 
meanwhile, claim there is a 1-in-10 
chance of infertility from an abortion 
in the first pregnancy. 
The method of abortion-suction or 
dilation and curetage-seems to make 
little difference. "Even with present 
medical techniques," Dr. Szabady of 
Budapest has written, "the operation 
cannot be regarded as a casual, prob-
lem-free thing. The widespread use of 
abortion as a means of birth control is 
unquestionably harmful." 
A Cautious Reassessnient 
STILL UNKNOWN is the long-range psychological impact of the opera-
tion on women. Joint American-Hun-
garian studies on this question are now 
under way, using women subjects who 
have had multiple abortions. Doctors 
say that most of their patients show 
signs of emotional relief, that there is 
no evidence that having an abortion 
has a worse mental impact than having 
an unwanted child. 
Yet a Yugoslav woman who had an 
abortion 10 years ago muses, "Every 
time I see a child who is 10 years old, I 
ask myself, 'What would mine be 
like'?' " 
Polish doctors particularly seem to 
have a horror of the very liberal law of 
New York State. "Is it true that abor-
tions are given in the fifth month of 
pregnancy and that some of the em-
bryos live?" asked one Warsaw physi-
cian. 
All this has resulted in a cautious 
reassessment. Given the state of social 
tensions, no government seems about 
to follow the Romanian example. How-
ever, as the screening process in Yugo-
slavia shows, efforts are being made to 
curtail abortions for young married 
women. Doctors such as Prof. Rosz-
kowski at Warsaw would like to elimi-
nate abortions in first pregnancies al-
together for health reasons, except for 
unmarried girls. Bulgaria already has 
such a regulation. And the draconi:ln 
Romanian 'law only allows abortions 
fu men over. 40_, for victims of rape 
or incest, and for medically imdan 
gered women. 
Theoretically, some kind of screen-
ing process exists everywhere, but 
often approval has been "virtually :m-
tomaUc." "We are moved by the tears 
of women," conceded a Yugoslav d'uc-
tor. 
Themselves to Blame 
TO THE EXTENT that education about contraceptives has been 
woefully neglected in Eastern Europe, 
the doctors now really have only them-
selves, and the somewhat backward 
state of Communist birth-control tech-
nology, to blame. · 
According to Hungarian studies, 20 
to 25 per cent of women there at most 
use modern contraceptives, and only 
The Import Problem 
BELGRADE-The liberal abor-. tion policies of Yugoslavia and 
t)le Communist bloc have had one 
undesired result: making the area 
seem a potential haven to West 
European and American women. 
Yugoslavia, with its open borders 
to the West, has been especially ap-
pealing. Foreign women are not en-
titled to an abortion on demand, 
but sometimes one is arranged 
through connections. 
Several years ago, an American 
woman and her husband arrived in 
Belgrade on a Yugoslav travel agen-
cy's package tour that included an 
abortion, a three-day stay in an A-
category hotel and round-trip plane 
fare for slightly more than $1,000. 
While thousands of Yugoslavs go 
to West Germany for jobs, the flow 
is the other way for abortions. 
A few months ago, a Belgrade 
hotel worker noticed an agitated 
West 'German female guest who 
about 10 per cent have been using the 
birth-control pill. About 60 per cent 
practice natural methods only. 
A university-educated couple in Yu-
goslavia recently recalled that they 
went 40 miles to their country doctor . 
to get a prescription for birth-control 
pills because they were unaware that 
prescriptions were issued free at Bel-
grade women's clinics. That episode 
made a local doctor shake his head in 
despair. 
Only recently has family planning 
begun to show results. Birth-control 
pill sales have climbed sharply in most 
of Eastern Europe in the past three 
years. Poland now manufactures its 
own, called Femigen. And the annual 
total of abortions in Poland has been 
cut to about half what it was in 1958. 
Nevertheless, there are probably few 
~if any women who would like to see 
their current range of choices abol-
ished, and few Communist politicidnS 
who would like to abolish them. 
Children and Jobs 
SOME WOMEN in Eastern Europe, . of course, .find they can have both 
their children and their work. One 
young Hungarian psychologist, for ex-
ample, drops her child off at her moth-
er's place Monday mornings and picks 
the child up again Friday nights. ln 
her world, the traditional roles of par· 
ents and grandparents have been re-
versed. 
Communist regimes are trying to en· 
courage this trend. Essentially, this 
has meant offering more services and 
money incentives for having babies. 
Joint Economic Committee 
said she was the wife of an impor-
tant industrialist. She had landed 
in Belgraae after trying in vain for 
an aoortion in Switzerland and 
Sp.ain. The family doctor was call-
ed in to give a certification to a 
local hospital. A few month's later 
the hotel worker received a grate-
ful note of thanks from the visitor 
tmd a kitchen mixing machine pro· 
,meed by her 'husband's firm. 
Yugoslav hospitals charge for-
eigners the equivalent of $50 for 
abortions. But they do not encour-
age foreigners to come. 
Similarly, Poland has made it 
difficult for foreign women to get 
abortions since a scandal involving 
a doctor's extortion ring in the port 
city of, Szczecin some years ago. 
Scandi11-avian women who came for 
cheap abortions were photographed 
and blackmailed, it was disclosed. 
The scandal was enough to warn 
away potential applicants. 
Although there is still a shortage of 
day care and nursery facilities all over 
Eastern Europe, the existing network 
is ·considerably more extensive than In 
many Western countries. For example, 
6 out of 10 Hungarian children be-
tween birth and school are in the cen-
ters, which are run by fa~tories or by 
precinct authorities. 
An even bigger push has occurred in 
offering financial incentives for child·· 
raising. Child allotments are the third 
biggest social welfare expense in Hun-
gary, after pensions and health insur-
ance. 
The allotments differ from the 
American system of tax reductions for 
dependents in that they are given in 
the form of straight cash handouts. In 
most of the countries, these allotments 
become significant only when a family 
has two or more children. For in-
stance, a three-child family in Hungary 
woula collect the equivalent J2i about 
$360 a year, and in Poland about $70. 
Maternity leave provisions are often 
more generous. Hungary provides five 
months' leave with pay and about 
$22.50 a month to mothers for the next 
31 months, with a guarantee that they 
can return to their jobs. Home leave 
with pay for mothers with sick chil· 
dren has also been increased in Po-
land, and Czechoslovakia has the most 
generous post-natal provisions of all: 
They provide all women with about 
$30 a month in cash for two years, 
whether or not the women stay home 
or go back to their jobs. 
Yugoslavia, as so often happens, 1s 
an exception; it offers mothers the 
chance to draw Western-style unem-
ployment compensation, but does not 
give child allotments except to very 
onor families. 
Although the abortion culture of 
Eastern Europe has not been an un-
qualified success-mainly because of 
the way it has inhibited introduction 
of safer, modern contraceptive meth-
ods-doctors and demographers do not 
call it a failure either. 
When Romania cracked down on abortions in 1966, its birth rate took off. 
"It seems difficult, if not impossible 
to find the ideal solution, and in the 
formulation of laws we should apply 
the basic principle of the lesser evil," 
Budapest's Dr. Szabady has written. 
"It's beyond doubt that the legalization 
of abortion prevents the considerable 
psychological, social and physical m-
jury which is produced by illegal abor· 
tions, though at the same time wide-
spread practice of abortion brings other 
ills into being. The lesson to be drawn 
is that the broad legalization of abor-
tion should be accompanied by propa-
gation of modern methods of contra· 
~eption." 
-~ --· .. 
